Friday, June 02, 2023

JOTWELL: Levy on George, et al. on SCOTUS Clerks

The new Courts Law essay comes from Marin Levy (Duke), reviewing Tracey E. George, Albert Yoon, & Mitu Gulati, Some Are More Equal Than Others: U.S. Supreme Court Clerkships, an empirical study of who clerks for SCOTUS, where they come from, and where they go.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 2, 2023 at 08:57 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 01, 2023

What is the Court planning for § 1983 "and laws"

My SCOTUSBlog case for this term is Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Talevski, asking the Court to reconsider precedent allowing enforcement of Spending Clause enactments through § 1983 "and laws" actions. The Court held arguments on November 8 and still has not issued an opinion. My reading on the argument was that there was no appetite for doing that. But the long delay suggests either 1) they are going to do it or 2) someone is writing separately to argue why they should do it. The case is not, all things considered, that controversial; I would not expect the Court to take seven months (and counting) or to hide it in the end-of-Term document dump.

The delay has created bigger problems for the in-progress third edition of Understanding Civil Rights Litigati0n. The discussion of "and laws" actions covers the state of the law from 1980 (Maine v. Thiboutot) through summer 2023. It includes a paragraph that there is "doubt" about § 1983 and Spending Clause enactments, mentioning that the Court granted cert to decide the issue in Talevski this Term. I wrote that as a placeholder in January, expecting to change it during the editing process. But the final round of of galley edits passed; the only remaining piece of the process is indexing, if we hope to have the book available in August. If the Court does something crazy, it renders several pages obsolete (how obsolete depends on how crazy), with no opportunity to correct it.

We could say the same about Mallory and establishing general personal jurisdiction through business registration, argued the same day as Talevski--this is a long time to spend on this case, suggesting division and someone doing something wild.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 1, 2023 at 11:18 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 31, 2023

More graduation free speech nonsense

Popehat calls out BU President Robert A. Brown for a lack of commitment to free speech dressed in cancel-culture/free-speech-warrior bullshit. I wish I could say it any better than he did.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 31, 2023 at 02:36 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

CUNY Law graduation: Everyone screws up a free speech problem (Updated)

I missed this story from two weeks ago, although the latest fallout continued yesterday. The student-chosen student speaker at CUNY Law's May 12 graduation, Fatima Mousa Mohammed, took aim at Israel and many other targets. People have responded in expected ways. Also as expected, no one covers themselves in free-speech glory.

• The three minutes drawing the most attention can be found here--Mohammed refers to "Israeli settler colonialism;" accuses Israel of, essentially, war crimes; accuses CUNY of supporting various evil causes; and praises CUNY Law (students and faculty) for supporting BDS. She later urges fights "against capitalism, racism, imperialism and Zionism around the world." Nothing in this speech falls outside of First Amendment protection and I presume school administrators either read and approved the speech or imposed no limits on its content.

• Which parts of the speech cross into antisemitism? For me, the obvious point is when she singles Zionism out as a unique evil to fight, distinct from racism and imperialism; if Zionism means the existence of a Jewish state (irrespective of Israel's current government and policies), that statement singles out Jews as a unique group not entitled to a homeland. Many people consider BDS antisemitic for similar reasons--it singles out Israel, and thus Jewish citizens and businesses, from all other wrongdoer governments. As for the rest, "Israeli settler colonialism" reflects her characterization of Israeli actions and policies; I disagree with the characterization and doubt the truth of much of what she describes. But does that (and can that) reflect protest of the Israeli government without crossing into Jew hatred? I leave comments open, because I confess that I remain unable to tell the difference in the gray areas.

• It appears students, including Jewish, support her and her words. CUNY's Jewish Law Students Association issued a statement (co-signed by Students for Justice in Palestine and other student groups) condemning Zionism as inherently racist and imperialist and condemning outside critics lobbing "absurd and false claims of antisemitism" against the "wishes of the majority of CUNY Law’s Jewish students." To be sure, CUNY Law's student body does not reflect a typical audience, including of American Jews. And query whether either group speaks, as the letter claims, for the majority of Jewish law students.

• What should objecting audience members--particularly graduates--have done in response to the speech? Should it be permissible to boo, jeer, heckle, etc. and up to what point? (Mohammed pauses at points because of audience cheers, so audience reaction obviously is fair game). Should they have walked out, thus missing a singular event in their lives? Recall that the anti-cancel-culture folks insist that either  is inconsistent with a commitment to free speech, which requires that people hear speakers, even without the opportunity to respond, so conversations can happen another day.

• Critics' reactions demonstrate, again, why few people truly believe in free speech as a principle, regardless of their rhetoric. CUNY's Chancellor and Board issued a statement yesterday that begins with this gem:

Free speech is precious, but often messy, and is vital to the foundation of higher education. Hate speech, however, should not be confused with free speech and has no place on our campuses or in our city, our state or our nation.

Ah, yes, "we believe in free speech, except when we don't like that speech." Since hate speech does not fall outside free speech protection, this is an inane statement. Worse, it is too generic. The problem with the speech, if any, is its antisemitism. So to call it hate speech--without identifying the particular racial/religious group attacked and without criticizing Mohammed for that specific form of hatred--shows the Board's unwillingness to specify and call out antisemitism (if that is what they believe this was) by name when it sees it.

Similarly, Republican legislators give lie to their supposed free-speech commitments by calling for CUNY to lose federal funding because students engage in constitutionally protected speech and the public university does not prevent them from doing so. I await Rep. Lawler's support as anti-LGBTQ+ forces emerge on campuses.

• What is the point of a graduation speech? Free speech aside, did Mohammed overstep by making the event about herself and her causes rather than those of her classmates? Students seemed to support her and must have suspected what she might do when they selected her. Mohammed framed a students v. administration narrative (all the things students achieved in the area of social justice, in the face of administration opposition); she thus likely viewed herself as speaking for, and reflecting the causes of, her classmates. But should this type of speech avoid controversy in its nature, in deference to the least-supportive member of the graduating class for whom this represents an important day and milestone?

Update: FIRE sent a letter to the chancellor pointing out the stupidity of "hate speech is not free speech." The letter then explains why CUNY, as a state institution, cannot punish Mohammed for her speech. This seems an odd tack, however, because I did not read the Board statement as threatening any sanctions against Mohammed.* I read the statement as a poorly written attempt to criticize Mohammed and to get on the right side of public officials (Rep. Lawler, NYC Mayor Eric Adams) criticizing Mohammed. In other words, CUNY engaged in government counterspeech., which I hope we agree is consistent with the First Amendment.

[*] Query what sanctions it could impose if it wanted to. I doubt CUNY could withhold her degree at this point, although I guess there is a nice question of when the property interest in the degree vests--when diploma is in hand, when the President completes the ceremony and allows the graduates to move their tassels? It could try to interfere with her Bar admission, although that is not CUNY's decision.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 31, 2023 at 12:56 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 30, 2023

Life without the Infield Fly Rule

(H/T: Michael Risch, I think from last season).

Video here; a YouTuber's analysis of why the ump erred in failing to invoke.

The play illustrates why we have the IFR. The ump almost certainly did not invoke because the ball was not high enough. The commentator argues that height alone should not matter. It was not a line drive and landed directly in front of the shortstop who barely had to move, thus implicating the rule's purposes (or evils).

One other thing as you watch the play: The best move for the runner on second, recognizing non-invocation, is to retreat to second base and hope that the second baseman catches the flip and steps on the bag before tagging him. Stepping on the bag puts out the runner on first, but removes the force, allowing the runner on second to remain. But the runner must have the wherewithal to process that in an instant. And the second baseman must have the wherewithal to stay off the bag while catching the flip, tag the runner, then step on the bag--and to process that in an instant. So there are "counters" to the intentional non-catch, but none that players can reasonably pull off.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 30, 2023 at 02:35 PM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

What is the trouble with SCOTUS reporting (and with SCOTUS)?

Slate's Amicus Podcast hosted a live conversation with Dahlia Lithwick, Mark Joseph Stern, Jay Willis, and Elie Mystal. The conversation centered on the failures of the SCOTUS press corps. Press failures include: too much focus on the law of the opinions (they liken it to how science reporters cover NASA); failing to identify the "reality" beneath those opinions, whether by exposing the Court's misleading presentation of facts (Kennedy) or by positioning one case within a larger political, ideological, and jurisprudential trend; failing to write about the real-world consequences of the decisions; failing to report on and follow individual justices (compared with the extensive coverage of members of Congress and even small legislative actions); and failing to write about the behind-the-scenes influences on the Justices (Harlan Crow, Leonard Leo, ADF, et al.).

I enjoyed the program, although I did not agree with a lot of it. Some reactions after the jump.

• There is an electoral/public accountability component to how the press covers Congress (and members of Congress) absent in covering the Court. The press provides information to the public which, we hope, the public uses in deciding whether to keep that person in office. By contrast, there is (I think) continued acceptance that no one (not Congress, not the public) should remove or sanction judges for their decisions. Those (including me) who would like some form of term limits do not want those limits to turn on agreement or disagreement with substance of decisions. Broader (i.e., beyond the opinion) coverage of the Court allows for public awareness and criticism of the Court, with whatever effects public opinion might have on the Court. It perhaps pressures Congress to do something about an out-of-control Court. But that something is not removal of individual members, unless progressives have abandoned the conclusion that the Senate properly acquitted Samuel Chase and that "Impeach Earl Warren" campaigns wrong.

• One SCOTUS decision resolves one case involving one dispute between discrete parties (e.g., whether Mississippi's law can be constitutionally enforced against Jackson Women's Health patients or whether this school could sanction this football coach for these activities). The decision includes an opinion that affects other real-world actors. But the opinion's effects on other actors and its consequences as to them are diffuse, prospective, unknown, and contingent at the time. It thus is impossible for reporters to write about them in covering argument or decisions. At best, reporters in the moment can speculate (and report speculative cases) about what could/might happen (subject to accusations of engaging in unreasonable parades of horribles). Reporting on consequences beyond the parties before the Court requires subsequent follow-up reporting. That reporting should happen, although we might question whether Totenberg, Liptak, Biskupic, et al., should do it and when. In other words, no one knows the specific effects of a SCOTUS case in the moment--it depends on what governments and lower courts do in response. Of course, we could raise the same argument as to congressional reporting--no one knows the specific consequences of a piece of legislation and someone should report on the on-the-ground effects of the enacted law, although the question is who and how and when.

Take Dobbs. States' race to impose the strictest laws was predictable and that prediction should have been part of the coverage (and might have been--I avoid most popular coverage of the Court). But the press could not have written specific stories about specific instances by specific states affecting specific people, as the panelists seem to demand. No one knew which states would enact or enforce which laws as to which people and in which circumstances. When Dobbs leaked in May or issued in June, no one could have written about Mifepristone or about Indiana sanctioning a doctor for performing an abortion on a 10-year-old rape victim from Ohio or about Idaho outlawing travel to other states.

Relatedly, lower courts--thousands of judges on hundreds of courts spread across the U.S.--determine the broad on-the-ground effects. By focusing on how media coverage of SCOTUS fails as opposed to how media coverage of of the judiciary fails, they perhaps commit the error people accuse legal educators of committing. In any event, the handful of SCOTUS reporters cannot cover the entire judicial system, although that is the locus of the large practical effects the panelists want covered.

• They spend a lot of time on the media's failure to report on the supposed outside influences on the Court and the Justices. Put Crow to one side--if that reporting bears out, it may reflect the sort of not-good behaviour warranting impeachment or resignation. The speakers criticize failure to report on the ADF and other conservative advocacy groups spending money (from specific wealthy people with an ideological goal) and operating campaigns to find plaintiffs and bring cases with the goal of overruling affirmative action, creating religious exceptions to LGBTQ+ protections, weaken environmental protections, etc. Criticizing that failure to report implicitly criticizes these groups' litigation efforts--they engage in nefarious conduct and the press commits journalistic malpractice by not writing about and exposing them and their nefarious conduct.

But much of the constitutional law that progressives cheered was created through similar litigation campaigns--advocacy organizations sought out plaintiffs to bring lawsuits challenging various laws with the goal of obtaining SCOTUS review and decisions establishing their favored constitutional provision. And the right resisted those efforts by attacking the groups bringing the cases and trying to bring them to heel. Virginia applied its laws against soliciting legal business to the NAACP's efforts to recruit parents to bring anti-discrimination suits. States investigated and prosecuted advocacy groups under anti-Communist laws, amid questions about who funded these organizations and their advocacy efforts. Lithwick and company would not argue (I presume) that the press failed 60 years ago in not exposing whether "communists" funded the NAACP and its efforts to overrule Plessy and invalidate Jim Crow.

Once again, progressives criticizing conservative impact litigation must distinguish these efforts from prior movements. "I disagree with current efforts but like past efforts" is not a principled distinction.

• Stern offers an interesting take on press coverage of 303 Creative as the latest step in an advocacy organization's campaign to carve religious exceptions into public-accommodations laws. Past cases pitted competing "rights-holders" receiving media coverage--e.g., Jack Phillips on one side and the same-sex couple who ordered the wedding cake on the other. But the posture of 303--Lorie Smith has never created a wedding web site and never been asked by a same-sex couple to create a wedding web site (Stern said it's because she sucks as a web designer). So the designer is the only person the media can cover and they have done so, in the usual soft-focus way; no specific person sits on the other side. I doubt that affects the Justices or the outcome; it affects how the public perceives the case and its consequences.

Stern suggests the one-sidedness shifting media coverage in Smith's favor illustrates why the case is bullshit. Smith lacks standing* because she faces no meaningful, imminent, or non-speculative threat of having state law enforced against her. No one--least of all two gay men, according to Stern--has or is likely to ask her to design their wedding web site or to complain to the state civil rights commission about her failure to do so, both of which are necessary to trigger any enforcement of the law against her. This is a good line, although LGBTQ+ people keep ordering from Jack Phillips.

[*] Or suffers no constitutional violation, in my preferred framing.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 30, 2023 at 09:31 AM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, May 28, 2023

Law meets entertainment news

A fun confluence. In April, a divided Ninth Circuit panel held that a state law limiting honking of car horns to warnings did not violate the First Amendment as applied to a person honking in support of a political protest. The court declined rehearing last week.

The issue, and thus the decision, has merged with the day's leading pop-culture story--the WGA strike. Burbank police have placed signs near Disney and Warner Bros. studies announcing that "excessive horn use" violates the vehicle code, in response to neighbor complaints about passing drivers honking in support of picketing writers. Applying the law in this context illustrates why Judge Berzon's dissent had it right. In this context, the government interest is less traffic safety than noise--and there is no difference in the noise from car horns as from the other noisemaking associated with the pickets.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 28, 2023 at 12:14 PM in Current Affairs, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 24, 2023

Thick-skinned judges

From Judge Joshua Wolson (E.D. Pa., with whom I clerked on that court), dismissing a lawsuit by a state judge against the Daily Beast for describing her as "QAnon-linked:"

Being a Judge is a great job. But it comes with downsides. What we do, we do in public, and we subject ourselves to public discussion and criticism of our decisions, both fair and unfair. Federalist No. 78 noted the importance of Judges being independent of the “effects of those ill humors, which are the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures [that] sometimes disseminate among the people themselves.” The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). That remains just as true today as it was in the 18th Century. Being a judge requires a thick skin and a willingness to make decisions in the face of criticism, even unfair criticism, and to remember that sticks and stones may break my bones, but names can never hurt me.

That view of judges needing thick skin and the ability to handle even unfair criticism and continuing to do the job departs from the attitude expressed by Justice Alito, Judge Duncan, Judge Ho, and others, demanding sanction for or defense against their critics. Is it easy to say this when discussing another judge reacting to criticism (in rejecting that other judge's efforts to silence those criticism) than when handling unfair criticism directed at oneself? (Note that I am not attributing that position to Judge Wolson or suggesting he would react differently to criticism targeting him).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 24, 2023 at 06:48 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 22, 2023

Dodgers reinvite Sisters (Update)

The Dodgers have reversed course and reinvited the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence to the team's June Pride Night, after other LGTBQ+ groups threatened to pull out of the event. As far as I can tell, FIRE never said a word.

Update: The LA Times' LS Granderson has thoughts (may be paywalled), as does the Catholic League.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 22, 2023 at 09:46 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, May 20, 2023

The presence of Justice Kagan

Gerard suggests Justice Breyer's absence explains the nastiness of the exchanges in Warhol (and deteriorating relationships among the Justices generally)--he "was a senior and avuncular person who liked to broker compromises. You can't easily replace the social function that sort of person fulfills." Josh Blackman says the same.

But wasn't the ability and desire to broker compromises one of Kagan's selling points, based on her time and efforts as HLS dean? Is she too young? Too junior to play that role on the Court (she is the median justice in seniority)? Too caustic a writer? Or does this involve a different type of compromise--not across ideological lines but across temperament, between two people who generally align.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 20, 2023 at 12:27 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 18, 2023

Kagan on Velazquez and Bacon (and Lain on Cortada)

 Justice Kagan devotes the final ten pages of her Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith dissent (begin at p. 25) to illustrating the "dramatic" effects of the majority's (narrow?) approach to the first fair use factor. Using examples in literature, music, and art, she discusses historic examples of work building on prior work; her premise is that that the majority's approach would not see the later work as transformative and thus as fair use, because both create something to be sold.

On pp. 32-34, she compares Velazquez's portrait of Pope Innocent X with Bacon's "Study After Velazque's Portrait of Pope Innocent X" (commonly known as "Screaming Pope").

Miami artist Xavier Cortada's May It Please the Court depicts ten SCOTUS cases originating in Florida; the paintings hang on the walls of FIU College of Law. Here is the piece for Proffitt v. Florida, which riffed on Bacon's painting:

CortadaproffittIn Painting Constitutional Law (edited with my colleague Matthew Mirow), Corinna Lain (Richmond) wrote a wonderful essay on Proffitt and how Bacon's painting and Cortada's painting explore "pain, imprisonment, isolation and obfuscation," which constitute "larger themes of the death penalty as well."

If Kagan is right that Bacon's painting cannot happen, then neither can this.

 

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 18, 2023 at 01:57 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

More on FIRE

I hope I am premature in my anticipatory criticism of FIRE; time will tell. I follow FIRE's statements pretty closely and will update (and eat crow) if it says anything. But two further points:

1) FIRE recently changed its name from Foundation for Individual Rights in Education to "Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression." This does not strike me as mission creep; this represents an intentional branching and rebranding beyond the educational context. As I understand it, FIRE and its supporters believe the ACLU has wavered in its commitment to free expression in the face of contrary commitments to equality and The Trump Resistance; they see themselves filling the gap in protecting free speech throughout society. So this is, in fact, something on which they might weigh in.

2) FIRE's Twitter thread on the Chappelle story reveals not-happiness with the comedy club's choice--dropping everyone's favorite word and wondering whether the club would have "canceled Prince because Tipper Gore and the PMRC didn’t like ‘Darling Nikki’." That is, the thread takes the club to task for "canceling" a speaker in deference to lefty critics, where it would not have done the same to conservative critics of a lefty icon such as Prince. (The answer is probably not. But private actors get to make such choices and distinctions in the name of their expressive preferences).

But if it is wrong as a matter of a "culture of free speech" (their words) to reject Chappelle but include Prince--as FIRE clearly believes--it is wrong to criticize the club for rejecting Chappelle while ignoring the Dodgers rejecting Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence. FIRE might argue that a comedy club, as an "artistic and culture venue[]," carries a unique mission. That seems a thin reed, putting aside that sports teams and stadiums should qualify as "culture venues" that draw a lot more people than comedy clubs.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 18, 2023 at 01:32 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sotomayor and Kagan

I do not know enough copyright law to comment on Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith (I hope one of my colleagues will write something on it). But what is happening between Sotomayor (for a 7-person majority) and Kagan (dissenting with Roberts)? Their exchanges seem uniquely sharp and direct and personal (each accusing the other of being, essentially, clueless about the law), especially for a non-political case between two justices who tend to agree on things.

The majority refers to "the dissent" more than 40 times and responds to points in 11 footnotes.

Kagan ends the intro to her dissent with the following footnote:

One preliminary note before beginning in earnest. As readers are by now aware, the majority opinion is trained on this dissent in a way majority opinions seldom are. Maybe that makes the majority opinion self-refuting? After all, a dissent with “no theory” and “[n]o reason” is not one usually thought to merit pages of commentary and fistfuls of come-back footnotes. Ante, at 36. In any event, I’ll not attempt to rebut point for point the majority’s varied accusations; instead, I’ll mainly rest on my original submission. I’ll just make two suggestions about reading what  follows. First, when you see that my description of a precedent differs from the majority’s, go take a look at the decision. Second, when you come across an argument that you recall the majority took issue with, go back to its response and ask yourself about the ratio of reasoning to ipse dixit. With those two recommendations, I’ll take my chances on readers’ good judgment.

I also wonder how much Roberts influenced the dissent's style. The opinion is loaded with references and allusions, a common feature of Roberts' writing (even more so than Kagan). The two together cannot help themselves. Unsurprisingly, the dissent is a fun read (again, I pass no judgment on the correctness of its analysis).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 18, 2023 at 01:03 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Some kind of culture

So: A large organization plans to host and honor a particular group. People, including political leaders, object to the honoree's expression and call for the large organization to disinvite the honoree because they object to, and find offensive, that expression. The large organization disinvites the honoree.

According to FIRE and others, this is bad--cancel culture and hecklers' vetoes and woke-mob-hive-mind silencing, oh my. They deem it bad when a Minneapolis comedy club canceled Dave Chappelle shows. They deem it bad when students shout down campus speakers. They deem it bad when colleges disinvite commencement speakers.

The Dodgers announced they had removed the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence from its Pride Night event, scheduled for June. The group describes itself as a "'performance, charity, and protest group that features drag as well as queer and trans nuns that “promote human rights, respect for diversity, and spiritual enlightenment.'” Marco Rubio,* Fox News, and the Catholic News Agency describe it as "an anti-Catholic hate group which exists to desecrate and degrade the Catholic faith" furthers "modern, secular, and indeed anti-religious 'values.'" (Note the scare quotes).

[*] Who insists faith in God is at the "heart" of our Nation's values, which might be news to those who drafted the constitutional provision excluding religion as a qualification for public office, to say nothing of the First Amendment.

Of course, the protesters in those other, censorious "cancellations" directed similar criticisms towards the targeted speakers--Dave Chappelle or Ann Coulter degrade the humanity of LGBTQ+ people. Yet Rubio, Fox, and their fellow travelers scream about wokeism gone wild destroying free expression when anyone seeks to exclude them from any space.

I do not expect consistency from Fox News or Marco Rubio; their reactions provide further evidence that their support for free speech ends where their agreement with the speaker ends. FIRE, on the other hand, purports to support free speech as a principle and touts its willingness to protect speech (and criticize supposed censors) from both sides. It often gets lumped in with conservative free-speech opportunists, which is mostly unfair.  While I believe FIRE sees too much equivalency left-wing law students' obnoxious and disruptive noise and right-wing government's legal speech restrictions, it genuinely treats similar speech restrictions by both sides in a similar way.

This becomes something of a test. If a comedy club disinviting Dave Chappelle because of his (offensive-to-some) expression is a free speech problem drawing concerns from FIRE and other free-speech proponents, then the Dodgers disinviting the Sisters because of their (offensive-to-some) expression is a free speech problem drawing concerns from FIRE and other free-speech proponents.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 18, 2023 at 09:56 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 16, 2023

Preclusion in the news (Update)

In his CNN-sponsored political rally, held the day after a jury found him liable to E. Jean Carroll for sexual abuse and defamation, Donald Trump  called Carroll a "whack job" and her allegations a "fake story." Carroll is contemplating bringing new claims for defamation.

Any lawsuit will continue Trump's trend of introducing the public to otherwise-obscure legal concepts--this time, issue preclusion. Trump in the new litigation will be bound by the jury's necessary conclusion that he did sexually abuse Carroll in that dressing room; the parties must litigate the remainder of the case (were his denials opinion, is "whack job" opinion, what are her new damages) in light of that established fact. But all the elements are satisfied--the jury found that he abused her, the finding was necessary to the verdict, Trump had a full-and-fair opportunity to litigate, and we actually have mutuality.

It plays an unusual role here. Kyle Rittenhouse has made noise about bringing defamation actions against those who continue to call him a murderer. Those claims fail for several reasons, including that these speakers are not bound by the jury's conclusion that Rittenhouse acted in self-defense and can speak contrary to that. Trump--as a party to the case--loses that luxury.

Update: Ken White on Serious Trouble discusses a different wrinkle (while calling the entire thing a law school exam)--whether Carroll can sue CNN for airing Trump's comments and whether she can establish actual malice based on the jury verdict. Again, issue preclusion does not apply to CNN--as a non-party to the original suit, it never had a full-and-fair opportunity to litigate and cannot be bound by the prior decision. But it presents an interesting fact question (White believes sufficient to survive 12(b)(6) and probably summary judgment) of how much pause a verdict holding a fact to be true must give a future speaker. And that question perhaps interacts with the standard of persuasion underlying that verdict--whether CNN is less reckless in disagreeing with a verdict finding it more likely than not Trump assaulted her as opposed to a verdict finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Trump assaulted her.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 16, 2023 at 03:44 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 15, 2023

Does PrawfsBlawg do ok on this?

I am a couple weeks late on this, but grading.

Eric Segall offers thoughts on how law schools can push back against political polarization, generating further comments from Ilya Somin.

I want to focus on the fifth of Segall's proposals:

5) The leading legal blogs, including this one (speaking to you Mike) should reach out to folks on the other side and invite them to write posts with different perspectives than the blog usually offers. Years ago, I presented this idea in person to Eugene Volokh and Jack Balkin, who both run highly visible and successful blogs. They rejected the idea out-of-hand saying that legal bloggers do this now simply by responding to experts on other blogs. But that response missed the point of my idea. It is the sharing of space, both physical and virtual, among folks with different views that is important because being in the other side's house reduces both extremism and dogmatism.

Is it pollyanna-ish of me to think that we have achieved something like that, albeit unintentionally and without trying. I think our group is genuinely--at least within the parameters of the legal academy but perhaps more broadly--runs the political spectrum. That includes those avoid political topics, those who match different "sides" on different issues, and those who think both "sides" are wrong on some things.

To that end, we as a group are exploring ways to continue and expand the breadth of the conversation on this blog and the featured non-heterogeneous voices.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 15, 2023 at 09:31 AM in Blogging, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 08, 2023

Backlash and the preferred first speaker

Fred Wellman's On Democracy podcast hosted Kevin Kruse (Princeton) to talk about his new book of essays, Myth America: Historians Take on the Biggest Legends and Lies About Our Past (2023). Later in the conversation, Kruse argues that we should not speak about "backlash" to social movements (race in the '60s or '70s or LGBTQ+ today). Backlash suggests a natural and inevitable force that blames the movement for the reaction--by pushing for its rights, Group A caused pushback. Rather, we must see the counter-movement as a similar, conscious, organized social movement that pursues a different, conflicting agenda. That is, the current wave of anti-LGBTQ+ legislation is not a "backlash" to those who pursued an agenda favorable to LGBTQ+ rights, something that just happened as a Newtonian reaction; it is a conscious choice by certain people to pursue an agenda unfavorable to LGBTQ+ rights. Perhaps the anti-LGBTQ+ movement only appeared because the pro movement appeared and enjoyed success; before that, they never thought or cared about LGTBTQ+ people. But that should not remove the intentionality and choice inherent in the anti-actions--they do not want LGBTQ+ people to have certain rights and they chose to pursue that agenda. Nor should it be framed as a "lesson" to the LGBTQ+ movement, showing why they should not have pushed for their rights in the first instance.

I am trying to figure out how this reframing fits within the preferred first speaker concept. I think they share a conceptualization--both "sides" in any situation share equal footing. One does not enjoy a superior right, each pursues a conscious and intentional agenda, and we should not understand one as causing the other.

Working through that.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 8, 2023 at 09:31 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, May 06, 2023

Shabbat Shalom

We celebrated the beginning of Shabbat last night with a pitching match-up of Dean Kremer of the Orioles (member of Team Israel) and Max Fried of the Braves (best Jewish pitcher since Ken Holtzman, if not yet Koufax). A six-inning pitchers' duel ended when Fried fell apart in in the 7th and the Orioles scored 7 runs (5 off Fried, including two homers). Kremer gave up 6 hits and struck out 3 in six innings, for his third win of the season. Fried had been untouchable in three starts since coming off the DL and continued that run for about six innings; his E.R.A. jumped from below 1.00 to 2.08.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 6, 2023 at 08:51 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 03, 2023

Snap removal swallows everything

An odd, but probably not unusual, phenomenon--one weird rule affects and infects application of other, related rules and processes. Snap removal seems to act as one such rule, with parties arguing that all sorts of removal is proper so long as it happens before service on a local defendant. I wrote last summer about a district court reading snap removal to override the time-of-filing rule for jurisdiction, allowing Tesla to remove a California case when it moved its headquarters post-filing but pre-service. (I tested on the case this semester). The defendant tried a similar move in this case, arguing that snap removal was proper when the diverse defendant removed before the non-diverse local defendant was served. Fortunately, Judge Stras was having none of it; even recognizing snap removal (the 8th Circuit has never weighed in), that cannot overcome the complete diversity requirement.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 3, 2023 at 08:55 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 01, 2023

JOTWELL: Steinman on constitutional remedies

The new Courts Law essay comes from Adam Steinman (Alabama) reviewing Brandon L. Garrett & Kaitlin Phillips, AEDPA Repeal, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1739 (2022) and Alexander Reinert, Joanna C. Schwartz & James E. Pfander, New Federalism and Civil Rights Enforcement, 116 Nw. U. L. Rev. 737 (2021); the articles explore and criticize different limitations on constitutional remedies.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 1, 2023 at 11:02 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 30, 2023

Challenging private enforcement

Rocky and I discussed this in our SMU piece, but I have been thinking about it more of late.

B8 and other exclusive-private-enforcement (or "vigilante federalism") draw two related-but-distinct objections. They force rights-holders to litigate their rights defensively, cutting off most offensive litigation; while offensive litigation is not constitutionally required, it offers certain advantages, notably not forcing rights-holders to "act at their peril" as a condition of litigating their rights. And they force rights-holders to litigate in state court.

The second objection arises from two limits on federal jurisdiction--the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule and Article III standing. Both prevent the defendant/rights-holder from removing a state-court action to federal court. Under the WPC, federal jurisdiction requires the federal issue to appear in the complaint; the rights-holder's federal defense does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction and thus for removal. And laws allowing "any person" to sue cannot be in federal court even absent the WPC, because a random "any person" plaintiff likely does not have Article III standing (even if he might have standing under more forgiving state law).

Of course, both judge-made limits on federal jurisdiction suffer from significant problems. The WPC arguably undermines the purposes of federal question jurisdiction (uniformity, expertise, respect); those needs are present regardless of the procedural posture in which the federal issue arises. A defendant needs expertise for a federal defense as much as a plaintiff needs expertise for a federal claim. Standing is stupid and not really jurisdictional, as I have argued. And even if jurisdictional, Andy Hessick argues that federal courts should apply state standing rules in diversity cases. Without both stupid doctrines, the defendant could remove the vigilante-federalism action and litigate in federal court, where she has a (perhaps) fairer and less-captured forum and a shorter path to SCOTUS.

This does not address the first objection--rights-holders should not be forced into defensive litigation. But the question is what is the real objection?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 30, 2023 at 11:09 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 27, 2023

More on write-in ballots

Building on Gerard's post, I wrote this in 2016 and this in 2014 about limitations on write-in voting under Florida law (the later post has some useful reader comments addressing Gerard's question). F0rmer Florida Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen wanted to write-in Jeb Bush for president in 2016; I wanted to avoid voting for Ros-Lehtinen in 2014. Florida law requires "write-in candidates" to qualify in advance (so they are not really write-in candidates in the sense Gerard describes). Florida excludes uncontested elections from the ballot because the voter has no choice but the unopposed candidate. Both reflect a prohibition on "let me write in a random name on election day."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 27, 2023 at 02:06 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 26, 2023

Roberts to Durbin: Drop Dead

Chief Justice Roberts "respectfully decline[d]" Sen. Durbin's "invitation" to appear before a Senate committee to discuss the wave of ethics concerns surrounding the Court. The letter included a new statement of ethics principles, signed by the nine Justices. Citing "separation of powers concerns and the importance of judicial independence," Roberts (ever the wannabee-but-incomplete-historian, as per his Year-End Reports) recites a laundry list of the times in which the Chief Justice or President has testified before congressional committees, as all were on "mundane matters of judicial administration." Imagine a student whose answer begins and ends with "this has not happened before on a matter this serious, therefore it cannot happen now."

Of course, my students take class assignments more seriously than the Chief Justice of the United States takes a request from the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee about a public controversy that undermines the Court's shaky reputation. Roberts' statement rests on a series of unspoken principles that capture the political and constitutional moment.

• Because the Supreme Court is constitutionally required, it is not subject to any congressional control or oversight. Roberts could put off Durbin on the barest of reasons. Durbin declined to "invite" Justice Thomas because he knew Thomas would refuse to accept. Steve Vladeck has a thread on this, arguing for considering the separation-of-powers issue in its full historical context, not of the uniquely modern-and-unchecked Court.

• I do not know how the Court would react if Congress tried to bring back some control--for example, expanding the Court's mandatory docket or reinstating circuit riding (whatever that might mean without the old circuit courts). Would the Justices push back against this rejection of the Court as a complete government in itself, despite the historical pedigree?

• A subpoena is not coming, which is why Roberts does not fear escalation. Committee Republicans will not agree to a subpoena and Durbin lacks the political will to try. Anyway, Roberts would sue to challenge it, arguing that it lacks any legitimate legislative purpose (because of separation of powers and SCOTUS's special place and the historical fact that no CJ has been subpoenaed). At worst, he ties it up until the end of the Congress. At best, no district judge would deny that injunction. Recall Roberts' opinion in Mazars and the deep distrust of congressional (as opposed to judicial) subpoenas. (Side point: I remain unable to square Speech or Debate immunity with the right to pre-enforcement challenges of subpoenas).

• The triumph of the Levinson/Pildes separation-of-parties thesis, introduced in 2006 (another lifetime) but truer than ever. Madison and Hamilton's assumed that Congress would destroy a Chief Justice and Court that rejected Congress' constitutional role in this way--Congress acted as an institution to check other institutions. But the introduction of organized--and ideological--parties destroys that framework. Senate Republicans do not see the (Republican-appointed) Justicses' actions as the problem to be investigated and checked; they see their Senate colleagues' actions as the problem to be resisted, making life difficult for their ideological compatriots in the other branches.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 26, 2023 at 10:46 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Florida drops one effort to destroy the First Amendment

The Florida bill to overhaul defamation law, set up a challenge to New York Times, and allow public officials to sue critics into oblivion is dead, at least for now. (H/T: Volokh). A cynic (including my co-author) would say that some Republicans figured out that the changes were more likely to hurt conservative media. I think they could not get their shit together and it will return next year.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 26, 2023 at 09:50 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 25, 2023

Harry Belafonte and the First Amendment

Harry Belafonte died Tuesday, at the age of 96. Belafonte was one of the celebrity signatories to Heed Their Rising Voices, the editorial advertisement seeking support for MLK and the civil rights movement that gave rise to New York Times v. Sullivan.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 25, 2023 at 06:40 PM in Culture, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, April 21, 2023

No standing even if you say obnoxious things

I forgot about the Connecticut attorney challenging a state law prohibiting ridiculing or holding people or groups up to contempt on account of creed, religion, color, and other characteristics. I wrote about the lawsuit 18 months ago, doubting standing based on his private practices of sharing Dave Chapelle videos and making fun of his Italian-American friends. The district court agreed that he faces no credible threat of prosecution, although only after the Connecticut Supreme Court answered a certified question that the statute does not cover private non-commercial conduct.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 21, 2023 at 08:46 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 19, 2023

Viewpoint discrimination in synagogue protests (Updated)

I have written the past couple years about ongoing anti-Israel (drifting many descending into blatant anti-Semitic) protests outside an Ann Arbor synagogue. Several congregation members brought a tort claim against the protesters. The claim (rightfully) failed in the Sixth Circuit. Ronald Lewin, a veteran religious-liberty litigator, sought cert, arguing that protest (at least the sort of obnoxious protests at issue here) should be prohibited outside houses of worship, as obnoxious protests are prohibited outside reproductive-health facilities. SCOTUS denied cert.

But then we have this story-- a gay Orthodox Jew has protested outside a Florida Orthodox shul every Shabbat and holy day, after the rabbi asked him and husband not to return because homosexuality violates Jewish law. I cannot identify a more appropriate place for this protest, showing the problem with Lewin's categorical bar. And if this protest is ok, we encounter obvious and egregious content (if not viewpoint) discrimination.

Update: An Ann Arbor resident suggests I understated the anti-Semitic nature of some of the protesters and signs (such as "Jewish power corrupts"), so I amended my language accordingly.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 19, 2023 at 11:43 AM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 18, 2023

Fox and Dominion settle

For $ 787.5 million, just on the Fox side of meeting halfway. Unsurprising.

Settling the typical defamation is problematic from a First Amendment standpoint--the court loses an opportunity to declare First Amendment values and the prospect of that even a nuisance settlement (which partisans will pitch as more, see Nicholas Sandmann) will incentivize new suits. Dominion was the rare case in which the plaintiff had a genuine chance to win and the evidence from the summary judgment record showed genuine wrongdoing by the media outlet. The settlement thus deprives the public of insight into the Fox News' problematic operations. And Fox News and others retain incentives to do this all over again.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 18, 2023 at 05:22 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Shakedown, 1979

I waited in line for 1 hour, 21 minutes to get gas today. And I ended up at that station because every place closer to FIU, closer to my house, or on the way from my kid's school to work was out.

Torrential rains last Wednesday caused flooding north of Miami (Fort Lauderdale Airport was closed for a couple days) and slowed gas trucks from getting through to Miami-Dade. There is enough gas. But people began panic-buying and hoarding (drivers filled multiple gas cans in addition to their cars), straining supply. They say it may be a couple of weeks before the situation normalizes.

Fortunately, our governor is handling the problem by threatening to build a prison and release prisoners next to Disney World.

(BTW, Steve: Include this in your list of great baselines).

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 18, 2023 at 04:17 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 17, 2023

FIRE adopts preferred first speaker

According to FIRE Executive VP Nico Perrino, in an op-ed endorsed by the Chief of the LAPD. Here is the central basis for the claim:

Protesters have every right to engage in peaceful, nondisruptive protest. But they do not have the right to take over someone else’s event and make it their own. This is a basic point, and we understand it in almost every other context. Nobody argues that you have a free speech right to stand up during a Broadway musical and sing along with the actors or to scream at a public library book reading.

Just because the public is invited to attend an event — and sometimes to speak during a Q&A period — does not make it the public’s event to disrupt or transform as it pleases. Your distaste for a speaker doesn’t grant you a right to prevent a willing audience from listening to that speaker.

There must be places in a free and pluralistic society where groups can freely associate and share ideas without first seeking approval from a crowd of hecklers. Colleges are such spaces. It’s the very reason they exist.

The first speaker has full First amendment rights and can say or not say what he wants. Counter-speech is proscribed--peaceful (must all speech be "peaceful') and not interfering with the first speaker (who presumably can speak over the counter-speaker). Maybe the counter-speaker has a right to speak during Q&A. But the first speaker controls who gets to speak in that window and presumably can ignore any counter-speaker or any audience member who wants to challenge what he says.

Perrino works off the paradigm of the Judge Duncan/Stanford debacle--invited speaker in a reserved speaking space on a college campus with an audience space that likely is a non-public forum.I see three big problems with Perrino's argument. But he draws from that paradigm a general principle: counter-speaking to and over a speaker in the moment is not protected speech.

I see several problems with that focus and that conclusion.

 

1) Perrino may be broadly right about that paradigm. He tries to bolster the point that "[n]obody argues that you have a free speech right to stand up during a Broadway musical and sing along with the actors," bolstered by a recent story about audience members singing "I Will Always Love You" during the finale of the show The Bodyguard.

Rather than "heckling is never protected speech," a better framing is "heckling is protected speech, but it yields to content-neutral rules in a forum." This may seem semantic, but semantics matter. A rock concert is protected speech, although it may have to follow neutral noise regulations; driving around town playing music and speaking through a speaker is protected speech, although it may yield to neutral noise regulations. If heckling is never free speech,  it remains unprotected when the forum-and its rules and expectations--changes. While the audience should not sing along at a musical, the audience does (and the performers expect the audience to) sing along at a rock concert in the same theatre. Cheering speech at a soccer match looks different than cheering speech at golf tournament.

2) The premise that "heckling is never protected speech" affects what counter-speakers must do and the form of counter-speech FIRE's solution is the alternative program--find a room elsewhere and express your ideas to a separate audience. But that is not counter-speech or protest, as it does not allow counter-speakers to be heard by, respond to, or protest their target.

Counter-speakers could instead take to a nearby public forum (e.g., a public campus space near the building containing the reserved space) and protest there. But Perrino's view forecloses that option. If heckling is never protected speech, then counter-protesters cannot heckle in a traditional public forum; the original rally or demonstration remains s "someone else's event" that counter-speakers "take over" (at least to the extent they are loud and can be heard). That traditional public forums allow for competing groups to be heard or that the rules account for "prolonged, raucous, boisterous demonstrations" does not appear to matter.

Worse, it carries to speakers and counter-speakers occupying the same public forum. Thus, counter-protesters on the of the U Va sidewalks cannot outnumber and outspeak the Proud Boys walking on the campus streets chanting "Jews will not replace us." Pro-equality protesters on the sidewalks around city hall cannot outnumber and outspeak the Klan or Nazis holding a rally on the steps. Students at FIU cannot outnumber and outspeak the bigoted "preacher" using the quad. This is an impoverished view of the role of counter-speech.

3) Perrino's analysis is incomplete within his reserved-classroom paradigm because he does not define "peaceful" or "nondisruptive." If peaceful means non-violent, the word does nothing--neither original nor counter speech can be violent. If peaceful means silent or nonverbal, that proves too much. Audience members can react out-loud to speech--booing, hissing--up to some undefined point of disruption. (Stanford Dean Jenny Martinez recognized this in her post-Duncan letter). No one has defined disruption--whether it means preventing the reserved event but does not include momentary reactions that cause the speaker to pause or delay but that do not undermine the event.

Positive non-silent reactions--applause, laughter, cheers, snaps--may cause the speaker to pause or delay; speakers build those delays into their speeches. If the forum rules prohibit non-silent reactions, they must prohibit positive and negative reactions. Otherwise, the rules cease to be viewpoint neutral, as required in a non-public forum.

4) Perrino doubled-down in a Twitter thread, arguing "[i]f you take over someone else's event, call it what it is: punishable civil disobedience, not free speech." On this point, I would recommend Jenny Carroll's (Alabama) forthcoming Yale L.J.  article arguing for a First Amendment civil-disobedience affirmative defense to crimes (e.g., trespassing) arising during protests; the idea is to allow juries to consider the expressive nature of the person's (prohibited) conduct and acquit accordingly. I wonder how the defense would apply in the context of a disruptive counter-protester.

5) That the police chief seized on the simplest version of Perrino's argument--based on the headline that Perrino may not have written--raises further red flags.

6) Perrino (and FIRE) overuse "heckler's veto." Perrino criticizes those who argue that hecking is "'more speech,' not an attempt to carry out a 'heckler’s veto' on the speaker." A heckler's veto occurs when government silences a speaker out of fear of the audience reaction to speech. It might extend to a complete prohibition on a speaker (e.g., the speaker must cancel the event) where government officials fail to enforce a forum's regulations against a hostile audience; Duncan could have become a heckler's veto had the students pushed further. Absent government action and the speaker being prevented from speaking, it is neither fair nor appropriate to call counter-speech a heckler's veto. This framing accepts and instantiates the preferred speaker. It assumes a  "first" speaker and gives him preferred status. It assumes that one speaker has priority, that anyone on the other side is a heckler rather than a speaker, and they censor, rather than counter-speaking or presenting competing ideas, censor. The Proud Boys at U Va have priority over their critics, their critics are not speakers, and their critics do something wrong by appearing in larger numbers and  uttering their message more forcefully.

7) I have made this point before. Under Perrino's argument, the pro-Ally/anti-Nazi patrons of Rick's engaged in a heckler's veto or acted as censors here. Or the rules of Rick's as a forum are different than the rules of a classroom at Stanford Law School. But the "heckling is not free speech" cannot stand as a blanket principle.

 

I plan to return to the preferred first speaker this summer, although I have been struggling to figure out how to approach the problem. This offers some organizational ideas.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 17, 2023 at 10:01 AM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

A Jewish NBA star

NBA star Domantas Sabonis of the Sacramento Kings is converting to Judaism. He and his Jewish wife keep Kosher and Passover and observe Shabbat (within the confines of an NBA season).

This could be interesting. I think Sabonis is, right now, the third-best Jewish NBA player in history, behind Dolph Schayes and Amar'e Stoudemire (converted in retirement but his career counts as "Jewish" under the Steve Yeager/Joe Horlen Principle). Sabonis is in his seventh year in the league, has made three All-Star teams and should be All-NBA this season. And it could be fun to watch him hopefully stay healthy and climb that ladder. After all, Schayes could not play in today's NBA and Stoudemire struggled with injuries the last five years of his career.

Domantas is the son of Soviet legend Arvydas Sabonis who played seven excellent seasons in the NBA, but whose best years were lost behind the Iron Curtain. Here is a fun story about Arvydas and his connection to legendary LSU coach Dale Brown.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 17, 2023 at 09:12 AM in Howard Wasserman, Religion, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 13, 2023

JOTWELL: Coleman on Brito, Sabbeth, Steinberg & Sudeall on racial capitalism

The new Courts Law essay comes from Brooke Coleman (Seattle) reviewing Tonya L. Brito, Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Jessica K. Steinberg & Lauren Sudeall, Racial Capitalism in the Civil Courts, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 1243 (2022), which explores the racial inequality embedded in state court procedure.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 13, 2023 at 01:19 PM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 05, 2023

Pico and public libraries

Judge Pitman (W.D. Tex.) ordered Llano County to return twelve books to the public library shelves and enjoined further book removals. The court said Pico applies with greater force to public school libraries, because schools receive uniquely great deference and public libraries are "designed for freewheeling inquiry." The county has appealed.

During law school, I interned at the American Library Association's Office of Intellectual Freedom. One of my tasks was drafting letters to library boards about limits on the power to remove stuff from the library because of disagreement with content (back then, we worried about internet filters). The letter was usually enough and we never litigated these cases. We are in new times.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 5, 2023 at 09:31 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 04, 2023

Old anti-Semitism and current anti-Semitism

Dara Horn, who has a book and podcast about how people think and talk about dead Jews, argues in The Atlantic that focusing on Holocaust education makes current anti-Semitism worse. The piece is long, but here is a money quotation:

One problem with using the Holocaust as a morality play is exactly its appeal: It flatters everyone. We can all congratulate ourselves for not committing mass murder. This approach excuses current anti-Semitism by defining anti-Semitism as genocide in the past. When anti-Semitism is reduced to the Holocaust, anything short of murdering 6 million Jews—like, say, ramming somebody with a shopping cart, or taunting kids at school, or shooting up a Jewish nonprofit, or hounding Jews out of entire countries—seems minor by comparison.

And she closes thus:

I want to mandate this for every student in this fractured and siloed America, even if it makes them much, much more uncomfortable than seeing piles of dead Jews does. There is no empathy without curiosity, no respect without knowledge, no other way to learn what Jews first taught the world: love your neighbor. Until then, we will remain trapped in our sealed virtual boxcars, following unseen tracks into the future.

I serve on a Temple committee working on anti-Semitism programming. In choosing (for this year) to do a program for Yom Hashoah, we had a form of this conversation. Modern U.S. anti-Semitism, however much on the rise and however bad, is unlikely to lead to a repeat of the Holocaust. How we speak, educate, and push back against modern U.S. anti-Semitism should reflect that.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 4, 2023 at 07:59 PM in Culture, Howard Wasserman, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, April 01, 2023

More thoughts on the ideological divide on free speech

Three stories and cases that illustrate the ideological/political divides over free speech.

• The trial court in Dominion v. Fox denied summary judgment for Fox; granted summary judgment for Dominion on falsity, defamation per se, factual, and certain affirmative defenses (such as neutral report); and denied summary judgment for Dominion on actual malice. So the case goes to trial, but Dominion has to prove only malice and damages; everything else is established. I have focused on (and taught about) the process in this case--how unusual it is for a plaintiff to get SJ on its claim absent burden shifting. Courts do not lightly relieve plaintiffs of their burden of persuasion at trial.

On the substance, the case illustrates the strangeness of the right-wing desire to overrule New York Times. Were Dominion required to prove  negligence by a preponderance, the only issue at trial would be how much money Fox must pay Dominion. Does Fox somehow think that legal change will not blow up on them and similar outlets?

• We have the first judgment declaring invalid the latest right-wing obsession--prohibiting drag. Judge Thomas Parker (WD Tenn.) declared the law invalid as content- (and perhaps viewpoint-) based and granted a TRO prohibiting enforcement. By its terms, the goes beyond the existing obscene-as-to-minors law by singling-out OATM speech by drag performers. And its history (a valid consideration under Reed) shows the state enacted the law after its sponsor tried (only partially successfully) to stop a drag show as a public nuisance. I expect many cases to come out the same way.

When we learned RAV (which at that point was about six years old) in law school, a classmate criticized the case's principle. A viewpoint-based obscenity prohibition, he argued, was impossible--a law could not, for example, prohibit Democratic obscenity while allowing Republican obscenity because that political focus gives the expression SLAPS value and thus makes it non-obscene. Tennessee (and other) Republicans obsessed with non-sexual drag have shown us how it is possible.

• George Mason invited (apparently without student consultation) Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin to give its commencement address. Some students objected, based on the policies Youngkin has pursued--including anti-trans and anti-race-in-educationstuff that DeSantis has tried in Florida to greater fanfare. FIRE and others have responded by, unsurprisingly, treating student objections as efforts at censorship. GMU President Gregory Washington echoed the platitudes by saying "'I don’t believe that we should silence the voices of those with whom we disagree, especially in this forum where there is no imminent threat present as a result of the disagreements.'" Instead, it was important to "giv[e] Youngkin a platform so students can not only hear his perspective, but also so conversations about differences can ensue."

I think we have reached Peak Preferred First Speaker. Because the only way to understand students as "censors" is if the invited First Speaker has an absolute right to speak and all others bear nothing more than an obligation (legal, moral, ethical, civic) to shut-the-fuck-up and listen.

FIRE and others object to the withdrawal of the invitation. But the objecting students must urge disinvitation as opposed to noninvitation because the university invited Youngkin unilaterally, before students had an opportunity to object. Suppose the university held a plebiscite on whether to invite Youngkin and the students vetoed the choice. I expect that FIRE, President Washington, and others would react the same way--the students are improperly denying the Governor of Virginia a platform to speak. If so, this is not about disinviting--this is about obligating everyone  to allow any First Speaker to be invited without objection and to listen to his perspectives. Alternatively, I cannot see a meaningful difference between objecting before or after the invitor (university administration) acts.

Moreover, this case is worse than the Duncan case. One can argue that "civil discourse" compels objectors to listen to the First Speaker and engage him (always politely) during Q&A (I doubt the position because the First Speaker need not engage with any student). But accepting that with Duncan or other open-forum speakers, Youngkin will not do a Q&A at graduation. So students are obligated, in Washington's words, to sit and hear his (and only his) perspective and maybe"conversations about differences can ensue" at some other undefined moment in time. Because I am sure

The final problem here is that graduation is supposed to celebrate the students and their accomplishments. So the rule is "shut-up-and-listen even if it casts a pall over a significant accomplishment." Or the rule is "avert your eyes by skipping your graduation." Either seems to be less about some theory of civil discourse and more about a duty to listen to those with power.

Other projects (especially the work on SB8) have captured my attention for the past 18 months, directing me away from exploring the first-speaker issue. I need to circle back to that project soon.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 1, 2023 at 11:56 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 27, 2023

Judge Duncan still does not get it

I was not at Judge Duncan's talk at Notre Dame last week, have not seen video, and have not read a transcript. I have only Bloomberg's with-a-gain-of-salt reporting. Whatever the sins of the most-disruptive Stanford students at Stanford, Duncan continues to recast the protest (and perhaps all criticism of him) as something other than the exercise of free speech the First Amendment envisions.

According to Bloomberg, the students acted wrongly because they "'staged a public shaming.'" Duncan had "harsh words for the Stanford protesters on Friday, saying they were there to 'heckle' and to 'shame.' 'Let’s say the quiet part out loud. The mob came to target me because they hated my work and my ideas,' said Duncan."

Yes, and? Heckling and responding negatively to a speaker is counter-speech. Public shaming is counter-speech. Targeting a government official for criticism because they hate his work and ideas is counter-speech. In fact, it seems to me exactly what people are supposed to do in response to a government official's disagreeable actions. Note Duncan's move here--criticizing his work and ideas, least in anything other than a polite conversation in which he is under no obligation (or inclination) to engage, is mob behavior. To criticize ideas is to censor those ideas.

Duncan continues to harp on "civil discourse" as the only form of appropriate discourse. But that encounters two problems. First, it ignores the profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. (Maybe this is why conservatives are so hot to overrule New York Times). Civil discourse is perhaps an ideal; it is not the limit of the First Amendment. Second, Duncan concedes it appropriate to abandon civil discourse at times; writing in the WSJ, he justified his in-the-moment rudeness towards the students because sometimes anger is the appropriate response to “vicious behavior.” But that is a fancy way of saying "they started it." And, of course, the students would say he started it through a judicial decision rejecting, in dismissive tones, concerns about how the government addresses trans people. The students viewed that decision as an example of vicious governmental behavior, therefore, on Duncan's argument, anger should be the appropriate response.

Duncan is not talking to me or trying to convince me. But like many other "free-speech warriors," he cannot help but reveal the thinness of his actual support for free speech other than his or the speech he likes.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 27, 2023 at 10:40 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, March 26, 2023

Two Jews in the starting rotation?

The Atlanta Braves placed started Kyle Wright on the IL and announced that rookie Jared Shuster will begin the season in the starting rotation. Shuster is Jewish. Which means 2/5 of the Braves starting rotation--Shuster and staff ace Max Fried--is Jewish. Since most Jewish pitchers in recent history have been relievers, I am pretty sure this is a historical first. Gilten Alter indeed.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 26, 2023 at 04:21 PM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, March 25, 2023

Ruth Markel (Dan's Mom) on Unorthodox Podcast

Ruth Markel (Dan's Mom) appears on the latest episode of the Unorthodox podcast (around 15:00 mark), talking about Dan, grieving, her book, and her efforts on grandparents'-rights legislation.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 25, 2023 at 03:17 PM in Blogging, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Still more on Stanford (Updated)

 Steve (welcome!) reports (with a copy of Dean Jenny Martinez's letter) on the for-the-moment resolution of the Stanford-Kyle Duncan debacle. A couple of points.

Martinez recognizes that some protesters--those who waved signs, those who snapped or hissed, those who asked provocative or even obnoxious questions--engaged in protected counter-speech for which they should not be punished. The letter also references a "non-disruptive level of audience reaction" as protected and appropriate in the forum, an important recognition of the gradations at work. Within the space reserved for a speaker event, it is not a simple binary between silently listen, display signs, and ask questions on the one hand and complete chaos on the other; oral counter-speech remains permissible prior to the point of disruption (wherever that begins). FWIW, Judge Duncan has not made similar distinctions; he expressed particular annoyance with the snapping.

As to my point about asymmetry: The President of West Texas A&M prohibited student organizations from putting on a drag show (scheduled for next Monday), calling it "derisive, divisive and demoralizing misogyny" and akin to blackface, and insisting that, despite the adult audience, drag shows cannot be harmless. The student group has sued and should win the TRO allowing them to hold the event. (Interestingly, the President recognizes that his decision violates the First Amendment but says he does not care). So again--obnoxious counter-speech v. formal state prohibition on student speech. Yes, there are counter-examples on both sides. But a trend is developing. Plus, I wonder how Judge Duncan--and his insistence that speakers be allowed to speak without interruption no matter how offensive the speech--would rule if he is on the Fifth Circuit panel for any appeal in that case.

Update: Popehat weighs in and again gets everything right.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 25, 2023 at 10:17 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, March 24, 2023

How else are you supposed to do it?

Journalist Jason Garcia is upset that the Speaker of the Florida House acknowledged that the bill altering state defamation law is "intentionally unconstitutional" and designed to trigger litigation and provide SCOTUS an opportunity to overrule New York Times and other defamation precedent.

Put aside that "intentionally unconstitutional" should mean, at most, "unconstitutional as judicial precedent understands the First Amendment" and that a legislature can hold and act on competing constitutional understandings. But even at the most judicial supremacist, what else is a legislature supposed to do if it believes judicial precedent wrong and wants to challenge (and change) it? If a state cannot do what Florida is trying here,  judicial supremacy means the popular branches lack the power to disagree with the judicial understanding or to create mechanisms to express that disagreement and urge the court to change path. The Court's word is not only final but unchanging and irrevocable.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 24, 2023 at 06:03 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, March 18, 2023

Is the ham green?

A break for something non-serious. Although Rick and Paul still might believe me wrong:

"I do not like green eggs and ham." What color is the ham on the dish that Sam-I-Am does not like?

The cover shows both as green--he does not green eggs together with green ham. But in my mind, I always have read green to modify eggs, while ham is unmodified--he does not like green eggs together with ham, regardless of the color of the ham.

If we focus on author intent, presumably Geisel signed off on the cover and his intent is that both food products are green. But is that the best interpretation of that language? What do ordinary rules of English and statutory construction tell us?Green_Eggs_and_Ham

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 18, 2023 at 12:35 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (8)

Friday, March 17, 2023

On why I think I am (mostly, generally) right

I appreciate Rick's response to my post on Stanford. I want to hit a few points.

• I said at the outset of my post that I vastly overgeneralized. To the extent I overstated the point or understated lefty's willingness to use state power to target speech, mea culpa. Yes, the left (often?) uses formal state power to suppress speech (and I oppose those efforts when they happen). But I stand by the point that in the current political-cultural narrative of "both sides suppress speech," the juxtaposition is young "social-justice warriors," often but not always on campus, making a lot of noise and complaining about "harmful" speech, compared with whoever Florida went after yesterday (the state is trying to strip the Miami Hyatt Regency of its liquor license over a drag show). I cannot think of a current Democratic-controlled state undertaking efforts mirroring what is happening in Republican-controlled states. Maybe campus speech codes? Maybe states using existing public-accommodations laws against expressive businesses? What else am I missing?

• I hope my post did not read as a defense of what the students or associate dean did; I am not sure I know enough to say. We might describe their conduct many ways--rude, obnoxious, unprofessional, counter-productive, many others. I do not believe we can describe it as falling outside of the First Amendment--especially the hostile signs and questions that created a nasty environment but did not prevent him from speaking. So I am troubled by the suggestion (to be clear, from Judges Ho and Branch, not from Rick) that the government should deny bar membership because of obnoxious-but-protected speech.

• I have read reports (yes, grain of salt and all that) that Judge Duncan was videoing protesters outside the building and the room and perhaps making negative comments to them (that is not clear). But it suggests that Duncan adopted an adversarial posture with people independent of the in-room disruption, people who I think we agree behaved in an appropriate manner towards a speaker this dislike. I admit I do not know how things would have gone had the protest remained silent or outside and he been able to give his prepared remarks and then respond to questions. I infer that his response to the question about the pronoun case would have gotten the same "read the opinion" response.

• Do we have a good sense of who did what among students in the room--who silently protested,* who asked questions,** who shouted and disrupted? And how does that affect how we evaluate the behavior of other audience members and of Judge Duncan. Video shows Duncan giving dismissive responses to some actual questions. Who asked those questions? If A acts like an idiot and interrupts, does that justify a non-response or dismissive response to a legitimate-if-challenging question from B, who did not join in the circus? In a mixed audience, how should we expect the speaker--especially a speaker who is an Article III judge--to engage with those who disagree  but attempt to engage?

[*] I believe silent, non-disruptive-if-distracting protest offers a fourth option to the three that Rick identifies.

[**] Can questions for an invited speaker be hostile? True, it may not be the best way to get a good answer. But does it fall outside expressive norms?

• At bottom, I think I come out that there is blame to go around here. It ought not fall on one side.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 17, 2023 at 01:43 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, March 16, 2023

Asymmetrical Censorship

Conventional wisdom holds that "both sides" want to restrict speech and lack respect for the First Amendment and free speech values. But that "both sides" framing overlooks the mechanisms through which each side disrespects speech. Vastly overgeneralizing and we can find exceptions, but:

    • From the left, private persons or entities exercise some form of free speech to oppose or counter speech and speakers they do not like--shouting down speaker, banning speakers from social-media sites, boycotting speakers, etc. That is, what gets framed as "cancel culture," especially on college campuses. One can disagree with such tactics. And these tactics can run afoul of some neutral rules--such as the rules governing a forum. But we cannot deny that those exercising it are: 1) private persons and 2) exercising some form of their own expression, however stupid we might believe them to be.

    • From the right, officials use the power of the state to silence speakers--banning drag shows, making some classroom speech unlawful, threatening reprisal against speakers who criticize government officials, arresting protesters and journalists, overruling speech-protective precedent to make suing critics easier, etc.

It seems to me that one is worse, because one has many more formal and practical consequences. But the intense pull of "both sides" in national coverage requires that a sophomore at Oberlin is as great a threat as the governor of Florida (and wannabee president).

This dynamic appears in the fallout from the events at Judge Duncan's Stanford speech. Judge Ho (Fifth Circuit) and Judge Branch (Eleventh Circuit)--who previously threatened to stop hiring Yale grads as law clerks--argue in the National Review that disruptive students should suffer consequences, including denying bar admission on character-and-fitness grounds. So lefty Stanford students do not want  Judge Duncan to speak and wield practical actions (some of which are arguably their own form of free speech) to stop him. Righty judges respond by using the full force of the state to punish them for their speech. And everyone will treat them as equivalents.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 16, 2023 at 04:21 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, March 15, 2023

Stanford, preferred first speakers, and the nonsense of "civil discourse"

Grading has denied me time to write about the Stanford debacle. I somewhat was waiting for Ken White to cover it, expecting that I would share his take--and I do.

I will add the following: This demonstrates why the "civil discourse" trope--students should not protest, they should sit quietly and politely listen to the speaker, then engage with the speaker in a "Platonic dialogue"--is and always has been bullshit. The speaker bears no obligation to engage with the questions. And Judge Duncan did not engage--including with actual, thoughtful (if pointed and hostile) questions. When someone asks the speaker about something he wrote (such as the opinion refusing to allow a prisoner to use his proper pronoun), "read what I wrote" is not engaging in civil discourse. And acting as if he was not on the panel is certainly not. That the questions and questioners were hostile does not excuse non-answers; it shows how those who censor speech use "politeness" and "civility" to silence counter-speech.

I like Ken's framing of the point: "The protesting students’ rights and interests are neither inferior to nor superior to the interests of the FedSoc and Judge Duncan. Policing the civility of the response to speech and not speech itself is incoherent nonsense. Put another way, if you say “fuck you” to your classmates, they may say “fuck you” back. If you set out to provoke a response, put on your big boy pants when you get one."

I also reject the framing of this as a "shouting down" issue. Yes, the protesting students prevented him from speaking, in violation of Stanford's forum policy. But if the students had done what the policy allows and urges--oral protests outside the building, silent protests through t-shirts and signs inside the room--Duncan would have responded the same way. He went to Stanford itching for a fight--not sure whether I buy the theory that he sought to raise his profile for a SCOTUS appointment--and would have been as dismissive and rude to silent protesters. No student should have the temerity to protest him--free speech means sit there and listen to what he has to say.

Chris Walker (now at Michigan) visited FIU this week. He shared that when he taught at The Ohio State University, Fed Soc invited a speaker from the ADF. OutLaw held a bake sale outside. The speaker bought something. That is not discourse. But it is effective protest.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 15, 2023 at 12:03 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 14, 2023

Whither Division III?

A current and a former basketball player at Brown filed a class action  suit, challenging the Ivy League's agreement/policy not to award athletic scholarships as an antitrust violation.

To our readers with antitrust knowledge: If successful, how does this not eliminate the NCAA's Division III, comprised of smaller, mostly private, heavily liberal-arts college and which prohibits athletic scholarships? If a conference-wide policy against scholarships violates the law, how can a nationwide policy not violate the law?

Comments open.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 14, 2023 at 07:02 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, March 10, 2023

Judicial immunity and other civil rights hurdles (Update)

Steve Lubet (Northwestern) writes in Slate about Judge Robert Benitez (S.D. Cal.), who ordered the marshall to handcuff the 13-year-old daughter of a defendant in a parole-revocation hearing and have her sit in the jury box; his intent, he explained, was to send a message: “So your dad’s made some serious mistakes in his life, and look at where it’s landed him. … And if you’re not careful, young lady, you’ll wind up in cuffs, and you’ll find yourself right there where I put you a minute ago.”

Lubet expresses concern that Benitez will incur no sanction for his actions. Life tenure means he cannot be removed from the bench other than by impeachment. The case was transferred to another, who reduced the 10-month sentence Benitez imposed. A judicial-misconduct complaint has been filed, but the sanctions are minimal--censure and perhaps an interruption of newly assigned cases.

As for civil remedies, Lubet says "He cannot be sued for damages, because he has judicial immunity for conduct on the bench."

But is the immunity issue that obvious? Immunity attaches to "judicial functions," performed not in the "complete absence of jurisdiction." That captures most conduct on the bench. But the conduct must relate to the conduct of judicial proceedings and control of the courtroom. But this may exceed even the broadest understanding of those concepts. Benitez was not maintaining order in the courtroom or ensure the proper conduct of judicial proceedings. He admits to "hoping" to get to the girl--not a party, witness, or other participant and only tangentially related to the proceeding--a "message" about how she should live her life. Above the Law called it a "bush league Scared Straight, which, despite the source, is a pretty good descriptor. Warning random teens about the danger of crime is not a judicial function; that it happens in court should not matter. The motive behind a function does not affect immunity--a judicial function performed for a racist purpose remains a judicial function. But the purpose of an action can affect whether it qualifies as a judicial function--an action that does not reasonably affect judicial proceedings cannot be judicial, even if a judge performs it.

Of course, judicial immunity is not the only hurdle the girl faces. Benitez is a federal judge, so any damages action falls under Bivens--and we know what that means. This presents a new context and thus an extension of Bivens since SCOTUS never allowed a claim against a federal judge. And the usual special factors will counsel hesitation before allowing the action--Congress never created a cause of action, the judicial-complaint system allows for alternate remedies, and a Bivens court will not want to chill other judges in managing their courtrooms in the future. And after Bivens comes qualified immunity and the absence of any precedent clearly establishing that judges should not order the handcuffing of courtroom observers without probable cause and for no legitimate judicial reason. Is the violative nature of this as obvious as leaving a detainee in a cold, feces-strewn cell or placing a prisoner on a hitching post for 7 hours? Who knows.

So Lubet is right that civil damages remedy are unlikely. But judicial immunity is the tip of that iceberg.

Update: Steve responds:

The leading SCOTUS case is Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991), which I considered when writing the essay (space limitations did not allow me to get into it). Mireles holds there is no immunity for actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. But the trial judge in Mireles had ordered the abusive seizure of a public defender who had missed a court call, and SCOTUS found that was not beyond all jurisdiction. I could be wrong, but my conclusion was that Benitez likewise had some jurisdiction over spectators in his courtroom, and especially over someone who had been invoked by the defendant as a reason for leniency – and thus as sort of a witness. She was in the courtroom to influence the outcome. Puente told the court that his daughter was in danger of drug use, so the judge had some jurisdiction to question or interview her about it, if only to determine whether to believe Puente’s assertion. Of course, his questioning was abusive, but that alone does not defeat judicial immunity.

Well, I would prefer being wrong about that, but as the abstract of the Mireles opinion put it, “That he may have made a mistake or acted in excess of his authority does not make the act nonjudicial.”

My reply (hey, my blog, my final word): We might distinguish Mireles because the order to the bailiff had a closer connection to courtroom management--the judge needed the attorney to get to court for things to proceed. I agree that Benitez could have questioned the girl, even in an abusive or threatening fashion; that would be judicial. Handcuffing her--for the purpose of teaching her a lesson rather than for determining whether to believe the defendant as part of the proceeding--is a difference in kind.

Finally, the cases distinguish actions "in excess of authority" from actions "in the clear absence of authority;" the former maintains immunity (as in Mireles), but the latter does not. Steve makes the best argument for why this is the former--she was there to influence the outcome of a proceeding and the judge can question that attempt. But the judge's statements of his purpose, to me, push this into the latter.

To be clear, I am not saying Lubet is wrong about judicial immunity. Only that it is more complex than the typical case of a judge misbehaving while conducting proceedings from the bench.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 10, 2023 at 02:23 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 07, 2023

Offended observer standing and the substance of the Establishment Clause

SCOTUS on Monday denied cert in an Establishment Clause case arising from a public vigil in Ocala, Florida. Justice Gorsuch agreed with the denial of cert while Justice Thomas dissented; both criticized "offended observer standing" in Establishment cases, repeating the themes in Gorsuch's concurring opinion (joined by Thomas) in American Legion.

I therefore re-up my 2019 post on why the Gorsuch/Thomas position eliminates pure Establishment Clause challenges to government religious expression and activities by eliminating any plaintiff with standing. Absent some compelled participation or exclusion (which would violate other constitutional provisions), no one suffers an injury from the display or program.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 7, 2023 at 11:28 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, March 04, 2023

So many First Amendment defects, so little time (Updated)

Florida SB 1316 would require non-journalist bloggers who write about members of the state executive or legislative branches to register with the state.

The bills has so many constitutional defects that different commentators can find and focus on different things. Jeff Kosseff (Naval Academy) focuses on the loss of anonymous speech. Kosseff wrote a book on that, so it makes sense that he would lock onto that when I did not. I latched onto the registration requirement, which goes beyond prohibiting anonymity and into an effective licensing system. (A bill could prohibit anonymous speech by requiring bloggers to publicize their names; this bill prohibits anonymity while authorizing a formal government database of speakers, a further constitutional problem). It also creates a new set of arguments for the state. Sen. Jason Brodeur, the bill's sponsor, does not appear to be a smart person, but someone must have told him that a flat ban on anonymous speech could not fly. But I believe Brodeur hopes to defend the bill as a lobbying regulation--any non-journalist who writes (for pay) about Florida public officials seeks to influence those officials and thus engages in lobbying, which the state can regulate through formal state registration and authorization. That does not save the law--A legislature likely cannot define lobbying to extend beyond "direct communication" with government officials on specific government business; speech "about" an official, even for money, cannot qualify. But it suggests a scheme beyond prohibiting anonymous speech.

The bill has prompted a different question over how we write and talk about law--how much should we worry (and write)about performative legislation? Josh Chafetz wants us to consider (and describe) the broader context--whether the bill originates with governor and/or legislative leadership (which makes passage more likely) or  with a random backbencher pandering to the base; we should not get too worked up if the bill has no realistic chance of passage. Kosseff, emphasizing the increase in these bills, urges vigilance in all cases--"If a legislator proposes a bill, which could be considered at any moment, I'll take that proposal seriously until it's off the table." I think the positions co-exist--Josh does not suggest ignoring the bill, only making context and likelihood-of-passage part of the story and the analysis.

Finally, Kosseff says "So many of us -- me included -- have taken the First Amendment for granted over the past few decades. I fear that it's about to face some pretty big stress tests and we're pretty unprepared." Early in my career, a senior colleague questioned my interest in writing about free speech; I responded that this area is fun because we usually win. That may be changing.

Update: So I was right about three things. Sen. Brodeur explains on Twitter that he sees this as a lobbying regulation.  This violates the First Amendment because calling something lobbying, beyond that core definition, does not make it lobbying. And Sen. Brodeur is not a smart person.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 4, 2023 at 01:17 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, March 02, 2023

Florida to register bloggers

SB 1316. The basic idea seems to be to treat non-journalists who write about DeSantis and other state officials as lobbyists.

It seems pretty obvious this cannot survive First Amendment scrutiny, even if enacted. Meanwhile, I guess I should now get out all my posts about Ron DeSantis and Republican legislators as crazy, dangerous authoritarians with no understanding or respect for the First Amendment or principles of free speech.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 2, 2023 at 10:26 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

It's all about the precedent

Jonathan Adler comments on universal vacatur in the student loan case. He gets at the fundamental (and overlooked) insight in this debate: The prospective non-party effects of a decision arise from precedent, never from the judgment. SCOTUS does not issue (or affirm) universal injunctions; its opinion affirming a particularized injunction in Case1 binds other courts in future cases involving similar issues. The DC Circuit does not issue universal judgments; its opinion in Case1 binds the circuit in future cases involving similar issues (where, Adler argues, Congress gives the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction). To the extent that disables regional circuits from imposing broader consequences, Congress chose that effect by creating a regional and hierarchical judiciary.

Departmentalism (not mentioned in the arguments or in Adler's piece) makes this compliance practical rather than legal. The executive follows precedent (at least within the circuit) because it chooses to do so, knowing it will otherwise lose when non-compliance returns to the D.C. Circuit.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 2, 2023 at 06:54 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)