Friday, November 01, 2019

Fun with diversity (Updated)

Two fun news stories on diversity.

1) President Trump announced yesterday that he was changing his domicile from New York to Florida, although he insists he enjoys living in the White House and plans to continue to do so for another five years. The jurisdiction essay for spring 2017 had Trump attempting to remove Summer Zervos' lawsuit; the best answer was despite having moved to Washington and owning property in Florida at which he spent a bit of time, he remained a New York citizen and was barred from removal by the Forum Defendant Rule.

So has Trump affected a change of domicile with his announcement, seeing as how he owns property and spends some part of the year in Florida? Or does he need to be present there more permanently after leaving the White House? Better still, does his stated desire to remain the White House five more years suggest an intent to remain (and thus a change to DC), at least for now?

2) I got a call from a journalist about this one. An insurance company filed suit against a Washington, D.C.-based law firm (a limited partnership). The firm moved to dismiss because it has a London office and a partner a U.S. citizen) who moved to London to staff the office, has been there for five years, and intends to remain in London for the foreseeable future, while keeping his U.S. citizenship. Because that London partner is domiciled in the U.K. while remaining a U.S. citizen, he is "stateless" for diversity purposes. And because a partnership takes on the citizenship of all partners, the partnership is stateless for diversity purposes. Thank you, Elizabeth Taylor.

I could not tell the reporter whether this was unusual or whether it was an increasing trend. The firm's motion cites a 1990 case from the Second Circuit holding that Sullivan Cromwell could not be sued in diversity because of its U.S.-citizen partners staffing overseas offices.

What I cannot figure out is why the firm (which filed its own suit in state court) would rather be in NC state court against a NC-based insurer. It is both an outsider to the state and a defendant, the two groups who generally want to be in federal court.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on November 1, 2019 at 01:58 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, October 30, 2019

JOTWELL: Mullenix on Choi on class-action mega fees

The new Courts Law essay comes from Linda Mullenix (Texas), reviewing Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, and Adam C. Pritchard, Working Hard or Making Work? Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Fees in Securities Fraud Class Actions, which examines "mega fee" awards in class actions.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 30, 2019 at 11:36 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Capping off a year in a yarmulke

Sunday marked one-year (on the Western calendar) since the shooting at Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh. Today marks one year since, in reaction, I began wearing a yarmulke.

So what have I learned after a year?

• While I said at the time I did not know how long it would last, I am happy to say I have no plans to change. My daughter's Bat Mitzvah was in January and we have leftovers to keep my head covered for another 25 years. The expression of Jewish community and the sense of humility before Hashem represented by the head covering (and awareness of it--I always feel it there) remain and I do not intend to give them up.

• Strangers become friendly. There is "The Nod" from other Jews, even more-observant Jews in tzitzit; several have struck up conversations in airport security lines. A person approached me on the street once to say "God bless you." And I cannot forget the Lyft driver in Boulder who wished me a "Happy Shabbat Shalom," earning high marks for effort.

• My students enjoy the many times it flies off during class.

• I continue to struggle with the idea that wearing a yarmulke means I must refrain from certain activities or at certain times--driving on Shabbat, eating non-kosher food, etc. My rabbi explained it by the concept of not leading others into sin--by eating at a certain restaurant or driving on Saturday afternoon, I send an erroneous signal to other Jewish people that it is ok to engage in those activities, which may cause them to do so. Others explain it as sending mixed signals to the world--how can this Jewish person do that?

The rabbi's solution is to wear a hat over the yarmulke when he eats in a non-kosher restaurant or drives on Saturday, which I do at times. Even if I do not refrain, I am conscious of engaging in certain conduct while wearing it. I did not order shrimp in a restaurant last week because I thought of how it would read to my (non-Jewish) companions. On the other hand, the principle seems under-inclusive: Why do these obligations attach to this expression of Jewish identity but not others; why does more-observant Jewry define the obligations that attach to different Jewish symbols. As I said, I have been thinking about this for a year and I do not believe I am closer to an answer. I mostly live my life as before, but with my head covered.

• I am conscious of walking into some truly non-Jewish spaces, such as my daughter's Episcopalian school. I am not conscious in "mixed" spaces. As I said, living my life as before, but with my head covered.

• I will be reading Torah at the weekly minyan in a few weeks. The rabbi chose the story of Joseph and his coat, which speaks to a piece of this--the idea of clothing and how we dress instilling humility. Or, in Joseph's case, not, prompting his brothers to throw him in a hole and sell him into slavery.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 30, 2019 at 09:31 AM in Howard Wasserman, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, October 26, 2019

Baseball and politics, again

The Astros win in Game 3 last night means there will be a Game 5 in Washington Sunday night, which means a game attended by President Trump (although not to throw out the first pitch).

Question to watch: Will fans boo trump, chant "impeachment" or "Ukraine," or otherwise criticize the President? And how will MLB and the Nationals respond?

Update: MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred golfed last week with Trump and Lindsey Graham. I think I have my answer to the third question.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 26, 2019 at 02:03 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, October 25, 2019

Aaron Sorkin wrote Donald Trump, Example No. 31

I have argued before that Aaron's Sorkin's The West Wing reflects and lauds the politics practiced in the Trump White House, albeit in service of different substantive policy ends. The latest example is the announcement that the White House would cancel subscriptions to The New York Times and Washington Post and was ordering agencies and departments to cancel their subscriptions.

In one episode of The West Wing, President Bartlet and C.J. Cregg are mad about coverage of the administration by reporter Danny Concannon and his paper (I do not remember if it was the Post or a fictional paper). In a meeting among the three, Bartlet announces that he is canceling "our" subscription to Danny's paper. C.J. applauds the move as a way to damage the paper financially. Bartlet then reveals that he was speaking only of his personal subscription, not the governmental subscription, which disappoints C.J.

The point is that Sorkin liked the sort of politics in which the government punishes critics financially, in a way that would worsen the effectiveness of government (if we believe that staying abreast of the news is important for government officials). C.J. is the POV character in that scene and she is incensed that Bartlet will not do more to sanction and financially injure the paper and his critics.

Nor does this explanation cut it:

The difference is that Bartlet was a good president, who was prone to being occasionally snitty. In contrast, Donald Trump is an awful president who routinely displays the immaturity of an infant.

That cannot be right. Either it is ok for a President to lash at his critics in this way or it isn't. Either it is ok to call political adversaries names or it isn't; either it is ok to strip press credentials from critical reporters or it isn't. Neither the political position nor perceived quality of the President and administration should make a difference.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 25, 2019 at 03:27 PM in Culture, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, October 23, 2019

Why not standing?

The problem with standing is not only that it is an improperly constitutiuonalized merits inquiry. It also is the inconsistency in the movement between standing and merits. Take this unpublished Third Circuit decision. Plaintiffs are anti-choice advocates who with to engage in sidewalk counseling through one-on-one conversations with entering clinic patients. The court performed a limiting construction on the statute, reading it (as it had done a similar ordinance in another case) as not reaching one-on-one sidewalk counseling.

But then shouldn't the result have been that the plaintiffs lacked standing? The conduct in which they intended to engage was not prohibited or regulated by the statute (as interpreted), so they were not suffering an injury-in-fact fairly traceable to the conduct of enforcing that statute, since that statute could not be enforced against them. At least that is how some courts resolve similar cases. And if not standing (as, normatively, it is not), that should mean that all of this is a question of the scope of the challenged law and the scope of constitutional rights?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 23, 2019 at 04:26 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 22, 2019

All apologies

A storm is brewing surrounding the Houston Astros and their assistant GM, Brandon Taubman. According to a Sports Illustrated report, during the post-game lockerroom celebration on Saturday night, Taubman yelled (several times) towards three female journalists "Thank God we got Osuna! I'm so fucking glad we got Osuna!" This is in reference to reliever Roberto Osuna, who served a 75-game suspension for domestic violence, before signing with Houston this year (the charges, in Toronto, were dropped when the Mexican-national accuser refused to travel to Canada to testify).

The Astros say the story is misleading, that Taubman was supporting the player during a "difficult time" and responding to the "game situation that just occurred," and that the remarks were not directed at any persons. The second point seems odd, because the game situation was that Osuna had blown a two-run lead in the top of the ninth inning, only to have the Astros win it in the bottom of the ninth; it seems odd to shout about being glad to have signed a player who almost gave a clinching game away. MLB announced an investigation into the incident.

Taubman issued the following through the Astros:

This past Saturday, during our clubhouse celebration, I used inappropriate language for which I am deeply sorry and embarrassed . . .In retrospect, I realize that my comments were unprofessional and inappropriate. My overexuberance in support of a player has been misinterpreted as a demonstration of a regressive attitude about an important social issue. Those that know me know that I am a progressive and charitable member of the community, and a loving and committed husband and father. I hope that those who do not know me understand that the Sports Illustrated article does not reflect who I am or my values. I am sorry if anyone was offended by my actions.

Yom Kippur, at which we think hard about apologies and what it means to apologize, has passed. But let's play with this.

What is Taubman apologizing for and how should we understand that apology? He is "deeply sorry" for his "inappropriate language," comments that were "unprofessional and inappropriate." But that is silly--profanity is quite common in sports and the three women, experienced sports reports, are used to hearing such language; it is not as if he swore at them. He apologized "if anyone was offended," the common non-apology-apology. Finally, he claims his statements have been misinterpreted. If so, how does that affect his apology. Should he have to apologize if he does not believe he did anything wrong? Do/must /should we apologize for someone else's misinterpretation or misunderstanding of our actions, actions that we believe were not wrong or harmful but that someone else has taken as wrong due to their mistake?

Update I: Marjorie Ingall of Tablet Magazine runs SorryWatch, a blog that analyzes apologies. She is not pleased.

Update II: The Astros GM Jeff Luhnow defended Taubman in a way that highlights my original question. Luhnow says we will never know the intent behind Taubman's inappropriate comments. Luhnow noted that Taubman apologized for his "inappropriate behavior" and for doing something that he regrets. But no one will say what that is--what was inappropriate and what does he regret? They are not helping themselves.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 22, 2019 at 06:43 PM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (4)

Universal injunctions and mootness

A divided Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the new regulations regarding the ACA contraception mandate. One issue in the case, which the court ordered briefed, is whether a universal injunction issued by a different district court (and affirmed by the Third Circuit) moots this case. Because the plaintiffs are protected by the other injunction, a Ninth Circuit ruling will not change their situation. (H/T: Brian Cardile of the Daily Journal).

The majority held the case not moot, although some of its analysis does not capture the issue. The court began by discussing the risk of conflicting injunctions, which is not the issue here--the denial of the injunction in the Ninth Circuit would not conflict in the sense of creating competing obligations--the Third Circuit injunction obligates (or restrains) the government from acting as to anyone in the universe, so nothing the Ninth Circuit does changes that. The court also spoke about the territorial limits about its injunction, ignoring that the issue is not geographic where but party who. It said that the injunctions "complement each other and do not conflict." In fact, however, it is not that they complement--it is that they repeat one another, because the Third Circuit universal injunction, which protects the California plaintiffs, renders a second injunction unnecessary.

The majority avoided mootness by applying capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review. The Third Circuit injunction is preliminary (thus of limited duration) and before SCOTUS on a cert petition, both of which could result in the vacatur of its injunction or at least of its universality. The injury would not be capable of repetition only if the Third Circuit turned this into a universal permanent injunction, which is speculative and far off.

Judge Kleinfeld dissented on mootness, standing, and the merits. As to the different injunctions, he gets it:

That nationwide injunction means that the preliminary injunction before us is entirely without effect. If we affirm, as the majority does, nothing is stopped that the Pennsylvania injunction has not already stopped. Were we to reverse, and direct that the district court injunction be vacated, the rule would still not go into effect, because of the Pennsylvania injunction. Nothing the district court in our case did, or that we do, matters. We are talking to the air, without practical consequence. Whatever differences there may be in the reasoning for our decision and the Third Circuit’s have no material significance, because they do not change the outcome at all; the new regulation cannot come into effect.

This is correct and a proper recognition of what happens when courts take universality seriously.

I am not sure if the proper conclusion is that the appeal becomes constitutionally moot (I am not a fan of justiciability doctrines). Or, as Sam Bray argues, this is a good reason the Ninth Circuit should have stayed its hand.

Update: I took a quick look at the Third Circuit decision affirming the injunction. It misses the point, talking about people who work in different states than they live and the problem of geographic limitations. Again, however, the problem is not where. A protected plaintiff (including a state) is protected everywhere.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 22, 2019 at 04:33 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, October 21, 2019

Why Yom Kippur

Writing on the lack of success enjoyed by Jewish players and their teams on the recent Yom Kippur, Tablet's Armin Rosen hints at an interesting question: Why the focus among American Jewry for players playing or not playing on Yom Kippur (and, to a lesser extent, Rosh Hashanah). Rosen points out that we do not care or expect players not to play on Shabbat, which is arguably more important within the faith.

One answer is the impracticality of a player not playing every Shabbat. The MLB regular season is built around series of 3-4 games, including series every weekend, Friday through Sunday. Except for the Cubs, virtually every Friday game is at night and some (although a smaller percentage) Saturday games are played during the day. Figuring four Fridays and Saturday per month in a six-month season, a Jewish player who would not play on Shabbat would miss 24--48 games. No player could do that and no team could afford to employ that player. Especially not the Cubs, who play most of their Friday and Saturday games during the day.

A second answer is this matches the Jewish calendar for many American Jews. Most do not observe Shabbat. Many who attend Shabbat services otherwise treat it as an ordinary weekend day--I attend morning services, but the rest of the day I might hold a make-up class, coach my daughter's basketball team (in a temple-sponsored league, no less), or spend the day writing. Shabbat is not, for most, a break in the calendar. Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are--schools are closed, many Jews do not work, and those are the two days on which a substantial portion of Jews go to synagogue. The logical leap--if I take this day off, so would a Jewish baseball player. Then it comes to the supposed Halachic difference between the joyous Rosh Hashanah and the somber Yom Kippur.

So fear not, Alex Bregman. Simcha Torah will be over before Game 1 begins tomorrow night.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 21, 2019 at 11:41 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, October 18, 2019

"Leavenworth" on Starz

This Sunday, Starz airs the first episode of the 5-hour documentary series Leavenworth, directed by Steven Soderburgh and telling the story of Lt. Clint Lorance. Episodes 3 and 5 feature FIU and my colleague Eric Carpenter (a former JAG officer); Eric is interviewed and the program includes footage of students mooting the case in his Military Justice class.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 18, 2019 at 12:31 PM in Criminal Law, Howard Wasserman, Television | Permalink | Comments (0)

More post-season infield flies

Twice in one night.

I missed this USA Today piece by Andrew Joseph arguing that the Nationals were lucky in their clinching Game 4 of the NLCS that infield fly was not declared on a run-scoring uncaught bases-loaded blooper to right field that scored the first of four first-inning runs. Joseph compares this with the infamous call in the 2012 NL Wild Card, arguing that the umpire was right not to invoke here, which shows why the 2012 call was wrong (he calls it a "fiasco"). (He provides video links to both plays, so watch for yourself).

I do not understand why the Nationals should be "thankful" the rule was not invoked. They scored one run on the play; that run scores anyway, since baserunners can run at their own risk when infield fly is declared. They scored three more runs in the inning subsequent to the fly ball. Two came on consecutive hits by the two batters following the fly ball, runs which would have scored anyway. The second out of the inning came on a sacrifice bunt by the pitcher, after which the fourth run scored on a hit. The Nats would not have had the pitcher bunt with two outs (as would have been the case had the rule been invoked, making the batter out for the second out of the inning). But who knows what would have happened in that at-bat were the circumstances different--maybe the pitcher is put out and the fourth run does not score, maybe the pitcher manages to get a hit. For that matter, the entire inning could have gone in any direction. The point is that it is not so obvious that an infield fly call would have killed the Nats' rally.

The comparison to the 2012 call is inapt, because the plays are different in significant respects. This year's ball was hit to right field while the 2012 ball was hit to left. Umpires are less likely to invoke on a ball to right field, especially near the foul line, because the first throw to start a double play would be so long that no double play is possible (thus the rule's purpose of preventing a double play by disincentivizing the intentional non-catch is not implicated); this was the area with the fewest infield-fly calls in every season I watched. The Cards' second-baseman also tried to catch the ball sideways, facing the foul line, body language that does not indicate that he was "settled comfortably" under the ball, which is what umpires look for. In 2012, the Cards' shortstop was facing the infield with his hands up, body language indicating he was settled and waiting for the ball to come down and calling his teammates off. The 2012 play owed, in part, to the foul-line ump's perspective--because of his position and perspective, the ump believed the ball was closer to the infield than it was, such that a double play might have been possible (thus the rule's purpose implicated). Or perhaps the ump on the 2012 call was a textualist (thus the call was indisputably correct), while the ump in 2019 was a purposivist (so the unlikelihood of the double play rendered the rule inapplicable).

Anyway, I thought we were past the point that this 2012 call was regarded as the Citizens United of baseball calls.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 18, 2019 at 01:20 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

The unknown nuances of the Infield Fly Rule

A play in the top of the 8th inning of ALCS Game 4 may have illustrated a finer point of the Infield Fly Rule. It also might have made the announcers' heads explode, had they been paying attention.

The Astros had bases-loaded/1-out when the batter hit a pop-up to the right of second base, about ten beyond the infield dirt. The Yankees shortstop, playing behind second, drifted back and to his left. He turned so he was facing the infield while backpedaling and waving his arms. At the last instance, he was called off by the charging right-fielder, who caught the ball about 15-20 onto the grass.

I do not know whether the umpires declared infield fly. The video does not show the second-base (and nearest) umpire and the announcers did not say anything (such as "infield fly rule is in effect", as they did on an obvious ball near the mound in the top of the 9th). It appears it should have been called: The second baseman was in position to catch the ball and while backpedaling a bit, he was moving less and less far than the infielders on dozens of plays I watched over seven seasons on which the rule was invoked. He was trying to wave-off his teammates. And the ball was close enough to the infield and to second base that a double play might have been in the offing without the rule.

Had the rule been obviously invoked, it would have illustrated an important principle under the rule: It can be invoked when an outfielder handles the ball, if the ball could as easily have been handled by an infielder. Which was the case here--the second baseman looked ready to catch the ball, until the right-fielder called him off and made the catch. And it would have sparked a fascinating (and likely ill-informed) discussion among the announcers about the rule, as they struggled to figure out and explain how IFR was invoked on a ball caught by an outfielder. Too bad; it would have been a fun discussion.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 18, 2019 at 12:05 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, October 16, 2019

JOTWELL: Bookman on new approaches to dispute resolution

The new Courts Law essay comes from Pamela Bookman (Fordham), reviewing Matthew Erie, The Emergent Landscape of International Commercial Dispute Resolution, ( Va. J. Int'l. L., forthcoming 2020) and Will Moon, Delaware's New Competition (Nw. U. L. Rev., forthcoming 2020), exploring new procedural mechanisms for handling business disputes in other countries.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 16, 2019 at 11:45 AM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 15, 2019

A progressive SCOTUS short list

The progressive group Demand Justice has issued a Supreme Court Shortlist, offering 32 names for SCOTUS appointments by a new Democratic President. It is an interesting list.

It contains only two federal court of appeals judges--Jane Kelly (8th Circuit, a short-lister for the Garland nomination), and Cornelia Pillar (D.C. Circuit). And not Patricia Millett of the D.C. Circuit, who had become the left's darling with her opinions in the undocumented-immigrant-abortion cases.

The list consists of 17 women and 13 men. Besides the two court of appeals judges, thirteen do some sort of public-interest representation, seven are in the academy,* four are on a state court (three on the Supreme Court of California, including Goodwin Liu, who Obama tried to put on the Ninth Circuit), four serve in elected or appointed office, and two serve on a federal district court. The organization expressly sought to move away from the former prosecutors and law-firm partners who have dominated among Trump appointees.

[*] Sharon Bloch (Harvard), James Forman, Jr. (Yale), Pam Karlan (Stanford), M. Elizabeth Magill (Provost at UVa, former dean at Stanford), Melissa Murray (NYU), Zephyr Teachout (Fordham), and Tim Wu (Columbia). Plus, Sherrilyn Ifill of the NAACP LDEF was on the faculty at Maryland and Rep. Katie Porter (Cal) was on the faculty at Iowa and Irvine.

The list is short on federal judicial experience, making it a throwback to a time when judicial experience was not regarded as essential to a SCOTUS seat and when service on a state court was respected judicial experience for that position. I wonder if this is a SCOTUS shortlist or a good place for a Democratic President to begin filling lower-court seats.

I am surprised our own Steve Vladeck did not make the cut. The combination of his scholarship, public advocacy, and recent litigation experience places him within the legal milieu reflected on the list.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 15, 2019 at 05:42 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (6)

LeBron James: Shut up and make trades

You would think that LeBron James--who has used his expressive platform more than most mega-stars and has been told on more than one occasion to "shut up and dribble"--would support an NBA colleague attacked for doing the same. You would be wrong.

Everything LeBron said could have been (and has been) applied to his statements on subjects such as Black Lives Matter, police violence, the killing of Eric Garner, etc.: 1) Morey was not educated on the subject (Taiwan Hong Kong) about which he spoke (while admitting it was just his "belief" that Morey was not informed); 2) people could be harmed as a result of his speech; 3) bad things can happen from the exercise of free speech and you cannot think only of yourself when deciding what to say, on or off Twitter. Ironically,the Morey tweet was supported people protesting in favor of democracy and who were subject to police violence--the very ideas James purport and support in his speech.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 15, 2019 at 07:10 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, October 13, 2019

When is it ok to miss an important ballgame?

On the heels of three Jewish players playing in late or elimination games on or after Yom Kippur comes a new controversy: Nationals reliever Daniel Hudson missed Game 1 of the NLCS (where he was not needed, as starter Anibal Sanchez took a no-hitter into the 8th inning) to be in the hospital for the birth of his daughter. Critics came out in force, not only from the Twitter cesspool, but from mainstream-media types and from former Marlins exec David Samson. Teammate Sean Doolittle defended Hudson with what should be the final word on the subject: "If your reaction to someone having a baby is anything other than, ‘Congratulations, I hope everybody’s healthy,’ you’re an asshole."

The criticism of players missing games in baseball and other sports to be there for childbirth (which my colleague Kerri Stone wrote about a few years ago) is fairly constant, at least if the game is important enough. So what would happen if a Jewish player did miss an important post-season game because of Yom Kippur? We assume that the player would be honored as Sandy Koufax and Hank Greenberg were (not only by Jews, but by all fans), but perhaps not. It is easy to reframe ESPN's Jay Greeson's tweet as "But if you're making $5.5 mil a year and your team needs you to close in the NLCS, well, I'd say go get 'em mom Rabbi."

This could go either of two ways.

Sports people are both religious and misogynist. So the trolls might forgive a player for missing for religious reasons (even a non-Christian religion) but not a player for doing the "woman's work" of being present for childbirth. Both Samson and Greeson qualified their stupidity by saying that if there were health problems with either Hudson's wife or the baby, it would be ok to miss; otherwise, this was a woman's job (never mind that childbirth, by induction, is a major medical procedure) and no reason for Hudson to be present.* Baseball also is steeped (some say stuck) in history. Koufax sat for Yom Kippur in 1965 and Greenberg sat in 1934 (and other years), so it would be consistent with that history for Bregman or Fried or Pederson to sit in 2019. But no one in 1965 or 1934 missed games to be with their wives during childbirth, so it is unique and new and unprecedented and scary and immasculating for anyone to do it in 2019.

[*] No one offered even a nod to a different need--taking care of his two extant children while their mother is in the hospital.

On the other hand, Greeson's touchstone was that Hudson's $ 5.5 million annual salary imposed an obligation to team uber alles. There is no reason to believe that obligation supersedes a player's commitment to his wife and children but not his commitment to his religious values. Or I would love to see Greeson and others twiste themselves into knots distinguishing the two. That we are living in a time of increased anti-Semitism does not help, especially on Twitter.

None of the current Jewish Major Leaguers appears especially observant (neither were Greenberg or Koufax) and none has shown an inclination to sit on the holy days. That is, of course, their choice. But if one did, I increasingly wonder what the public reaction would be.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 13, 2019 at 12:15 PM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (6)

Friday, October 11, 2019

Talking Infield Fly Rule in Pittsburgh

For those of you in the Pittsburgh area: I will be at White Whale Bookstore in Pittsburgh on Saturday evening, discussing my book on the infield fly rule  The event was organized in cooperation with the Sports & Entertainment Law Societies at Pitt and Duquesne. It runs 7-9 p.m. Earlier Saturday afternoon, I will speak at the fall meeting of the Forbes Field Chapter of the Society for American Baseball Research.

If you are in the area, please join us.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 11, 2019 at 09:31 AM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sports and Speech

I am watching the NBA/China controversy play out, as it has evolved from a simple tweet into a full-blown illustration of the role of speech within sports. From a free-speech (not to be confused with First Amendment, because I doubt there is state action to be found here, except by China) standpoint, the NBA and its teams have done everything wrong. From Commissioner Adam Silver trying to have it both ways ("we respect free speech, but what Morey did was wrong"), to teams removing fans from arenas, to a team PR person cutting off media questioning of players. The NBA apologized for the last one and said the team should not do that. But if the league is going through these contortions to cut-off speech, it should be no surprise that teams would follow suit in their own clumsy ways.

The interesting question is how far into the regular season this bleeds. China may form a unique chapter in the book on the subject of sport-and-speech I someday hope to write.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 11, 2019 at 07:51 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 10, 2019

Playing on Yom Kippur

Journalist Yair Rosenberg beat me to this, but: Three teams in MLB's post-season have a Jewish player, each Jewish player played either Tuesday night or Wednesday, and each team lost. Alex Bregman of the Astros played on Tuesday night and the Astros lost Game to even the series. Max Fried of the Braves pitched on Wednesday and gave up four runs in an inning-and-change as the Braves lost Game 5 and the series. Joc Pederson of the Dodgers played Wednesday evening in the Dodgers loss of Game 5 and the series.

So is the lesson do not play on Yom Kippur? It may not help. The Dodgers famously lost Game 1 of the 1965 World Series as Koufax sat, with Don Drysdale getting shelled and someone (stories vary as to who) joking that Dodgers manager Walter Alston wished Drysdale were Jewish.

One interesting question: In the era in which all post-season games are at night, what does it mean to play "on Yom Kippur"? Bregman played on Kol Nidre. But many (most) non-Jewish fans probably are not aware that the holy day begins at sundown; so had Bregman not played on Tuesday evening "because it is Yom Kipper," many people might have been confused. On the other hand, the Dodgers game began at 6:45 PDT, past the time that many Jews had broken their fasts (my Reform temple's break fast was at 6:30), so he was not playing on Yom Kippur, which also might have confused people.

Meanwhile, the Astros and Rays play Game 5 tonight. If the Astros lose, it will be our first all-Goyishe LCS and World Series in several years. The new is not all bad; win or lose, Bregman might win American League MVP, making him the fourth Jewish player to win an MVP (joining Greenberg, Koufax, and Al Rosen).

Update: The Phillies fired manager Gabe Kapler. Well, we ask who shall perish by fire.

[Further Update: The Astros won, with Bregman breaking the game open with a 2-run double in the first.]

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 10, 2019 at 05:09 PM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 07, 2019

Virginia has jurisdiction over Twitter in Nunes suit

It must be awful procedure day. In addition to whatever the Second Circuit did, a Virginia trial court denied Twitter's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction Cong. Nunes' suit against Twitter, a Twitter user, and Devin Nunes' Cow.

The court found "general personal jurisdiction" over Twitter, based on its being registered to do business in Virginia, having a registered agent in Virginia, deriving a large amount of revenue from there, and having many users in Virginia, "sufficient minimum contacts to confer jurisdiction." Perhaps in 2005, but not since Good Year, Daimler, and BNSF did away with general jurisdiction based on a company doing a lot of business in a state and seemed to limit general jurisdiction to state of incorporation and principal place of business. The court discussed BNSF to distinguish it based on the injury occurring in the forum state, but ignored the other two cases. It also emphasized that Nunes suffered an injury in Virginia (because that is where the tweets were sent from and read), while not mentioning that locus of injury is not sufficient and Twitter did not direct any activities (not deleting the tweets) at Virginia in relation to this case. Even if knowledge of the plaintiff's location were sufficient (it is not, after Walden), Twitter's assumption would have been that Nunes was in California or Washington, D.C., not Virginia.

The court also rejected a forum non conveniens argument, because it was not clear there was an alternative forum. It was not clear there would be jurisdiction in California, even though both Nunes and Twitter are from there and the individual defendant consented to jurisdiction there. (Nunes does not want to be in California, where he must deal with its SLAPP statute).

Someone said the judge has a reputation as being pretty good. This is not his best work.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 7, 2019 at 06:22 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

District court abstains in Trump subpoena case (Fast Update)

The Southern District of New York abstained under Younger from a federal lawsuit by the President seeking to stop enforcement of a New York grand-jury subpoena seeking 8 years of Trump tax returns and financial records. The court abstained in a meticulous Younger analysis, then explained why the President did not enjoy immunity warranting a preliminary injunction even if it kept the case. The Younger analysis is almost certainly correct. The President's attempt to create an exceptional-circumstances exception by analogizing his immunity to double jeopardy (which some courts have held as a basis for not abstaining) was interesting, but I think properly rejected.

Given Steve's thesis that Trump and his DOJ cannot stand passing through the court of appeals, next step SCOTUS on a petition for cert before judgment?

Quick Update: The Second Circuit stayed the decision. But what did it stay and what does it mean to stay it? The district court abstaining? It makes no sense to "stay" a decision declining to hear a case. The denial of the preliminary injunction, which was arguably dicta? What does the stay of the denial of an injunction do--it can't create the injunction, which was never issued (because the district court lacked the power to issue it). What the Second Circuit wanted to "stay" is the state-court subpoena, but it has no power to do that. Ah, procedure.

Further Update: The Second Circuit order states

Appellant has filed a motion seeking an order temporarily staying enforcement of a subpoena to his accountant. Because of the unique issues raised by this appeal, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a temporary administrative stay is granted pending expedited review by a panel of the Court.

So the court did stay the subpoena, not the district court order. I have had some conversations with Civ Pro colleagues and the general view is this makes no sense. Administrative stays are routine  as a precursor to turning the stay to a motions panel. But there is nothing to stay here. The court cannot "stay" a dismissal of an action or the denial of an injunction. Now there are mechanisms for the court to do this, namely under the All Writs Act as in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction. But that is not what Trump asked for (it requested a stay) and the court did not do the (I expect) more complex analysis required before issuing a writ. It seems as if the court took the usual approach to an unusual case. In the routine case, the district court enjoins enforcement of a law or reg and the court of appeals stays that injunction; here, it rotely applied that procedure in a situation that does not match.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 7, 2019 at 11:18 AM in Carissa Byrne Hessick, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

Sunday, October 06, 2019

So glad sports are not political

Houston Rockets GM last week tweeted "Fight for Freedom. Stand with Hong Kong." This pissed off Rockets owner Tilman Fertitta, who insisted that Morey does not speak for the Rockets, which is a "non-political organization," although Fertitta regularly publicizes his support for the Bushes and President Trump. Morey's tweet caused the Chinese Basketball Association, headed by former Rocket star Yao Ming, to suspend cooperation with the Rockets following Morey's "'improper remarks regarding Hong Kong' to which it expressed its 'strong opposition.'" The NBA, trying to save its business interests, responded with the following word salad:

We recognize that the views expressed by Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey have deeply offended many of our friends and fans in China, which is regrettable. While Daryl has made it clear that his tweet does not represent the Rockets or the NBA, the values of the league support individuals' educating themselves and sharing their views on matters important to them. We have great respect for the history and culture of China, and hope that sports and the NBA can be used as a unifying force to bridge cultural divides and bring people together.

The ESPN story highlighted the league trumpeting the "open flow of ideas," although those words appear nowhere in the NBA statement and the reaction by the Rockets owner, the CBA, and the NBA all seem to reflect a desire to staunch the flow of ideas, since the premise of every reaction is that Morey was out of line to tweet a political opinion. Plus, in what universe is a statement in support of people protesting freedom "regrettable"? And who was "deeply offended," besides the leaders of an authoritarian state that is the target of pro-western protests?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 6, 2019 at 10:03 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (8)

Friday, October 04, 2019

Tea leaves on the abortion case

SCOTUS granted cert in two related cases challenging Louisiana's admitting-privilege law. The Fifth Circuit had declared the law valid despite Whole Woman's Health, in which the Court declared invalid a similar Texas law, drawing some arguably specious distinctions. The Court (with the Chief joining Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) stayed the Fifth Circuit order and reinstated the injunction in February.

I have to think this is a reversal, because there is no meaningful way to distinguish this law from the Texas law in Whole Woman's. If Roberts wanted to take the air out of WWH and let the law take effect, he would have denied the stay and voted to deny cert. Now perhaps he is setting the Court to overrule Whole Woman's and this is a power move--"only we can ignore or overrule our precedent." But I would expect that Roberts values "institutionalism" enough that he would not want to overrule a three-year-old decision.

The Court did grant a cross-petition in the case to consider whether medical providers can so easily assert third-party standing on behalf of all current and potential patients. This was a point in Thomas's WWH dissent.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on October 4, 2019 at 11:09 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 30, 2019

Bleg: Great Recession and the Legal Academy

Can anyone point me to studies or articles on the slowdown in legal academic hiring during and just after the Great Recession?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 30, 2019 at 07:24 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, September 23, 2019

JOTWELL: Campos on Bartholomew on e-notice in class actions

The new Courts Law essay comes from Sergio Campos (Miami), reviewing Christine P. Bartholomew, E-Notice, 68 Duke L.J. 217 (2018), exploring the use (or non-use) of new technologies for providing notice in class actions.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 23, 2019 at 10:50 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, September 22, 2019

Minding the abstention gaps

I am trying to make heads or tales of this Third Circuit decision, which reveals some problems and holes in abstention.

A family court awarded custody of Malhan's children to Myronova, his ex-wife, ordered him to pay child and spousal support, and to give his ex rental income from their jointly owned properties. Malhan eventually received joint custody (and more than half of residential time) and the court ordered Myronova to return some money. But the court postponed a request to reduce child-support obligations until final judgment (which has not issued), although the children spend more time with Malhan and he earns less money than is ex. At one point Malhan stopped paying child support (in erroneous reliance on a comment by the judge), causing the court to garnish his wages. Malhan sued in federal court, challenging (among other things) the disclosure and administrative levy of his bank accounts, the garnishing of his wages (which order was vacated), and the refusal to allow the plaintiff to claim certain offsets and counterclaims in the state proceedings.

This type of case has been identified as the paradigm Rooker-Feldman case: A party claiming constitutional injury by the custody and similar orders of a state family court. And the district court dismissed the action on that ground. But the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff was not a state-court loser because there was no "judgment" from the state court, no order that was final as a formal or practical matter over which SCOTUS might have jurisduction under § 1257. The state proceedings are ongoing--motions are pending, discovery has not closed, no trial is scheduled, and the court has declined to give Malhan relief until that final judgment.

There is a circuit split was to whether Rooker-Feldman applies to interlocutory state-court orders. The Third Circuit adopted the textual argument to say no. RF is based on § 1257 giving SCOTUS exclusive jurisdiction to review state-court judgments; a district court thus lacks jurisdiction to review a challenge to a state-court judgment, which should instead be appealed through the state system and then to SCOTUS. On that view, RF does not apply to state-court orders that could not be appealed to SCOTUS, such as non-final orders.

The argument for RF barring challenges to interlocutory orders relies on the policies underlying RF that federal district courts should not interfere with state-court proceedings or be a forum for obtaining review and relief from state-court decisions. That policy is as offended by an attempt to circumvent state appellate procedure on an interlocutory order as on a final order. One could identify a textual component, tying it to § 1331 granting district court "original" jurisdiction, leaving them without power to, in practice, exercise appellate jurisdiction over a state-court order, even an interlocutory order.

The court rejected an alternate argument that the three claims were barred by Younger. None of the three claims fit the third Younger category of involving "certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." Count 2 challenged the administrative rules for collecting non-final money judgments; Count 5 challenged orders that are more like final monetary judgments and less like orders (such as contempt or appeal bonds) in furtherance of other judicial orders and thus enabling judicial functions. And the garnishment orders in Count 6 are threatened but not pending, thus federal jurisdiction would not interfere with state-court adjudication of those issues. The Younger analysis probably is correct, although the analysis as to Count 2 seems strained and the analysis and the analysis as to Count 6 suggests the challenge is moot, although the court strains to explain why it is not.

But the case produces a large abstention gap. An ordinary state-court interlocutory order in private civil litigation, one that is not akin to a contempt or appeals-bond order (orders that SCOTUS identified as enabling the state court to operate, as opposed to resolving the particular case), can be challenged in a § 1983 action. But Younger and RF together should mean that state courts must be allowed to decide the cases before them, without interference from federal district courts, subject to eventual review through the state system and to SCOTUS under § 1257. This case may allow substantial number of such cases into federal court.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 22, 2019 at 07:25 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, September 16, 2019

FIU Bar Passage

I do not know if I have ever done this before, but I wanted to highlight that FIU Law grads had a 95.7 % pass rate (111/116) for the July 2019 administration of the Florida Bar. A ton of credit to Louis Schulze, assistant dean for academic support, who does an amazing job working with students on how to learn and study, and Raul Ruiz, who runs our bar-prep program.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 16, 2019 at 10:46 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 12, 2019

Dorf on the irrepressible myth of the great scholar/bad teacher

My experience, as a student and faculty member, lines up with Mike's: I have had, as teachers and colleagues, many excellent scholars who also were also excellent teachers. And I would add another category: Great scholars who are not great teachers, but want to be  and, even well into their careers, think a lot about teaching and how to improve. The archetype of the "prof who can't be bothered with teaching" is not a thing--or no more of a thing than the insurance salesman who can't be bothered. There are always people who are not good at their jobs.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 12, 2019 at 04:48 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (13)

Asylum injunction stayed, everyone confused

Sam Bray and I agree on the impropriety of universal injunctions--I am the NAIA version of Sam as opponent of universality. But I disagree with Sam's suggestion that Thursday's SCOTUS order staying the asylum regulations portends the end of universal/nationwide/whatever injunctions. This case is too confused and too much of a procedural and analytical mess to be that vehicle or even the canary in the coal mine.

First, the unstayed injunction that reached SCOTUS had been narrowed in the court of appeals to be circuit-wide rather than nationwide. So nationwideness should not have been an issue in this case. The court was staying a narrow injunction against a federal regulation.

Second, both lower courts had entirely conflated the issues and analysis, I believe because they continue to use the wrong nomenclature. The result was a mess. The modified-but-unstayed injunction that reached SCOTUS protected the named plaintiffs (immigration-rights advocacy organizations) within the Ninth Circuit, making it over- and under-broad. It was overbroad  because it purported to continue to protect non-plaintiffs; it was under-broad in focusing on geography, thus failing to provide sufficient protection to these plaintiffs by not barring enforcement against them everywhere they might operate and be affected by the challenged regs. In fact, Tuesday's order from the trial court reimposing the "nationwide" injunction (by supplementing the record that the Ninth Circuit found failed to support nationwideness) applied the appropriate analysis: It focused on the extra-circuit activities of the four named plaintiffs, that they operated and were injured outside the Ninth Circuit, and thus needed protection in other states; no mention made of protection for non-parties, which is the real problem. And the Ninth Circuit one day later limited that new injunction to the Ninth Circuit--inappropriately, as there were findings that the organizations work outside the Ninth Circuit and thus needed the protections of the injunction outside the circuit.*

[*] The result of this circuit-only approach is that one plaintiff who operates in multiple states must bring multiple actions to obtain complete relief. What should happen is that one plaintiff should have to obtain one injunction for itself, protecting everywhere. The further litigation should be by other plaintiffs, obligated to obtain their own judgment and remedy.

Instead, this seems an example of what Steve wrote about in his forthcoming Harvard piece (which Sotomayor cites in her dissental): The government increasingly seeking, and gaining, extraordinary relief from the Court in constitutional-injunction cases, rather than allowing litigation to proceed in the lower courts. It reflects the Court's general opposition to injunctions against federal regulations (a concern that seems to have begun on January 20, 2017 and likely will end on January 20, 2021). Scope had nothing to do with it.

Process aside, I am not sure the result--stay of the injunction--is not appropriate. I like to apply the chaos theory to the stay question--would allowing the injunction to take effect create irrevocable chaos if the lower court is reversed. On that theory, for example, stays of injunctions were appropriate in the marriage cases, lest the state have to either rescind marriages or have some same-sex couples married by the fortuity of the time that litigation takes. On the other hand, the stay of the injunction was inappropriate in The Wall case, since the harm is irreparable if government funds are unlawfully spent and an environmentally harmful wall is even partially built. As for this case, while the asylum-regs are enjoined, the government must allow this class of people to seek asylum. But there will be chaos in handling this group of people if the injunction is reversed on appeal because the regs are found to be lawful, yet some asylum-seekers are present when they should not have been and would not have been but for the erroneous injunction. I have to think more about that.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 12, 2019 at 07:44 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, September 10, 2019

Root, root, root for the new citizens

Thoughts about nationalization ceremonies being held at baseball games? Too informal and non-serious? Does the "frivolity of hotdogs, peanuts and Cracker Jack" detract from the solemnity of the citizenship ceremony? Or is it a subtle recognition that baseball was, at least a century ago, the vehicle through which immigrants and new citizens became American (unfortunately, neither baseball nor welcoming new people to the American policy are as popular as they once were). And what if some jerks at the game decided to jeer or hold "go back where you came from" signs?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 10, 2019 at 02:36 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (4)

I am not alone

Here.

I would add that, based on Ferguson's description of the examples Gladwell uses in the book, he is again trying to squeeze widely disparate examples into a single category. The issue with Chamberlain/Hitler, Madoff, Sandusky, and Cuban spies is that they successfully lied to people about their actions or intentions. The problem with Bland was--at best--a racially charged, power-imbalanced confrontation between a police officer and a person of color--the kind that happens too frequently.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 10, 2019 at 10:06 AM in Culture, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, September 05, 2019

"We the People" on universal injunctions

The new episode of the National Constitution Center's "We the People" podcast featured Amanda Frost and I discussing and debating universal injunctions. It was a great conversation.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 5, 2019 at 11:43 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Under color?

An interesting under color question. The officers were in disguise (and thus out of uniform) and presumably off-duty. But their personal vendetta arose from their professional conduct as police officers about which the citizen-victim had complained. Could they have done this but-for their official position? Being police officers did not enable the conduct. But being police officers is the only reason they had to vandalize this guy's property.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 5, 2019 at 11:42 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, September 04, 2019

JOTWELL: Levy on Fisher and Larsen on virtual briefing

The new Courts Law essay comes from Marin Levy (Duke), reviewing Jeffrey L Fisher & Alli Orr Larsen, Virtual Briefing at the Supreme Court (Cornell L. Rev., forthcoming), exploring how online speech and writing affects SCOTUS decisionmaking.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on September 4, 2019 at 11:36 AM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 30, 2019

Declaratory judgments and injunctions

The Fifth Circuit held that due process was violated by a system in which some portion of cash bail was used to fund court expenses and the magistrate deciding bail sits on the committee deciding how money should be spent. The remedies portion states as follows:

After recognizing this due process violation, the district court issued the following declaration: "Judge Cantrell's institutional incentives create a substantial and unconstitutional conflict of interest when he determines [the class's] ability to pay bail and sets the amount of [*8] that bail."

That declaratory relief was all plaintiffs sought. They believed that section 1983 prevents them from seeking injunctive relief as an initial remedy in this action brought against a state court judge. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable . . . .").7

That statutory requirement reflects that declaratory relief is "a less harsh and abrasive remedy than the injunction." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 , 463 (1974) (quotation omitted); see also Robinson v. Hunt Cty., 921 F.3d 440 , 450 (5th Cir. 2019); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33 cmt. c ("A declaratory action is intended to provide a remedy that is simpler and less harsh than coercive relief . . . ."). Principal among its advantages is giving state and local officials, like Judge Cantrell, the first crack at reforming their practices to conform to the Constitution. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 470 .

One response to the declaratory judgment would be eliminating Judge Cantrell's dual role, a role that is not mandated by Louisiana law. In contrast, because Louisiana law does require that the bond fees be sent to the Judicial Expense Fund, LA. R.S. 13:1381.5(B)(2)(a) , the declaratory judgment cannot undo that mandate. Challengers did not seek to enjoin that statute, instead arguing only that the dual role violated due process. But given today's ruling and last week's in Cain, it may well turn out that the only way to eliminate the unconstitutional temptation is to sever the direct link between the money the criminal court generates and the Judicial Expense Fund that supports its operations.

I am unsure about the final paragraph. The challengers cannot "enjoin that statute" because courts do not enjoin statutes; they enjoin enforcement of statutes. The district court could have declared that the state-law mandate created the unconstitutional conflict of interest; to comply with that judgment, the defendants would have had to stop enforcing that statute, much as if they had been enjoined from enforcing.  The court issued a seemingly narrower declaratory judgment. Perhaps the point of the final sentence is that eliminating the defendant magistrate's dual role would not eliminate the constitutional violation, opening the door to an injunction because the defendants violated the declaratory judgment.

Two other cute procedural pieces in the case: It was certified as a class action, thus avoiding mootness when the named plaintiffs' criminal cases ended. The court also noted that it is not clear that the exceptions provision of § 1983 applies here, because it is not certain that the defendant judge was acting in a judicial rather than administrative capacity.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 30, 2019 at 06:08 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 29, 2019

Faculty Hiring: FIU (two tenure/tenure-track positions)

Assistant, Associate, or full Professor of Law (two positions)

Florida International University College of Law, Florida’s public law school located in Miami, invites applicants for two tenured or tenure-track Assistant, Associate, or full Professor of Law positions to begin in the 2020-21 academic year. Our primary curricular interests are Cyber Law (focusing on cybercrime/forensics, interconnected cities, infrastructure security, and general cybersecurity training and education), Environmental Law, Wills & Trusts, and Torts. The Cyber Law position may be a joint appointment with another FIU School or College.

Candidates must have a J.D. degree or its equivalent (or a Ph.D. for the Cyber Law position) and a strong academic record. In addition, applicants should demonstrate a track record or promise of outstanding scholarly achievement and effective teaching. Successful candidates will be expected to engage in scholarship, teaching and service. Rank as Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, or Professor will be determined based on qualifications and experience.

FIU Law is the only public law school in South Florida, established in 2001 on the idea that a high-quality legal education should be affordable and accessible to a broad, diverse community. In 6 of the past 8 administrations of the Florida bar exam, FIU Law has ranked first in bar passage among the 11 law schools in the State. In 2018, 84% of graduates secured full-time, long-term bar passage required and J.D. advantage jobs. FIU Law ranks as the most diverse law school in Florida, and the third most diverse nationally.

FIU is Miami’s public research university and in less than five decades has become a top 100 public university, according to U.S. News and World Report’s Best Colleges. The university is focused on student success and research excellence, with nearly $200 million in annual research expenditures. FIU is in the Carnegie R1 category (“highest research activity”), and was recently designated by the Board of Governors as an emerging preeminent university in the State’s public university system. FIU has 16 colleges and schools that offer more than 180 bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral programs in fields such as engineering, international relations, architecture, and medicine. FIU has awarded over 200,000 degrees and enrolls more than 54,000 students in two campuses and three centers. For more information about FIU, visit http://www.fiu.edu/.

Qualified candidates are encouraged to apply to Job Opening ID 519267 at https://facultycareers.fiu.edu and attach a cover letter and curriculum vitae in a single PDF file.

Prior to a campus interview, applicants will also be required to submit a list of references. For any questions related to the position, please contact Appointments Committee co-chairs Jan Osei-Tutu ([email protected]) or Scott Norberg ([email protected]). To receive full consideration, applications and required materials should be received by September 30. Review will continue until the positions are filled.

FIU is a member of the State University System of Florida and an Equal Opportunity, Equal Access Affirmative Action Employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability or protected veteran status.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 29, 2019 at 10:01 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Faculty Hiring: FIU

Lecturer in Legal Skills and Values

Florida International University College of Law, Florida’s public law school located in Miami, seeks applicants for entry-level or lateral appointments for the position of Lecturer in Legal Skills and Values. The start date for the position is August 2020.

The College of Law’s Legal Skills and Values program consists of two required courses in the first year of law school and an additional required course by the end of a student’s fourth semester. We are seeking dedicated legal writing and skills teachers to teach legal research, analysis, and written and oral communication skills, all with a heavy emphasis on professionalism.

Lateral candidates should show a demonstrated record of teaching excellence. Entry-level candidates should show commitment to excellence in teaching and significant potential as law teachers. Experience in legal practice and/or judicial clerkships is preferred. JD required. This is a full-time faculty appointment, with an initial one-year term, with the possibility of successive three-year or five-year terms.

Qualified candidates are encouraged to apply to Job Opening ID 519269 at https://facultycareers.fiu.edu and attach a cover letter and curriculum vitae in a single PDF file.

Prior to a campus interview, applicants will also be required to submit a list of references. The Appointments Committee may request additional material such as teaching evaluations, writing samples, and letters of recommendation. To receive full consideration, applications and required materials should be received by September 30. Review will continue until position is filled.

Questions about the position can be directed to search committee co-Chairs, Scott Norberg ([email protected]) and Jan OseiTutu ([email protected]).

FIU is a member of the State University System of Florida and an Equal Opportunity, Equal Access Affirmative Action Employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability or protected veteran status.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 29, 2019 at 09:31 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, August 28, 2019

Merits, not standing

I have no idea whether the Eleventh Circuit is correct that a single unsolicited text violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. But it highlights the absurdity of treating standing as something other than substantive merits. The heart of the analysis is the scope of the TCPA and congressional intent--what should be questions of whether a plaintiff has stated a cause of action under applicable substantive law.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 28, 2019 at 10:17 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, August 26, 2019

A real universal injunction

Equity famously cannot enjoin a crime. But can we agree that this injunction would be universal and not nationwide?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 26, 2019 at 11:02 AM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, August 25, 2019

Qualified immunity and judicial departmentalism

The Sixth Circuit on Friday held that Kim Davis was not entitled to qualified immunity from a claim for damages by same-sex couples denied marriage licenses in the early weeks after Obergefell. Obergefell clearly established the constitutional right the plaintiffs sought to vindicate--to receive marriage licenses and a reasonable official should have known about that right. And Davis did not show her entitlement to a religious accommodation, as the court said:

Davis provides no legal support for her contention that Kentucky’s Religious Freedoms Restoration Act required her to do what she did. Her reading of the Act is a subjective one and, as far as we can tell, one no court has endorsed. In the presence of Obergefell’s clear mandate that “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry,” and in the absence of any legal authority to support her novel interpretation of Kentucky law, Davis should have known that Obergefell required her to issue marriage licenses to same-sex coupleseven if she sought and eventually received an accommodation, whether by legislative amendment changing the marriage-license form or by judicial decree adopting her view of the interplay between the Constitution and Kentucky law.

Under judicial departmentalism, an executive official, such as Davis, is free to adopt and implement her "subjective" reading of the statute and judicial precedent. She does not need "legal authority to support her novel interpretation of Kentucky law"--the legal authority is her power as an executive official to act on her understanding of the law she is empowered to enforce. But qualified immunity is focused on precedent and the judicial understanding of precedent. So it could check executive officials going too far in a departmentalist direction, by tying them to judicial precedent on pain of damages.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 25, 2019 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

Rosencrantz and Guildenstern vote Democratic (Further Updated)

• Isn't the President's problem that Denmark is finally governed by someone who can make up their mind (about Greenland not being for sale, if not about whether to kill Claudius). I am surprised (and somewhat disappointed) by the absence of Hamlet jokes in all of this.

• I have a different take on the President's "any Jewish person who votes Democratic shows great disloyalty." I don't think he was trafficking in the dual-loyalty stereotypes that Rep. Omar was accused of. Nor do I think he was accusing American Jews of disloyalty to the United States (at least more than he would say that anyone who votes Democratic is disloyal), although the latter risks giving crazies another reason to target Jews.

I think he was calling us "Bad Jews." But this shows his ignorance more than anything else. As Julian Zelizer put it, "Judaism has revolved around debate, disagreement and deliberation;" there is no official source defining who is a good or bad Jew based on their views and ideas. And certainly not an orange-tinted shaygets.

Update: The President reiterated his point today, saying "If you vote for a Democrat, you’re being disloyal to the Jewish people and you’re being very disloyal to Israel.” So he is saying "disloyal," because it is the only word he knows. But he is really saying we are bad Jews.

Further Update: Tying together this post and the news of the day: Denmark saved 90 % of its Jews during the Shoah.

Further, Further Update: Jordan Weissmann at Slate echoes my point that this is about labeling bad Jews. It would be an odd twist on the dual-loyalty trope to stay the problem is that Jews are insufficiently loyal to a foreign country. The problem is more tied to Jewishness:

[T]hey are implying that they are disloyal to their own ethnic interests, American interests, and even the almighty’s. It’s the 2019 version of calling liberal Jews a bunch of heretics. And we all know what happens to heretics in the end.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 21, 2019 at 10:45 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (8)

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

MLS bans "political" signs

Deadspin destroys MLS's policy prohibiting "Using (including on any sign or other visible representation) political, threatening, abusive, insulting, offensive language and/or gestures, which includes racist, homophobic, xenophobic, sexist or otherwise inappropriate language or behavior." The league and teams have interpreted that language to prohibit signs protesting racism, fascism, etc., as well as signs using racist language.

The question should be who owns the stadiums MLS teams play in and the terms of ownership and operation of these facilities. If they are publicly owned and leased to the teams or if there is a substantial public involvement in the financing, building, and operation, it might trigger arguments that MLS teams act under color of state law and thus are bound by the First Amendment. A ban on political signs in a public space opened for expression should not survive constitutional scrutiny. Particularly where, as the Deadspin piece argues, MLS has encouraged "European-style, community-minded soccer fandom," where fandom and expression about community matters (beyond the team) are intertwined.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 20, 2019 at 10:23 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (4)

N.C. Court blows the mulligan

I was right that the withdrawal of the original opinion in the "flip-off-the-cop" case could have been for the majority to find a new basis to justify the traffic stop without having to accept that flipping the officer off was constitutionally protected. Which it did, although now with a dissent.

The court does recognize case law (it somehow missed the first time around) that the finger is protected and less likely to constitute fighting words when directed at an officer. But the  majority offers a new theory: The officer could not tell who the defendant was flipping-off: the officer (which would be constitutionally protected speech) or another driver (which somehow would not be; if the latter, the officer could have believed that the situation between the defendant and the other driver was "escalating" and, if left unchecked, might have become disorderly conduct. Importantly, the officer needed only reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, to make the initial stop and determine if the defendant was trying to provoke another motorist.

The dissent calls out the majority for, essentially, making up facts. The officer testified that he saw the driver wave at him, then turn the wave into the middle finger directed at him; there was no testimony about the situation escalating or about concern for a gesture at another car. The dissent insists that flipping a middle finger is protected by the First Amendment and thus cannot provide reasonable suspicion. Although he does not say it, that should be true regardless of at whom the gesture was directed.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 20, 2019 at 01:51 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 19, 2019

The street is never the place to argue the appropriateness of an arrest. That is what our courts are for.”

This, from the NYPD Commissioner, is scary. And it is wrong. Given modern Fourth Amendment doctrine, limits (to say nothing of arguments to eliminate) the exclusionary rule, and the expansion of qualified immunity, the courts rarely conclude that an arrest was inappropriate. And even when they find the arrest inappropriate, they more rarely provide a remedy beyond the dropping of charges, which provides nothing for the collateral consequences of the improper arrest.

What the Commish really should have said is "Don't argue the appropriateness of an arrest. Just give in to police power."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 19, 2019 at 07:03 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, August 18, 2019

Malcolm Gladwell has chutzpah (too bad he does not know what it means)

You would think that after the first seven episodes of this season of Malcolm Gladwell's podcast, I would have learned my lesson. But the eighth episode was titled Chutzpah v. Chutzpah, so my interest in all things Jewish got the better of me.

The episode is about . . . I am not entirely sure.

Points of discussion include:

    • The difference between chutzpah as we use it "in America" (pronounced KHUTS-puh) and chutzpah as used in Israel (pronounced khoots-PAH). He says, interviewing his Israeli-born neighbor, that the former means audacity or nerve or guts, while the latter indicates a lowness or shamelessness.

    • Lots of anecdotes: 1) The creator of "Hogan's Heroes," Al Ruddy, walking into a meeting with CBS chair William Paley with no prior experience or qualifications, pitching a comedy about Nazi soldiers by acting out the roles and casting Jewish actors as Nazis; 2) Mafia boss Joseph Colombo founding the Italian-American Civil Rights League to counter stereotypes of Italians as criminals, extorting NBC to broadcast the Columbus Day Parade by threatening a hit on Johnny Carson (Carson had hit on Colombo's wife), and attempting to derail "The Godfather" until the producer, Ruddy, agreed to remove the word "mafia" from the script (which appeared only once in the original script, in any event).

    • Israel is a low-hierarchy, in-your-face society. This explains Abraham bargaining with Hashem over Sodom and Gomorrah, the Hebrew word "nu" as a conversation-rusher (a kind of "go on" or "get to the point already"), and Gladwell's neighbor confronting school administrators about closing the school because of snow (having the kids at home on these days made her life difficult).

    • Oral argument in the appeal of the Flores litigation, in which the DOJ lawyer argued that toothbrushes, soap, and decent sleeping conditions are not within the ordinary meaning of "safe and sanitary."

It does seem worth deconstructing how much is wrong here.

1) Gladwell never mentions that chutzpah originates in Yiddish; he repeatedly talks about how the word is used "in America," as if it is an American concept. American English absorbed the word and concept into Yinglish. That explains the different pronunciations. Yiddish places the emphasis  on the next-to-last syllable of words (SHA-bos); Hebrew places the emphasis on the last syllable of words ("sha-BAHT). English also places the emphasis on the next-to-last syllable, which is why Yiddish words slide into English so well. It makes sense that modern Hebrew (a language that did not exist until the late 19th century) would incorporate the Yiddish word, but with Hebrew pronunciation. So we are dealing with the same word, but in different languages having different pronunciation rules.

2) The bigger problem: I am not sure Gladwell understands what chutzpah means. Gladwell's premise is that the Al Ruddy story illustrates what we "in America" call KHUTS-puh, but would not be what Israelis call khoots-PAH; only the Joe Colombo stories qualify as the latter.

But would a Yiddish speaker call what Ruddy did chutzpah? Leo Rosten's "The Joys of Yiddish" offers several illustrations of chutzpah--the boy who kills his parents and pleads for mercy because he is an orphan; the man who shouts for help while beating you up; and the beggar who, given a choice between free challah and free black bread, chooses challah, and when told that it is more expensive, says "it's worth it." All reveal not simple audacity or guts, but shamelessness and self-servingness, perhaps with a touch of irony thrown in (what Gladwell says is khoots-PAH but not KHUTS-puh).

None of Rosten's examples is analogous to what Ruddy did. He was ballsy and audacious, because he had no business being in that room pitching a TV show. It also was potentially offensive for its time (this was a different era of comedy two years before "The Producers"), even though everyone in the room was Jewish. But it lacked that irony. Colombo, on the other hand, was a chutzpanik. Rosten would have been happy to include "Italian criminal forms group to protest media portrayal of Italians as criminals" in his definition.

In other words, KHUTS-puh (Yiddish) and khoots-PAH (Hebrew pronunciation) are the same: Neither would include Ruddy, both would include Colombo. Now some might disagree with this and argue that both do qualify. Fine. Then we are debating the meaning of one word (however pronounced), not the difference in meaning between two words.

3) Suppose Gladwell's premise is right: English-speakers in the U.S. would talk about Ruddy as chutzpah (even if Rosten would not), while Hebrew speakers in Israel would not. But that suggests that the Yinglish chutzpah has evolved and broadened to cover all instances of audacity or nerve or guts, without the shamelessness. Then, as my wife pointed out, we have a nice illustration of cultural appropriation, how a culture or language alters a word or concept by absorbing it. The lesson is not that Israel has a different word than we have "in America;" the lesson might be that American English altered or expanded the meaning of a word taken from a different language, while Israeli Hebrew maintained the original meaning. So talk about that. Or at least acknowledge a different explanation for the phenomenon.

4) The discussion of nu has the same problem. Gladwell describes it as a uniquely Israeli verbal push to move a conversation along. But, again, the word was part of Yiddish, was spoken in Eastern Europe, and was brought to America by millions of Yiddish-speaking immigrants a century ago. What is interesting (but not mentioned in the podcast) is that nu has not been absorbed into Yinglish as has, for example, oy vey. It thus died off as people stopped speaking Yiddish. Meanwhile, Hebrew has maintained the word.

5) As for his neighbor's tangles with the school administration over the inconvenience of snow days: I would describe them as obnoxious, inconsiderate, and selfish, to say nothing of clueless as to how broader institutions and the social compact operate. I can imagine the "are you kidding me" conversations school administrators had about her phone calls.

But not chutzpah. However pronounced.

I promise this will be my final Gladwell-related post. I think I am hate-listening at this point.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 18, 2019 at 09:32 AM in Culture, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (7)

Saturday, August 17, 2019

Hit Man Podcast

iHeart Radio has a new podcast titled Hit Man. It tells the story of the book "Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors," the murder it supposedly inspired, and the lawsuit against publisher Paladin Press, in which the Fourth Circuit held that the book was not entirely protected by the First Amendment under Brandenburg. Also worth reading is Eugene Volokh's Crime-Facilitating Speech, which sought to develop a speech-protective framework for speech that provides information that can be used for bad purposes but that does not incite or advocate (under which I believe the book would have been protected).

It is in eight parts. The first episode, giving some background to the book, was quite enjoyable.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 17, 2019 at 11:18 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 16, 2019

Nomenclature and the real issue on the scope of injunctions

A Ninth Circuit panel refused to stay a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of new asylum regulations. But a divided court narrowed the injunction from its "nationwide" scope to the extent it applies "beyond the Ninth Circuit," because the district court had not found that beyond-the-circuit scope was necessary to remedy the plaintiffs' harm. The decision, while proper, illustrates the importance of the problems of nomenclature and the misunderstanding of what is at stake.

The plaintiffs in the action were four California-based organizations that represent asylum-seekers; the district court found they had organizational standing because they would lose clients and funding and be forced to divert resources as a result of the regulation.*

[*] The district court also found the organizations within the statutory zone of interest, although that no longer should be part of the standing analysis.

The focus of the scope-of-injunction analysis thus should have been the four organizations, not California. The injunction should have been limited to prohibiting enforcement as to these organizations. But it should have protected those organizations everywhere in the country--states within the Ninth Circuit as well as any other states in which they may represent (or seek to represent) asylum-seekers. Perhaps that means the injunction would reach California and Arizona only, if these organizations only represent clients in those states; outside-the-states application is not necessary to remedy their harm if they do not work outside those states. But to the extent they work outside California and Arizona, their harm is remedied only if the injunction protects them outside of Ninth Circuit states.

And that is why the term "nationwide" does not work. All injunctions should be nationwide in the sense of protecting the plaintiffs wherever in the nation they are--that is the only way to remedy their harm. The problem in this case (and others) is that the district court's injunction purported to prohibit the government from enforcing the regulation beyond these four organizations. The problem is that the injunction was not "particularized" to the parties to the case, but attempted to apply to the "universe" of people and organizations affected by the regulation.

The court thus should have "grant[ed] the motion for stay pending appeal insofar as the injunction applies" beyond the four plaintiff organizations in this action.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 16, 2019 at 02:25 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (6)

Thursday, August 15, 2019

What about a tablet?

A question for those who do not allow laptops and do not allow students to type notes in class:

What about taking notes using a stylus and tablet (iPad, Surface, etc.)? On one hand, this is writing rather than typing, so the ability/temptation to stenography is absent; it is the same means of notetaking, with fewer dead trees. On the other, I presume the benefit is that the tablet program converts the handwritten notes into typeset notes, which can be cut-and-pasted into a study outline; this eliminates the need or use for retyping of notes, which is an important point at which learning and understanding occurs.

Thoughts? Does anyone familiar with the literature know of any studies comparing writing-on-tablet with writing-on-paper or typing?

(Note: I know many readers believe that my position on laptops is wrong. That is beside the point here, so please do not bother with comments to that effect. My question begins from the premise that laptops and typing for notes are out. Now what?)

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 15, 2019 at 05:51 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (4)

N.C. court recalls opinion on the bird (updated)

Earlier this month, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that flipping-off a police officer provided probable cause to conduct a traffic stop; it was a "rude, distracting" gesture that could cause a reasonable officer to believe a crime was being committed, such as disorderly conduct. This opinion was inconsistent with federal courts that have held that it is clearly established that flipping the bird is protected by the First Amendment. I did not blog about the case, but I had some interesting email exchanges about the case, including how it interacted with last Term's Nieves v. Bartlett.

Today, the court of appeals withdrew the opinion, with the panel retaining jurisdiction to dispose of the case. No idea what that means. It could mean a majority will hold that the officer lacked probable cause to stop the case. Or it could mean a new opinion finding a basis for probable cause that does not involve constitutionally protected expression.

While this is good for the First Amendment, it is hard not to wonder how much the universal derision the opinion received on the interwebs affected the judges and their decision to reverse course (as to reasoning if not result). And it is hard not to think that this is not a good thing for the judicial process. There are processes in place for reconsidering a decision. Those processes should not involve Twitter.

Update: I was briefly Twitter-famous last week (despite not being on Twitter) when people found this post and criticized me for "bemoaning" the restoration of rights caused by Twitter saying mean things about the decision. Other then piled on to suggest I was trying to take away their right to criticize the government. And one commenter here--in a more-thoughful and less-character-constrained way--suggested that sometimes this is necessary, if imperfect, to snap courts out of the assumption that every case is the same and routine.

I see the latter point. But if rights can  (in a tweeter's view) be "restored" by Twitter pressure on a court, then rights can be taken away by Twitter pressure on a court. I cannot remember the judge or the case. But in 1995, a judge in the S.D.N.Y.  suppressed evidence in a criminal case, saying that a person running upon seeing a police officer does not give probable cause to stop, because people of color in New York have learned from experience not to trust the police and to avoid all interactions. The judge was lambasted and threatened with impeachment; he withdrew the opinion (not sure if it was in response to a motion to reconsider) and held the search was valid. Imagine the Twitter response, had it existed.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 15, 2019 at 01:11 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, August 14, 2019

Punishing female attorneys

The Supreme Court of Missouri suspended the licenses of two female former assistant prosecutors in St. Louis who helped cover up a police officer beating of a suspect in 2014. A third female prosecutor, who was more directly involved by filing false charges against the victim, was disbarred in 2016. The officer pleaded guilty to a § 242 violation and was sentenced to 52 months.This represents the exceedingly rare case in which police and prosecutors faced sanctions for their roles in misconduct within the criminal-justice system.

But it is difficult not to notice that this rare case involved three female prosecutors. It thus echoes the fallout from the Central Park Five, in which the only people facing professional consequences (informal, but still) were two female assistant prosecutors, but no man involved in the case.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 14, 2019 at 11:43 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)