Saturday, March 18, 2023
Is the ham green?
A break for something non-serious. Although Rick and Paul still might believe me wrong:
"I do not like green eggs and ham." What color is the ham on the dish that Sam-I-Am does not like?
The cover shows both as green--he does not green eggs together with green ham. But in my mind, I always have read green to modify eggs, while ham is unmodified--he does not like green eggs together with ham, regardless of the color of the ham.
If we focus on author intent, presumably Geisel signed off on the cover and his intent is that both food products are green. But is that the best interpretation of that language? What do ordinary rules of English and statutory construction tell us?
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 18, 2023 at 12:35 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (6)
Friday, March 17, 2023
On why I think I am (mostly, generally) right
I appreciate Rick's response to my post on Stanford. I want to hit a few points.
• I said at the outset of my post that I vastly overgeneralized. To the extent I overstated the point or understated lefty's willingness to use state power to target speech, mea culpa. Yes, the left (often?) uses formal state power to suppress speech (and I oppose those efforts when they happen). But I stand by the point that in the current political-cultural narrative of "both sides suppress speech," the juxtaposition is young "social-justice warriors," often but not always on campus, making a lot of noise and complaining about "harmful" speech, compared with whoever Florida went after yesterday (the state is trying to strip the Miami Hyatt Regency of its liquor license over a drag show). I cannot think of a current Democratic-controlled state undertaking efforts mirroring what is happening in Republican-controlled states. Maybe campus speech codes? Maybe states using existing public-accommodations laws against expressive businesses? What else am I missing?
• I hope my post did not read as a defense of what the students or associate dean did; I am not sure I know enough to say. We might describe their conduct many ways--rude, obnoxious, unprofessional, counter-productive, many others. I do not believe we can describe it as falling outside of the First Amendment--especially the hostile signs and questions that created a nasty environment but did not prevent him from speaking. So I am troubled by the suggestion (to be clear, from Judges Ho and Branch, not from Rick) that the government should deny bar membership because of obnoxious-but-protected speech.
• I have read reports (yes, grain of salt and all that) that Judge Duncan was videoing protesters outside the building and the room and perhaps making negative comments to them (that is not clear). But it suggests that Duncan adopted an adversarial posture with people independent of the in-room disruption, people who I think we agree behaved in an appropriate manner towards a speaker this dislike. I admit I do not know how things would have gone had the protest remained silent or outside and he been able to give his prepared remarks and then respond to questions. I infer that his response to the question about the pronoun case would have gotten the same "read the opinion" response.
• Do we have a good sense of who did what among students in the room--who silently protested,* who asked questions,** who shouted and disrupted? And how does that affect how we evaluate the behavior of other audience members and of Judge Duncan. Video shows Duncan giving dismissive responses to some actual questions. Who asked those questions? If A acts like an idiot and interrupts, does that justify a non-response or dismissive response to a legitimate-if-challenging question from B, who did not join in the circus? In a mixed audience, how should we expect the speaker--especially a speaker who is an Article III judge--to engage with those who disagree but attempt to engage?
[*] I believe silent, non-disruptive-if-distracting protest offers a fourth option to the three that Rick identifies.
[**] Can questions for an invited speaker be hostile? True, it may not be the best way to get a good answer. But does it fall outside expressive norms?
• At bottom, I think I come out that there is blame to go around here. It ought not fall on one side.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 17, 2023 at 01:43 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, March 16, 2023
Asymmetrical Censorship
Conventional wisdom holds that "both sides" want to restrict speech and lack respect for the First Amendment and free speech values. But that "both sides" framing overlooks the mechanisms through which each side disrespects speech. Vastly overgeneralizing and we can find exceptions, but:
• From the left, private persons or entities exercise some form of free speech to oppose or counter speech and speakers they do not like--shouting down speaker, banning speakers from social-media sites, boycotting speakers, etc. That is, what gets framed as "cancel culture," especially on college campuses. One can disagree with such tactics. And these tactics can run afoul of some neutral rules--such as the rules governing a forum. But we cannot deny that those exercising it are: 1) private persons and 2) exercising some form of their own expression, however stupid we might believe them to be.
• From the right, officials use the power of the state to silence speakers--banning drag shows, making some classroom speech unlawful, threatening reprisal against speakers who criticize government officials, arresting protesters and journalists, overruling speech-protective precedent to make suing critics easier, etc.
It seems to me that one is worse, because one has many more formal and practical consequences. But the intense pull of "both sides" in national coverage requires that a sophomore at Oberlin is as great a threat as the governor of Florida (and wannabee president).
This dynamic appears in the fallout from the events at Judge Duncan's Stanford speech. Judge Ho (Fifth Circuit) and Judge Branch (Eleventh Circuit)--who previously threatened to stop hiring Yale grads as law clerks--argue in the National Review that disruptive students should suffer consequences, including denying bar admission on character-and-fitness grounds. So lefty Stanford students do not want Judge Duncan to speak and wield practical actions (some of which are arguably their own form of free speech) to stop him. Righty judges respond by using the full force of the state to punish them for their speech. And everyone will treat them as equivalents.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 16, 2023 at 04:21 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, March 15, 2023
Stanford, preferred first speakers, and the nonsense of "civil discourse"
Grading has denied me time to write about the Stanford debacle. I somewhat was waiting for Ken White to cover it, expecting that I would share his take--and I do.
I will add the following: This demonstrates why the "civil discourse" trope--students should not protest, they should sit quietly and politely listen to the speaker, then engage with the speaker in a "Platonic dialogue"--is and always has been bullshit. The speaker bears no obligation to engage with the questions. And Judge Duncan did not engage--including with actual, thoughtful (if pointed and hostile) questions. When someone asks the speaker about something he wrote (such as the opinion refusing to allow a prisoner to use his proper pronoun), "read what I wrote" is not engaging in civil discourse. And acting as if he was not on the panel is certainly not. That the questions and questioners were hostile does not excuse non-answers; it shows how those who censor speech use "politeness" and "civility" to silence counter-speech.
I like Ken's framing of the point: "The protesting students’ rights and interests are neither inferior to nor superior to the interests of the FedSoc and Judge Duncan. Policing the civility of the response to speech and not speech itself is incoherent nonsense. Put another way, if you say “fuck you” to your classmates, they may say “fuck you” back. If you set out to provoke a response, put on your big boy pants when you get one."
I also reject the framing of this as a "shouting down" issue. Yes, the protesting students prevented him from speaking, in violation of Stanford's forum policy. But if the students had done what the policy allows and urges--oral protests outside the building, silent protests through t-shirts and signs inside the room--Duncan would have responded the same way. He went to Stanford itching for a fight--not sure whether I buy the theory that he sought to raise his profile for a SCOTUS appointment--and would have been as dismissive and rude to silent protesters. No student should have the temerity to protest him--free speech means sit there and listen to what he has to say.
Chris Walker (now at Michigan) visited FIU this week. He shared that when he taught at The Ohio State University, Fed Soc invited a speaker from the ADF. OutLaw held a bake sale outside. The speaker bought something. That is not discourse. But it is effective protest.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 15, 2023 at 12:03 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, March 14, 2023
Whither Division III?
A current and a former basketball player at Brown filed a class action suit, challenging the Ivy League's agreement/policy not to award athletic scholarships as an antitrust violation.
To our readers with antitrust knowledge: If successful, how does this not eliminate the NCAA's Division III, comprised of smaller, mostly private, heavily liberal-arts college and which prohibits athletic scholarships? If a conference-wide policy against scholarships violates the law, how can a nationwide policy not violate the law?
Comments open.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 14, 2023 at 07:02 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (1)
Friday, March 10, 2023
Judicial immunity and other civil rights hurdles (Update)
Steve Lubet (Northwestern) writes in Slate about Judge Robert Benitez (S.D. Cal.), who ordered the marshall to handcuff the 13-year-old daughter of a defendant in a parole-revocation hearing and have her sit in the jury box; his intent, he explained, was to send a message: “So your dad’s made some serious mistakes in his life, and look at where it’s landed him. … And if you’re not careful, young lady, you’ll wind up in cuffs, and you’ll find yourself right there where I put you a minute ago.”
Lubet expresses concern that Benitez will incur no sanction for his actions. Life tenure means he cannot be removed from the bench other than by impeachment. The case was transferred to another, who reduced the 10-month sentence Benitez imposed. A judicial-misconduct complaint has been filed, but the sanctions are minimal--censure and perhaps an interruption of newly assigned cases.
As for civil remedies, Lubet says "He cannot be sued for damages, because he has judicial immunity for conduct on the bench."
But is the immunity issue that obvious? Immunity attaches to "judicial functions," performed not in the "complete absence of jurisdiction." That captures most conduct on the bench. But the conduct must relate to the conduct of judicial proceedings and control of the courtroom. But this may exceed even the broadest understanding of those concepts. Benitez was not maintaining order in the courtroom or ensure the proper conduct of judicial proceedings. He admits to "hoping" to get to the girl--not a party, witness, or other participant and only tangentially related to the proceeding--a "message" about how she should live her life. Above the Law called it a "bush league Scared Straight, which, despite the source, is a pretty good descriptor. Warning random teens about the danger of crime is not a judicial function; that it happens in court should not matter. The motive behind a function does not affect immunity--a judicial function performed for a racist purpose remains a judicial function. But the purpose of an action can affect whether it qualifies as a judicial function--an action that does not reasonably affect judicial proceedings cannot be judicial, even if a judge performs it.
Of course, judicial immunity is not the only hurdle the girl faces. Benitez is a federal judge, so any damages action falls under Bivens--and we know what that means. This presents a new context and thus an extension of Bivens since SCOTUS never allowed a claim against a federal judge. And the usual special factors will counsel hesitation before allowing the action--Congress never created a cause of action, the judicial-complaint system allows for alternate remedies, and a Bivens court will not want to chill other judges in managing their courtrooms in the future. And after Bivens comes qualified immunity and the absence of any precedent clearly establishing that judges should not order the handcuffing of courtroom observers without probable cause and for no legitimate judicial reason. Is the violative nature of this as obvious as leaving a detainee in a cold, feces-strewn cell or placing a prisoner on a hitching post for 7 hours? Who knows.
So Lubet is right that civil damages remedy are unlikely. But judicial immunity is the tip of that iceberg.
Update: Steve responds:
The leading SCOTUS case is Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991), which I considered when writing the essay (space limitations did not allow me to get into it). Mireles holds there is no immunity for actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. But the trial judge in Mireles had ordered the abusive seizure of a public defender who had missed a court call, and SCOTUS found that was not beyond all jurisdiction. I could be wrong, but my conclusion was that Benitez likewise had some jurisdiction over spectators in his courtroom, and especially over someone who had been invoked by the defendant as a reason for leniency – and thus as sort of a witness. She was in the courtroom to influence the outcome. Puente told the court that his daughter was in danger of drug use, so the judge had some jurisdiction to question or interview her about it, if only to determine whether to believe Puente’s assertion. Of course, his questioning was abusive, but that alone does not defeat judicial immunity.
Well, I would prefer being wrong about that, but as the abstract of the Mireles opinion put it, “That he may have made a mistake or acted in excess of his authority does not make the act nonjudicial.”
My reply (hey, my blog, my final word): We might distinguish Mireles because the order to the bailiff had a closer connection to courtroom management--the judge needed the attorney to get to court for things to proceed. I agree that Benitez could have questioned the girl, even in an abusive or threatening fashion; that would be judicial. Handcuffing her--for the purpose of teaching her a lesson rather than for determining whether to believe the defendant as part of the proceeding--is a difference in kind.
Finally, the cases distinguish actions "in excess of authority" from actions "in the clear absence of authority;" the former maintains immunity (as in Mireles), but the latter does not. Steve makes the best argument for why this is the former--she was there to influence the outcome of a proceeding and the judge can question that attempt. But the judge's statements of his purpose, to me, push this into the latter.
To be clear, I am not saying Lubet is wrong about judicial immunity. Only that it is more complex than the typical case of a judge misbehaving while conducting proceedings from the bench.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 10, 2023 at 02:23 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, March 07, 2023
Offended observer standing and the substance of the Establishment Clause
SCOTUS on Monday denied cert in an Establishment Clause case arising from a public vigil in Ocala, Florida. Justice Gorsuch agreed with the denial of cert while Justice Thomas dissented; both criticized "offended observer standing" in Establishment cases, repeating the themes in Gorsuch's concurring opinion (joined by Thomas) in American Legion.
I therefore re-up my 2019 post on why the Gorsuch/Thomas position eliminates pure Establishment Clause challenges to government religious expression and activities by eliminating any plaintiff with standing. Absent some compelled participation or exclusion (which would violate other constitutional provisions), no one suffers an injury from the display or program.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 7, 2023 at 11:28 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, March 04, 2023
So many First Amendment defects, so little time (Updated)
Florida SB 1316 would require non-journalist bloggers who write about members of the state executive or legislative branches to register with the state.
The bills has so many constitutional defects that different commentators can find and focus on different things. Jeff Kosseff (Naval Academy) focuses on the loss of anonymous speech. Kosseff wrote a book on that, so it makes sense that he would lock onto that when I did not. I latched onto the registration requirement, which goes beyond prohibiting anonymity and into an effective licensing system. (A bill could prohibit anonymous speech by requiring bloggers to publicize their names; this bill prohibits anonymity while authorizing a formal government database of speakers, a further constitutional problem). It also creates a new set of arguments for the state. Sen. Jason Brodeur, the bill's sponsor, does not appear to be a smart person, but someone must have told him that a flat ban on anonymous speech could not fly. But I believe Brodeur hopes to defend the bill as a lobbying regulation--any non-journalist who writes (for pay) about Florida public officials seeks to influence those officials and thus engages in lobbying, which the state can regulate through formal state registration and authorization. That does not save the law--A legislature likely cannot define lobbying to extend beyond "direct communication" with government officials on specific government business; speech "about" an official, even for money, cannot qualify. But it suggests a scheme beyond prohibiting anonymous speech.
The bill has prompted a different question over how we write and talk about law--how much should we worry (and write)about performative legislation? Josh Chafetz wants us to consider (and describe) the broader context--whether the bill originates with governor and/or legislative leadership (which makes passage more likely) or with a random backbencher pandering to the base; we should not get too worked up if the bill has no realistic chance of passage. Kosseff, emphasizing the increase in these bills, urges vigilance in all cases--"If a legislator proposes a bill, which could be considered at any moment, I'll take that proposal seriously until it's off the table." I think the positions co-exist--Josh does not suggest ignoring the bill, only making context and likelihood-of-passage part of the story and the analysis.
Finally, Kosseff says "So many of us -- me included -- have taken the First Amendment for granted over the past few decades. I fear that it's about to face some pretty big stress tests and we're pretty unprepared." Early in my career, a senior colleague questioned my interest in writing about free speech; I responded that this area is fun because we usually win. That may be changing.
Update: So I was right about three things. Sen. Brodeur explains on Twitter that he sees this as a lobbying regulation. This violates the First Amendment because calling something lobbying, beyond that core definition, does not make it lobbying. And Sen. Brodeur is not a smart person.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 4, 2023 at 01:17 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, March 02, 2023
Florida to register bloggers
SB 1316. The basic idea seems to be to treat non-journalists who write about DeSantis and other state officials as lobbyists.
It seems pretty obvious this cannot survive First Amendment scrutiny, even if enacted. Meanwhile, I guess I should now get out all my posts about Ron DeSantis and Republican legislators as crazy, dangerous authoritarians with no understanding or respect for the First Amendment or principles of free speech.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 2, 2023 at 10:26 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
It's all about the precedent
Jonathan Adler comments on universal vacatur in the student loan case. He gets at the fundamental (and overlooked) insight in this debate: The prospective non-party effects of a decision arise from precedent, never from the judgment. SCOTUS does not issue (or affirm) universal injunctions; its opinion affirming a particularized injunction in Case1 binds other courts in future cases involving similar issues. The DC Circuit does not issue universal judgments; its opinion in Case1 binds the circuit in future cases involving similar issues (where, Adler argues, Congress gives the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction). To the extent that disables regional circuits from imposing broader consequences, Congress chose that effect by creating a regional and hierarchical judiciary.
Departmentalism (not mentioned in the arguments or in Adler's piece) makes this compliance practical rather than legal. The executive follows precedent (at least within the circuit) because it chooses to do so, knowing it will otherwise lose when non-compliance returns to the D.C. Circuit.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 2, 2023 at 06:54 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, February 27, 2023
Florida redefines defamation law
Continuing my discussion of horrible new Florida laws. Rocky and I discussed DeSantis' 2022 never-reduced defamation-reform plan. It has been introduced in the current session. I describe some of the provisions after the jump.
Two things remain from the original proposal (and why we discussed it in our SB8 articles): The bill has serious and obvious First Amendment defects (many First Amendment people would call it "blatantly unconstitutional"). And those constitutional defects cannot be raised or adjudicated in offensive pre-enforcement litigation, because they define the elements of a private right of action for damages; speakers must sue and raise the First Amendment as a defense. Some defamation defendants might have the option of removing the private action to federal court on diversity grounds, an option unavailable to SB8 defendants.
Here are the bill's lowlights, all of which should raise serious First Amendment problems.
• Statewide (or near-statewide) venue for defamation actions. One of the key ways SB8 supposedly stacked the deck.
• Fee-shifting for prevailing defamation plaintiffs, plus removing defamation action from offer-of-judgment fee-shifting. This runs against the trend of granting fees to prevailing defendants to deter performative defamation actions (even absent full application of a state SLAPP in federal court).
• Limits on when someone can become an accidental, involuntary, or limited-purpose public figure. In particular, non-elected public officials (read: cops) do not become public officials solely by virtue of employment and no one becomes a public figure by denying accusations of wrongdoing. This is enables police officers involved in excessive-force incidents to use defamation suits to silence critics--they can go on a media tour to deny the allegations and neither their government job nor media access renders them public figures.
• Identifies situations in which actual malice is presumed. These include relying on "unverified anonymous reports," repeating something that is "inherently implausible," and failing to validate. The irony, of course, is DeSantis seeks to target the people who picked on Nick Sandmann, Kyle Rittenhouse, etc. But this language is more likely to enable claims by Dominion against election deniers and other conspiracy theorists who repeat nonsense that only a crazy person or reckless person could believe.
• An allegation that someone discriminated on all sorts of bases constitutes defamation per se, with statutory damages of $ 35k. This should not fly because such an allegation or report of an allegation may be opinion or hyperbole, either of which is protected.
• Where that allegation of discrimination is because of sexual orientation or gender identity, a plaintiff cannot prove truth if the defendant relied on religious or scientific beliefs. This exacerbates the viewpoint-discriminatory nature of most defamation. But it shows how the accusation of discrimination is non-provable opinion--both involve competing, non-falsifiable "beliefs" rather than facts. Nevertheless, it may have a chilling effect in reporting and reporting on widespread discrimination--especially around LGBTQ+ status--in the state.
• A statement by an anonymous source is presumptively false. And where the defendant refuses to disclose the identity of the anonymous source, the plaintiff (including a public figure or official, it appears) need only prove negligence.
As I said, each bullet point will draw serious First Amendment scrutiny and many should be declared invalid. Much depends on how much of the First Amendment defamation edifice is constitutionally compelled. That is, how much leeway does a state have to define the scope and application of actual malice in its defamation law and what limits does the First Amendment impose from above. For example, can a state shift the burden to prove truth in anonymous-source cases or does the First Amendment place the burden on the plaintiff? Can a state define who qualifies as a public official/public figure required to prove actual malice or does the First Amendment control?
Regardless, it again demonstrates that what Texas did with SB8 was not new; it reflected a specific application of a state's longstanding ability to define torts and private rights of action. Again, decry Florida's blatant disregard for free speech. Do not treat the process as unprecedented or problematic.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 27, 2023 at 10:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, February 25, 2023
Whittington on the new Florida higher-ed bill
The filed version of HB 999 matches the principles DeSantis announced several weeks ago. Keith Whittington (Princeton and chair of the Academic Freedom Alliance) analyzes the constitutional and academic-freedom problems. His analysis is spot-on. I will highlight two things.
First is his closing line: "In the name of prohibiting political litmus tests for faculty, the reform will wind up imposing political litmus tests for faculty." That is the point--DeSantis and his minions do not intend or desire to prohibit political litmus tests or stop indoctrination; they want to impose their preferred indoctrination and litmus tests.
Second, he says in the closing ¶: "Hard to imagine that this kind of micromanagement of how universities operate will be very workable in practice, even if it were a good idea." Much depends on the university presidents. If they decline to exercise this new power and allow faculty governance to proceed as it has, this may do less practical than rhetorical damage.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 25, 2023 at 12:42 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Making a hash of pre-enforcement offensive litigation
In Fund Texas Choice v. Paxton, a First Amendment challenge to three sets of Texas laws a purporting to prohibit funding and facilitating legal out-of-state abortions--SB 8, HB 1280 (a trigger law that took effect 30 days after Dobbs), and pre-Roe zombie laws. Some blame for the hash rests with justiciability doctrine, some rests with the district judge.
To demonstrate the hash, I will identify the key legal or mixed principles, then identify the court's holding in the case, then show where (I believe) it goes off the rails.
Legal Principles and Findings:• No public enforcement of SB8.
• The attorney general lacks power to enforce pre-Roe laws; enforcement rests with local DAs. Nevertheless, Paxton made numerous public statements about his intent to enforce those laws.
• The attorney general has the power to enforce HB 1280 and made numerous statements indicating an intent to enforce the law with respect to out-of-state abortions.
• HB 1280 has no extra-territorial effect and the attorney general's public-but-informal hints and suggestions, falling short of a full statement of intent, do not overcome the law's text.
• Texas repealed its pre-Roe laws by implication. Based on binding Fifth Circuit precedent and undone by legislative findings in SB8, the post-Roe regulatory scheme for legal abortion cannot co-exist with the pre-existing bans on virtually all abortions.
• The court never analyzed whether enforcement of the pre-Roe laws violates either the First Amendment or the right to travel.
Conclusions:
• Claims against Paxton dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on lack of standing and sovereign immunity. Although the court does not specify, it appears to be for lack of standing and/or sovereign immunity. Because Paxton cannot enforce any of the challenged laws against plaintiffs' desired conduct (he cannot enforce pre-Roe laws and cannot enforce HB 1280 as to the plaintiffs' desire conduct), he is not a responsible executive officer and plaintiffs lack traceability and redressability.
• Preliminary injunction granted against several named local DAs (although the court has not certified the defendant class of all DAs) from enforcing pre-Roe laws as to funding or facilitating out-of-state abortions.
Why this is all such utter nonsense:
• Bickel defended standing and the "passive virtues" as eliminating unnecessary constitutional adjudication. But consider how much and how detailed the adjudication necessary to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction--to say that the court lacked the power to consider the constitutional validity of Paxton's conduct or the scope of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The court analyzed the attorney general's power under three sets of laws, the effect of the attorney general's grandstanding and bumptious threats, and the extra-territorial scope of new state law. But the real meaning of these conclusions (putting aside their normative correctness) should be substantive--Paxton's conduct does not and cannot violate the plaintiffs' rights because he lacks the power to impose any legal consequences on their conduct. No constitutional violation means no injunction. But the court had jurisdiction to analyze all of this.
• Were this accurately treated as merits, plaintiffs could tailor a lawsuit such as this one. Paxton has been running around hinting about enforcing HB 1280 extra-territorially, even if he lacks the power to do so. It would benefit the constitutional system if plaintiffs could react to those hints by obtaining an express declaration that he cannot do so, whether because he lacks power under state law or because doing so would be constitutionally invalid. Instead, they have that analysis and those determinations, but without legal effect. (It might have precedential effect, as it is essential to the holding; but district courts cannot create binding precedent and jurisdictional holdings tend to carry less substantive precedential force as to any underlying constitutional issues.
• The court drops the following footnote in dismissing the claims against Paxton:
While the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ H.B. 1280 claims without prejudice, it recognizes that there may be certain situations where the statutory analysis changes. For example, the analysis might change if a local prosecutor imminently threatens charges for funding out-of-state abortions or an opinion from the Attorney General’s office declares it illegal.
The court did not dismiss the claims against Paxton for lack of imminence, so I do not see why imminence has entered the mix. He dismissed them because HB 1280 unambiguously does not allow extra-territorial application. I do see why either of those events changes that conclusion. The court recognizes that Paxton is hinting at extra-territorial enforcement "for the deliberate purpose of deterring funds from facilitating out-of-state abortions." But if those hints and threats do not overcome unambiguous text, a local DA's more imminent and specific threat or a formal AG opinion should not do so. Either the executive position can overcome unambiguous text (in which case these claims against Paxton should proceed, based on his posturing) or they cannot (in which case the footnote is wrong).
• If pre-Roe laws were repealed by implication, the claims against the DAs should have been dismissed on the same bases as the claims against Paxton. Repealed laws no longer exist as law, leaving the DAs nothing to enforce. A court cannot enjoin an executive from doing something he lacks the authority to do. DAs can no more enforce pre-Roe laws than Paxton can enforce HB 1280--in either case, no existing state law prohibits funding or facilitating out-of-state abortions and thus the target executives have nothing to enforce. In fact, the argument for lack of jurisdiction as to the DAs is stronger than as to Paxton. Paxton has an extant law he could enforce in the abstract, but the court interpreted it to be unenforceable in the current circumstances; the DAs have nothing but air.
• Making even less sense, the court uses implied repeal as the sole basis to find likelihood of success on the merits and to grant the injunction. The court never discusses whether the pre-Roe laws violate the First Amendment or the right to travel; that the laws were repealed by implication makes them invalid and unenforceable.
• The last point arises from the court treating impliedly repealed laws differently from expressly repealed laws, a unique category subject to unique analysis. But that framing makes no sense. Had the legislature repealed pre-Roe laws, the court would have dismissed for lack of standing (what I think should be merits, but same result); again, the lack of a law on the books leaves nothing to enforce and the court cannot enjoin the executive from what he cannot do. Had the law not been impliedly repealed, it would be a Dobbs-dezombified law; the court must consider whether the living law applies extra-territorially (the court says it does) and whether it violates the First Amendment or the right to travel (the court never says). Instead, impliedly repealed laws create a third thing--extant (thus potentially enforceable, giving plaintiffs standing) but per se invalid (thus obviating analysis of their constitutional validity). I have never seen anything like this and the court does not explain or justify this category of law.
How the case should have been resolved:
• The court should have reached the merits as to Paxton enforcing HB 1280, a live law. There ought to be consequences for executive saber-rattling, even when ungrounded in state law, having the purpose and effect of deterring conduct that is lawful under state law and constitutionally protected. The court should have addressed whether the law, if applied extra-territorially as Paxton has threatened, violates the Constitution.
• If pre-Roe laws were impliedly repealed, it should not have enjoined the DAs. If implied repeal remains an open question, then the court should have analyzed their constitutional validity before entering the injunction.
• Someone in the comments to Volokh's post on the decision suggests the Fifth Circuit will certify the question of implied repeal to the Texas Supreme Court. That may be a good idea. But the district court's analysis cannot stand regardless of that court's decision. If the laws were impliedly repealed, the district court erred in enjoining enforcement. If the laws were not impliedly repealed, the district court never addressed or resolved the substantive constitutional issue, which the reviewing court ought not do for the first time.
Pretty bad all around.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 25, 2023 at 12:29 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, February 22, 2023
Judge cannot certify appeal of prior order by prior judge in same case
From In re Sensipar Anitrust Litigation:
District Judge Leonard Stark issued an interlocutory decision. He was elevated to the Federal Circuit five days later and the case transferred to a different district judge, Colm Connelly. The defendant moved, unopposed, for a § 1292(b) certification for immediate appeal. Connelly holds he lacks authority to certify. Section 1292 speaks of a "judge" issuing a decision and certifying the § 1292(b) elements, which means the same judge must issue the order and certify; a different judge cannot certify, including in the same case. The key is that § 1292 does not use judge and court interchangeably; thus while both judges are the "court" hearing the case, they remain different judges for one order.
The textual point is well-taken, I suppose. At the same time, this cannot be the right answer. I know of no other statute or rule that gives a judge less-than-full control and power over a transferred case than had she been assigned the case from the outset. The answer may lie in a different textual point.
Section 1292(b) says that when the judge is of the opinion that an interlocutory order satisfies the elements of (b) and warrants immediate review, " he shall so state in writing in such order." In other words, the statute contemplates that the parties and court work out certification in advance and one order will resolve the underlying issue and certify for appeal. On that framing, this problem--Judge2 certifying Judge1's order--never should arise because Judge1 adjudicates and certifies in one order. Thus, Judge Connelly's interpretation, if correct, has no adverse consequences because it never arises.
In practice, however, parties argue appealability and the court certifies after the the target order. That happened here--Judge Stark issued the underlying order on March 11, 2022, Judge Stark was elevated on March 16, the case was reassigned to Judge Connelly, the parties briefed the certification motion, and Connelly decided the motion 11 months later. This practice is inconsistent with § 1292(b), to the extent the judge certifies in a subsequent order rather than "in such order" to be appealed. The court's interpretation, if right, now has absurd consequences--certification becomes impossible if something unexpected, even tragic, requires the case be transferred between the underlying order and the certification decision. And certification becomes impossible not only in a case such as this (eleven months lapsed between original order and ruling on certification), but in a case in which things move quickly (Order on Monday, Judge1 dies on Tuesday, case transferred to Judge2 on Wednesday, certification decision on Thursday).
But we can apply textualism to a different piece of text. Taking (b) seriously and reconciling text and practice, a judge can certify subsequent to the underlying order--but must do so not through a new-and-separate order but by amending the original order to add the (b) findings. The power to alter or amend an order rests with the court, meaning any judge assigned the case can alter or amend any order, including the prior judge's order. Connelly thus could have issued an amended version of the March 11, 2022 order, fully repeating and adopting Stark's conclusion while adding the (b) certification. This makes the amended order of February 2023--containing the content of the March 11 decision--an order that Judge Connelly made and therefore can certify for interlocutory appeal.
I am curious what happens next. The denial of certification is obviously not final and appealable. But a determined defendant might seek mandamus on the issue, asking the Third Circuit to order Judge Connelly to grant--or at least consider, which he has not done--certification, because his failure to do so is clearly erroneous
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 22, 2023 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, February 18, 2023
Leiter Poll: Best Judges of 20th Century
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 18, 2023 at 01:49 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, February 15, 2023
Painting Constitutional Law: Thursday, February 16
For readers in the Miami area:
FIU College of Law will post Painting Constitutional Law: A Celebration of Xavier Cortada's "May It Please the Court" at 5:30 tomorrow (Thursday, February 16) at FIU College of Law. May It Please the Court is a painting series by Miami artist Xavier Cortada, representing ten major SCOTUS cases originating in Florida. My colleague Matthew Mirow and I edited a 2021 book, Painting Constitutional Law, featuring essays analyzing the paintings and underlying cases. This program brings both together. Speakers include Mirow, Cortada, and Jenny Carroll (Alabama), who wrote the essay on Williams v. Florida (jury size).
Please attend if you are in town and able. The event will be recorded and livestreamed.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 15, 2023 at 10:52 AM in Blogging, Books, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, February 10, 2023
JOTWELL: Kalajdzic on Tang on copyright class actions
The new Courts Law essay comes from Jasminka Kalajdzic (Windsor), reviewing Xiyin Tang, The Class Action as Licensing and Reform Device, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 1627 (2022).
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 10, 2023 at 01:58 PM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
DeSantis exposes how much First Amendment doctrine he hates
Ron DeSantis on Tuesday hosted a roundtable on "legacy defamation practices" which illustrates the breadth of his campaign against free speech (that he does not like) and how most observers and press reports misunderstand that.
• Someone attacked "actual malice" as an "invention of the Supreme Court inconsistent with the way the Founders thought about libel and freedom of speech." The program included Nick Sandmann as an example of a victim of defamation. But Sandmann did not lose because of NYT or actual malice; he was a private figure who had to prove negligence. He lost because of other aspects of the defamation regime--the statements were not provably false assertions of fact as opposed to opinion. That does not change because NYT goes away. Another panelist lost a case because the judge found the (supposedly deceptively edited) report neither false nor misleading, another piece of defamation law with a long history and having nothing to do with actual malice.
• An important response to the attack on NYT should emphasize the case's facts and historical context: A coordinated campaign of defamation suits by government officials to silence and suppress the civil rights movement by using defamation law to prohibit criticism of government, analogous to seditious libel. Similar campaigns become possible if the Court eliminates NYT--government officials or powerful privte individuals to sue critics into silence. Make DeSantis own this point; he likely will do so, happily. But it should be part of the conversation.
• DeSantis purported to be fighting for the "little guy" because he has a platform to defend himself. But he then took off on the "Russia collusion hoax" for its reliance on anonymous sources. If anyone had a platform to defend himself against the media, it is the target of the Russia collusion hoax (whose name, of course, went unmentioned). He also complained about the coverage of Brett Kavanaugh--again, a fairly powerful individual with a national platform through which to respond to critics.
• Moreover, the First Amendment protects the right to speak anonymously, which should include the right of others to report or repeat that anonymous speech. DeSantis seems obsessed with anonymous speech as a unique evil. It is of a piece with a drafted-but-never-introduced bill that would have presumed statements from anonymous sources to be false, among other likely constitutionally invalid changes to defamation law.
Between this, pulling books from the library, targeting drag shows as obscenity, dictating what speech private companies must carry, and limiting the topics that can be taught or discussed in the classroom (in the name of protecting ideas), DeSantis genuinely seems to be running for a president on a campaign of othering and censoring speech and speakers.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 10, 2023 at 11:31 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Visitors sue Air and Space Museum, encounter Fed Courts doctrine?
Visitors to the Air and Space Museum sued the museum, agency, and several Doe officers, alleging that the officers forced them to remove hats with the logo "Rosary Pro Life" while visiting the museum; they allege free speech, equal protection, and RFRA violations and seek damages and injunctive relief. Eugene Volokh reports that the Museum admits this happened and that it should not have. He also argues that the free speech analysis is obvious here--the museum is a non-public forum in which officials can make reasonable content-based distinctions but not viewpoint-based distinctions (such as not promoting "equality").
But I am not sure we reach those merits:
• Plaintiffs should lack standing for an injunction. The plaintiffs cannot show this will happen again in the immediate future. Not only is it unlikely they can show concrete plans to return to the museum. And they cannot show they will suffer this injury if they do return, given the museum's response and the seeming randomness of the officers' conduct.
• This is an extension of Bivens--the Court has never allowed a free-speech claim. And the usual special factors arise--Congress should create causes of action and has not done so and, post-Egbert, agency disciplinary-complaint procedures offer sufficient mechanism for deterring misconduct. This is not a national-security case so that over-arching factor is absent. But lower courts emphasize the new single question of "Isn't Congress is better suited to balancing the costs and benefits of causes of action?" (to which the answer is always "yes") to reject actions outside national security.
• RFRA provides a cause of action for suits against government officials, so plaintiffs do not need Bivens for their religion claims. But plaintiffs must show this was religious rather than speech discrimination--does the word Rosary on the hats mean the officers knew the message was religious and forced them to remove the hats because of that religious (as opposed to political or ideological) message?
• If this is religious discrimination and/or they convince the Court that no special factors counsel hesitation, they must overcome qualified immunity. There is almost certainly no case law about making someone remove a hat because of its religious or political message in a museum. The court must fall back on general First Amendment principles, the sort of high-generality analysis courts usually reject. It might be interesting to see how the court uses the museum's mea culpa--does that show that it was clearly established that officers could not make visitors remove hats and other clothing because of the message?
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 10, 2023 at 04:03 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (6)
Tuesday, February 07, 2023
Younger strikes again
Florida (naturally) leads the pack of red states trying to stop (likely First Amendment protected) drag shows. It is pursuing the Orlando Philharmonic Foundation in an administrative action for producing "A Drag Queen Christmas" in December; it seeks to revoke its business and alcohol licenses, premised on a drag show involving lewd, lascivious, and sexual activity. The state is threatening a similar action against the Broward County Performing Arts Center for a similar program. The Foundation should win, because drag show should be constitutionally protected, including for children. The pleading includes photos of the event, but it is hard to take the pleading's descriptions of the event seriously when comparing it to the photos.
But the case offers yet another example of the commonality of defensive litigation, including where the constitutional invalidity of the state's enforcement efforts is obvious. An administrative proceeding, subject to state judicial review, triggers Younger abstention; this case squarely fits the second Sprint category of a quasi-criminal civil action. And while politically motivated and designed to score cheap populist points (towards a presidential run), I doubt this qualifies for Younger's bad-faith exception.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 7, 2023 at 10:29 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, February 02, 2023
Life and the Court marches on
I have mentioned that I end each Civ Pro class by telling students to Remember someone associated with that class. We did Twiqbal today, so it was "Remember David Souter." Students had to google him.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on February 2, 2023 at 01:21 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, January 30, 2023
More on Warren-DeSantis and the court's ill-advised analysis
I wrote last week about the district court decision in the lawsuit between the Hillsborough (FL) County DA and Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, arising from the latter suspending the former. I argued that the court made two legal mistakes: 1) Framing the case as DeSantis violating Warren's First Amendment rights in considering protected speech where he would have reached the same conclusion based on something other than protected speech and 2) Pronouncing that the suspension was inconsistent with state law while refusing on Eleventh Amendment grounds to issue an injunction ordering reinstatement. I also suggested Hinkle--whether intentionally or otherwise--provided Warren a weapon in the political controversy.
That last thing happened more quickly than I anticipated. Warren last Wednesday sent (and publicized) a letter to DeSantis urging the governor to voluntarily reinstate him. Warren frames the situation as follows: The court found as a matter of fact and law that the suspension violated the U.S. and Florida constitutions. Although not ordering Warren's reinstatement "in deference to federalism," the court called on DeSantis to "easily set [that violation] right" by recognizing that "the facts matter" and that he should not have removed Warren. DeSantis thus should follow his oath and obey the law by rescinding the suspension. This is a political stunt (as was the entire lawsuit), leading with the court's words as if they provide the final answer on these issues.
I explained where the court went wrong. But Warren's tendentious framing raises that error to another level.
The Eleventh Amendment (as courts apply it) does not create discretionary deference to federalism allowing a court to offer binding legal conclusions while declining to issue any legal remedy. It imposes a jurisdictional bar to adjudicating state-law issues. The court had no power or basis to consider the state-law validity of the suspension. It dismissed Warren's state-law claim as improper under § 1983/Ex parte Young. Nor were the state-law issues built into the federal issues. Adjudicating the First Amendment claim did not turn on the accuracy of the state law grounds--for purposes of whether DeSantis' decision rested on something other than Warren's protected speech, the question is whether DeSantis believed Warren adopted blanket non-prosecution policies, not whether DeSantis' beliefs were true or accurate.
Warren's letter treats the court's state-law analysis as akin to a declaratory judgment--the court issuing a jurisdictionally appropriate order that DeSantis violated state law, but finding that declaration sufficient and declining to issue further relief in deference to competing values. That is, the court provided a valid statement of law designed to persuade the defendant to change his behavior going forward, while reserving the "strong medicine" of an injunction for discretionary reasons and with faith that DeSantis will comply with the decision. DeSantis must "follow the law" as the court declared it.
This is wrong. The Eleventh Amendment strips courts of jurisdiction to issue all remedies, not only injunctions. The court had no more power to issue a DJ based on violations of a state-law rights than to issue an injunction based on a violation of state-law rights. That bar precludes any consideration of state law or whether DeSantis' conduct comported with the state constitution--the court acted beyond its power in making these pronouncements and they should have no legal force. Again, this goes beyond dicta--it is a court speaking words without the power to act as a court.
But those words provide Warren's first line of attack in the press and in politics.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 30, 2023 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, January 27, 2023
Jack Phillips loses on defense, no one cares
Jack Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop provide the response to complaints about SB 8 (and other "vigilante federalism" laws) that resist pre-enforcement offensive federal-court challenge and consign rights-holders to defensive litigation in state court--expecting the state court to properly vindicate federal rights or hoping for SCOTUS review at the end of the multi-stage process.
Phillips finds himself in that position, facing a private civil action under Colorado law from a transgender customer denied a custom cake. Phillips lost in the trial court and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the cake (pink on the inside, blue on the outside) carried no intrinsic message apart from how the customer planned to use it (a celebration of the anniversary of her m-to-f transition).*
[*] And Masterpiece did not know about that use when the customer ordered the cake and the store initially agreed to make it.
Phillips believes his constitutional rights are as obvious and as violated as those seeking reproductive care in the face of SB8 or trans athletes seeking to compete. Yet no one complains about Autumn Scardina using civil litigation against his (perhaps) protected conduct or acting as vigilante against Phillips. The difference remains that the people opposing SB8 and other vigilante laws disagree with his legal position and do not mind people suing him into oblivion. Procedure cannot turn on such substantive differences.
On the merits, this case bolsters my thoughts after the 303 arguments: These cases superimpose a complicity element on compelled speech. The messages made by the challengers--"Jack and Jack are getting married," "pink-and-blue cake"--carry no political message. It is what the customers do and say with that message after it is made--something untouched by the challengers--that matters. So the First Amendment argument must be that an anodyne, identical message is put to an end with which I disagree. That differs from the core compelled-speech case.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 27, 2023 at 09:14 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, January 20, 2023
Bizarre (and arguably advisory and ultra vires) opinion in Warren v. DeSantis (Slight edit)
The case arises from Florida Governor Ron DeSantis suspending Hillsborough County (Tampa) State's Attorney Andrew Warren. The court held that DeSantis considered six things in suspending Warren--three impermissible under the First Amendment and three permissible under the First Amendment. DeSantis would have suspended Warren based on the latter permissible grounds had he not considered the former impermissible grounds; therefore Warren's retaliation claim fails under Mt. Healthy. DeSantis violated Florida law in suspending Warren, because those federally permissible grounds were impermissible under state law, because the facts did not show incompetence or neglect-of-duty. But the Eleventh Amendment* prohibits federal courts from granting relief against state officials for state-law violations. Thus, although the court makes a big production of announcing that DeSantis violated state and federal law, it grants no remedy and dismisses Warren's claims.
[*] Really the limits of § 1983, but that ship sailed.
This is a bizarre decision.
• I doubt it is proper for the court to say DeSantis "violated the First Amendment." Constitutional violations occur with adverse enforcement action, not with thoughts or ideas not acted upon. The adverse action here was suspending Warren. If DeSantis would have taken that adverse action regardless of anything related to Warren's protected speech, he did not violate Warren's constitutional rights, at least as we define the scope of the First Amendment in this context. Compare a racist cop who arrests a Black person on a charge for which he has probable cause; the arrest is valid because of probable cause, regardless of any racist ideas or statements the officer makes. We may disagree with that doctrine. But it, for the moments, defines when a government official violates someone's constitutional rights.
• The court should not have declared the state-law validity of the firing. This goes beyond mere dicta or even an advisory opinion. Warren brought a state law claim, which the court dismissed under Pennhurst (again, better if § 1983, but whatever). The propriety of the state-law reasons were not before the court. Worse, if the Eleventh Amendment, as elaborted in Pennhurst, strips courts of jurisdiction over state-law issues, the court pronounced on issues beyond its jurisdiction.
• I said the court should have abstained under Pullman and Hinkle's approach to the opinion confirms this. The case always turned on the suspension's state-law validity; the First Amendment provided a sideshow. The court did what Pullman seeks to avoid--passed on unnecessary federal constitutional issues in the face of controlling state-law issues.
• It is hard not to read this as a political shot for Warren to use in the media. He can wave the opinion and say a federal court backs his view that DeSantis ran roughshod over his First Amendment rights. It also represents a political shot at the Florida Senate, which will hold a "trial" on the state-law propriety of the suspension, affirming DeSantis' decision or reinstating Warren. Hinkle has created a detailed legal and factual record, particularly finding that DeSantis' insistence that Warren had a blanket non-prosecution policy was nonsense and that he knew (or at least should have known, had he looked) it was nonsense. This helps Warren in the press and in the public should he lose before the Senate. Warren can compare this opinion to any Senate decision finding the suspension warranted and use it to argue that the Florida Senate made an incorrect, politically motivated decision--"see, we know the Senate made a politically motivated decision, because here is a federal judge showing why the suspension violates federal state law." Hinkle hints at this motive by referring to the "heavily partisan Florida Senate."
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 20, 2023 at 03:07 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)
Thursday, January 19, 2023
Thanks to Michael Ariens
Thanks to Michael Ariens (St. Mary's) for blogging about The Lawyer's Conscience A History of American Lawyer Ethics (University of Kansas Press) the past two week. His posts can be found here, here, here, here, and here.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 19, 2023 at 01:03 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, January 14, 2023
GEICO can intervene over sex-in-car case
The story of the woman who sued her former partner for infecting her with HPV during a sexual encounter in his car gained attention in June. I offered the case as the latest example of journalistic malpractice in covering the court, where stories snickered about the prospect of a multi-million judgment over car sex, ignoring that the case involved a narrow procedural question--whether GEICO should have been allowed to intervene in the state action to affirm the arbitration award, without (at this point) considering whether sex is an ordinary use of a car triggering coverage..
The story returned to the news last week, when the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that the trial court erred in denying intervention. GEICO moved within 30 days of receiving notice that it (rather than its insured) was the litigation target and before the trial court entered judgment; state law grants intervention as of right.
The case returns to the trial court, with GEICO able to argue that it is not required to cover. GEICO's federal DJ action, also seeking to avoid coverage, remains pending. Both courts must decide whether sex constitutes an ordinary-and-expected use of a car triggering insurance. Let the snickering resume.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 14, 2023 at 02:41 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, January 13, 2023
JOTWELL: Tidmarsh on Hershkoff & Norris and democracy and jurisdiction
The new Courts Law essay comes from Jay Tidmarsh (Notre Dame) reviewing Helen Hershkoff & Luke Norris, The Oligarchic Courthouse: Jurisdiction, Corporate Power, and Democratic Decline, Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023), exploring how corporate power influences jurisdictional rules in ways that enhance corporate power and limit democracy.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 13, 2023 at 12:52 PM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, January 10, 2023
More on oral assessments
Following on this exchange on oral assessments: My Civil Rights class this semester (first meeting this morning) will not include a large end-of-semester writing project, only oral arguments (plus three short in-semester papers and class participation). The three papers are worth more than the arguments, as school rules require. But students can focus all attention to the arguments as the capstone to the class.
I am curious to see if it makes a difference in the quality of arguments or in my ability to evaluate overall performance.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 10, 2023 at 08:31 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, January 03, 2023
Football
I stopped watching football about seven years ago. I reached a point that I could no longer watch and enjoy what had become gladiatorial. And I watched and read enough to believe that, given the game's nature and object, they could not make it "safe" or even "safer." Too many hits, large and small. I was done.
That said, I do not regard what happened to the Bills' Damar Hamlin as further evidence of football's unsafe nature. The collision between Hamlin and the Bengals' Tee Higgins was not unusually hard (for football). Some cardiologists speculate he suffered "commotio cordis"--cardiac arrest arising from an impact to the chest during a miniscule (40 millisecond) point in the heart's electrical cycle. Watch the play and the theory makes sense. Hamlin is standing someone upright and moving sideways when Higgins, moving forward, leads should-first into Hamlin's chest; Hamlin wraps his arms around Higgins and pulls him to the ground. But the point of contact between the two was the middle of Hamlin's chest.
This injury is neither unique nor common to football. It is more likely in baseball and hockey, especially among young players--taking a ball or puck to the chest at that vulnerable moment in the cardio cycle. And even then it is incredibly rare--15 or 20 cases per year, according to a 2017 story--and less common among adult athletes (something about the hardening of the chest wall as the body matures). At worst, it is a risk inherent in all sports. Not another reason (as if I need more) to turn away from football.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 3, 2023 at 09:43 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)
Whither laptops in the (in-person) classroom? (Updated)
Pre-COVID, the trend in higher ed, particularly legal ed, was to prohibit students from using laptops to take notes in class. Early studies showed students learned and retained information better when handwriting notes compared with typing often-verbatim notes. I had banned them from my room since spring 2009, based on a combination of those studies, a general belief that students were better prepared off handwritten notes, and a desire to create habits of engaging in a conversation while taking brief notes followed by a recording or transcript sometime later (i.e., what happens at a trial or deposition). About half the 1L faculty at FIU (7-8 people) did the same.
COVID changed a lot. Student habits of using computers became more entrenched, with students creating multi-screen, multi-device systems for online classes. Although I encouraged students to continue reading and taking notes on paper during my year+ of remote teaching, I doubt they listened.
So where do things stand on the other side (more or less) of COVID? I returned to my old system the day I returned to the classroom (Fall 2021); I heard no complaints. But an informal survey of my colleagues reveals four of us still ban; the rest allow computers, including several who previously did not. Early studies about notetaking have not been replicated in full.
What are faculty at other schools, especially those who did not allow computers pre-COVID, doing? Have student expectations changed and hardened, so they push back against bans? Do accommodations make this an impossible general policy?
Comments left open.
Update: Heard from one more colleague. He allows students to use devices for e-books and materials (which are cheaper and more available) but requires they take notes by hand, the computer reserved for reading and searching materials. I followed this approach by necessity one year in Civil Rights, when the new edition of the book was available electronically but not in print when class began in January. Students followed the no-notes rule, which was easy to enforce in a small (5 students) class; it becomes more challenging with 60+ students. Eboks made it more difficult and time-consuming for students to jump among materials (an issue in code classes). But that may be worth lowering the cost of books. Perhaps an intriguing middle ground for next year. In any event, that does mean five of us remain in the no-laptops-for-notes camp.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 3, 2023 at 09:31 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Sunday, January 01, 2023
2022 Chief Justice Annual Report
From 6 p.m. Saturday (continuing the practice since 1978). The history lesson tells of District Judge Ronald N. Davies of the District of North Dakota, who received a special appointment to serve on the Eastern District of Arkansas, oversaw the Little Rock desegregation case, and faced death threats for his decisions. That leads to this year's "theme" of the importance of judicial security--"the law requires every judge to swear an oath to perform his or her work without fear or favor, but we must support judges by ensuring their safety. A judicial system cannot and should not live in fear."
Some thoughts.
• Some have criticized Roberts for not writing about the issues surrounding SCOTUS--the Dobbs (and other) leaks, the forgotten leak investigation, attempts to use Historical Society donations to peddle influence, the Thomas' political misdeeds, dissension within the Court, the race to overrule precedent, etc. I will defend the Chief on that, because any expectation or hope that he might do so was fanciful. First, these reports are generally anodyne; no Chief has ever taken on real issues in a real way. Second, this is the Report on the Federal Judiciary, not the Report on the Supreme Court; Roberts' reports center lower courts and de-center SCOTUS.
• This Report differs in a number of ways. It is short--about 3 1/4 pages in the two-column format he adopted in 2019. The history occupies the majority of the Report--almost three full pages on Judge Davies, with three or four brief paragraphs (depending on how you count) on the modern. And the modern says noting beyond thanking Congress for enacting a law to enhance judicial security and privacy (not mentioning, of course, that the privacy protections immunize the Thomas' political shenanigans) and the agencies that protect the courts. He does not mention the man arrested outside Justice Kavanaugh's house (but see above, about de-centering SCOTUS).
• Telling the story of Judge Davies and Little Rock reveals the reality of desegregation litigation and constitutional litigation more generally. Brown of its own force did not compel integration in Little Rock. It required affirmative steps from the School Board, followed by a new lawsuit and Judge Davies' new orders and injunctions to compel school officials to integrate, stop state officials from interfering with local efforts, and prohibit local officials from using "extreme public hostility" as an excuse to delay integration.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 1, 2023 at 11:42 AM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, December 29, 2022
George Santos, Lies, and Jewishness
I am skeptical of the new state and federal criminal investigations of George Santos will lead anywhere. I am persuaded by Eugene Volokh's arguments that campaign lies cannot be prosecuted--that counter-speech from the press and the rival candidate provide a sufficient check. (See this explanation for how opposition research works and why the Democrats failed so badly). Of course, that position rests in part on the difficulty of separating fact and opinion in political speech and in determining falsity in statements about complex policy and voting records. Santos presents something without nuance or uncertainty-factual and provably untrue statements about graduating from a college or having a grandparent born in one country at one time. But many people in American life, including politics, invent their biographies. I imagine SCOTUS would situated this in its recent line of cases refusing to criminalize politics.
There is a tempting counter argument that a candidate lying to get elected is akin to a job applicant lying in an interview--false statements to obtain a paying job (and the power that comes with it). But I think the public and widespread scope of campaign speech--paradoxically, speech is easier to sanction when it is said to a smaller group than a larger one--distinguishes the cases.
There is a nice question of whether this affected the election and how that affects our sense of whether government can sanction his lies. Santos did not face a primary challenge for the nomination. He won the general election by more than 20,000 votes. I doubt that,when party affiliation is everything for many voters, 21,000 Republican voters would have voted differently had they known the truth about his background, education, and work history. Seeing the House GOP caucus embracing Santos and laughing about the story bolsters that thought. Perhaps Jewish identity would have prevailed over party identity, revolting against efforts to falsely appropriate our history and culture, especially the Holocaust. But I doubt it would have been 21,000 Jewish Republicans worth.
One unrelated point: Should Jews take pride that a political candidate lied to make himself Jewish and to attach himself to the name "Zabrovsky," the kind of name early-20th-century Jews ran away from. Maybe our societal position is not as tenuous as people fear--at least not in New York's Third Congressional District.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 29, 2022 at 11:52 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, December 28, 2022
In Memoriam, Megan Fairlie (Updated)
I am sad to announce that my FIU colleague Megan Fairlie died Tuesday, following a lengthy illness. She leaves two daughters, Aileen and Maca.
Megan came to FIU in 2007. She taught Crim, Crim Pro, and PR almost every year, so she taught and touched the vast majority of COL students the past 15 years. She wrote extensively on the ICC and international criminal law. She also was a wonderful friend and colleague; I will miss her contributions to the school's intellectual community.
More details, including about a memorial service sometime in the spring, to come.
Update: The family created a Go Fund Me for Megan's daughters. Please share the link.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 28, 2022 at 01:25 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, December 19, 2022
What if "You've Got Mail," but Jewish?
In considering whether When Harry Met Sally . . . is a Jewish movie, I argued no one would believe so if you replaced Billy Crystal with Tom Hanks--and get You've Got Mail. Behold Hanukkah on Rye, the 2022 Hallmark Chanukkah movie that earns such Hallmark-high praise as weirdly good and terribly sweet.
At some level, I have the same complaints I level at all of these movies--they place Chanukkah at the center of the adult (as opposed to kid) Jewish lifecycle and calendar and ascribe the holy day a force it does not have for most Jewish adults. Adults in these stories mark the year and their lives by Chanukkah. So from last year's Eight Gifts of Hanukkah:
• A Jewish contractor tells his Jewish client that construction on her optometry office-a business with no discernible connection to Judaism or the holiday--will "be done by the Eighth Night of Chanukkah."
• That client's ex wants to get back together because "maybe it's the holiday, but I have been taking stock of my life." Umm, we have a month plus ten days devoted to that, nowhere close to this time of year.
• A family gathers for the first night to light candles, etc., then the child in the family asks whether she can "unwrap her Chanukkah presents"--as if anyone in a real conversation in that context would need the adjective. OK, that may just be bad writing, but it illustrates how these movies find it necessary to hit everyone over the head with the fact that these people are Jewish.
Although these recent movies have included Jewish actors and crew, they continue to present Chanukkah as "Jewish Christmas"--that most wonderful time of year when we gather we family, do not want to be alone, and make a lifetime of memories that guide us through life.
HoR does not suffer from those problems because it is not an original story. It is a Jewified You've Got Mail, with identifiably Jewish characters played by Jewish actors and set within the eight days of Chanukkah. The timing sort-of makes a little sense because the story revolves around latkes and a secret latke recipe, although it still centers Chanukkah as the time of year where Jews gather, take stock of life, long to find love, etc. Anyway, Jacob, the fourth-generation operator of LA-based deli Zimmers, relocates to New York to open a new location on the Lower East Side; Zimmers is known for combining old-time Jewish deli with modern takes and a wider menu. Molly is preparing to take over Gilbert's, her family's fourth-generation, very traditional, but secretly struggling, deli in that neighborhood--if she only can figure out how to make a good egg cream (hint: stir the chocolate into the milk before spritzing the seltzer). Meanwhile, their respective bubbes sign them up for a mysterious New York-based matchmaking service in which people write handwritten letters to a pseudonymous match ("David" and "Beth") that a courier collects and delivers. Multi-generational family dynamics appear to center the final act.
Some non-Jewish-focused spoilers on HoR after the jump; if you do not want to know how the movie ends, stop reading.
I will leave with this point. I can give Hallmark credit for wanting to depict Jews at Christmas, the only people in the Hallmark Cinematic Universe who want to stay in The Big City. But then tell a somewhat realistic story of American Jews. If it wants a December-based Jewish-American rom-com, set it at one of the Matzah Balls in many cities on Christmas--events designed for young Jewish singles to meet. Or at a Christmas-day Chinese restaurant comedy show. Importantly, neither story has anything to do with Chanukkah--which may be over or not have begun on December 25; each is about how Jewish-Americans make a unique culture in the larger society. If Hallmark insists on a Jewish-holy-day-themed story, set it at Passover or Yamim Noraim--the days that matter on the Jewish calendar. Otherwise there are better Jewish rom-coms that need not squeeze into a short holiday.
OK, now the spoilers. What I find interesting about HoR as a riff (generously) on YGM--the movie corrects the two things people find unrealistic and arguably problematic about the source material.As in YGM, Jacob figures out that "Beth" is Molly and tries to use it to his advantage, although not as manipulatively. YGM ends with that reveal and she acts it happily without thinking more about. In HoR, Molly learns about this about 20 minutes before the end, and is (rightfully) pissed off--he was dishonest with her and used that information to his advantage. Yes, the advantage was love, but still. It takes awhile and several different conversations with different people to bring her down from the point.
Unlike YGM, Zimmers does not put Gilberts out of business as Fox Books (inevitably) crushed the independent bookstore. There is something hinkey in YGM's story of "you destroyed my multi-generational family business and put me out of work, but I am in love with you" story. HoR changes that because despite its obvious political conservatism, Hallmark hates capitalism. Zimmers is not a franchising behemoth; it remains family-owned, just with a less-traditional approach. Jacob helps Molly (something Tom Hanks never did for Meg Ryan); he tries to convince his family to find a new location and he works with Molly on a bunch of Chanukkah-themed promotions at Glberts. Finally, the families learn of an historical connection and end the story by combining businesses in New York (in a way that would undermine both in real life--again, I do not think Hallmark understands capitalism).
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 19, 2022 at 01:10 PM in Culture, Howard Wasserman, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)
Sunday, December 18, 2022
AntiJewishness: Societal or Individual
Rob Eshman is on to something. We miss something when we amplify individual antisemitic acts or statements but ignore the broader context or reaction by government and the rest of society. What matters more in evaluating American Jewry's position and security--that Kanye runs around saying bad things or the near-universal condemnation; that someone vandalizes a synagogue or that government and the rest of the community respond appropriately.
Eshman's argument sounds in a piece of the debate over hate speech. Nazi Germany became Nazi Germany because law and government policy instantiated Jewish inequality and broader society shared--or do not push back against-- the views reflected in those laws. It did not become Nazi Germany by allowing individuals or groups to spout Jew-hating ideas. And we do not become Nazi Germany because Twitter is loaded with assholes.
Eshman captures his point in two sentences: "No Jew in the history of Judaism ever looked smart by saying things aren’t as bad as you think," but "that's an argument for nuance, for data that reveals a deeper understanding of where we stand before we decide to flee."
I serve on the board and exec comm of my temple and we will participate this year in an ADL-sponsored educational program on antisemitism. I want to try to keep Eshman's point in mind.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 18, 2022 at 10:53 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, December 16, 2022
Infield Fly strikes again
Writing about the Infield Fly Rule produced one key takeaway--it is everywhere. Once we see what defines the play and warrants a rule change--unexpected action, substantial advantage and exclusive control to actor, inability to counter--it is easy to find other sports responding to similar plays with similar rules changes.
The NFL offers the latest example. It "reinterpreted" a rule to prohibit teams from holding the ball on top of (as opposed to on) the kicking tee on kickoffs. This placed the ball an extra 1/2-inch off the ground (1 1/2" inches rather than 1"), allowing the kicker to get under the ball more and gain more height and hang-time on the kick, allowing the coverage team to get downfield quicker for shorter returns. And it worked--the Raiders' opponents averaged more than four yards fewer per return than league average.
This possesses all the features of the infield fly situation--teams ordinarily place the ball on the tee rather than on top of it; the kicking team controls how the ball is placed on the kick-off; it gives them what appears to be a substantial advantage on the play; and the receiving teams cannot counter the play because the coverage team's extra running head start overwhelms even the best blocking-and-return schemes. This is what leagues impose limiting rules (or limiting interpretations) to eliminate that unusual play and thus the extraordinary advantage.
The NFL did not explain the reinterpretation in these terms. It said the practice produced the same effect as using a 1.5" tee, whereas the rulebook limits tees to 1". Still as Deadspin says, it is hard to believe the league would have cared unless it produced a meaningful one-way benefit and incentivized other teams to do the same.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 16, 2022 at 12:12 PM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, December 09, 2022
No state standing in SB8 suit
Press release on the judge's ruling from the bench that standing requires a plaintiff directly affected by the provision of abortion services. This is remaining lawsuit of the three filed by "colorful" actors; the plaintiff is Felipe Gomez, a suspended Illinois lawyer who purports to support abortion rights.
This is largely moot, since Texas post-Dobbs banned abortion through criminal penalties and government enforcement. But it provides a nice coda to the SB8 story that has ended with a whimper. Rocky and I called the result, although we argued that Texas has a history of statutorily authorized private enforcement that complicates the analysis more than in federal court. It also reveals an irony in the debate over "bounty-hunter" laws--legislative efforts to deter disliked-but-constitutionally-protected conduct through the chill of random private litigation fail in the face of state judiciaries that interpret their constitutions to ape Article III. Further irony: California--which tried to create a "blue-state SB8" on firearms--allows broader "any person" standing than Texas (at least according to one trial judge) and other states that are trying this.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 9, 2022 at 08:03 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (6)
Thursday, December 08, 2022
Changing arguments
Mike Dorf and Will Baude discuss changing dynamics at SCOTUS arguments--including an increase in justices cutting off attorneys, demanding yes-or-no answers to nuanced questions, and not letting them give reasonable answers and making long arguments in the form of questions. Baude argues they increasingly sound like congressional hearings and attributes a number of possible causes, including the new round-robin format, increased polarization, and live-streaming. For what it is worth, at least they sound like they know what they are talking about in their questions, unlike most legislators.
While listening to the 303 argument and before seeing Will's post, I had the idea that the individual-justice questions portion sounded different, with lawyers not bothering to answer many "questions." At one point,the Colorado SG expressed "hope" that he might be able to answer someone's question, because that did not seem to be the point of the exchange.
I hope the blame does not lie with livestreaming. Many of us spent many years arguing for televising arguments, believing the Justices would not undermine their institution.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 8, 2022 at 02:33 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, December 07, 2022
Which side of the bench?
Here is a different way of studying SCOTUS arguments--which side of the bench is most active in questioning and draws the most attorney attention? For right now, the answer seems to be to Chief's left/attorney's right--Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson.
This is of limited long-term use (as opposed to looking at individual justices) because seating changes frequently. It might have been of interest with the long Breyer-juniormost Court (1994-2005). On the other hand, I would not be surprised to see the current Court remain for the next 7-10 years, so maybe that will give us a longer sample.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 7, 2022 at 02:05 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
JOTWELL: Michalski on FJC on pro se electronic filing
The new Courts Law essay comes from Roger Michalski (Oklahoma) reviewing the Federal Judicial Center's study of electronic filing by pro se litigants.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 7, 2022 at 01:55 PM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, December 06, 2022
Quick thoughts on 303
I found a few interesting things in the questioning of Kristen Waggoner, counsel for petitioner in 303 Creative. (Mike Dorf has more about the "culture war" lines in the argument).
IAlthough Waggoner repeatedly disavows it, 303 is arguing for First Amendment protection of implicit endorsement of an idea, rather than for the words spoken. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson peppered her with questions (real and hypothetical) about purely informational web sites--"Mike and Mark are getting married on this date at this place and these are the people in the bridal party." Even if that is 303's speech, it says nothing about marriage, same-sex marriage, or the righteousness of same-sex marriage. The First Amendment argument is not about the words being uttered on the web site, but that providing that information requires her to implicitly express her approval of same-sex marriage.
An exchange with Justice Barrett, designed to help Waggoner show that this is about speech rather than customer identity, drives the point home. Barrett offered two hypos of cis-het couples whose story (to be told on the web site) includes political statements--one that "we would have gotten married even if we were not cis-het because it doesn't matter" and the other "we were married to other people when we met at work, realized we were meant to be together, so we each got divorced six months later and now begin our lives together;" Waggoner said 303 would not do those web sites. Barrett's hypos involve objections the words and message written on the page--"everyone who finds their soul mate should get married, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity." Most sites do not include such messages. The objection cannot be to the factual statement that Mark and Mike are getting married on June 10; it must be to the implicit endorsement in the artist announcing that fact. The follow-up should have been whether 303 would refuse to design a purely informational site--"Lily and Luke are getting married on this date at this place"--if she knew that Lily and Luke had divorced other people to be together. Would she consider that a similar implicit (and objectionable) endorsement of their marriage or their conduct?
The question becomes whether the freedom of speech protects against such implicit endorsements not grounded in the words themselves. The Court has pushed the complicity-in-sin idea through free exerise, but never through speech. What is the best way to read Hurley? One is that the parade organizers were compelled to send an implicit message of endorsement by including GLIB--having to include the group endorses the message that it is ok to be gay and Irish. Another is that GLIB itself sent an express message--possibilities and pride to be LGBT and Irish and with LGBT Irish people marching in the New York parade--that the parade was compelled to incorporate into its overall message. If Hurley means the latter, this case does not fit because Mike and Mark are not sending a message about LGBT rights by getting married--unless everything LGBT people do sends a message about LGBT rights.
II
I will admit to being annoyed by Waggoner's refusal to admit that, under her position, a web designers can refuse to do pages for mixed-race, mixed-religion, or (per Sotomayor's hypo) disabled couples. All entail the same endorsement. And the First Amendment does not turn on the "honorableness" of the message or distinguish between ideas we find odious and ideas we respect--if the seller of expressive products has a right not to sell where the product sends an objectionable implicit message, the nature of the message does not matter, only that the seller objects. Own it.
III
Waggoner repeatedly tried to generalize the principle--that it protects not only her Christian-web-designer-who-hates-same-sex-marriage, but other, left-leaning people, such as a "Democrat publicist" or "lesbian graphic designer." Dorf points to the adjective in the former as a culture-war dog whistle. I find the latter telling because it conflates identity with viewpoint--supposedly what she is not otherwise arguing. I doubt that most lesbian web designers object to opposite-sex marriage or would refuse to design page for a cis-het couple because it sends a message of approval for opposite-sex marriage. The refusal certainly would not be because of her LGBT status. That example--which she surely prepared, given how frequently she used--says a lot about how Waggoner sees the connection between identity and ideas.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 6, 2022 at 10:49 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, December 05, 2022
Oral assessments (if not exams) (Updated)
Responding to Gerard's post: In Fed Courts and Civil Rights, a chunk of the grade (about 30/165 points) is based on oral arguments. I usually have 20-30 students in each. The class gathers for a full day at the end of exams. Each student argues one case and judges one case. A petitioner and respondent argue the case before a panel of 3 students and me. It is a lot of fun and the students enjoy it. And it allows me to test them in real-time--to push back and/or correct their understandings and arguments and thus to measure how well they get stuff.
I have not been able to pull the trigger--which I think is what Gerard is suggesting--on making it the sole big assessment. That comes from a written opinion on a third case (as well as two smaller in-semester papers). I am not sure our internal academic policies on the curve and blind grading allow it. But it is an interesting thought would make my life easier. And that other people, such as Gerard, would consider it suggests it is worth thinking more about.
PS: A colleague described doing oral exams years ago at another school, in Fed Courts. He met with each student and had a conversation about some subjects or issues. Sometimes, to ease student discomfort, he took it outside--they walked around campus talking about federalism.
Update: One more thing, perhaps against the idea. In litigation, the balance between oral and written has shifted overwhelmingly towards the latter--fewer appeals get oral argument, fewer trial motions get oral argument, district judges spend less time on the bench. So do we do a disservice by emphasizing oral over written in getting them ready to practice?
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 5, 2022 at 01:33 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, December 01, 2022
Uvalde lawsuit
Complaint here. I have been thinking about this inevitable lawsuit and the problems it will face--and I am not sure this complaint, as pleaded, avoids those problems. The main claim is substantive due process/bodily integrity. There are two ways to plead this claim based on third-party harms--state-created danger and special relationship. The complaint alleges both and both encounter problems.
As to the former, the Fifth Circuit (so far) refuses to recognize state-created danger as a basis for due process liability (the only circuit never to do so), although the complaint does not mention this fact.Maybe this is the case that would prompt a change, but I doubt it. So to the extent they premise liability and remedy on "Uvalde officials did a horrible job and allowed Salvador Ramos to do what he did," that theory is unavailable in the Fifth Circuit.
As to the latter, special relationship does not apply between schools and teachers and students, because their presence in school (unlike, e.g., prisons) is not involuntarily coercive. And law enforcement does not have a special relationship with the public or a general duty to protect. Plaintiffs offer two ways around this. First, by showing up and establishing a perimeter, police created a special relationship that did not previously exist. This raises tricky line-drawing problems. The theory is that police lack a general duty to protect but at some point they take enough affirmative steps to establish a special relationship and create that duty to protect--where, exactly, is that point? But this seems to be the best thing they have. The second theory is that police affirmatively prevented parents and others from helping out while police did nothing. But this does not describe inaction within a special relationship; it describes affirmative action to worsen a third-party-harm situation, which sounds in state-created danger (still unavailable in the Fifth Circuit) rather than special relationship.
Plaintiffs include claims for municipal liability against the school district for a custom or practice of noncompliance with safety regulations and against the city for failing to follow existing active-shooter protocols and failing to train/supervise officers on those protocols, which they "magnificently failed" to follow. Two things. First, there is an interesting puzzle here over the concept of policy and policymakers Uvalde had protocols--formal policies established by government policymakers--that police ignored; municipalities avoid liability when they can show that officers ignored or acted contrary to official policy. Plaintiffs attempt to avoid that by alleging that the acting police chief, the policymaker for law enforcement, created new policy by ignoring existing policy. Second, municipal liability depends on an underlying constitutional violation and injury to which municipal policy, custom, or failure-to-[blank] contributed. The immediate cause of the injury is the private shooter, which returns us to state-created danger (policies and failures as affirmative acts enhancing the shooter's ability to kill) not recognized in the Fifth Circuit or to special relationship that, as described above, does not fit seem to fit here.
Finally, they ask for an injunction basically compelling the school and the city to get its shit together as to school safety and active-shooter responses. They also ask to certify a class to get around the obvious standing problems. We will see if that works, given the unlikelihood of another shooting situation, no matter how bad the city's customs and practices.
I am putting the final touches on the third edition of my civil rights treatise, including new case-based problems. I may need to add this one.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on December 1, 2022 at 10:32 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, November 16, 2022
Yale withdraws from US News
Dean Gerken's announcement. I do not think about legal education and metrics enough to predict what this will mean. I am curious to hear other people's thoughts, in particular for schools in the middle of the US News pack. Update: Harvard, too.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on November 16, 2022 at 01:34 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Effective v. Enforceable
Further thoughts on the Georgia trial court and the idea that a law enacted contrary to binding judicial precedent never became a law:
The problem may be one of nomenclature and the conflation of two terms--when a law is effective and when a law is enforceable. My view is that a law is effective on the date the legislature indicates in the enrolled and signed bill. Constitutional litigation concerns whether a law is enforceable--and the judicial remedy from constitutional litigation is to stop enforcement of the challenged law, not to cause the law to cease being effective. Thus the Georgia court's fundamental error. Pre-Dobbs precedent did not cause the law to lack effect; it causes the law to be unenforceable. This, again, goes back to the source of the constitutional violation--the law itself or its enforcement.
The same nomenclature problems arose in the S.B.8 discussions in September 2021. People complained about SCOTUS' denying emergency relief allowing S.B.8 to take effect. But that is wrong. S.B.8 took effect on September 1, 2021, per the law's text. Denying emergency relief allowed S.B.8 to be, and remain, enforceable (through private lawsuits).
Posted by Howard Wasserman on November 16, 2022 at 01:32 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Georgia trial court rejects judicial departmentalism
A Georgia trial court declares Georgia's heartbeat ban constitutionally invalid underGeorgia's "void ab initio" doctrine--a law enacted contrary to binding judicial precedent never had any force or effect. While "on the books," the law never carried any force or effect. It "'is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office.'" It is "'in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.'" The court adds that "an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void." There can be no zombie laws that "spring back to life" when precedent changes.
Obviously I disagree with this framing. The legislature did enact a law that is in effect in the state of Georgia. The law is not enforceable--or at least enforcement is certain to fail once the issue reaches the judiciary and the judiciary applies then-existing constitutional doctrine. Moreover, this approach presumes that a law violates the Constitution (in this case, the rights of pregnant people) by existing and thus the legislature violates the Constitution by enacting it. But the constitutional violation arises from the actual or threatened enforcement of the law, not from the law itself; the legislature does nothing wrong in enacting a law. Put differently: The court says that the heartbeat ban "exist[ed] only on paper." But all laws exist only on paper. Their force and effect comes from actual or attempted enforcement--at which point the judiciary and controlling precedent come into play.
Here is the topper:
What does this ruling mean? Most fundamentally, it means that courts -- not legislatures -- define the law. This is nothing new, but it seems increasingly forgotten (or ignored): “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210, 219–20 (1850). If the courts have spoken, clearly and directly, as to what the law is, as to what is and is not constitutional, legislatures and legislators are not at liberty to pass laws contrary to such pronouncements. This does not, as the State protests, leave the legislative branch powerless in the face of “judicial supremacy run amok.” (Defendant’s Response at 1). To the contrary, “[t]he inherent powers of our State General Assembly are awesome.... [It] is absolutely unrestricted in its power to legislate, so long as it does not undertake to enact measures prohibited by the State or Federal Constitution.” Sears v. State of Ga., 232 Ga. 547, 553–54 (1974) (citation omitted). The void ab initio doctrine and its application to something like the LIFE Act properly cabins that broad legislative authority to set policy for our State and for the people who comprise it: do what you will, only do so within the bounds of the constitution that the courts have established.
If I were looking to give my students a definition of judicial supremacy, I could not do any better--the courts define the law, the Constitution means what the courts say it means, and the legislature must yield to the judiciary's constitutional understanding. The legislature's power is unrestricted unless the judiciary restricts it.
One criticism of judicial departmentalism (as Kevin Walsh framed it and as I have applied it to disputes about SB8 and universal injunctions) is that it collapses into judicial supremacy--because every dispute reaches court, the judicial view prevails at the end of the day. This case demonstrates the difference--judicial departmentalism leaves the legislature a modicum of power to engage in the legislative process and to define the state's statute books--however the laws on those books may or may not be enforced.
Besides being a bad approach to constitutional law, this approach may prove to much and raises a number of open issues:
• Must legislatures repeal zombie laws and ensure the statute books are consistent with the state of judicially declared constitutional law? Alternatively, must they reenact zombie laws when the Court changes its constitutional understanding? If a new law contrary to judicial precedent never gains legal effect, does an existing law contrary to new judicial precedent lose all legal effect? The court's logic is yes--the zombies never "spring back to life." So a new law is required for any effect.
• How can the political branches seek to change judicial precedent? There must be a law and actual or threatened enforcement to present a case in which the judiciary could change precedent. So Mississippi succeeded in getting the Court to overrule Roe by enacting a new law and triggering the litigation through which the Court changed precedent. But if the new law is void ab initio, the court never reaches the substantive constitutional question (or must reach out to do so when unnecessary, which we say courts should not do) because the new law never was law. And that will be the case for any new law. And if I am right about the prior bullet point, the state cannot use existing laws for the challenge, because those lost all force and effect.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on November 16, 2022 at 10:56 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)
Friday, November 11, 2022
Chamber of Commerce on corporate speech
The chief legal officer of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce told a Fed Soc panel (paywalled) that corporate activism--particularly so-called "ESG (environmental, social, and governance) investment--is First Amendment protected corporate speech. The statement comes days after Sens. Chuck Grassley, Tom Cotton, Marsha Blackburn, Mike Lee and Marco Rubio-- anticipating a Senate majority--sent a letter to numerous law firms threatening them with investigations for assisting corporations in that activity.
So two issues for the other side of the political and ideological spectrum:
• Will the Chamber of Commerce pursue this First Amendment position in court and in legislative chambers if and when Republican officials come after some of these companies and their lawyers?
• I thought FedSoc and the conservative constitutional movement oppose canceling, threatening, or targeting lawyers for representing clients on causes of which they disapprove. It was bad when people criticized or sought to impose market consequences on firms helping Donald Trump and his minions bring frivolous cases to overthrow the election with frivolous cases. Apparently it is ok to threaten government action against law firms that helping companies take steps not to help the environment or the common good.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on November 11, 2022 at 05:36 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Argument in Talevski
Here is my recap of Tuesday's argument in HHC v. Talevski, considering whether any Spending Clause enactments can be enforced through § 1983 litigation. I remain bad at predictions, but best guess: The Court will not categorically reject § 1983 enforcement, perhaps unanimously. But a majority will hold that FNHRA precludes private enforcement (the SG's position) because of the statute's comprehensive administrative scheme.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on November 11, 2022 at 02:51 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, November 10, 2022
SCOTUS questioning
What should we call the Justice-by-Justice questioning tacked onto the open questioning in SCOTUS arguments. (This is a vestige of the process from telephone arguments during COVID). During Tuesday's Mallory arguments, Justice Sotomayor called it "round-robin," a term I have used informally. But that does not seem accurate--a round-robin is a tournament format in which every team faces one another. Obviously the Justices do not face one another. And round-robin does not describe one competitor facing each of nine opponents.
In a more formal writing, I used "serial questioning" or "sequential questioning," either more accurate. This is a series of questions by a series of Justices, asked sequentially.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on November 10, 2022 at 07:08 AM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (6)
Monday, November 07, 2022
§ 1983 and the Spending Clause
SCOTUS hears argument Tuesday in Health & Hospital Corp. v. Talevski, considering whether Spending Clause enactments (there, the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 ("FNHRA")) can be enforced in damages actions under § 1983. I am covering the case for SCOTUSBlog; here is my case preview.
This is the latest in the Court's move to limit private rights of action, but with an important twist. The supposed separation of powers arguments driving limits on Bivens and implied statutory rights of action--Congress, not the courts, should make the policy choices and balancing of interests in creating private rights of action and Congress has not done so--do not apply. Congress made that choice in enacting 1983 as a free-standing cause of action and including the phrase "and laws" to allow plaintiffs to enforce statutory rights beyond constitutional rights. Not that I do not expect the Court to find some new means to its preferred end of limiting private litigation. Just that the recitation of separation of powers will not do it in this case.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on November 7, 2022 at 06:55 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)