Thursday, February 06, 2025

What happens on Pullman Abstention

The Fourth Circuit abstained under Pullman from the dispute over the North Carolina Supreme Court election; the district court had abstained under Burford, which the court of appeals said was the right conclusion for the wrong doctrinal reason.

But the court's explanation of the difference in coverage and effects seems off. Pullman is appropriate because unclear state laws may moot a federal constitutional claim. True enough. But Pullman differs from Burford in that Pullman requires the federal court to retain jurisdiction should state litigation not moot the federal issues. Under Burford, the district court dismisses because the dispute will be resolved in the state's complex remedial system (the reason for abstaining in the first place) and the case will not return to the district court. The court ordered the district court to retain jurisdiction over the federal issues, citing England.

The court relied on long-standing precedent for this, but it seems wrong. Pullman should require dismissal of the action to allow the parties to fully litigate state issues through the state judiciary. The case may return to federal court, but it does so as a new lawsuit. England does not address the court retaining jurisdiction. It allows the plaintiff to "reserve" the federal issues in state court, thereby avoiding claim preclusion upon possible return to federal court with the new purely federal action.

Retaining jurisdiction following Pullman abstention also destroys the distinctions with certification. Certification was a more expedient alternative (a "more precise tool," as Justice Sotomayor put it) because: 1) it went straight to the state's highest court and 2) the federal court otherwise retained the action pending resolution of the state questions. The Fourth Circuit's approach destroys one of those two distinctions.

Not the biggest deal given everything else being litigated in federal courts (more on that later). But a notable example of how lower courts go in strange directions.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 6, 2025 at 10:48 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 28, 2025

303 Creative, Exclusive Private Enforcement, and Blue State Revenge

My latest with Rocky Rhodes, in the Journal of Legislation. We argue that a Blue State wanting to create a real counterpart to S.B. 8 and its copycats should enact an exclusively privately enforced public accommodations law, targeting the First Amendment opt-out recognized in 303 Creative.

Abstract after the jump.

Red states have made exclusive private enforcement schemes targeting locally unpopular but constitutionally protected conduct a cornerstone of culture-war legal strategy. Laws such the Texas Heartbeat Act (“S.B. 8”) in 2021 and anti-“WOKE” laws forego public enforcement in favor of private enforcement; this forces targeted federal rights-holders to vindicate their rights by raising the law’s constitutional invalidity as a defense to liability rather than through pre-enforcement offensive litigation against the government or government officials responsible for enforcing the law. This threatens rights-holders with a wave of costly and burdensome litigation and liability.

Blue states and liberal scholars and advocates have sought a progressive counterpart targeting a favored conservative right. This Article finds that counterpart in 303 Creative v. Elenis (2023), in which the Supreme Court recognized a (not clearly defined) First Amendment right for expressive businesses to decline to provide expressive goods and services related to same-sex marriage and not to be compelled to express messages violating their religious, political, or ideological beliefs. The decision angered liberals, who criticized the “fake case” and “legal performance art” that produced the decision, and delighted conservatives, who had long sought recognition of such a First Amendment right. We hypothesize a Blue state enacting the Discrimination Is Not Expression Act, a public-accommodations law prohibiting such First Amendment opt-outs and compelling all businesses to provide all services, including expressive ones. By removing any public enforcement mechanism and relying on exclusive private enforcement, this law places business owners seeking to exercise a conservative-favored federal right in the same bind that S.B. 8 placed abortion providers and patients seeking to exercise a liberal-favored right.

This paper, the fifth in a series on the procedure of exclusive private enforcement, details this privately enforced public-accommodations law as a response to 303 Creative. It explores how the law offers Blue states “revenge” for S.B. 8 and other anti-abortion laws by burdening a conservative-favored right; how it might fare in constitutional litigation of any posture; how it exposes procedural inconsistency in the face of substantive preferences; and why the prospect of this law might cause both sides of the spectrum to abandon private-enforcement schemes and the burdens they impose.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 28, 2025 at 02:26 PM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, January 26, 2025

Craven, cowardly, and clueless

Republicans in the Idaho legislature are pursuing a resolution urging SCOTUS to overrule Obergefell. The exercise is performative bullshit. SCOTUS resolves lawsuits, not requests from random people to do things. The article quotes Tobais Wolff (Penn) as saying "the Supreme Court will no more respond to a letter from the Idaho Legislature than they would a letter from me." It also quotes one legislator emphasizing the need to make a statement about protecting rights.

The clueless part is that the legislators could make a statement that would have actual legal effect: Pass a law limiting marriage to one man and one woman (presumably a new version would specify cis-man and cis-woman) and set up a lawsuit by a couple denied a license; then they can marshall their legal brilliance to argue to the Court why it should overrule its precedent. They cannot claim a belief in judicial supremacy; the proposed resolution begins "[s]ince court rulings are not laws and only legislatures elected by the people may pass laws." Such a view of the balance between the judicial and legislative powers suggests the legislature can (and should) pass a law reflecting the views of the people of Idaho and let the legal controversy play out.

The answer is the cowardly part. They do not want the political blowback to enacting a law contradicting SCOTUS precedent. They likely fear being lumped with Massive Resistance and the authors of the Southern Manifesto--who, to their (limited) credit, offered a procedurally and substantively coherent vision of constitutional judicial review. They also likely fear the hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees they will pay for litigating two guaranteed losses in the lower courts and a likely loss in SCOTUS (which I do not believe is so anxious to overrule Obergefell, as opposed to limiting its application). But these people will not put their money or their power where their mouths are.

And so we get the craven part--a legally, procedurally, and practically meaningless performative gesture.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 26, 2025 at 11:39 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 24, 2025

Nazi jokes and Nazi salutes

I have no real use for the ADL and less for Jonathan Greenblatt. I have long believed they see antisemitism lurking around every corner, often in a way the conflicts with my views on First Amendment protection for hate speech. So I am not the group's target audience. And October 7 produced a genuine uptick in antisemitic speech and incidents, so I began to see a bit of the group's point.

But Greenblatt and the group's response to Elon Musk's adventures destroys any credibility. First, it was a Nazi salute; it did not just "appear to be," as so many outlets (including The Forward) described it. And it was made on stage at an inaugural even by a person with an office in the West Wing and the ear of the new President. Minimizing it as "an awkward gesture in a moment of enthusiasm" is absurd. Greenblatt exacerbated the problem by condescendingly telling everyone who disagrees with him (those who are "on edge") to chill out by "giv[ing] one another a bit of grace, perhaps even the benefit of the doubt, and take a breath" and "hop[ing] for healing and work[ing] toward unity in the months and years ahead." As if Musk and the president he supports are not expressly targeting those they do no like. Demanding that one side give the benefit of the doubt and work toward unity--while the other runs roughshod--is offensive nonsense.

Greenblatt made himself look worse by chastising Musk over bad puns about Nazi leaders, taking umbrage about the Holocaust as a unique event that should never be joked about. (Maybe have a word with Mel Brooks?). One might see this as attempted compensation--chastising the joke to overcome the criticism for his response to the salute. But I think Greenblatt sincerely sees the latter as worse than the former. And that reflects bizarre priorities--an online joke deserves strident condemnation but a political speech celebrating a president set to pursue some problematic policies is no big deal. Of course, it is consistent with the view that the pro-Palestinian shouts of an Oberlin student represent an existential threat to Jews but government policy that harms Jewish interests is no big deal.

To be clear, both of Musk's actions warrant condemnation. And both are constitutionally protected, so nothing (besides cementing my negative opinion about him) should befall Musk. Greenblatt's disparate treatment reflects more about the ADL than it does on Musk's character. That is sad.

Update: From Jodi Rudoren at the Forward. She makes a point I considered after posting--the subsequent jokes should lend some "context" to the salute, strengthening the view that it carried an antisemitic message. Also, Greenblatt's quotations are moronic--"we don't know anything, but I can say it was not a Nazi salute."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 24, 2025 at 03:48 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, January 18, 2025

Settlement and New York Times v. Sullivan

It is not news that at least three members of SCOTUS (Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch) have shown some desire to at least revisit New York Times v. Sullivan. I have been sanguine, and perhaps Pollyanna-ish, in believing there are not two more votes to undo the Court's first-and-strongest act of protecting free speech. But news reports that Paramount wants to settle Trump's suit against CBS over supposedly deceptive editing of 60 Minutes' Kamala Harris interview*--hot on the heals of Disney settling the suit against George Stephanopoulous over saying Trump had been found liable for rape--suggests the regime collapsing in a different respect.

[*] Purportedly because Paramount worries--and may have been told by told as much by incoming FCC Chair Brendan Carr--that the FCC will resist a proposed merger with Skydance Media and that Paramount must make concessions to Trump and his administration.

Prior to the 1960s, the Times' refused to settle defamation acti0ns. Adolph Ochs regarded settlement as "tribute" and would spend money only for litigation. By the early 1960s, $300 million in potential defamation liability to Southern officials (including $ 3 million against the Times for "Heed Our Rising Voices") rendered that strategy unworkable. That partly explains the Times taking Sullivan's case to SCOTUS as a First Amendment issue--it needed the decision to stop the organized strategy of extortionate litigation as a legal weapon to silence the media.**

[**] The rise and demand for anti-SLAPP statutes reflects the view that speakers need protection against not only liability but the cost of litigation itself, where plaintiffs seek to use the judicial process as the punishment.

We have returned to extortionate litigation but against a more compliant, and compromised, media ownership. And as bad as the Disney/Stephanopoulos case was, the Paramount/60 Minutes case is worse. The district court in Stephanopoulos had denied a motion to dismiss and there was at least a plausible claim that Stephanopoulos was not substantially truthful (and knew as much) when he repeatedly said Trump had been found liable for rape (rather than sexual abuse). Paramount wants to settle before the case even gets that far. And their case is absurd--Trump cannot identify any way in which 60 Minutes editing the interview  injures Trump in a legally cognizable way such that, however deceptive, it loses constitutional protection. But Paramount has no interest in fighting for free speech where it conflicts with its business interests. A settlement in this case arguably extends beyond extortion to something like bribery--Paramount would give Trump tribute in exchange for the merge despite facing no real risk of legal jeopardy.

This post provides an opportunity to promote two pieces of scholarship: Samantha Barbas' Actual Malice: Civil Rights and Freedom of the Press in New York Times v. Sullivan, which uses the Times' internal files to explore the case as one about civil rights, and Thomas Healy's review of the book in Michigan Law Review.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 18, 2025 at 11:36 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 17, 2025

Polarization, and what to do about it

This is the third post in the series from Chad Oldfather on his book, Judges, Judging, and Judgment.

                In my last post I outlined the diagnostic portions of Judges, Judging, and Judgment (use code JJJ2024 for a discount). The problem, as I see it, is not just polarization, but that many of the mechanisms that have traditionally served to channel judicial behavior toward adherence to law (again, however we might conceive of that) have weakened. The result is more space for the operation of the sorts of influences—usually imagined as raw politics--that we’d prefer to shield against.

                So what do we do about it?

                One answer is methodological. Proponents of textualism and originalism claim that both have the virtue of pointing judges toward a fixed target, and that by deeming certain sorts of evidence and arguments to be presumptively out of bounds they can prevent judges from, as the claim is often formulated, doing whatever they want. (There are other arguments as well, but I’ll pass over those here.)

                But of course, language can never fully specify how it applies in all situations. Original understanding, even when it can be discerned, will likewise be incomplete. Usually figuring out what the text means, or what the original understanding was, involves the application of professional judgment. There’s an additional step—which also entails the exercise of judgment—required to get from whatever it is that the text or the original understanding might yield to a conclusion about how that should be applied in each case. Sophisticated proponents of these methodologies acknowledge this.

                There are at least two problems. One is that the larger discourse about judicial methodology glosses over the need for judgment. Adherents present the process as algorithmic. “We” are constrained; “they” are just making it all up. This feeds into a dominant cultural taste for the tangible and quantifiable. Ours is a world that craves metrics and distrusts expertise. “I know it when I see it” is an epithet, and our culture sweeps aside notions such as Michael Polanyi’s “we know more than we can tell,” Wittgenstein’s “imponderable evidence,” and Karl Llewllyn’s “situation sense.” Yet I think we all, in our daily lives, have experience to the contrary. Over the course of my half-century plus on this planet I’ve met people whose instincts, judgment, and situational feel I rate very highly, and those for whom the opposite holds. My sense is that those assessments are not unique to me, and that my peers in the relevant context would generally agree on who it is they’d consult in difficult situations. The correlation of these assesments with raw intellectual power, the possession of abstract knowledge, or the holding of any sort of political views is well short of perfect.

                The second problem is that, as Richard Fallon among others (including me) has demonstrated, courts’ use of these methodologies is often opportunistic. This could be a product of pure ideological motivation, though I tend not to believe that that’s what judges or justices understand themselves to be doing. More likely it’s a manifestation of bounded rationality and the fact that motivated reasoning is a powerful drug. Perhaps the judges and justices would say that in their best judgment the ordinary tools of originalism, say, weren’t the best tools for this specific job. Judgment, as I emphasize throughout Judges, Judging, and Judgment, is inescapable, and judicial behavior, if not judicial rhetoric, demonstrates as much.

                What we need, then, is to prioritize and praise the exercise of good judgment. Saying that, of course, leads me straight into the sorts of objections one can expect in a world that privileges the tangible and quantifiable. If I can’t precisely define it, if it can’t be measured, it must not be real. “This person has good judgment” will become just another way of saying “this person is likely to reach conclusions I prefer.”

                That’s a risk, no doubt. But I don’t think it’s impossible for us to reach consensus on characteristics we want judges to exhibit. I’d suggest that dispassion is a component of good judgment, and that whatever the rule of law means it certainly means that my side doesn’t always win, even in the most difficult and most politically charged cases. There are others where we might disagree. In my view good judgment involves—and in this respect my book might as well be called Son of The Lost Lawyer—the exercise of practical wisdom, including at its core recognition of the idea that the law exists to serve multiple and often-conflicting social ends rather than to seek perfect compliance with some abstract, theoretical ideal. It also involves, for something that early experience suggests is a tough sell amongst the law professor community, the cultivation and exercise of intellectual humility. But here I stand with Cardinal Lawrence, Ralph Fiennes’s character in the movie Conclave: “the one sin I have come to fear more than any other is certainty. Certainty is the great enemy of unity. Certainty is the deadly enemy of tolerance.” Much better, in my view, to constantly ask ourselves the question “what if I’m wrong”?

                There’s much more to say, of course, including a dive into a growing body of interdisciplinary research into the nature and effects of epistemological humility, both in general and with respect to the judicial role. I’ll refer you to the book for that, and I hope you’ll check it out. I’ll be back here with a couple more posts less directly related to the book next week.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 17, 2025 at 10:49 AM in Books, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, January 16, 2025

Polarization, but not just polarization

This is the second installment of Chad Oldfather's series of posts on his new book, Judges, Judging, and Judgment.

                As I mentioned in my first post, Judges, Judging, and Judgment (out today!) arose generally out work I’ve been doing for the entirety of my time in legal academia, and more directly out of materials I developed and continually refined for the Judging and the Judicial Process course I’ve consistently taught for over fifteen years. What resulted is thus very much a work of synthesis, a weaving together of strands of in law, philosophy, political science, and psychology in an effort to tease out what ails us.

                It’s plain that we live in a polarized world. It’s nearly as plain that polarization has affected the workings of the judiciary. We’re all Realists now, as the saying has it, and as such are sensitized to the ways in which things other than law, however we define it, can influence decision-making. The Realists led to the Crits and the attitudinalists and in turn to the suggestion that there are Obama judges and Trump judges, all of which is nowadays mostly greeted with a shrug. Chief Justice Roberts of course resisted the suggestion, but I’ve heard federal judges openly acknowledge its truth, including as recently as last week at the AALS annual meeting. Quantitative empirical research supports the claim, and research into cognitive biases and our blindness to them, including especially motivated reasoning, describes the likely mechanism.

                We’ve mostly been taught to believe these realizations are of relatively recent vintage, that until the Realists arrived everyone believed in some form of mechanical jurisprudence. Brian Tamanaha has shown that story to be inaccurate when it comes to the beliefs of those operating within the system. What’s more, the very design of the judicial system likewise suggests that our legal culture has long been mindful of the sway of non-legal influences. Features like the adversarial process, the expectation that decisions will be justified in written opinions, the doctrine of precedent, and the existence of multi-member courts all have historically served to minimize the influence of sloppy and biased thinking. There are external forces as well, things like ethics codes, selection processes, and media coverage. Perhaps most powerful of all are shared norms, tacit understandings of how things are done.

                What’s often overlooked, largely because the erosion has been so gradual, is that the influence of these mechanisms, their ability to channel judicial behavior, has weakened. An earlier generation of scholars and judges decried the delegation of opinion-writing to clerks, the heavy reliance on non-precedential opinions, the vanishing trial, and the bureaucratization of judging. Today they’re largely accepted as just the way things are. Media coverage of the courts once devoted space to description of the competing arguments but tends now almost exclusively to rely on reductionist characterizations of judges as liberal or conservative. Judicial selection has become an overtly partisan affair, and ethical norms appear to hold little sway over the justices on the highest court in the land.

                Meanwhile the profession, reflecting society more generally, has become polarized. To my mind one of the more important books of the last quarter-century is Neil Devins and Larry Baum’s The Company They Keep: How Partisan Divisions Came to the Supreme Court. Their central point is that the justices, like people generally, are significantly influenced by their salient personal audiences. We shape our behavior to meet the expectations of those whose approval we value. For judges, or at least many of them, the salient personal audience is no longer “the legal profession,” but rather an ideologically inflected subset of it. Shared norms serve as a form of dark matter, with a gravitational pull that invisibly influences behavior. When those norms are no longer shared, or when their violation is overlooked in service of expediency, that source of discipline also erodes. Criticism from those on “the other side” can be dismissed as just another partisan gripe.

                The first two-thirds or so of Judges, Judging, and Judgment, the diagnostic portion, explores all of this. It attempts to survey the landscape in a manner that is both comprehensive and concise (and suitable for use in the classroom!). The last third attempts, much more tentatively, to tackle what we might do about it. More on that tomorrow.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 16, 2025 at 10:36 AM in Books, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, January 13, 2025

Can Donald Trump block people on Twitter?

I taught Lindke v. Freed in Civil Rights today and I genuinely do not know the answer. But I think it is yes, he can--Knight Foundation v. Trump comes out the other way under Lindke.

Step One of the analysis requires that the official exercise government-provided authority to speak for the government in that forum, derived from some statute or other source of law. The President has the power to speak to the public and what he says may reflect official policy. But no statute or constitutional provision obligates him to do so, certainly not on Twitter. And the fact that he uses Twitter to repeat things that the government announces more formally elsewhere (e.g., an executive order) does not make the social-media page the formal government mechanism.

It is unfortunate that the government used a case about a government employee (Lindke was city manage) to address this question rather than a case involving elected officials who are expected (as a matter of representative democracy) to speak to the public about the business of government but are not required by law to do so.

Curious to hear what others think. What's that definition of insanity everyone uses?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 13, 2025 at 02:42 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Pleading as press release, performative litigation, and good guys v. bad guys

I read Steve's article in conjunction with this post from David Schraub discussing the suit against the congressmen and complaint against Haverford College. The district court dismissed Haverford because the complaint spent 129 pages railing about anti-Semitism and political disagreements over Israel/Gaza but did not allege any facts showing any violations of any laws by Haverford injuring Haverford students. David criticizes the lawsuit as a "form of press release -- a ritualized airing of grievance trying to drape itself in the seriousness of a lawsuit -- strike me as intolerably obnoxious and abusive." Meanwhile, Steve's article reveals why the suit against the legislators is doomed and that the lawyers have no clue what they are doing--there is no "it's really unconstitutional" exception to Speech or Debate.

I want to drill down on this because a range of ideas are floating here.

Beth Thornburg coined the term "pleading as press release" years ago. She used it (and I teach it in class) to refer to the portions of an otherwise arguable claim meant for public consumption, that promote someone or something apart from the lawsuit. In other words, extra material thrown into the complaint for the public to see. For example, a lawsuit several years ago against a Nike store over a shopping-while-Black incident includes pages and pages of statistics and stories about George Floyd, the 2020 protests, and the problem of shopping-while-Black. Or Jameis Winston's answer to the lawsuit by the FSU student he allegedly sexually assaulted includes sixteen pages not conforming to the required structure of pleadings or responding to the allegations in the complaint (the usual point of an answer) calling the plaintiff a lying slut. This practice likely existed for years, although increased (if not improved) coverage of courts increases the likelihood of such add-ons.

We should distinguish this from "performative litigation," in which the entire lawsuit is a performance without regard to success. The lawsuit seeks to draw public attention to a cause (e.g., Gaza), to the plaintiff (making Trump or Musk look like tough-guy heroes for their fanboys), or to both. It seeks to garner support for an issue, rally the troops, or something else. The over-the-top complaint is part-and-parcel of that--performance requires an audience and attention, both of which come with a long complaint filled with hyperbole and rhetoric. But you can have a press-release pleading in a meritorious lawsuit. Alternatively, the desire to perform can overwhelm that meritorious claim (David argues this happened in Haverford, where attorneys buried allegations suggesting a meritorious claim "inside such an amalgam of irrelevant ranting").

David and Steve raise shared-but-opposite questions about the relative responsibility for this problem between parties and attorneys. The plaintiffs in the Gaza case have made public statements celebrating the lawsuit as a way to shine a spotlight on the U.S. role in Gaza and to rally public support for their cause; Steve blames the attorneys for ignoring their essential role of advising and guiding their clients to as to the limits of what courts can do. The attorneys in the Haverford case failed in their duty by sacrificing the potential merits of their clients' claims to their desire to play "soapbox orator" (and, I would add, filing a 129-page complaint, regardless of the content). Update: Note that this potential divide between lawyers pursuing a cause and their clients is as old as constitutional litigation, as Derrick Bell described. But Bell described a divide over remedies--integration versus best educational opportunities. A departure over how much rhetorical hyperbole to include in the complaint seems like a different in kind.

These issues arise, although draw less discussion, in the lawsuits alleging violations of due process and the public-trust doctrine because of climate change. These lawsuits fail, usually on standing. But many attorneys, activists, and academics cheer these lawsuits even as they fail; they argue in similar terms--legal losses draw attention to the cause and perhaps prompt changes in conduct or action by other parts of the government. Climate activists also view themselves as the NAACP in the mid-1940s; I think the Gaza plaintiffs see themselves the same way.* Still, it would be interesting to see how climate activists and Musk fans or Gaza activists would distinguish their lawsuits from the others'.

[*] Interesting Rule 11 question Steve and I kicked around: The complaint does not acknowledge the uncharted territory it enters as to Speech or Debate and as to Flast standing. Should plaintiffs acknowledge in the complaint when they seek an extension or change in the law? Or is it enough to plead the case, ready to defend the good-faith extension in response to a Rule 11 motion. I lean towards the latter, although I see the benefit to getting ahead of it in the pleading. The fact these plaintiffs did not do that may suggest they do not realize how far on a limb they go.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 13, 2025 at 02:00 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 31, 2024

Roberts to Court critics: Be nice, be truthful, and listen to what we say

Forgive the snark, but that is the best summary of the 2024 Year End Report on the Federal Judiciary. Roberts begins with the usual historical lecture, this one on judicial independence from 1761-Present. He goes from George III interfering with colonial judges through the Declaration complaining about that interference through the Convention and The Federalist establishing life tenure through Marbury and into modern times, framing judicial independence as a necessary concomitant of judicial review. He identifies four threats to judicial review: 1) Violence; 2) Intimidation; 3) Disinformation; and 4) Threats to defy judgments.

One problem is that his framing of "intimidation" is so capacious as to cover most constitutionally protected criticism of judges and judicial decisions. Intimidation includes: disappointed litigants urging online followers to send messages to the judge; disappointed litigants claiming the judge was biased against them for various reasons; doxing of judges leading to people protesting judges at home and in public; and suggesting political bias in rulings "without a credible basis for such allegations." He finishes with this: "Public officials certainly have a right to criticize the work of the judiciary, but they should be mindful that intemperance in their statements when it comes to judges may prompt dangerous reactions by others." He segues into disinformation disconnected from intimidation, such as "distortion" of the factual or legal basis for a decision, which "can undermine confidence in the court system."

Criticism of the courts must be, as my title suggests, nice, polite, and truthful--otherwise it constitutes improper intimidation and a threat to judicial independence. Never mind that public debate may (and should) include "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Never mind that all speech directed at all people "may" cause bad people to do bad things--that cannot be the basis for silencing criticism of public officials. Never mind that Roberts does not--and cannot--explain who decides what criticisms are accurate or inaccurate and when there is sufficient basis for a charge of political bias or when a criticism crosses into "distortion." Absent any basis for measure, the answer must be "do not criticize the courts" lest that criticism become illegitimate--and dangerous-- intimidation. As with "I believe in free speech, but . . ." the but in "you can criticize the courts, but . . ." subsumes everything before it. And gives the rhetorical game away.

Roberts also uncorks this: "Our branch is peculiarly ill-suited to combat this problem, because judges typically speak only through their decisions. We do not call press conferences or generally issue rebuttals." This is a long-standing--and patently false--trope. In 2024 alone, Justice Alito, Judge Jones, Judge Duncan, and others showed that they enjoy many outlets and opportunities--including friendly press outlets--through which to issue rebuttals.

To his credit, Roberts frames the disobedience point in the right way. He does not target the Southern Manifesto as defiance of Brown itself. He focuses (properly) on lower courts' decisions post-Brown/based on Brown to integrate other schools, specific instances of governors defying those specific lower-court orders, and Eisenhower and Kennedy enforcing those lower-court orders.

Finally, Roberts pays single-paragraph lip service to the courts' responsibility for maintaining their own legitimacy--stay in their constitutionally assigned lanes, respect standing limits, and respect coordinate branches. He expresses "confiden[ce]" that judges will "faithfully discharge their duties." Put aside the conspicuous absence of any acknowledgement or awareness of the Court's ethical problems. And put aside the conservative realignment to loosen standing and expand the scope of the Court's lane, a realignmentn in which Roberts has played a role. It does not matter whether judges faithfully discharge their duties; for Roberts, any suggestion that any judge did not do so is improper intimidation and disinformation.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 31, 2024 at 10:41 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, December 13, 2024

Hypocrisy and question-begging on standing

A few days late on this: Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) dissented from denial of cert in Parents Protecting Our Children v. Eau Claire Area Sch. Dist., where lower courts found a group of anti-trans parents lacked standing to challenge trans-supportive policies. The lower courts relied on Clapper; Clapper's author, Alito, was not having it. He finished with this:

I am concerned that some federal courts are succumbing to the temptation to use the doctrine of Article III standing as a way of avoiding some particularly contentious constitutional questions. While it is important that federal courts heed the limits of their constitutional authority, it is equally important that they carry out their “ virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them. ” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976).

Alito seems to want to single-handedly prove the point that conservative justices are abandoning standing now that conservative litigants are challenging liberal policies. This is of a piece with his dissents in Murthy (the jaw-boning case) or California v. Texas (standing to challenge an unenforceable law). He was not worried about courts avoiding such contentious constitutional questions as the validity of a federal law authorizing warrantless searches. Richard Re argues that the Court is, so far, holding the line on standing. Not so Alito.

Note the question-begging dishonesty in that last sentence. The "virtually unflagging obligation" goes to abstention--when to decline exercise jurisdiction granted. Standing (for better or worse) goes to whether jurisdiction has been granted. And it should not affect how the Court understands the scope of jurisdiction--courts do not expand their interpretation of standing (and thus jurisdiction) because of the virtually unflagging obligation.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 13, 2024 at 01:43 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, November 22, 2024

Norberg on the InfoWars/Onion Bankruptcy Controversy

I asked my colleague Scott Norberg, a bankruptcy expert and a member of the BK Rules Advisory Committee, for his thoughts on the InfoWars/Onion Bankruptcy controversy. (TL:DR -- The Onion bought InfoWars in the bankruptcy auction in a bid supported by the Newtown-parent creditors; InfoWars, the State of Texas, and a bunch of right-wing people are objecting in typically performative terms). Scott's comments after the jump.

The Onion’s bid is the best one for the estate, superior to First Union’s.  The trustee’s job is to maximize the proceeds from the sale of assets for the benefit of the unsecured creditors and he’s the expert in doing that.  (Indeed, his payment in the case is based on a percentage of the monies generated by the sale of assets.)  Further, the fact that the major creditors support the Onion bid validates the trustee’s assessment of the competing bids.  After all, he is liquidating the estate on their behalf.  I see the bankruptcy judge’s expressed concern about transparency, but the potential for some creativity in the bid packages was probably inherent in the secret written bid procedures and the fact that the sale of assets was not conducted by live auction.  Jones’s and First United’s allegations of collusion seem way overblown if not desperate.  Jones’s history of playing fast and loose with the legal system leaves him with little credibility.  That said, you know what they say about keeping of with the Joneses. . . . Ultimately, the bankruptcy judge’s decision regarding the better bid is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.  The appearance by the Texas Comptroller seems heavy-handed and political.  It will be interesting to see what they have to say at the hearing, or if they are even permitted to speak – not sure that they would be considered a party in interest.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on November 22, 2024 at 11:25 AM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 22, 2024

Attorney courage and state interference

More on the controversy over the Florida Department of Health efforts to stop tv stations from airing ads supporting an reproductive-freedom constitutional amendment: John Wilson--the attorney who drafted letters threatening tv stations with civil and criminal nuisance actions, was named as defendant in the EpY action, and loudly quit his job--filed an affidavit with the district court (presumably in support of a motion to dismiss) saying: 1) people in Governor DeSantis' office drafted the letters and ordered Wilson to send them under his name and department; 2) people in DeSantis' office ordered Wilson to enter contracts with outside counsel; and 3) Wilson resigned a week later rather than send a second round of letters.

As to ## 1 and 2: It is not surprising that DeSantis is behind these efforts or that he tried to launder those efforts behind Public Health. Nor do I imagine there is more fallout, other than perhaps to get DeSantis and his aides added to the suit.

As to # 3: There is a nice PR question as to how much to praise Wilson. Usually the "I'm drawing a line" involves someone willing to do X but not Y--"I'll decline to report this wrongdoing, but I won't forge documents to hide it." Here, Wilson's "line" was I will do X once but not twice. What changed--why did his conscience not stop him from attaching his name and sending letters on October 3 but stopped him from doing the identical thing with identical letters on October 10? In what way could the wrongfulness of those letters become apparent in those seven days?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 22, 2024 at 10:36 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, October 18, 2024

More free speech in Free Florida

Things move fast when the Free State of Florida decides to show its true censorious colors. Following that absurd letter threatening TV stations with liability if they ran the "Caroline" ad supporting passage of an abortion-rights constitutional amendment, documents revealed that the state retained two law firms for possible litigation. On Wednesday, the Floridians Protecting Freedom, sponsor of the ballot initiative and the ad, brought a § 1983/EpY action against the surgeon general and the general counsel of the department of health (the author of the letter). On Thursday, the court granted a TRO enjoining the SG from taking further actions to stop people from running the ad. Also on Thursday, reports leaked that the attorney, John Wilson, quit, saying "A man is nothing without his conscience. It has become clear in recent days that I cannot join you on the road that lies before the agency." Of course that burst of conscience 1) came after he wrote the letters and 2) did not stop him from getting sued.

Some thoughts on the suit and the decision:

• The First Amendment violation here is so obvious as to be funny. In his Murthy dissent, Justice Alito complained that the comparative outcomes in Murthy (finding no standing) and Vullo (finding a plausible violation) showed "[i]f a coercive campaign is carried out with
enough sophistication, it may get by. That is not a message this Court should send." Ron DeSantis and his cronies do nothing with subtlety or sophistication.

• The case has an interesting standing wrinkle. The state directed the challenged letter to the tv stations, but the ad sponsors filed suit and sought the injunction. The plaintiffs offered two theories of standing: 1) although sent to the tv stations, the letter threatened action against everyone involved with the ad and 2) one station stopped running the ad. The court adopted the first theory and did not reach the second.

    Is that right? The letter expressed views about the unlawfulness of running the ad. But can a threat referencing wrongdoing and intent to prosecute directed to specific people create an imminent threat of enforcement against everyone not named in that letter who may engage in related-but-different conduct? In other words, the letter expresses intent to come after one tv station but standing seems clear for another tv station that might run the ad. But the ad sponsor is differently situated.

    I also wonder if the court adopted that theory to avoid a Clapper/chain-of-inferences problem, in that the injury to the plaintiff depends on the action of the tv stations, not the action of the defendant government officials. The chain here is much shorter, so it should not be a problem. Or maybe the court was worried about Murthy and the possibility that the station would have declined the ad without

• Naturally, the court creates scope-of-injunction problems. The injunction enjoins the SG from "taking any further actions to coerce, threaten, or intimate repercussions directly or indirectly to television stations, broadcasters, or other parties for airing Plaintiff’s speech, or undertaking enforcement action against Plaintiff for running political advertisements or engaging in other speech protected under the First Amendment."

    The problem goes to whether the remedy must match the theory of standing (or the theory of the constitutional violation). The court accepted the theory that the letter threatened FPF with prosecution, an injury remedied by an injunction prohibiting the state from pursuing enforcement actions against FPF over the ad. An injunction stopping the state from threatening or acting against the tv stations remedies a very different injury to FPF, not one the court considered or found.

• The ad features a woman with terminal brain cancer who sought a 20-week abortion that would have allowed her to receive life-extending (not live-saving) treatment that would give her more time with her husband and extant child; it claims she could not terminate that pregnancy under current law, while the state (in the letter Wilson wrote and sent before discovering his conscience) insists she could lawfully obtain an abortion in that circumstance. What is "true" or "false" in questions of legal interpretation and legal meaning and how can a legal argument be false--if I interpret the law differently from the SG, am I "lying?" Does the statement become true if, even if a doctor could not be convicted for performing that abortion, some crazy prosecutor might try or no doctor will take the risk of performing the procedure, forcing the woman to leave the state? To paraphrase Henry Monaghan, if such a technical legal question qualifies "as a 'fact,' it is nevertheless a very different kind of fact from the bigness of Cyrano's nose."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 18, 2024 at 11:52 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 17, 2024

Limits of private enforcement in a mixed scheme

In our taxonomy of private enforcement, Rocky and I focused on when the scheme leaves open private-enforcement options. But we neglected to consider a distinct feature--when the public piece limits the private piece. That is, a statutory scheme limits the situations in which public enforcement gives way to private.

And thus ends the saga of Masterpiece Cakeshop and Autumn Scardina, the trans activist who ordered and was refused a cake to celebrate the anniversary of her transition. I wrote previously about the case, but in brief: The Civil Rights Commission found probable cause of a violation of state antidiscrimination law and instituted proceedings; Phillips filed a federal action to enjoin the Commission from proceeding; the federal court refused to abstain under Younger (citing the bad-faith and harassment exceptions); the Commission voluntarily dismissed. Scardina brought a civil action and won in the trial court and court of appeals, both courts rejecting Masterpiece's

A divided Colorado Supreme Court reversed on procedural grounds. The private right of action does not stand alone. A complainant must pursue and exhaust the administrative process. Subject to several limited off-ramps to the process involving the commission's failure to act, the complainant must follow that process to the end, including by appeal into the state judiciary. The commission's resolution of Scardina's complaint--unilateral dismissal following a finding of probable cause--does not satisfy any of those off-ramps. Scardina instead was required to appeal the commission dismissal to the Colorado Court of Appeals.

So consider this a fifth category of private-enforcement scheme--mixed, with a preference for (at least initial) public administrative adjudication. That somewhat limits the scope of private enforcement.

We avoid that problem in our new paper by eliminating public enforcement, including in administrative agencies.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 17, 2024 at 02:57 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 14, 2024

Vagaries of public enforcement

As states (especially Red) increase the use of private enforcement of culture-war laws, states may get creative with vestigial public-enforcement authority and courts must wrestle with how much public authority allows for offensive pre-enforcement EpY litigation.

Case in point: Free Speech Coalition v. Anderson. Utah's porn age-verification law creates a private right of action against sites that fail to establish age-verification. FSC sued the AG as the default "enforcer" of state law and and the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety as the overseer of a state program allowing for digital drivers' licenses, one of three statutory age-verification mechanisms (and, according to plaintiffs, the only one that satisfies the statute).

The court unanimously held that the AG's general enforcement authority is insufficient, that an EpY defendant must have a particular duty to enforce the challenged statute, at least where the statute describes a particular enforcement method. The panel divides over the Commissioner. The majority rejects the claim--DPS has not yet created the type of digital license that satisfies the statute and the Commissioner's obligation to create that license exists independent of the statute. The dissent argues that the challenged statute depends on DPS creating the necessary functionality (the only way to satisfy the statute) and the Commissioner's failure to perform that duty cannot allow him to avoid suit. The Commissioner "implements" the law because the law cannot function unless DPS creates the digital license; it does not matter that he draws the obligation to create the digital license from a different statute.

In our taxonomy of private enforcement, Rocky and I argue that offensive litigation remains when states combine public and private enforcement. This case adds a layer of complexity. By designating specific enforcement mechanisms and responsibilities, states can make it difficult for plaintiffs to find the "correct" state officer connected to the challenged statute, with no "default" official. By adopting private litigation as the primary enforcement mechanism, states leave officials in ancillary "implementing" roles. States thus may find a way to insulate mixed-enforcement schemes from EpY.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 14, 2024 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 18, 2024

Fifth Circuit makes a Heck-of-a-mess

I wrote last December about Wilson v. Midland Cty., a § 1983 action by a woman convicted (and given a suspended sentence) two decades ago by a prosecutor who was moonlighting as a clerk for the judge who presided over her trial. The case wades into a circuit split over whether a person seeking damages arising from constitutional violations within a criminal prosecution must show favorable termination under Heck when she is no longer in custody (and thus able to get habeas relief in federal court).

At the time, I wondered whether the plaintiff would seek rehearing on en banc or go straight to SCOTUS; she chose the former. Not only did she lose, but the Fifth Circuit made a hash of Heck.

Judge Oldham wrote for a plurality (9/18) to say that Heck is not about the line between two statutes (§ 1983 and § 2254), as everyone has long understood. Instead, it is about the requirements of common law torts. Citing the Court's most recent decision--which defined favorable termination as an element of a malicious-prosecution claim and which the Court did not decide as a Heck case--the plurality holds that favorable termination is an element of all § 1983 actions challenging violations around a criminal conviction. The unavailability of federal habeas was of no moment, so long as state mechanisms remained open to her. Judge Haynes concurred in part for two, approving of the disposition of the case--dismiss without prejudice so plaintiff can pursue state favorable-termination mechanisms. Judge Willett--who wrote the panel majority while expressing outrage over the result--dissented in even higher dudgeon. Not only does he object to applying Heck to non-prisoners (the result, he argues, of following pure dicta), be he must take on Oldham's nonsense.

Haynes' concurrence actually illustrates the problem with the outcome (and the plurality's analysis). Insisting that he does not argue that Heck imposes a state exhaustion requirement, he argues that Heck includes as a favorable-termination mechanism "the ability to go to the state," includng a state appellate or post-conviction court. That is, he rejects the idea that federal habeas represents the only mechanism for obtaining favorable termination, since Heck itself identifies state mechanisms for obtaining favorable termination.

But that gets everything backwards. The issue is not the availability of state mechanisms to undo a conviction. The issue is what happens when those state mechanisms fail; the text, history, and purpose of § 1983 and § 2254 show that the states cannot have the last word on the validity of the conviction and the rights-holder must have a federal forum at some point. The question is which vehicle. A person-in-custody uses § 2254, which requires state exhaustion anyway. But habeas is not an option for a person not in custody. Under the Fifth Circuit approach, that rights-holder is stuck with the state result, with no option for federal reconsideration. That functions as an exhaustion requirement. And it is inconsistent with what § 1983 is supposed to do.

I cannot believe the Court will not take this case. Lord knows how badly they will botch it.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 18, 2024 at 02:30 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 17, 2024

Procedure Matters, Episode LIX

Kind of a weird one but it illustrates how the rules operate and interact in confusing ways.

Plaintiff brings False Claims Act qui tam action; defendant answers but does not raise the constitutional invalidity of qui tam actions as an affirmative defense; defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings based on constitutional invalidity (qui tam actions violate Article II). The court denied the motion because defendant did not raise the affirmative defense in the answer, so it is not part of the pleadings for FRCP 12(c) purposes. Defendant had to amend its Answer to add the constitutional defense, which might be tricky since the court had set a scheduling order (which heightens requirements for amending).

This is a plausible outcome. But I think the court errs (or at least fails to perform proper analysis) in two respects. Both go to the court's failure to actually decide whether qui tam actions violate the Constitution.

First, the constitutional defense should be a built-in defense--the constitutional validity of the law sued upon should be built into the complaint's allegations of a violation of that law. Defendant could have responded to the complaint with a 12(b)(6) motion raising the constitutional defense, which would have forced the court to decide whether the Constitution permits qui tam actions. If so, a defendant should be able to raise a built-in defense on a 12(c); even if not pleaded in the answer, the affirmative defense is built into a complaint that mentions and includes allegations about the FCA. For comparison, a defendant can raise the statute of limitations on a 12(b)(6) if the complaint includes dates showing the claim is untimely; if the defendant answers without an SL defense and moves under 12(c), the court can still look at the complaint, see that the complaint is untimely, and grant the motion, even if the defendant did not plead SL.

Second, before deciding the defense must be in the answer, the court waves away the constitutional analysis. The court says this (and this is all it says):

Under the present state of the law, Defendants’ separation-of-powers challenge to the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act is insufficient on its own to demonstrate that Relators’ complaint is implausible. Further, even if “[t]he FCA’s qui tam provisions have long inhabited something of a constitutional twilight zone,”and even if it is time to revisit the matter, it is equally true that “lower federal courts should not ‘pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable’ . . . .”

That is a cop-out. If qui tam actions are constitutionally invalid, they do render the complaint implausible--no reasonable inference from the facts taken as true shows plaintiff can recover, given the constitutional defects in the FCA. But the court must decide the open constitutional question to make that plausibility determination. It cannot stop with pointing out that other (non-binding) precedent has gone the other way and thus does not outright preclude the claim or make the claim frivolous.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 17, 2024 at 06:33 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 31, 2024

Do reasons for non-enforcement matter?

The Eighth Circuit declared invalid a Missouri law that a bunch of federal laws related to firearms "shall be invalid to this state, shall not
be recognized by this state, shall be specifically rejected by this state, and shall not be enforced by this state." No state or local officials possess enforcement authority. And the law creates a private right of action (because Republican lawmakers believe that is the magic bullet to stop everything they do not like) against any public official who enforces the law.

Missouri argued (correctly) that it can refuse to allow its officers to enforce federal law; thus, the reasons for refusing to enforce do not matter. Here, in full, is the Court's response:

That Missouri may lawfully withhold its assistance from federal law enforcement, however, does not mean that the State may do so by purporting to invalidate federal law. In this context, as in others, the Constitution “is concerned with means as well as ends.” Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 362 (2015). Missouri has the power to withhold state assistance, “but the means it uses to achieve its ends must be ‘consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution.’” Id. (quoting McCulloch, 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421) (alteration in original). Missouri’s assertion that federal laws regulating firearms are “invalid to this State” is inconsistent with both. If the State prefers as a matter of policy to discontinue assistance with the enforcement of valid federal firearms laws, then it may do so by other means that are lawful, and assume political accountability for that decision.

I am a formalist and even I recognize this as utterly mindless formalism. This is not 1833 South Carolina preparing to wield the militia against federal enforcers. There is no meaningful difference between "federal law is illegal in this state and we will not enforce it" and "federal law is stupid and we will not enforce it" and "we don't wanna enforce it just 'cause and you can't make us--nyah." Missouri can reenact the identical law tomorrow and rely on #2 or #3 and land in the same place--no state or local enforcement, private right of action against any officer who attempts to enforce.

Maybe the law could include a preamble or finding saying "We, the legislature, believe these laws are invalid to this state, should not be recognized by this state, should be specifically rejected by this state, and shall not be enforced by this state, but the activist federal judges will not let us say that."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 31, 2024 at 08:21 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 17, 2024

Why randomize assignments?

I guess I should have considered this when I answered Gerard's first question, but here goes: What would be the point of randomized assignments? Of all the things Congress can try to bring the Court to heel, why would it want to do this? Is the idea that analysis and precedential effect (if not outcome in this case) might change if Justice Barrett wrote a particular opinion rather than Justice Thomas? Assuming agreement on basic principles and given the collective nature of the writing process, would the final opinion be so different?

And might there be unintended consequences? Unable to get everything he wants, Justice Alito leaves the opinion in a 5-4 and writes separately, eliminating the majority and, to the extent Marks matters, giving more power to his individual opinion without him having to do the work of maintaining a majority. Do we lose something if there is no Justice who becomes the go-to person on some issues (e.g., Ginsburg on procedure or Gorsuch on Indian law).

If it does not do much as a stand-alone change, it might be a cute addition to Sherry's plan--random assignment of that single, unsigned, unenumerated opinion. This creates further distance between individual Justices and case outcomes.

Posted by Administrators on August 17, 2024 at 06:03 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 16, 2024

It should be constitutional

In answer to Gerard's question: Suzanna Sherry proposed a system in which the Court issues one per curiam majority opinion, without names or counts. She defends constitutionality by arguing, in essence, that Congress cannot dictate or influence resolution of a case but can control how the Court communicates its decision. I think her argument would support the choice of who communicates the decision for the Court as well as how the Court presents that decision.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 16, 2024 at 11:23 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 15, 2024

Collegiality for collegiality's sake

Steve Vladeck's latest Substack (paywalled) discusses Justice Kagan's remarks at the Ninth Circuit Conference. With respect to collegiality, Steve quotes Kagan and writes the following:

Third, and in a similar vein, in responses to questions about how the justices are getting along internally, Justice Kagan pivoted to a response about why the answer shouldn’t matter that much to the public—not because collegiality is unimportant, but because the issue isn’t whether the justices are friendly; it’s whether their relationships influence their colleagues. As she put it:

“I can’t imagine why the public should care if we go to the opera together, or we can talk about baseball together. What the public should care about is … if the collegiality brings about a certain kind of decision-making process. In other words, if it leads to people listening to each other in talking about the law and in talking about cases and making decisions. If it leads to people being able to step into each other’s shoes and see the world through another person’s eyes or see certain legal issues through a different perspective.

Again, I think there’s some nuance here. The point is not, as some accounts reported it, that the justices’ collegiality is unimportant; it’s that it’s important as means to an end—with a subtle insinuation that there isn’t enough of that kind of camaraderie on the Court today.

I made a similar point years ago when people complained that President Obama and Speaker John Boehner could not sit down and have a beer, comparing them unfavorably with the Scalia/Ginsburg safaris and opera trips. I pointed out that this friendship rarely convinced either person to switch a position or compromise--which is what everyone wanted from Obama and Boehner. We do not want collegiality on multi-member bodies for its own sake, but as a means to a better-functioning multi-member body. (With Kagan pushing the ideal of empathy that Obama proposed but never defended). Media coverage of politics and the Court (stuck in a Sorkin-esque vortex of wanting everyone to get along and agree with one another) cannot see past the former.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 15, 2024 at 01:33 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 03, 2024

12(b)(6), summary judgment, and conflicting video

I think the Fourth Circuit reaches  the right place--further proceedings required. A trial court can consider a video on a 12(b)(6) if "(1) the video is 'integral' to the complaint and its authenticity is not challenged, but (2) only to the extent that the video 'clearly depicts a set of facts contrary to those alleged in the complaint,' or 'blatantly contradicts' the plaintiff’s allegations, rendering the plaintiff’s allegations implausible." The district court should have denied dismissal because the video did not blatantly contradict the allegations in the complaint.

But I think it gets there via two mistakes, sounding in the general problem of conflating 12(b)(6) and summary judgment, especially in civil rights actions: 1) Expanding what the court can look at on 12(b)(6) and 2) conflating 12(b)(6) and summary judgment when dealing with conflicting information.

1) A court on a 12(b)(6) is limited to the allegations within the four corners of the complaint plus documents attached as exhibits. FRCP 10(c), 12(d). Courts have extended that plus to include documents that the complaint mentions or relies on, which makes sense on a rule of completeness--if the complaint refers to something (e.g., a contract or a magazine article), a rule of completeness dictates that the court treat the entire thing as part of the complaint. Otherwise a plaintiff could selectively and inaccurately quote pieces of a broader thing to create a false impression. Courts have further extended this to videos.

The 4th Circuit does not explain what "integral" to the claim means--whether it includes complaints that identify the video as a source or otherwise expressly rely on the video or whether it includes any set of facts describing events for which publicly available video may be found. If video cases are not to subsume 12(b)(6), it should not extend as far as the latter. That is, if the complaint includes factual allegations X, Y, and Z and there happens to be video evidence of those facts that the complaint does not mention, discuss, or rely upon, the video should not be treated as part of the complaint.

The court does not explain which side the case falls. The complaint alleged a bunch of facts; defendant's 12(b)(6) introduced the video, emphasizing that it was "publicly available" and "integral to" and "apparently relied on" in the complaint. Publicly available should not matter (unless it is part of a public record and a subject of judicial notice). And I do not know how the complaint "apparently relie[s]" on the video--either it does or does not. Unfortunately, plaintiff did not object to the court considering the video and used the video to argue it meaning in opposing the motion, effectively waiving the 12(d) argument. The court therefore did not resolve the "not entirely clear" question of whether the video qualifies as integral to this complaint.

2) If the video is part of the complaint, I do not think the "blatantly contradicted" standard should apply. Blatant contradiction comes from Scott v. Harris, where the Court disregarded the plaintiff's deposition testimony of what happened during a high-speed chase (specifically whether he was a threat to persons and property) by watching video of the chase and concluding that the video was capable of one reasonable interpretation. The Court therefore need not accept plaintiff's version of events or draw reasonable inferences for the non-movant plaintiff ("I was driving fast but safely") when his evidence was "blatantly contradicted" by the video whose one true meaning ("he was a threat'") the Court can divine by watching.

Putting aside the correctness of Scott and the idea that the video shows one obvious thing rather than being subject to interpretation, the approach makes some sense on summary judgment. Opposing parties offering competing evidence, stories, and versions of events; the court decides whether the evidence each offers sufficiently conflicts as to show a factual dispute requiring jury resolution. "Blatant contradiction" gets us to the place of the defendant offering the video, the plaintiff offering no evidence (as is his burden of production), leaving no disputed facts requiring jury resolution. I do not agree with the standard, but it is consistent with the inquiry on summary judgment.

But 12(b)(6) is supposed to be different. The court hears one side--what the plaintiff offers; it hears no facts or evidence from the defendant. The court takes everything the plaintiff alleges as true and considers whether the plaintiff can win if everything he says is true. Where the complaint contains adverse allegations or facts, the court can consider those and rule against the plaintiff--we say plaintiff has pleaded herself out of court. Where the complaint includes contradictory allegations, the court need not resolve that conflict or decide which is true; it accepts everything true and decides if the plaintiff loses under either of those sets of facts. Consider Craig v. Rich Township High School. A fired school counsleor alleged that he published his book (the speech for which he was fired) outside of work , but the book (which he attached to the complaint) included content connecting to his counselor job. The court could consider that fact in the Pickering balance on a 12(b)(6) because the facts showing connectedness were in the complaint. The court did not disregard contrary facts; it took all facts as true, some of which showed why the plaintiff lost under controlling law. Or imagine a hypo I use in class--a Black non-attorney brings a race-discrimination claim against the law firm that denied him a job, with allegations that he was told he was not hired because he is not an attorney and because he is Black. The court would not unpack or reconcile the facts; it would take both allegations as true, with one fact (not hired because not an attorney) defeating the claim.

So how should this case have come out? Where (as it seems to have been in this case) there is ambiguity whether the complaint relies on the video, the court should treat it as not having relied and not treat the video as part of the complaint. The court therefore should have either refused to look at the video and denied the 12(b)(6) or converted  to summary judgment; the latter moves allows the court to consider whether the plaintiff's testimony is "blatantly contradicted" by the video as a competing piece of evidence. But if the video is clearly part of the complaint, then the court should review the video and decide if it plausibly shows a violation, without regard to other allegations in the complaint. If the video defeats the claim, we would say the plaintiff pleaded herself out of court by including adverse facts for the court to take as true. Blatant contradiction never comes up, because the plaintiff is on the hook for the effects of all the facts she includes in the complaint.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 3, 2024 at 10:35 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 29, 2024

A civ pro puzzle

Something I was thinking about while listening to several papers on personal jurisdiction at SEALS last week. It shows how the analysis has shift under us:

Imagine the facts of World Wide Volkswagen in 2024: Defective car sold in New York by two New York companies (distributor World Wide and dealer Seaway) and two non-New York companies (Audi from Germany and VWA from New Jersey), accident occurs in OK.

Before 2011, we mostly agreed on the following:

    1) No jurisdiction over WW and Seaway in OK

    2) General "doing business" jurisdiction over Audi and VWA in OK (although this was the subject of the Twitchell/Brilmayer debate)

    3) General jurisdiction over all defendants in New York--Audi and VWA on "doing business" and WW and Seaway because they are incorporated there.

In 2024, I think we have the following:

    1) No jurisdiction over WW and Seaway in OK

    2) Specific jurisdiction over Audi and VWA in OK under Ford, because they serve the OK market for the same cars (although not the car in the accident). Not general jurisdiction because neither is at home and Daimler/Good Year reject doing business.

    3) General jurisdiction over WW and Seaway in NY because each is "at home" there.

    4) Specific jurisdiction over Audi and VWA, although the theory depends on where Audi and VWA designed, manufactured, and sold the car to World Wide for distribution:

        • If any of that happened in New York, then specific jurisdiction because the case "arose" in New York because something about the defective product occurred there.

        • If all of those things happened outside New York (i.e., Audi sold the car to WW in New Jersey), specific jurisdiction would require the "related to" analysis of Ford--they serve the NY market for the same cars as the one at issue in the case, even if their NY activities did not involve the car at issue.

Posted by Administrators on July 29, 2024 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 13, 2024

More on the continued usefulness of Younger

A third post on the 11th Circuit and rethinking Younger:

The Volokh Conspiracy's weekly Short Circuit roundup includes the case, along with a link to an Institute for Justice amicus brief. IJ offers a slightly different argument than Judge Rosenbaum for rethinking Younger. Pre-enforcement offensive litigation has expanded since the 1970s when the Court decided Younger and its early progeny, because the Court has developed a greater willingness, especially in First Amendment cases, to find the threat of prosecution sufficiently imminent. In this case, that means a "phonebook's worth" of similarly situated PACs and organizations could sue Georgia in a pre-enforcement challenge to these laws. Abstention in this case therefore does not serve Younger's stated purposes: Someone else can bring the federal court into the mix via pre-enforcement action, leaving state courts and agencies no room to operate, just not the plaintiffs with the most concrete injuries (the ones facing actual rather than threatened enforcement).

An interesting argument, although it might prove too much. Constitutional litigation is atomized, with different cases challenging a particular law as to different rights-holders. So there is nothing inconsistent if some cases involving some rights-holders must remain in state court while other cases involving other rights-holders can be in federal district court. Maybe a case such as this one, involving general campaign-finance regulations, is different.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 13, 2024 at 01:06 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 11, 2024

More on Younger--Exhaustion and the limits of defensive litigation

I am thinking through some points in my post about 11th Circuit Judge Robin Rosenbaum's call for rethinking the scope of Younger, at least in electoral speech cases.

Rosenbaum argues that "Younger has evolved to allow states to impose a state-exhaustion requirement on those trying to exercise core First Amendment rights." This is a bit nit-picky, because I agree with her basic criticism. But it is inaccurate to say Younger imposes an exhaustion requirement. An exhaustion delays federal litigation by requiring the plaintiff to pursue other procedures before going to federal court. But the plaintiff should get to federal district court eventually. On the other hand, when the federal court abstains under Younger, that plaintiff will never return to federal district court in a § 1983/EpY action. The rights-holder remains in state administrative and judicial proceedings, with the possibility of a federal forum through SCOTUS review of the state's highest court. Rather than creating exhaustion, Younger limits offensive pre-enforcement § 1983/EpY litigation and compels defensive litigation on important free speech issues. Still potentially problematic, depending on one's views of the lines between offensive and defensive litigation. But not as inconsistent with the text and purpose of § 1983.

The key to Rosenbaum's argument is an objection to Younger's application to state administrative proceedings (at least in First Amendment case), which delay access to state courts. She identifies two arguable problems. First, while Younger perhaps fairly presumes parity between state and federal courts in willingness to vindicate federal rights, that presumption should not apply to state administrative agencies, even with eventual state judicial review. Second, delaying access to state court may delay the first meaningful opportunity to raise federal issues--a rights-holder has an adequate opportunity so long as he can raise issues in some state proceeding, even if it does not come until several steps down the line. That is, if the PAC cannot raise First Amendment issues before the hearing board, it is enough that it can appeal the board's decision to a state appellate court and raise the First Amendment there--regardless of how long it takes to get to that second level of review.

On the other hand, the upshot of Younger is to push rights-holders out of federal district court and into state proceedings that must run their (state-determined) multi-level course. It is not clear why the first level must be judicial rather than administrative. Nor is it clear why the opportunity to raise federal issues must come at the first stage of the multi-level process, if that process must run its course before those rights can be vindicated. That is, why does it matter whether the rights-holder can raise and prevail on his federal rights at the first stage if the state will appeal that decision in any event and force completion of those proceedings.

The answer to that goes to preliminary relief, available in offensive federal litigation but not in defensive state litigation. A rights holder (such as the PACs in the Georgia case) can obtain a preliminary injunction in federal court, allowing it to engage in political speech pending resolution of the constitutional questions. From a defensive posture, especially within an administrative process, the rights-holder must remain silent and ride out the proceeding. That, ultimately, becomes the real issue with Younger's push into defensive litigation.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 11, 2024 at 11:08 AM in Civil Procedure, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 09, 2024

Rethinking Younger

Interesting Younger case from the 11th Circuit. The Georgia AG pursued a state administrative action against a PAC associated with Stacey Abrams for failing to register and file various reports. The state commission found reasonable grounds and referred the case to the AG, which referred the matter to the state administrative hearing body. Between those events, the PACs filed a § 1983 action to enjoin the state proceedings. The court held that the district court should have abstained from the federal action.

Judge Newsom wrote another Fed Courts treatise for the panel. Although the PACs filed the federal action before the hearing body received the referral to commence its proceeding, the court applied the piece of Younger under which the court must abstain if the state proceeding commences after the federal proceeding but before any "proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in federal court." The plaintiffs had filed a complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction and the court had handled some case-management motions. But the court had not ruled on the PI motion or otherwise engaged with the merits in the few weeks before the state proceeding commenced.* And the fact that the state conducted a thorough multi-year investigation of the PACs undermined the suggestion that the case falls within the bad-faith exception.

[*] The court rejected the district court's reliance on its "experience managing cases" in defining the point at which the state action is too late.

Judge Rosenbaum concurs to call on the courts to "reconsider just how far Younger should extend." Rosenbaum fears Younger in a case involving core political and electoral speech; that speech has achieved greater protection than it had at the time of Younger. Whatever the merits of abstention in 1970s actions involving communists, nude dancing, and "Deep Throat" (speech which the Burger Court was backing away from protecting), Citizens United and other recent campaign-finance cases vault such speech into a unique First Amendment core demanding the "strongest protection." (A cute rhetorical move in a case in which a Republican AG was going after a Democratic PAC). She complains that two of the Middlesex factors--state interest and adequate opportunity to raise federal issues--invariably favor abstention and the exceptions are too narrow to offer help. This imposes an exhaustion requirement for those wishing to engage in core political speech during and around an election. And she identifies the "Goldilocks" problem in Younger--plaintiffs must hit the sweet spot between state enforcement being sufficiently imminent to warrant standing but before that state enforcement has begun.

Recent criticisms of Younger--especially in the work of Fred Smith (Emory)--focus on efforts to challenge proceedings within the criminal justice system, such as bail or the corrupt mess in municipal courts in Ferguson and elsewhere. The argument is that federal courts should not defer to broken state systems that the federal action challenges. Rosenbaum focuses on one area of substantive law that abstention disparately effects, in a way that undermines the substantive purposes of that law.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 9, 2024 at 03:45 PM in Civil Procedure, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 05, 2024

More on collateral order review of presidential immunity

The latest episode of Divided Argument with Will Baude and Dan Epps explores Trump. Baude praises Barrett's conception of presidential immunity  as an as-applied constitutional challenge to the law. So conceived, however, Baude questions Barrett's conclusion that denial of the defense is immediately reviewable. Immunities receive immediate review, as they protect the person from having to stand trial or stay in litigation for too long. Constitutional defenses--e.g., a separation-of-powers defense to the CFPB (Barrett cites Seila Law as an example) or a First Amendment defense to a flag-burning law--do not, as they protect the person from liability. I want to unpack what I wrote about this.

COD appealability should not turn on labeling something as "immunity" or as a "right not to stand trial." Barrett's point is that immunity is never a distinct concept; it is shorthand for the argument that a law does not apply to the defendant's conduct.* And it is not obvious what makes something a right not to stand trial as opposed to a defense to liability, beyond the label--every defense can be characterized as one or the other.  There is no obvious reason that double jeopardy and qualified immunity are immunities according a right not to stand trial while preclusion and the FTCA judgment bar are defenses to liability.

[*] Justice Alito has said the same about MLB's antitrust immunity--he describes it as a judicially interpreted exclusion of MLB from the scope of antitrust laws and the application of those laws to MLB's conduct

Justice Souter tried to wrangle this issue in two unanimous COD opinions--Will (FTCA judgment bar) and Digital Equipment (private covenant not to sue). Reviewability should turn on the systemic import of the interests sought to be vindicated by immediate review and that would be lost by "rigorous application of a final judgment requirement." Thus, "it is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest, that counts when asking whether an order is 'effectively' unreviewable if review is to be left until later." This analysis considers the source of the asserted right (Constitution, statute, common law, contract) and who and what the right protects (individual or systemic interests). Unfortunately, Souter's approach has been lost in favor of simple labels.

Back to Barrett and presidential immunity. Her conception of a constitutional defense to a prosecution places presidential immunity on the same footing as the separation of powers and First Amendment defenses above. So why is the first immediately reviewable and the other two not? She never explains. Souter's considerations about underlying interests provide a way out. Although all derive from the Constitution, the latter two (and certainly the third) protect individual liberty interests; the first protects broad systemic interests of the presidency and the ability of the President to act within the constitutional system. That distinction may be wrong. Separation of powers in Seila Law serves structural interests of preserving the President's removal power; one could argue individual liberties serve structural interests of limiting government power. Maybe Barrett's position, taken seriously, explodes the COD or forcse the Court to make absurd distinctions to ensure COD remains a "small class of claims."

But Barrett's position about presidential immunity is not necessarily wrong or inconsistent with COD--if we accept Souter's position that COD turns on the underlying interests and policies at issue and begin the analysis there.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 5, 2024 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 03, 2024

Questioning prosecutorial immunity

Justice Sotomayor respecting (although not dissenting from) denial of cert in Price v. Montgomery County questions prosecutorial immunity--its origins (including noting Alex Reinert's article that Congress abrogated all common law immunities when it enacted § 1983); the misalignment of its scope compared with its policy goals; and the inadequacy of alternative means of remedying prosecutorial misconduct. She does not argue the Court should have granted cert. She argues that the cert denial should not be read as tolerance of the prosecutor's conduct (the Court denies cert for many reason); that the Court may need to step in; and that lower courts must keep immunity with "'quite sparing'" bounds.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 3, 2024 at 11:13 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Jurisdictionality and presidential immunity

On top of everything else that was bad in Trump, the majority and Justice Sotomayor use language that could be read to suggest that this immunity is a limit on the court's adjudicative jurisdiction rather than a defeat on the merits.

Discussing the first bucket of presidential conduct (conclusive and preclusive), Roberts quotes Youngstown that this bucket "'disables the Congress from acting upon the subject'" and Marbury that "the courts have 'no power to control [the President's] discretion'" and that discretion "cannot be subject to further judicial examination." He repeatedly speaks in the same breath of what Congress and the courts cannot do--"Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President’s actions;" Congress "may not criminalize the President's actions . . . Neither may courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution;" or the removal power "may not be regulated by Congress or reviewed by the courts." Justice Sotomayor does the same in arguing against immunity, as by insisting that "'common tribunals of justice should be at liberty to entertain jurisdiction of the offence'"  or stating that "'judicial action is needed" such that "the exercise of jurisdiction is warranted.'"

To be fair, some of this comes from quoting old sources (Marbury and Story's Commentaries) or cases from before the Court grew more careful about using the word jurisdiction or speaking about courts exercising judicial power (Nixon v. Fitzgerald). But it would be unfortunate if the language causes courts (such as Judge Chutkin and the DC Circuit on remand) to backslide. Trump recognizes a disability on Congress and its legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction--Congress cannot enact criminal statutes that regulate certain presidential conduct. It is not a limit on the court's adjudicative authority, except in dictating how the courts must resolve any future attempt to prosecute a president and likely dismiss such a prosecution, if attempted.

Justice Barrett's distinct framing of immunity--as a challenge to the constitutional validity of the statute as applied to the President's conduct--also understands immunity as merits rather than jurisdictional limitation. Where the would-be statute of conviction is constitutionally invalid as-applied, the court is not stripped of adjudicative jurisdiction; it rejects the prosecution on the merits due to a defect in the congressionally enacted substantive law.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 3, 2024 at 11:02 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 02, 2024

The penumbra of Trump v. US

I don't have a lot to add to the discourse over presidential immunity from people who know more about this. So let me highlight some incidental points from reading it.

• The majority repeatedly suggests that "speaking to and on behalf of" the public and on matters of public concern is a non-core/official function. This might affect future applications of Lindke and when public officials can block the public from web and social-media sites. To act under color, an official must possess actual authority to speak on the government's behalf. I argued that Knight Foundation (holding that Trump and his aides acted under color in blocking readers from his Twitter feed) would come out differently, because the President lacks formal speaking authority about much of the stuff on social media. But this case suggests I may have been wrong about that--in part because the majority cites Lindke to support this broad presidential power to speak to the public. I wonder if that power to speak holds for the "chief executive" of other governments (e.g., the chairman of the county legislature). If so, Lindke may not be as narrow as I thought.

• It seems to me that Justices Barrett and Jackson take a similar approach to criminal law. Both reject the idea of of "immunity" in favor of a defense to prosecution under the statute. Jackson argues immunity lifts someone from the obligations of the law, as opposed to an individual defense to a prosecution under a particular statute. While agreeing there are limits on prosecuting a former president, she sees that immunity at the statutory level--does the particular statute reach official acts and would allowing prosecution pose a danger of intrusion on presidential authority and function. This sounds similar to a defense as Jackson defines one--it is a constitutional defense to the application of that statute to the president and his conduct.

• Barrett makes explicit what is implicit in the majority--a trial court decision allowing the prosecution to proceed is subject to immediate appeal. The Article II defense is separate from the merits of the criminal charge and making him wait to challenge the decision would undermine the executive authority and affect the President's decisions in office. This has two interesting consequences for the collateral order doctrine.

First, Midland Asphalt v. US says that collateral-order immunity in criminal cases applies to "explicit statutory or constitutional guarantees that trial trial will not occur;" that includes arguments over excessive bail, double jeopardy, and Speech-or-Debate immunity. Lower courts have applied Midland to deny immediate review of denial of a defense of judicial immunity in a criminal case--although that issue is immediately reviewable in a civil action--because no constitutional or statutory provision creates that immunity. The majority makes clear that presidential immunity is atextual, but Barrett does not attempt to connect her argument to Midland's seemingly off-hand dicta. Maybe that means Midland does not limit COD to explicit rights (as suggested in Sell v. US, allowing COD review of an order to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent).

Second, if what we label presidential immunity is an as-applied constitutional defense, it seems to me that COD should apply to other as-applied constitutional defenses to prosecution, such as the First Amendment. It rests on the same idea--the argument that Congress cannot criminalize the alleged conduct (because of the First Amendment rather than Article II, but still) is separate from and collateral to the merits of the prosecution (whether the defendant violated the statute). I imagine it turns on unreviewability on appeal from final judgment, which considers the broad public policy and interests lost by delaying review. The individual importance of the defendant's First Amendment rights differs from the structural importance of presidential independence and authority.

• The majority pretty obviously believes  that everything Trump is alleged to have done--speaking with cabinet officials, speaking with state officials, speaking to the public about the electoral process and how it violated federal law, speaking to the VP--is official conduct. That the President has no role to play in state selection of electors or in the electoral counting is of no matter, because everything that happens in the country on every level is a matter of presidential concern (because he may be asked about it) and thus within his official functions. Other than lying about having sex with an intern and maybe shooting someone himself on Fifth Avenue (as opposed to ordering Seal Team 6 to do it), I am not sure what the President does that is not official. Although it does not conclusively say so, the majority opinion places a thumb on the scale on remand or shows its hand when the case inevitably (if Trump loses the election) returns to SCOTUS.

• I continue to look for a good explanation for why this immunity, once recognized, should not include an evidentiary component. If Speech-or-Debate immunity prevents the prosecution in a bribery case from offering evidence of a legislative act (e.g., a floor speech or vote), it seems to me that this presidential immunity prevents the prosecution in a bribery case from offering evidence of an official presidential act (e.g., granting a pardon or firing his attorney general or urging a state official to do something). I am not arguing that either situation is normatively good or correct. But if both immunities exist (as Barrett believes), why should they have different scopes? Someone please help me with this.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 2, 2024 at 03:46 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 01, 2024

Thoughts on NetChoice

I decided to begin the day with NetChoice, the case about which I would have something to write. Then I can read about how the framers, 11 years removed from a revolution against a king, created a monarch (more powerful than the one it replaced) who is selected and serves for a few years at a time but otherwise can do no wrong.

Anyway, NetChoice. The argument somewhat previewed the result, but the internal dynamics may have been messy.

• The Court is unanimous on the disposition of this appeals--vacate both lower courts and tell them to do the analysis over, because this is a facial challenge. Justice Kagan writes for six (the Chief, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson) to explain a proper approach to facial challenges and to trace the Court's editorial-judgment jurisprudence (Tornillo, PG&E, Turner, Hurley, Pruneyard, and FAIR). She writes for five (loses Jackson) to explain how that jurisprudence applies to render the core provisions of the laws constitutionally invalid and to highlight how badly the Fifth Circuit messed up. Justice Barrett concurs to complain about the complexities of facial challenges and to suggest plaintiffs would have an easier time with a narrower as-applied challenge. Justice Jackson does not join the parts of Kagan's opinon (III-B and C) that explain how that jurisprudence ought to apply to these laws, deeming it premature. Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment to explain why facial challenges should not be allowed. Justice Alito concurs in the judgment for three (Thomas and Gorsuch) to explain why the Court should not have opined on the First Amendment questions and then to offer a contrary First Amendment analysis.

• This will be lost in the procedural mud and the news of the day, but: Five-and-a-half Justices offered a strong vision of First Amendment protection for curators of all kinds and of the limits of government trying to balance the market in ways it deems proper or in ways that will help the speakers and speech it likes.

• Justice Jackson's choice is odd. She joins Kagan's summary of the jurisprudence (III-A) but not its application (III-B and C). But Kagan completes that summary with three general points--1) the First Amendment protects curation of third-party speech; 2) that does not change when the compiler allows most speech or only excludes a small amount of speech; and 3) the government does not have an interest in balancing the expressive marketplace. Those three principles imply the resolution as to the core provisions--the sites have a First Amendment right to do this and Florida and Texas cannot rely on the only interest either has offered for these provisions. So if Jackson believes the statement of legal principles (with their obvious implications) is proper, I am not sure why she departed from the actual application.

• Justice Thomas explains everything that is wrong with facial challenges, including that they enable universal injunctions. But this is wrong, as Dick Fallon has argued. A declaration of facial invalidity is a statement about the law that has preclusive effect on the parties and precedential effect on future parties. It does not disappear the law, it does not adjudicate the rights of non-parties, and it does not stop future enforcement against non-parties. Although facial resolution from SCOTUS dictates the outcome of that future enforcement as a matter of precedent, that is how precedent is supposed to work. Perhaps apprehensiveness about facial challenges is of a piece with the idea (observed more in the breach) that the Court should decide no more than necessary to decide the case. But that is a prudential rule, not grounded in Article III or separation of powers. Of course, the Court could get to the same place if it did not insist on judicial supremacy, on it having the final word on the constitutional question that binds all other actors.

• The Court limits (majority view) or rejects (Thomas view) facial challenges as a way to keep the Court from wielding too much power at the expense of the other branches, where those branches would be stymied by the Court's pronouncements on the Constitution to make or enforce the laws against non-parties in the future. But the Court would not need that limit if it did not assume that a declaration of facial validity binds the executive in the future.

Murthy v. Missouri held that states and users lack standing to challenge the Biden Administration's jawboning of social-media sites, reflecting the Court's distaste for "massive kitchen-sink, lots-of-plaintiffs/lots-of-defendants/lots-of-bad-conduct constitutional claims." Something similar might be at work here. These laws have core provisions raising constitutional problems (limits on curation and notice requirements) for specific actors (Facebook and YouTube) for specific conduct (their home pages or news feeds). Litigation by a trade association challenging all provisions of the law goes too far. Again, that limit might have cross-ideological effects.

• It will be interesting to see what happens going forward. Might it be worth it for NetChoice (or just Facebook and YouTube) to rework this as an as-applied challenge to the moderation and notice provisions (which a majority of the Court said violate the First Amendment) and leave the rest for another day? There is an argument (Ilya makes it) that the invalidity of these core provisions is sufficient to create the necessary overbreadth compared with any legitimate sweep of the law (such as Gmail or Uber reviews).

• Florida AG Ashley Moody took to Twitter to announce that the Court unanimously sided with it--"We are pleased that SCOTUS agreed with Florida and rejected the lower court’s flawed reasoning—invalidating our social media law. While there are aspects of the decision we disagree with, we look forward to continuing to defend state law." This is impressive in its understatedness and in its cynicism that my fellow Floridians will not read the opinion or get their news from an accurate source. "Aspects of the decision we disagree with"--the Court rejected the entire First Amendment edifice on which Florida relied. Kagan's opinion sees "the First Amendment issues much as" the Eleventh Circuit did in Judge Newsom's excellent opinion. Moreover, in emphasizing the Fifth Circuit's wrongness, the Court impliedly announced the Eleventh Circuit's correctness as to the constitutional invalidity of the core provisions.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 1, 2024 at 02:46 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

The EPA and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Day(s)

Before we SCOTUSe wreaks new havoc at 10 a.m., we can review last week's old havoc. This post is by my FIU colleague Alex Erwin, who teaches and writes in environmental law.

Thursday was a terrible day for EPA (and frankly any American that had the misfortune of watching the presidential debate or the US v. Panama game at Copa America …).  To start things off, using its shadow docket magic, the Supreme Court stayed EPA’s Good Neighbor Rule in Ohio v. EPA.  Mr. Rogers would not be pleased.

Under the Clean Air Act, Congress tasked EPA with setting standards for common air pollutants.  Once a standard has been set, the states are charged with implementing those standards by developing a State Implementation Plan (SIP).  While the states have great latitude in how they meet the federal standard, the CAA requires states to be good neighbors.  Air pollution obviously travels, and this provision prevents states from developing a SIP that would dump air pollution onto its downwind neighbors in order to meet the standard in-state.  If EPA, however, believes a SIP is insufficient, it can promulgate its own plan, known as a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).  In this case, Ohio and at least 18 other states messed around and got FIPped.  EPA proposed a single FIP that would cover 23 states.  The rule had already been temporarily stayed in over half of these states by the district courts, and Justice Gorsuch (joined by the other men on the Court) obliged Ohio granting emergency relief.

It’s been a long time since EPA won a case in front of the Supreme Court – the current conservative majority has routinely found that EPA has overstepped its authority.  This time around there is no need for the “major questions doctrine” of West Virginia or the “clear statement rule” of Sackett – instead, it is just a particularly nitpicky application of arbitrariness review.  What Ohio does have in common with those previous cases is, in my view at least, an over emphasis on the role of states in environmental protection.  The majority opinion is happy to harp on the fact that SIPs are the “primary responsibility” of the states, while significantly downplaying EPA’s mandatory role in ensuring compliance with air quality standards.

The majority holds EPA to task for failing to adequately explain its final rule, especially in response to submitted comments.  It is all a bit technical, but basically Ohio argued that the models the rule is based upon relied on the rule applying to all 23 states and, thus, if that base assumption is incorrect, then the estimates generated could be wrong when applied only to states that remain covered under the rule.  Gorsuch says the rule was “not reasonably explained” because it did not address this issue directly.  I agree with what Dan Deacon wrote on the Yale JREG Notice and Comment blog – the majority basically buys everything Ohio was selling hook, line, and sinker, while holding the agency to a much higher standard.  As Justice Barrett discusses in her dissent, EPA claims that it did address this issue (when it included a severability clause in the rule), that the issue was never directly raised during notice and comment, and that the models are not dependent on the number of states included.  The majority is happy to give the states leniency here, but not EPA.  Ohio’s arguments were good if they were close enough, but EPA’s needed to be perfect.  I don’t know how precedential this case will be, but it certainly seems wrong to me. 

Not done with ruining Administrator Regan’s day, the Court also handed down SEC v. Jarkesy.  Here Chief Justice Roberts, joined by the other 5 conservatives, stripped the SEC of its ability to seek civil penalties in an administrative proceeding, holding that the 7th Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.  While EPA was not directly involved, Jarkesy could cause EPA serious problems.  Right now, the agency hands out hundreds of civil penalties a year via in-house administrative proceedings.  As currently structured, DOJ ENRD handles enforcement cases in federal court.  If Jarksey is applied to block EPA from seeking civil penalties in-house, the increased caseload will certainly stretch DOJ’s capacity to the brink.  This all just means fewer polluters pay.

And Friday was even worse!  The Supreme Court killed Chevron once and for all in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.  As far as I can tell, it replaced it with even more judicial aggrandizement!  Looking narrowly at the two cases themselves, it seems fitting to me that the decision in Loper Bright directly benefits an extractive industry just like the original decision in Chevron did.  Business interests once again trump the environment at the Supreme Court.  While the case was ostensibly about who has to pay for monitors on fishing vessels, Loper Bright ended up just a vessel for the court to do away with Chevron deference.

Hot takes are raining in on all sides as to whether the death of Chevron is the most consequential thing to happen or if it will be a big nothingburger.  They didn’t offer divination where I went to law school, so I will refrain from much prognostication.  All I’ll say is that I was struck (maybe bludgeoned is a better word …) by the idea that there is one singular “best” meaning of a statute, and that meaning can only be divined by reviewing courts.  What inevitably happens when lower court judges, unmoored by Chevron, come to different conclusions about what is best?  The Supreme Court takes so few cases a year, it will never be able to clear up every circuit split that inevitably pops up because the 5th Circuit and 9th Circuit are living in two separate realities.  In that case, which is “best”?

While I can buy that the judiciary is the better body to do purely legal statutory interpretation work, so much of what Chevron dealt with were questions where facts and specialized expertise do in fact matter.  Justice Kagan gives us a laundry list of these kinds of cases in her excellent dissent.  EPA and the other environmental agencies constantly deal with these kinds of interpretations and will be the agencies that suffer the most at the hands of activist judges without Chevron deference. 

To bring it back to Ohio, Justice Gorsuch gives us a great reason to doubt that judges always know best when it comes to science.  Despite explicitly reminding the reader that the court “reviewed over 400 pages of briefing and a voluminous record, held over an hour of oral argument on the applications, and engaged in months of postargument deliberations”, Justice Gorsuch repeatedly mixes up laughing gas (nitrous oxide or N2O) with nitrogen oxides (such as NO or NO2).  The opinion had to be corrected after the press caught wind of it!

As a final note – shout to Justice Kagan for adding more relevancy to my current research project!  She uses Fish and Wildlife Service’s interpretation of “distinct population segment” as it relates to populations of western gray squirrels as her lead example for the problems created by overruling Chevron.  I'm currently working on an article about intraspecific genetic variation and the Endangered Species Act – contrasting the Service’s decision to define the term “distinct population segment” via regulation with its decision to leave the also unclear “subspecies” undefined and thus determined on a case-by-case basis.  Stay tuned!

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 1, 2024 at 09:01 AM in Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 29, 2024

Separation of powers and judicial aggrandizement

Interesting piece in the Yale Journal of Regulation: Notice and Comment on Justice Sotomayor's  Jarkesy dissent accusing the majority of judicial aggrandizement. The idea is that the Court has aggrandized its power to become the arbiter determining the scope and separation of everyone else's powers, ignoring that the judiciary is an interested actor in the inter-branch dance and dialogue.

I make a similar point in Fed Courts about standing--separation of powers cannot serve as the "single basic idea" supporting standing doctrine, at least in statutory cases. When Congress authorizes a statutory cause of action for judicial resolution and the Court declares that invalid, the Court aggrandizes to itself the power to control the terms of the separation of powers debate. True, standing limits reflect the Court aggrandizing in the name of surrendering and minimizing its future power--judicial aggrandizement in the name of judicial limitation--whereas Loper and Jarkesy aggrandize in the name of adding to the power courts exercise in the future at the expense of the executive. Framed differently, however, judicially imposed standing limits aggrandize the judicial power to stop Congress from telling the courts what to do and when to do it.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 29, 2024 at 11:34 AM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 28, 2024

Another entry in the jurisprudence-of-sport canon (Updated)

Fischer v. U.S. wins the prize for "decision likely to gain media attention out of all proportion to its actual effect." The Court per the Chief (for Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Jackson) holds that § 1512(c)(2) (enacted in Sarbanes-Oxley) is not a general obstruction statute but is limited to obstruction via doing something to things used in the proceeding, as in § 1512(c)(1). Because Fischer is a January 6 defendant, NBC News interrupted local programming to announce the decision, then say they have no idea how it will affect Trump or any other defendants. According to Ryan Goodman at Just Security, it affects at most 6 % of cases (many of whom may not push the issue) and it does not affect Trump.

Two points about the decision.

• The majority relies on two canons of construction--ejusdem generis (interpret a general catch-all term by reference to the specific terms preceding it) and noscitur a sociis (give a word more precise content by the neighboring words associated with it). I agree with Justice Barrett's dissent (for Sotomayor and Kagan)--neither applies to distinct provisions as opposed to a catch-all word at the end of a list within one provision. But what about in pari materia, requiring that distinct provisions on the same subject be read together? Wouldn't that provide a basis to understand the broad language of (c)(2) in light of the limitations in (c)(1)?

• The case adds a new entry into the jurisprudence-of-sport canon--and perhaps demonstrates the problems when judges talk about sports.

The Chief introduces the following rule in football: A player may not "grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise attack, assault, or harm any player.” The Chief insists the "otherwise" clause cannot reach a linebacker trash-talking and hurting the feelings the quarterback, as the otherwise clause must be understood in reference to the dangerous conduct in the prior provision. Justice Jackson concurred to add that the rule cannot reach conduct at the other extreme--a player murdering or poisoning the quarterback would not violate the rule because such conduct is for the criminal law, not the rules of football.*

[*] I think this is wrong. If the linebacker shoots the quarterback, the game would stop and the linebacker would be arrested. But when the game resumes some time later, I would expect the refs to penalize the linebacker's team under this rule, as he did "otherwise attack, assault, or harm" another player. In a less absurd example, imagine the linebacker repeatedly punches the quarterback to the point of unconsciousness. The refs would apply the "otherwise attack, assault, or harm" rule to penalize him as part of the game in the moment, then the criminal law would step in following the game. (This is how it has worked in the rare cases in which states have brought criminal charges for on-field conduct).

Barrett has the better argument on this. The connection between the two provisions of the football rule is closer than between (c)(1) and (c)(2). The football rule reaches all physical conduct directed at and injurious of a player--the first part prohibiting conduct against the player's equipment and the second prohibiting other physical conduct against the player. Section (c)(1) targets objects in the proceeding while (c)(2) targets the proceeding itself.

Barrett then offers her own football rule (she did teach at Notre Dame, after all) and does a better job of it by coming up with a football rule that mirrors § 1512(c):

Any player who:

    (1) punches, chokes, or kicks an opposing player with the intent to remove him from the game; or

    (2) otherwise interrupts, hinders, or interferes with the game,

shall be suspended.

The first clause deal with attacks on the player (which would interfere with the game) while the second deals with acts other than attacking an opposing player that also interfere with the game, such as tackling a referee. Similarly, § (c)(1) deals with attacks on documents that interfere with the proceeding while (c)(2) deals with other acts interfering with the proceeding.

Again, maybe judges need to stop talking about sports.

Update: A reader points me to the opening scene of The Last Boy Scout with Bruce Willis, in which a running back shoots the defenders trying to tackle him as he carries the ball. I added the video after the jump.

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 28, 2024 at 03:06 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 26, 2024

No standing in jawboning case (Updated)

Murthy v. Missouri--6-3, per Barrett, finding that any injuries were not fairly traceable to the government defendants; Alito dissents for Thomas and Gorsuch.

• The decision limits these massive kitchen-sink, lots-of-plaintiffs/lots-of-defendants/lots-of-bad-conduct constitutional claims--a record of undifferentiated "stuff that looks bad" is not sufficient to get a broad injunction stopping the government from engaging in future conduct.  Instead, plaintiffs must show "a particular defendant pressured a particular platform to censor a particular topic before that platform suppressed a particular plaintiff's speech on that topic." These plaintiffs encountered two further problems--1) any (questionable) past injuries were merely evidentiary on claims for prospective relief but could not themselves establish standing; 2) they needed to link the government defendants' actions to those of the non-party social-media sites, a longer chain of causation. As Jonathan Adler puts it, the Court's message to litigants is "do the work" if you want to push aggressive legal claims.

• The decision will have cross-ideological effects, as liberal plaintiffs must similarly tailor their lawsuits. Of course, courts have hamstrung liberal plaintiffs for years, so this is nothing new for them.

• The case illustrates why standing makes no sense independent of the merits. Even for the one plaintiff (Jill Hines, a medical commentator) able to "eke[]" out a showing of traceability, the challenged conduct does not rise to the level of coercion that would violate the First Amendment. So talking about whether she is suffering an "injury" traceable to not-unlawful conduct as a basis to enjoin not-unlawful conduct seems like a waste of time. The essence of this decision is the plaintiffs sued the wrong people, which would be a merits decision in, for example, a tort claim. It should not be different in a constitutional action.

    Update: Michael Dorf argues that the majority hides within the standing analysis "a view on the merits--namely this: wherever the line between permissible jawboning and impermissible coercion lies, the sorts of actions taken by the Biden administration fall on the permissible side." But by framing this as standing, it leaves the Court room to find coercion in future jawboning efforts that go farther than this does.

    But this case and Michael's hypothetical future case both address the merits, distinguishable only by the facts and the constitutional line. Why is it not better for the Court to be honest about that, rather than disguising a determination that no rights were (or presently are) violated as the absence of jurisdiction.

    I wonder if the answer to the incoherence of standing is Thayerian judicial review. Courts will reach the merits more often, so review should be more deferential. Have to give that some thought.

• The Court recognized the standing of Louisiana and Missouri as nonsense. But here are the arguments the states tried to make: 1) States suffer an injury when sites moderated posts from state legislators; and 2) States suffer a sovereign injury when the federal government prevents their citizens from speaking to them and prevents them from hearing from their citizens. The latter is prohibited parens patriae in disguise. But it seems hard to square both arguments with the positions states and state officials took in Lindke and O'Connor-Ratcliff about the power of state officials to block citizens from social-media pages. Lindke made clear that officials do not want to hear from their citizens all that much. And under Lindke, which required the defendant to have the legal power and obligation to speak for the government, no legislator will be subject to suit because no individual legislator possesses that power or obligation. It seems hard to square the argument that states are injured if legislators cannot speak on social media with legislators are not sufficiently connected to the state when their blocking readers on social media.

• Although spread across two sittings, three cases--Murthy, NetChoice, and Vullo--danced around similar issues about the extent to which government can affect or influence one actor as it relates to the speech of others. We have two and await NetChoice. Alito's dissent linked them: He argued that the "censorship" (his word) here was as dangerous, if more subtle, than the action declared invalid in Vullo; and he argued that social media sites are more susceptible to government coercion because of their dependence on § 230 and susceptibility to antitrust suits. Might the latter point hint that the Court will declare the state laws in NetChoice invalid--with Alito placing his marker for a dissent arguing it is inconsistent to limit state power over site moderation to the detriment of particular speakers while leaving the federal government free to (indirectly) run roughshod over the same group of speakers.

• Will this bring the Fifth Circuit to heel--the second time in less than a month the Court has reversed, on standing grounds, an overbroad universal injunction in a conservative constitutional challenge to a Democratic administration, forum-shopped into the Fifth Circuit? I doubt it. (Note: Adler adds California v. Texas as another example of the Fifth Circuit ignoring traceability problems to pass on the invalidity of federal law).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 26, 2024 at 12:01 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 24, 2024

Tea leaves on gender-affirming care? (Updated)

SCOTUS granted cert in United States v. Skrmetti on whether Tennessee's ban on gender-affirming care for minors violates equal protection. This is a fool's errand, but I am trying to read the tea leaves on what it might do.

• The grant was narrow. It granted the petition of the U.S. on the equal protection issue as to Tennessee (where the Sixth Circuit held the bans were not gender-discriminatory and not subject to intermediate scrutiny). It did not grant (although it also did not deny) petitions from the private plaintiffs, their due process and parental-rights arguments, or as to Kentucky's similar law. (Compare this with Obergefell, where the Court granted as to all four states whose laws were addressed in the lower court).

Update: I forgot an important piece, related to the fact that the U.S. is the sole plaintiff/petitioner before the Court. What happens if Trump wins the election, which likely will occur before argument (expect the case to be on the November or December calendar) and certainly will occur before a decision? The Court is suspicious of SGs changing legal positions with every new administration. But a Trump Administration could not act quickly enough to stop this litigation. How quickly can Trump get his AG confirmed?

• There is no direct circuit split (yet). A divided Court in April stayed a district court injunction barring enforcement of Idaho's ban pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit, although without getting deep into the merits and with a lot of scope-of-injunction noise; not sure how much to read into the merits there. The en banc Fourth Circuit held that states violate equal protection by denying Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming care. And the Eleventh Circuit held that an insurance provider violated Title VII in not covering an employee gender-affirming care. But no other circuit has ruled on care bans to minors. The Court typically does not take cases to affirm, absent an actual split between courts of appeals (not district courts). And it typically does not take cases anticipating a circuit split--i.e., reviewing (and affirming) the Sixth Circuit to head off the Ninth Circuit. Maybe this changes in the Court's Imperial Phase, more inclined to believe it knows the correct answer now and less inclined to allow multiple circuits to weigh on the other side before SCOTUS' ultimate resolution.

• This may be a test of Bostock and whether what remains of that majority (Chief, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and (presumably) Jackson in place of Breyer) holds and expands to the 14th Amendment.

I will go out on a limb: The Court holds that these bans constitute gender discrimination requiring intermediate/heightened scrutiny, then remand for the lower court to apply that. See you in about 10 months.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 24, 2024 at 12:43 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

The limits on judicial departmentalism

In response to Steve:

I agree it presents difficult line-drawing problems. There are prudential limitations--lawmakers should not do this lightly and perhaps requires some good-faith belief that the law should or might change. Two legal doctrines impose a drag on officials. A successful § 1983 plaintiff can recover attorney's fees under § 1988--this increases the cost of defending these laws by placing government on the hook for the plaintiff's legal fees if the courts ultimately declare the law constitutionally invalid. And state officials would lose on qualified immunity in a post-enforcement damages action--SCOTUS precedent clearly establishes most rights.* Elections and the electorate provide the ultimate check--a functioning polity (and yes, we do not have that in all respects now) might punish officials for wasting public money on performative legislation that loses in court and costs the state money in damages and funding litigation costs for both sides.

I take the point that those drags apply only where actual or threatened enforcement allows offensive § 1983 litigation, whether pre- or post-enforcement. This would be more difficult with Steve's example of a state reinstating capital punishment for minors. A defendant could not sue for damages over the decision to pursue the death penalty--prosecutors would enjoy absolute immunity for the litigation decision. An offensive EpY action also may be problematic, although this is a tricky question. A minor not yet subject to a capital prosecution would lack standing; someone facing an ongoing capital prosecution could be Younger barred from going to federal court ("could" because a capital prosecution contradicting binding precedent might fit within Younger's "flagrantly unconstitutional" exception). In any event, a truly brazen example such as this would be litigated to an immediate, potentially pre-trial answer in the first case in which the state sought the death penalty against a minor (assuming case fits, as I think it would, in Cox Broadcasting's fourth finality category of seriously eroding federal policy if SCOTUS must await final judgment).

The capital-punishment example raises concerns for injuries--minors pleading out or spending time on Death Row until SCOTUS resolves (again) the constitutional issue. This warrants a few responses.

    1) Those costs exist in every period before SCOTUS decides any constitutional issue. Not to minimize, but they are inherent in the system of constitutional litigation. Minors sat on death row before Roper; I doubt they were less injured than any minors placed on death row while the state attempts to relitigate Roper. Especially were SCOTUS to overrule Roper and affirm the propriety of those sentences.

    2) They assume lower courts will ignore Roper, allow capital prosecutions of minors, and sentence minors to death. I instead would expect lower courts to apply Roper, bar the capital portion of the prosecution, and force the state to appeal to SCOTUS for new precedent.

As for where it ends, it may not not have an "end," so long as we tie constitutional decisionmaking into adversarial litigation and require some mechanism for reconsidering precedent. The alternative is that rights-increasing constitutional precedent survives forever (unless overruled by constitutional amendment).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 24, 2024 at 11:29 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 21, 2024

Judicial departmentalism and the Ten Commandments

A quick word on the new Louisiana law allowing a sect-specific version of the Ten Commandments in all public-school classrooms.

The governor and legislature acted in a legitimate way. They believe the law constitutionally valid and acted on that view, even if that view runs contrary to binding SCOTUS precedent. And they acted in something other than a purely performative, wasting-taxpayer-dollars way, to the extent they believe (not unreasonably) that the current Court might overrule Stone.

Critics must wrestle with this problem: If Louisiana did not or cannot do this, a court could never reconsider or revisit precedent. It takes a new law or enforcement of an old law to create new litigation allowing the court to resolve the constitutional question and to change the law if it sees fit. If a state cannot do this, decisions declaring that government cannot do something are set in stone (no pun intended) and never can be changed. Whatever one thinks of the constitutional validity and/or wisdom of these displays and whatever one thinks about whether the Court should reconsider Stone, it cannot be that any judicial precedent lies procedurally beyond reconsideration.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 21, 2024 at 12:32 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Fifth Circuit overrules Ex parte Young

Exaggerating only slightly in Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg. Groups brought an EpY challenge to Texas's bullshit post-2020 "election integrity" law, including through some criminal prohibitions. They initially sued the attorney general, but the Texas Supreme Court held that the power to bring criminal charges rested with local prosecutors, not the AG. So plaintiffs amended to add the DA of Harris County (includes Houston). But the Fifth Circuit held that the DA does not fall within EpY (and thus has 11th Amendment immunity from the § 1983--some statutory claims remain) because: 1) Ogg has general discretion to bring criminal charges and no specific obligation to enforce the challenged statute; 2) her specific duty is to do justice, not to enforce criminal laws through convictions; 3) Ogg has never enforced the challenged law (the lawsuit was filed six days after it took effect) and has agreed not to enforce during litigation.

If not making EpY actions impossible, it offers state officials a roadmap for how to get out of it.

• The court requires that every provision impose a duty on a particular officer to enforce that provision. The DA's general obligation to enforce "criminal laws" is insufficient. But most states do not legislate that specifically. Worse, Texas law generally obligates DAs to "see that justice is done," which is not a duty to enforce. Moreover, discretion is inherent in executive functions, especially prosecutions--the DA possesses some discretion on which cases to bring and when. So even the clearest connection between an official and a particular statute runs aground on that inherent discretion.

• The promise not to enforce is even more problematic. Whether an official will enforce a law is part of justiciability (especially standing); the court now imports that into EpY, exacerbating the conflation of these concepts. Even if this should be part of EpY, the analysis is circular. Ogg promised not to enforce while litigation is pending. But if that promise gets the target defendant out of the suit, the plaintiff has no one to proceed against in the EpY action--the promise not to enforce until the end of litigation ends the litigation.

• The promise not to enforce may not control if plaintiff's can point to enforcement history (again importing a piece of standing analysis). But the court emphasizes that Ogg had no history of enforcement because plaintiffs filed suit less than a week after the law took effect, leaving Ogg no opportunity to do that. The lesson: Do not pursue offensive litigation too quickly. Stated differently, if you use EpY too quickly, your EpY action will fail because the target defendant never enforced the law.

• The court cites Whole Woman's Health for the proposition that rightsholders are not entitled to bring pre-enforcement EpY challenges to all laws and that some constitutional rights must be asserted defensively. But WWH bars an EpY action against state officials who have no authority or obligation to enforce a challenged law that is subject purely to private enforcement; it does not purport to narrow EpY or to limit the right to bring pre-enforcement challenges to publicly enforced laws. And while some rights in some circumstances must be litigated defensively, a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a criminal law has never been one of them. At the same time, the court adopts a cribbed reading of the part of WWH that allowed medical professionals' claims against the licensing boards; it refused to credit as binding the fractured views of two four-person opinions.

So at least in the Fifth Circuit, rightsholders cannot pursue offensive pre-enforcement litigation against a law unless that law expressly imposes a non-discretionary duty to enforce on a specific official, the official does not agree to withhold enforcement until the end of the case, and the official has had time to enforce in the past and build a record of intention to enforce.

EpY aside, the case features some interesting appellate jurisdiction issues. Ogg appealed the denial of her sovereign immunity defense, which is generally subject to COD review. But plaintiffs asserted claims under the Rehabilitation Act, Voting Rights Act, and Americans With Disabilities Act, all of which (or at least arguably are--the court played coy as to all but the VRA) abrogate sovereign immunity; they argued that immediate review was improper here, since the case would not end if the court of appeals reversed and found sovereign immunity. The court also considered, but declined, to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the question of the plaintiffs' standing; Ogg argued that because standing and EpY turn on the same issues, the court should consider all.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 21, 2024 at 12:00 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 13, 2024

Paring back strange standing doctrines

SCOTUS decided FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine Thursday, holding 9-0 (per Justice Kavanaugh) that a collection of anti-choice doctrines lack standing to challenge FDA's expansion of Mifepristone availability.*

* And implicitly holding that the Fifth Circuit and the district judges within Texas are off the rockers, although that is unlikely to have any effect.

The case hints at paring back more strained forms of standing.

The Court emphasizes that the plaintiffs are unregulated parties seeking to challenge government regulation of others, requiring a "predictable chain of events." It refuses to accord standing to anyone who sees an increase in her workload or job burdens as a result of government policy (e.g., the doctors here alleging they will have to treat more patients suffering side effects of Mifepristone or firefighters alleging they will face more fires because government relaxes fire codes).

The Court cabins Havens "organizational" standing. An organization cannot claim standing because it diverts resources in response to the defendant's actions, as by spending money to oppose or work around some policy. The plaintiff organization in Havens (HOME) providing counseling services to homeeseekers; Havens injured HOME in that function by providing Black testers false information about the availability of housing. But Havens does not accord standing to any advocacy group that spends money or otherwise acts to oppose a policy. Note that this conclusion is cross-partisan. Immigrant-rights groups such as HIAS relied on a similar theory in challenging Trump's travel ban--they diverted resources to try to bring people into the country around the travel ban and to educate people about the new rules and limitations.

Finally, Justice Thomas concurs to reaffirm his stated distaste for third-party standing and to add associational standing (which he sees as another form of third-party standing) to his hit list. (He relies on an amicus brief by friend-and-spouse-of-the-blawg Andy Hessick of UNC). He links the expansion of (and thus defects in) associational standing to the problems of universal injunctions--protecting beyond plaintiffs, undermining FRCP 23, and creating preclusion problems. And he rejects any "practical" justifications for the vehicle. (Update: Andy and Michael Morley made the full critique of associational standing here.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 13, 2024 at 11:53 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 31, 2024

The end of the "obvious alternative explanation" on 12(b)(6)?

The idea of an "obvious alternative explanation"--introduced in Twombly and reified in Iqbal--does not fit the 12(b)(6) analysis. If all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor, it is incoherent to credit an alternative explanation; that requires drawing inferences for the defendant and rejecting as implausible those inferences for the plaintiff. That is, if the AG orders the arrest of thousands of Arab Muslim men from Middle Eastern countries in the months after 9/11, saying it is more plausible that he was motivated by a desire to protect the country rather than animus is to draw inferences for the defendant and against the plaintiff.

And it confuses students. Despite my emphasizing that it dropped out of the analysis for most lower courts, students run to it as part of the analysis. Worse, they use it as a basis to suggest different facts. ("The plaintiff alleged X, but a more obvious explanation is that unalleged Y is true, therefore complaint dismissed.").

On a day in which public attention focused on other legal matters, perhaps NRA v. Vullo interred "obvious alternative explanation" in the 12(b)(6) analysis. The NRA alleged the head of the state insurance regulator threatened to take (or promised to refrain from taking) unrelated regulatory actions against the companies if they cease doing business with the NRA. The state argued that the agency engaged in government speech in its press releases and that in meeting with insurers, the agency exercised regulatory authority to pursue violations and to offer leniency to resolve enforcement actions. But the Court could not "simple credit" the argument that "we're just enforcing the law" as an obvious alternative explanation, in light of other allegations taken as true and the obligation to draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff.

This may not mark any sea change in the Twiqbal analysis. The Court (including the liberal justices) may be more solicitous of the NRA's free speech claims than of 9/11-detainees' equal-protection claims during a national-security crisis or consumers' antitrust claims, and thus less solicitous of New York's obvious alternative explanations than of John Ashcroft or Bell Atlantic. The Court also does not follow obvious alternative to its real point of favorable inferences--"we cannot credit defendant's suggested inference from the alleged facts at this time." Instead, the moves to the need to accept pleaded facts as true, subject to what discovery may show those real facts to be. That is a different point.

Nevertheless, NRA at least offers plaintiffs a new argument that a court cannot grant a 12(b)(6) and dismiss a claim by accepting the defendant's best explanation for the facts alleged over the plaintiff's best explanation for those facts, where both explanations are independently plausible.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 31, 2024 at 02:34 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 28, 2024

Erie and the source of multi-part tests

Here is an under-discussed Erie problem: Whether, and how to analyze whether, a federal court must apply an atextual judicially created multi-factor balancing test over contrary state law. I thought of it in looking at this Third Circuit case that Eugene flagged. I wondered what courts had done in diversity cases and found this 2021 New Mexico case in which plaintiffs urged the court to apply the state near-absolute guarantee of anonymity in sexual abuse cases rather than the federal multi-factor balancing. The court's analysis, in language that would fail my Civ Pro exam, came in a footnote:

The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ request for “deference to the State of New Mexico's judicial system's ‘blanket finding’ that childhood sexual abuse survivors be permitted to remain anonymous until their trials.” Doc. 33 at 4. When exercising its diversity jurisdiction, this Court must apply New Mexico substantive law. See Hayes Family Tr. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 845 F.3d 997, 1005 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965)). But this mandate does not allow Plaintiffs to argue that this Court should defer to a state court procedural practice. Federal courts are bound to follow federal procedural law. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465 (1965).

This case and the general problem provided two insights on Erie.

First, when courts make the "federal courts apply federal procedural law" move, they mean federal courts apply the FRCP or other statutorily created procedural law. That is the lesson of Hanna--the Erie doctrine does not act as a "check" on the FRCP. But Hanna requires a different approach (and perhaps conclusion, although not in Hanna itself) when the federal rules--including procedural laws--derives from a source other than the FRCP. Courts have unfortunately (and inaccurately) short-handed the analysis. But I think that is the idea they are getting at.

Second, courts have not identified clear rules for determining when an atextual judicial gloss derives from sparse statutory text (and thus becomes part of the text) and when it reflects judge-made common law. That distinction determines whether the federal standard certainly applies under the REA (because no federal rule is invalid) or whether the court performs a far less certain "relatively unguided Erie" analysis that is more likely to require it to apply state law. This was the point of departure between Ginsburg's majority and Scalia's partial dissent in Gasperini--whether the judicially created "seriously erroneous result"/"miscarriage of justice" standard for new trials derived from an interpretation of FRCP 59(a) (Scalia) or whether the courts created it to fill statutory gaps (Ginsburg). But neither explained why their preferred understanding was correct. But it is not always obvious. Why is Twiqbal plausibility an interpretation of FRCP 8(a)(2) while the four-part Winter test for a preliminary injunction is a stand-alone test independent of FRCP 65? (the latter one is historical and predates the FRCP, but the point stands).

Although not explicit and not framed in these terms, courts seem to understand the multi-factor balance for pseudonymity as an interpretation and thus part of FRCP 10(a), which requires that the case caption include the party names. The Third Circuit explained: 1) "Rule 10(a) requires parties to a lawsuit to identify themselves in their respective pleadings" and 2) "[w]hile not expressly permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), in exceptional cases courts have allowed a party to proceed anonymously." It follows (although the court did not say this much) that the balancing of nonexhsaustive competing interests for and against anonymity implements FRCP 10. Again, however, it is not obvious why this is the case.

So how should the District of New Mexico have resolved the plaintiff's argument for applying the more plaintiff-friendly pseudonymity rule, beyond "we must apply federal procedure." It should have said that under the Rules of Decision Act, FRCP 10(a), as interpreted through the multi-factor balancing, constitutes an Act of Congress that "otherwise requires or provides" and serves as the rule of decision; as interpreted, it is sufficiently broad to answer the question of when a plaintiff can proceed pseudonymously. The court then should have analyzed whether the rule was valid under § 2072--whether it really regulates procedure and whether it does not abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right. The answer would be "yes, it is valid," because every FRCP is valid. But the substantive policies underlying state law (protecting the privacy of sexual-assault victims and encouraging them to come forward) would have forced the court to either rely on "incidental effects" on substantive rights being permissible or adopt the Scalia view that a procedural rule never, in any meaningful sense, can AEM. Either way, that analysis is a lot more complicated than the footnote allows.

And what if the multi-factor test were not part of FRCP 10? The unguided Erie analysis must consider whether ignoring state law would cause the "character or result" to differ, whether a party might go to federal court to avoid less favorable state law, and whether the state law is "bound up" with substantive policy. That analysis usually points towards state law and probably would here--a defendant might remove to avoid automatic pseudonymity and the state law has underlying substantive concerns.

But this example shows why "apply federal procedure," without more, cannot be the extent of the analysis. A litigant-name rule is unquestionably "procedural"--it relates to the manner and means through which rights are enforced in court. But if the conflict with state law comes from a federal legal rule unmoored from the FRCP, the federal court may be required to apply that state law.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 28, 2024 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 22, 2024

Shadow Docket Sunlight Act of 2024

Introduced by Sheldon Whitehouse with a number of Dem co-sponsors. It requires disclosure of votes and at least one written opinion for the Court explaining any decision granting, denying, or vacating injunctive relief or vacating a stay of injunctive relief. The bill makes clear this covers cases within the Court's appellate jurisdiction and thus is an exercise of the exceptions-and-regulations clause.

Two thoughts.

1) Different complaints about the Court trigger different solutions--and those solutions may contradict one another. The need for transparency on the shadow docket requires opinions and vote counts. But the need to get the Court to act  less like a body of self-serving individuals requires eliminating vote counts and limiting opinions.

2) Attempts to control what, when, and how the Court reaches and explains its judgments presents an interesting question about the line between Congress' exceptions-and-regulations power and the "judicial power"/Klein/dictating case outcomes principle. Previous discussions have focused on whether Congress can stop or limit the form and content of opinions; this bill presents the flip side of whether Congress can require opinions. But both go to the same idea--how much can Congress control the presentation of a decision once made.

I expect to use this in Fed Courts in the fall, even if it has no chance of ever becoming law.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 22, 2024 at 04:42 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Judge Reeves on Qualified Immunity (Updated)

Judge Reeves offers his second judicial takedown of qualified immunity. He hits the usual hits--atextual; ahistoric; fails to achieve supposed policy goals; contrary to intended text; judicially created and silently modified; a tool for injustice; inconsistent with every other area of law (e.g., a physician cannot avoid malpractice liability because no court of appeals had imposed liability on another physician who made that precise mistake). Shout-outs to the work of Alex Reinert, Joanna, Schwartz, Will Baude, Karen Blum, Andrew Pollis, and others, as well as to the string of the most absurd cases in which courts found QI. Reeves adds a new tool to his argument--Dobbs and why Justice Alito's arguments justifying overruling Roe provide stronger justification for overruling the entire QI line. For example, if women lack an abstract reliance interest in the ability to control their lives by controlling when and if to have children, police officers lack such an abstract interest in being able to violate the Constitution.

The puzzle comes at the end. Describing what he calls a "more democratic vision," Reeves argues that courts must "tell the jurors the truth." He lists a series of points on which jurors should be instructed--police may act in split-second, rapidly evolving circumstances; the law gives less deference to officers who engage in a pattern of misconduct or who act in a calculated fashion with advice of counsel; unnecessary suits against public officers divert energy and attention from the public business and deter qualified people from entering public service. The jury should be able to resolve these tensions and contradictions on a case-by-case basis.

But where is he getting this from? Is it tied to the constitutional right--the officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment in that fast-moving situation? Or does this retain the basic idea of qualified immunity (an officer avoids liability for policy reasons despite violating plaintiff's rights) but place the decision in the jury's hands? If so, the same criticisms remain--this sort of immunity has no basis in law, and putting the balance in the "more democratic" hands of the jury does not change that. Reeves wants "the People" to resolve the contradictions in "America's DNA," although without any actual law or legal basis for doing so. This new approach retains the analytical gap between when an officer can be liable for damages and when he can be liable for an injunction--a gap that similarly has no legal basis.

The opinion is a tour de force in identifying and illustrating, in plain language, the absurdity of modern qualified immunity. It has some unnecessary hyperbole--a reference to Southern trees bearing strange fruit and to the 3/5 compromise--but I'll law allow it. But the opinion also highlights problems in the "get rid of qualified immunity" discussion. What, if anything, replaces it--strict liability (as exists for prospective relief)? a different form of qualified immunity more in line with 1871 common law? narrower substantive constitutional rights? something else? And where does the replacement come from--if the Court does it, the  atextualism objection remains. Can we reform qualified immunity without addressing the other two legs of Judge Ho's "unholy trinity"--prosecutorial immunity and Monell?

The opinion offers an additional insight that I had not considered--its place in the backlash to the Civil Rights Movement, particularly to civil disobedience and public protest. Pierson v. Ray introduced qualified immunity (common law good-faith-and-probable-cause) in an April 1967 case arising from the arrest of several Black ministers who entered a segregated bus-terminal waiting area. The Court (except Justice Douglas) lost its stomach for protecting civil rights and undoing Jim Crow when it came to imposing damages on Southern officers enforcing constitutionally dubious laws against people who knowingly and intentionally violate those laws for political purposes. We might see Pierson of a piece with Walker v. City of Birmingham, decided two months later, where the Court applied the collateral bar rule to a First Amendment challenge to those who ignored a nakedly racist injunction against a public march. Or Adderly v. Florida (earlier in the term), rejecting a right to protest on the driveway of a county jail. Although raising distinct legal issues, all reflect the Court allowing government greater leeway and authority in stopping public protests.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 22, 2024 at 11:57 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 08, 2024

TikTok ban and 3-judge district courts

TikTok challenged the new law banning it (at least with Chinese ownership), alleging violations of the First Amendment, equal protection, bill of attainder, and taking. Pursuant to § 3(a) of Division H of the Act, it filed the petition with the D.C. Circuit.

Congress essentially adopted for challenges to the statute the procedure for challenges to regulations implementing and enforcing the statute. But reviewing regulatory action looks appellate, while reviewing the validity of enforcing legislation involves an exercise of original jurisdiction, including taking evidence about standing (unfortunately) and the plaintiff's factual allegations about things such as the impossibility of compliance and the effect on speech. And Congress had such a process if it wanted quick multi-judge review--3-judge district courts.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 8, 2024 at 08:58 AM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 01, 2024

Judge sanctioned for handcuffing teenager

In March 2023, Steve and I had an exchange about Judge Benitez (S.D. Cal.), who probationee's daughter handcuffed and placed in the jury box during a revocation hearing, purportedly to teach the girl a life lesson. Steve and I debated whether judicial immunity would protect Benitez in a damages action and Steve worried that he would suffer no real consequences.

Fourteen months later, we have something: The Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit reprimanded Benitez; prohibited Benitez from taking new criminal cases for three years;* and allowed defendants in pending or future probation-revocation hearings to move to recuse Benitez, with the motion going to the Chief District Judge.

[*] Relatively meaningless, because Benitez took senior status in 2017 and no longer takes new criminal cases.

I leave it to those who study judicial ethics to opine on whether any of this constitutes "real consequences."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 1, 2024 at 04:04 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 30, 2024

Except when they're not really questions

Gerard should be right. The problem is that many questions in oral argument are not really questions. They are statements of the justice's views or thoughts or arguments about the case. And many of those views and thoughts are so off the wall as to look less like devil's advocate and more like justices flirting with (what the panicking folks regard as) troubling ideas. Or it reflects their willingness (if not intention) muck up the timing of the prosecution to do more than is necessary in the case. And while it has always been thus, it seems to be getting worse. Or the presumption of good faith surrounding the Court has so disappeared that we cannot come back--everyone assumes the justices have made up their minds and their questions are designed to further and defend their determined positions.

And this is non-partisan. Consider the EMTALA argument. Some people highlighted the eight pages of exchange (beginning on p.104) between Justice Alito and Elizabeth Prelogar, in which Alito suggested that EMTALA does not protect abortions because the unborn child is identified in the statute. It is a textually awful argument and Prelogar explained how it misreads the text and the logical end of the underlying premise. But at least Alito gave Prelogar a chance to answer, at length, pushing back when he did not like what she said. Contrast that with the five-ish pages (beginning on p.14) between Justice Sotomayor and Joshua Turner. Sotomayor began with a long hypothetical about a state prohibiting the use of insulin to treat diabetes, complete with details about the medical problems that would result, then never gave Turner a chance to offer more than a sentence in response--the colloquy ended when the Chief jumped in to get Turner to complete his answer.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 30, 2024 at 11:47 AM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 18, 2024

More zombie laws

Dara Purvis (Penn State) in the Conversation. She makes two points of note: One is a 2015 (12 years post-Lawrence) attempt in Louisiana to enforce a prohibition on same-sex sex--permissible under departmentalism, but a political problem to be sure. She also discusses the failed Arizona attempt to repeal the 1864 law, in which some Republicans joined with Democrats in the effort. Dara describes the many zombie laws and what legislatures can do. But it is worth highlighting Virginia's comprehensive effort to scour the statute books and find all the Jim Crow laws that should be repealed.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 18, 2024 at 04:53 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Why Roe is different

When SCOTUS decided Dobbs, I wondered what made it "unprecedented," as pro-choice critics argued. It was not overruling precedent simpliciter, because the Court had overruled other precedent. It was not overruling precedent to limit a right, since the Court had overruled other rights-creating precedent (Lochner, death penalty, and some crim-pro protections).

While doing an interview about the Arizona case, I think I hit on what might be different: The massive number of zombie laws, many more than 100 years old, that Dobbs reanimated. Abortion raises two related features: 1) the large number of old laws dating back to a prior understanding of medical science and a prior perspective on women's bodily autonomy and 2) the large number of abortion laws, many inconsistent or contradictory, that states enacted between 1973 and 2022 to test Roe or to prepare for its demise. Courts must now sort laws out. Women, providers, and advocates to understand a confusing landscape. The same thing did not happen after West Coast Hotel. And probably would not happen if the Court overruled Brown, New York Times, or Obergefell.*

[*] Many zombie anti-SSM provisions remain, including in state constitutions. But the issue is more straight-forward compared with the myriad laws and ways to regulate abortion.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 18, 2024 at 09:31 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)