Thursday, August 13, 2020

Birtherism 2.0 more insidious than Original Recipe

Counter-arguments from top-line conservative scholars will not be enough to slow this tide. Original Recipe was based on a provably false factual premise--Obama was not born in Hawaii--that allowed it to be dismissed as the ravings of people living in an alternative factual reality. But 2.0 is not about a fact--no one questions that Harris was born in California. Instead, 2.0 is based on a legal argument; however weak and contrary to every judicial and scholarly position the argument, editors (such as those of Newsweek) can rationalize it as a point of scholarly disagreement and a constitutional debate "unlikely to fall quiet any time soon." And the President, editors, and others will bolster the legal position--however descriptively incorrect--by argumentum ad verecundiam, pointing out that Eastman is "very highly qualified and talented" and that he clerked for Justice Thomas and used to be a dean.

Two thoughts on responding. First is to recognize that this is a legal rather than factual dispute. The response cannot be "Eastman is wrong and Harris is eligible because she was born in California;" no one disputes that.* Eastman's argument is that she is ineligible even thought she was born in California, because she was born to non-citizen parents. Second, the conversation must emphasize the difference between descriptive and normative arguments. Descriptively, the prevailing state of current law is birthright citizenship, which makes Harris eligible. Eastman (and soon Trump) is making a normative argument about what he believes the law should be. Any conversation must show why that vision is wrong.

[*] For the moment. Once the fever swamp gets hold of this, who knows where she will have been born or what explanation there will be for why California was not properly admitted to the Union.

Two questions. First, will we see a spate of lawsuits (as we did in 2008) challenging Harris' placement on the ballot, which will be dismissed for lack of standing. Second, if Biden/Harris wins, do they get an OLC opinion on the subject?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 13, 2020 at 09:08 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, August 11, 2020

JOTWELL: Steinman on Jacobi & Sag on laughter at SCOTUS

The new Courts Law essay comes from Adam Steinman (Alabama) reviewing Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking Laughter Seriously at the Supreme Court, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 1423 (2019), analyzing the frequency of laughter during SCOTUS arguments and its dark side as a "weapon of advocacy."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 11, 2020 at 11:12 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 08, 2020

Podcasts on cancel culture

Since I have been writing about cancel culture this week, here is an episode of Noah Feldman's Deep Background podcast, featuring Osita Nwanevu of the New Republic discussing cancel culture and why it is not a threat to free speech. On that note, Nwanevu debated Yascha Mounk on the subject on Slate's The Gist.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 8, 2020 at 02:19 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, August 07, 2020

Standing for nothing

I agree with the majority of the en banc D.C. Circuit that the House has standing to enforce its subpoena against former W.H. counsel Don McGahn.

But it reaffirms how little sense standing makes as a threshold Article III inquiry. As Marty Lederman notes, more important questions remain about whether the House has a cause of action, whether there is testimonial immunity, and other executive-privilege objections to the subpoenas. But we now have spent 17 months fighting over this issue and are no closer to a resolution before January 3, when Congress ends, the subpoena expires, and the whole mess becomes moot.

Worse, some of the arguments and disagreement between majority and dissent conflate standing and merits, a common and unavoidable problem. For example, McGahn and Judge Griffith's dissent argue that the House lacks standing because the case raises separation of powers problems and separation of powers underlies standing (sort of). But those stand-alone S/P concerns go to the merits of the case--to whether the subpoena or something sought through the subpoena is valid or whether the executive/legislative balance protects against some disclosures. The result is an attempt at double-counting: Using the possible failure of the House subpoena on its merits with what is supposed to be, but is not, a distinct question.

The court also splits on questions of legislative/executive cooperation and bargaining and perverse incentives that arose in Mazars. The majority argued that without judicial enforcement, the executive would have no reason to bargain, because the House would have no alternative means to ensure compliance (the executive may not pursue contempt against itself and inherent contempt authority has fallen into disuse). The dissent argues that the House will run to the courts rather than negotiate (this is the same argument the Chief Justice used in Mazars).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 7, 2020 at 02:54 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 06, 2020

Anti-SLAPP fee-shifting in federal court

I have argued in prior posts that the solution to SLAPP suits is not the  heightened standards from state laws (which cannot apply in federal court) but attorney fee-shifting. The paradox has been that most fee-shifting provisions apply to actions disposed of under the statutory standard, but not under a different standard. Thus, if the state statutory standard does not apply and the case is resolved on a simple 12(b)(6), the fee-shift does not apply.

But not so with the Florida anti-SLAPP law, according to Judge Martinez of the Southern District of Florida. Florida law provides for fees for any action that is "without merit" and based on constitutionally protected speech. The determination that the action is without merit can be made under any procedural device, such as 12(b)(6) (as in this case). In other words, the statute is a garden-variety fee-shifting provision serving substantive policy ends, the same as other fee-shifting provisions held to apply in federal diversity actions. So an action dismissed on a 12(b)(6) can provide the basis for an award of fees.

This is unique to Florida's anti-SLAPP statute. But it produces a conclusion that balances the requirements of the REA/Erie/Hanna against First Amendment interests.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 6, 2020 at 03:38 PM in Civil Procedure, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

More cancel culture and counter-speech

Efforts continue to define and defend criticisms of cancel culture, beyond "I know it when I see it" or "Canceling for me but not for thee." Jonathan Rauch takes a crack in Persuasion (free registration required), identifying six warning signs, the presence of some or all suggest canceling:

• Punitiveness, in that the goal or effect is to cost a job or other opportunities.

• Deplatforming, which includes disinvitations, demands for retractions, and shout-downs.

• Organization

• Secondary Boycotts

• Moral grandstanding, through "ad hominem, repetitive, ritualistic, posturing, accusatory, outraged" rhetoric.

• Truthiness

Punititiveness perhaps helps. But there must be circumstances in which someone's deeds or expression are so egregious that calling for his removal from a job or position or platform should be fair game, such that non-governmental actors can decide to remove him from their circle of discourse and engagement. The person remains free to speak, but private persons need not listen, nor provide him with a platform. And private companies can choose not to retain him as an employee, private consumers can choose not to do engage in business with him, and people and entities in general can elect not to associate with him. If that is permissible, then the dispute is not punitiveness or deplatforming, but where to draw the line. We can identify ridiculous overreactions. But some situations are not ridiculous overreactions.

Five of Rauch's categories involve forms or manners of expression and thus of counter-speech. These purportedly neutral rules perpetuate the problem of the preferred first speaker--they impose unique limits on the type of speech regarded as "legitimate" when used by those who object to a speaker. For example, Rauch does not call for an end to all "ad hominem, repetitive, ritualistic, posturing, accusatory, outraged" rhetoric, only that used in response to someone. He rejects shout-downs, thus obligating counter-speakers to engage civilly and openly through dialogue in a way that original speakers are not obligated to do. A categorical line between organizing (rallying many people to a cause, which is somehow a bad thing) and persuading imposes an obligation of reasoned discourse not placed on an original speaker.

Rauch does treat everyone the same as to truthiness--it is as problematic when President Trump lies and distorts as when left-leaning groups lie and distort. But then we are not talking about cancel culture as some unique threat to free speech. The threat is lying, whoever is lying and wherever that person stands in the exchange process.

These and other efforts bring me back to Chief Justice Rehnquist in Hustler v. Falwell: "If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description [cancel culture] does not supply one."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 6, 2020 at 12:11 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, August 05, 2020

Judge Reeves on qualified immunity

An opinion to behold from Judge Reeves of the Southern District of Mississippi. (H/T: Michael Masinter). the 72-pager includes a lengthy history of § 1983 from passage in 1871 to the creation of qualified immunity; it calls out racial bias in policing and in society at large (especially in Mississippi) to explain why a search was not consensual. It calls out appellate judges for creatively interpreting Reconstruction statutes to protect older white men while failing to protect African-Americans against government misconduct. It calls directly and explicitly on the Supreme Court to do something (while admitting to not knowing what that should be). And it uses a cute three-point Star Wars allusion to organize the opinion ("§ 1983: A New Hope;" "Qualified Immunity: The Empire Strikes Back;" and "The Return of § 1983"). All while granting the officer qualified immunity for an egregious Fourth Amendment violation (traffic stop and lengthy search with no cause to be found) because he has no choice under current law.

For those who believe in such a thing (I don't), is this judicial activism? Does the judge's role, especially a lower-court judge, include railing against the state of the law, its horrific incorrectness, and its negative effects, especially in such sharp terms? Judge Reeves "applied the law rather than making the law," so he behaved consistent with that typical definition. An opinion is an essay having no direct force or effect. But should judges use these essays for such a cri de coeur?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 5, 2020 at 03:40 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (21)

Tuesday, August 04, 2020

Debate: Free speech v. Cancel culture (Updated)

Ken (Popehat) White for the position that "cancel culture" is a cynical ploy to undermine counter-speech v. Greg Lukianoff (of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education) for the position that the real source of protection comes from "free speech culture," which means a culture of accepting other people's views and going along for the ride.

Unsurprisingly, I agree with White. Critics of cancel culture are imposing norms on "more speech" that they do not impose on the speech being rebutted and are essentially insisting that more speech not be too harsh. Lukianoff makes the good point that a culture of free speech is as important as formal legal protection for free speech. But he never deals with White's argument that much of what is derided as cancel culture is counter-speech, including many of the outrageous examples he offers. Lukianoff emphasizes the heralded legal principles "Sticks and stones" and "to each his own," which are possible responses to obnoxious speech. But there is no reason they should be the only responses to obnoxious speech.

Lukianoff kind of proves White's point with his requests: Don't call people hypocrites, welcome temporary allies, and don't lump free-speech advocates (himself or Nadine Strossen) with cynical partisans (Charlie Kirk). The last is well-taken, although most serious free-speech advocates do not do that. But the last is inconsistent with the first, which seems to require us to accept Charlie Kirk's support for free speech rather than recognizing its hypocrisy. In any event, Lukianoff's argument is about policing speech, about declaring some expression out of bounds. His arguments never answer that concern.

Update: As if on cue: Kelly Loeffler--Senator and senatorial candidate from Georgia, co-owner of the WNBA Atlanta Dream, and critic of BLM and kneeling basketball players--cries "cancel culture" because WNBA players wore t-shirts supporting her opponent in the coming election. It is difficult to imagine anything more central to the First Amendment than speech saying "Vote for X." Can it possibly lose protection because spoken in response to Loeffler's statements about about BLM and the flag?

Meanwhile, Auburn is investigating a (non-tenure-track) faculty member for "fuck the police" tweets and a Republican congressman is calling for him to be fired for anti-police hate speech. Proving White's point that there are hypocrites and grifters.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 4, 2020 at 02:25 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (7)

Monday, August 03, 2020

Competing views on the Biskupic articles

Josh Blackman sees this as a threat to the institution that the Chief must repair (through some actions that I am not sure the Chief, as "first among equals," can do) or resign. Dan Epps argues that more transparency is a good thing. Take your pick or land somewhere in the middle.

I will share and concur in a comment from the Conaw List Serv that the Biskupic stories were interesting, but not earth-shattering--some of it could have been gleaned from the opinions themselves or from what we already knew about the Court's operations.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 3, 2020 at 12:40 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, August 02, 2020

RIP, Wilfred Brimley

Actor Wilfred Brimley died Saturday. Brimley had too many roles to mention--most curmudgeonly, which apparently was Brimley. But I, and many lawyers, love his scene as a DOJ attorney in Absence of Malice, who swoops in at the end to smack everyone down. (This is one of two great lawyer scenes in this movie, the other comes early when the newspaper's attorney explains the law of defamation to the reporter). The full Brimley scene is not on YouTube, but here is the beginning:

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 2, 2020 at 10:28 AM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, August 01, 2020

Judicial departmentalism and particularity on Twitter (Updated)

In 2019, the Second Circuit held that Donald Trump could not ban people from following him on Twitter for viewpoint-discriminatory reasons, affirming a declaratory judgment. Trump and Daniel Scavino, the aide who runs his Twitter account, unblocked the plaintiffs and many others. But they did not unblock two groups--those who had been blocked before Trump became President (where there was no First Amendment problem with blocking them because he was not a government official at the time of blocking) and those who cannot point to a specific tweet that caused them to be blocked (where there is no evidence of viewpoint discrimination).

The Knight Foundation on Friday filed a new lawsuit on behalf of those two groups, asking for a declaratory judgment and injunction ordering the unblocking of these new plaintiffs.

Once again, inefficient but appropriate. Trump unblocked the plaintiffs, as we was obligated to do by the judgment. He negotiated with the Knight Foundation to unblock others, not out of an immediately enforceable legal obligation but a recognition of what would happen if he did not unblock--a motion to extend the existing judgment to additional individuals, which would succeed and which would impose that legal obligation. But he identified two groups differently situated than the plaintiffs who, in Trump's view, have not suffered similar violations of their First Amendment rights. This requires new litigation, a new analysis of the First Amendment, and a new declaration of First Amendment rights, duties, and relations.

Update: A further thought on the process: We know the plaintiffs recognized the particularized scope of the original judgment by the fact that they filed a new lawsuit on behalf of these plaintiffs. Had the original judgment protected these non-parties to that action, they could have moved to enforce the judgment, to hold Trump or Scavino in contempt, or to convert the declaratory judgment into an injunction.

For better or worse, this how the process should work. And Trump should not be accused of disobeying a court order or otherwise ignoring the court.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 1, 2020 at 06:41 PM in Civil Procedure, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (8)

Thursday, July 30, 2020

Delaying the election

I expect the election to happen, if Steve Calabresi and Ari Fleischer are calling the President out for today's tweet and Kevin McCarthy insists on going forward. Nevertheless, some light reading if.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 30, 2020 at 05:37 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Biskupic, Part IV

All about the Chief cobbling together the largest possible majority in the subpoena cases. They were a contested 5-4 after conference, with Roberts assigning himself the opinion but no guarantee which of G/B/S/K would join his opinion and Gorsuch and Kavanaugh on the other side.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 30, 2020 at 05:21 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 29, 2020

Biskupic, Part III

Focuses on Justice Kavanaugh in June Medical, in which he tried to get people to go along with a remand for more fact-finding, and the subpoena cases, in which he raises the political-question issue. It also describes his efforts to adopt a softer tone towards the parties he rules against, such as DREAMERS or "gritty" LGTBQ individuals.

I think the spin on his moves in June is a bit disingenuous. Remanding for factfinding in these cases is often a delay tactic, a way to decide without deciding, when the trial court's fact-finding is clear and a remand serves no real purpose other than allowing the Justices to keep their hands clear (and make life less difficult for Susan Collins). The remand proposal recalls his dissent on the D.C. Circuit in the pregnant-unaccompanied-minors case, in which he called for giving the government more time to find a sponsor, as the 20-week state-law clock ran down.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 29, 2020 at 04:56 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 28, 2020

Biskupic, Part II

Here. The focus is on Bostock and its internal deliberations. The reveals include that the 6-3 breakdown was clear from the beginning (so Roberts, not Ginsburg, assigned the opinion to Gorsuch; that Kagan joined Gorsuch's draft immediately and Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor followed soon after; and that Alito was angry. There also was a leak in November about how conference had gone, which prompted some op-eds directed to moving Gorsuch away from Kagan.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 28, 2020 at 02:14 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

JOTWELL: Singer on Reichman, Sagy, & Balaban on machines and judges

The new Courts Law essay comes from guest reviewer Jordan Singer (New England Law-Boston), reviewing Amnon Reichman, Yair Sagy, & Shlomi Balaban, From a Panacea to a Panopticon: The Use and Misuse of Technology in the Regulation of Judges, 71 Hastings L.J. 589 (2020).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 28, 2020 at 10:32 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 27, 2020

Biskupic on the internal workings of the Roberts Court

At CNN, Joan Biskupic has the first of a series of pieces on the internal workings of the Court and the Chief's place in control, both as the Court's median vote--allowing him to piss off or appease both sides--and as the one who runs proceedings. Tidbits in the piece include: Roberts not providing an obvious fifth vote with the conservative wing on the Second Amendment; Roberts agreeing that DACA rescission was procedurally unlawful from the outside, while refusing to find any equal protection problems (thus losing Sotomayor from a complete majority); some negotiations with the liberal wing over the COVID-voting petitions; and pushing through the remote-argument process (including resisting the push from some to do it by Zoom). She also reports that Roberts began in the dissent in the Georgia copyright case, with Thomas assigning the original opinion and someone (she does not say who) switching during the drafting process.

I hope the coverage describing Roberts as the "swing" vote does not conflate that with him being a "moderate" or ideologically varied--he is not White, Powell, or O'Connor.

And a question: When was the last time the Chief was also the median Justice whose position defined the winner in most 5-4 decisions? Maybe Hughes, but Owen Roberts often moved with him.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 27, 2020 at 03:44 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 24, 2020

Lawyers and judicial departmentalism

One thing keeping judicial departmentalism from diverging too far from judicial supremacy is DOJ and the role of government attorneys in the judicial process. Obligations to respect judicial authority, of candor to the court, and of being the government face in court compel attorneys to comply with judicial processes and not yield to the lesser impulses of the executive (which does not have a similar legal or ethical obligation of candor).

Yesterday's letter from the US attorney for SDNY to Judge Furman offers an example.

The attorneys acknowledged and apologized for inaccurate and misleading statements in the litigation (over New York's exclusion from the Trusted Traveler Program), which supported the (erroneous) litigation position that the AUSA was required to take on behalf of DHS. Irina Manta simplifies it. DHS made false statements in furtherance of its policy positions (restricting immigration), which it can do. But its power runs out when things enter court. DOJ attorneys serve as the go-between, the persons and institutions who must counsel the executive to change conduct when confronted with the judicial process. And they do that because they bear the brunt of the judicial wrath when the executive pulls stunts such as this.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 24, 2020 at 09:30 AM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

(Update) Grab your fedora, we are all journalists now and other thoughts on the Portland TRO

A federal judges issued a TRO preventing federal paramilitary force in Portland from targeting journalists and legal observers. An existing preliminary injunction, to which the City stipulated, does the same as to Portland police. Some thoughts and questions.

First, the TRO requires journalists and legal observers to identify themselves through badges or distinctive clothing (hats, press passes, etc.). Some concerns and questions.

Vintage-reporter-fedora-hat-camera-picture-id510580998First, it is about time we revived this look from His Girl Friday or The Brady Bunch.

Second, this seems to run afoul of the principle that the press does not have special status from other speakers when it comes to what they can say and their access to spaces. The key access cases speak of information-gathering by the press and the public. I expect that some non-press people in the mix of these protests are there to observe and record. And they possess or can possess the same equipment that allows a reporter to do her job--a device that takes photographs, moving pictures, and audio recordings. And I assume fedoras can be purchased online. Maybe the point should be to not have paramilitary forces using force and effecting arrests indiscriminately against anyone who happens to be in a crowd but is not engaging in unlawful activity, not only those with J.D.s or an institutional affiliation.

Second, the government tried to defeat the plaintiffs' standing with a string of cases making it difficult to challenge practices within the criminal-justice system (choke holds during arrests, discriminatory bail or sentencing); the cases rest on the refusal to speculate that the plaintiff will break the law and thus come in contact with the criminal-justice system and be subject to those policies. The court rejected that because threat to plaintiff arose not from breaking laws, but from engaging in protected First Amendment activity--"It is one thing to ask citizens to obey the law in the future to avoid future alleged harm. But it is quite another for the Federal Defendants to insist that Plaintiffs must forgo constitutionally protected activity if they wish to avoid government force and interference." Good call.

Third, the court orders wide dissemination of the order, including to Bill Barr and Ken Cuccinelli and those with supervisory authority over agents in Portland. The reason is that "the Court considers any willful violation of this Order, or any express direction by a supervisor or commander to disregard or violate this Order, to be a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and thus not subject to qualified immunity" in any Bivens action. This is odd. The violation of the order is not necessarily the same as a violation of the underlying constitutional rights protected by the order, but only the latter would be the basis for a Bivens action. The court seems to be couching its power to enforce its order with its power to award damages should an injury occur. That is, it will use its equitable power to enforce its equitable order by imposing a legal remedy. Equity cannot enjoin a crime, but can it enjoin a constitutional tort? Any way, I am troubled by the practice--made necessary by unwise qualified-immunity doctrine--of courts announcing that "henceforth, some right is clearly established.

Update: From a conversation with a Remedies colleague: A court can enforce an injunction through civil contempt, which can be compensatory. A court could order the violating defendant to pay money to the plaintiff in the amount of the injury suffered. And if that injury were physical (e.g., medical expenses from being shot), the remedy would look like compensatory damages. But Bivens and qualified immunity still have nothing to do with this. A plaintiff need not bring a Bivens claim if the remedy is contempt for an existing court order in an ongoing case. And qualified immunity should have no role to play in the court enforcing an existing order.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 24, 2020 at 08:26 AM in Civil Procedure, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, July 23, 2020

Watching on-screen, working on paper

The posts from Jessica and our other guests on teaching remotely/online have been great. But here is a question on integrating tech learning with non-tech work (this arose during our remote 1L orientation session today):

I ordinarily limit students' sue of technology in class-no laptops, hand-written notes, hard-cover books. I do it out of a believe, backed by much if not unanimous science, that this is the best way to learn. Obviously, I cannot prohibit them from taking notes on a computer when they are home. But how hard should I advise (or push) them in that direction? And should I require them to purchase hard-cover books so they at least have to do that part by hand?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 23, 2020 at 07:18 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (6)

Monday, July 20, 2020

Has the submission window moved?

Scholastica sends daily announcements about article submissions, including which journals have reopened for submissions. I have seen several such announcements the past few days, including from some top journals.

 I had thought that the already-narrow August window opened around August 10. Has it moved up? Are journals actively accepting and reviewing articles? Are scholars submitting? Would love to hear from authors and journal editors.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 20, 2020 at 10:04 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (19)

Thursday, July 16, 2020

Why bulls and bears?

Question for anyone who might know: Why are bulls and bears the animal metaphors for the financial markets and why is an up market "bull" and a down market "bad"? My father was an over-the-counter stock trader and I had a t-shirt showing a bull beating up a bear, but I never thought to ask.

A colleague says it is because a fighting bull gores up when it is winning, while a fighting bear swipes down when it is winning.

Looking for other theories.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 16, 2020 at 07:18 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (2)

2020 Law Journal Meta Rankings

From Bryce Newell.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 16, 2020 at 03:36 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, July 15, 2020

Anti-SLAPP law does not apply in Second Circuit

The Second Circuit has joined the chorus holding that state anti-SLAPP laws (in that case, California's) do not apply in federal court. The case arises out of a lawsuit against Joy Reid over two tweets with a photo of a woman in a MAGA hat interacting with a Latinx teen at a city council meeting; one tweet described the plaintiff as shouting epithets at the teen (who said their interaction was civil), while the other juxtaposed the infamous 1957 photograph of the screaming white teen in Little Rock.

The Second Circuit joins the Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits in not applying them, compared with the Ninth and First that. The court followed the prevailing approach--FRCP 12 and 56 provide the standards for pre-trial resolution, leaving no room for state law. The court rejected the amici argument that the SLAPP law serves a "distinct function of protecting those specific defendants that have been targeted with litigation on the basis of their protected speech," supplementing rather than conflicting with the FRCP. But this is a policy argument, one that contradicts the policies underlying the FRCP themselves. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that she can recover attorney's fees under the statute for a 12(b)(6) dismissal; the statute allows fees when the defendant prevails on the statutory motion to strike, not on some other basis.

Tellingly, the four most recent cases have gone this way, while the First Circuit decision is from 2010 and the seminal Ninth Circuit cases is from 1999, with several Ninth Circuit judges calling for its reconsideration in 2013. The courts of appeals are congealing around the correct Erie answer and may not require SCOTUS resolution, one point of percolation.

But that might not be the correct answer as a matter of the First Amendment and the need to protect speakers, especially media, against frivolous lawsuits by powerful individuals designed to chill public criticism. (Query whether this is such a case, but bracket that for a moment). Many First Amendment advocates want a full federal anti-SLAPP statute. For the moment, I think a fee-shifting statute, combined with vigorous use of Twiqbal would be sufficient to get rid of cases early in the process and to protect defendants from the intentional imposition of litigation costs. But I need to look in greater detail at how federal courts have looked at defamation claims under that pleading standard.

SLAPP and Erie aside, this case may be more troubling for Reid going forward. The court held that the plaintiff (who spoke and was photographed at city council meetings advocating against sanctuary-city laws) was not a limited-purpose public figure; she lacked media access, did not thrust herself into a public controversy, and stepped forward for interviews only after the first alleged defamation. Thus, the plaintiff had to allege negligence, not actual malice. The court also rejected Reid's argument that the second tweet (juxtaposing the photos) was not an actionable assertion of fact, because a reasonable reader could understand it as equating the plaintiff's conduct with "archetypal racist conduct."

It is interesting that this case came to litigation. When the plaintiff's lawyer asked Reid to delete the posts, Reid did so and apologized, which would seem to suggest the absence of negligence. But the plaintiff sued anyway. And we continue forward.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 15, 2020 at 07:01 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 13, 2020

Universal v. Nationwide, Again

The Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction prohibiting enforcement of DOJ's sanctuary-city regulations as to California and the City and County of San Francisco. This comes after the Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc of a panel decision declaring the regulations valid. We now have a clear circuit split, although I imagine nothing will happen at SCOTUS if Biden wins and the regulations go away.

The Ninth Circuit did narrow the injunction to prohibit enforcement within California but nowhere else. It did so in terms that seem to contemplate the distinction between the injunction's who and where:

Plaintiffs here, a state and a municipality, “‘operate in a fashion that permits neat geographic boundaries.’” . . . Because Plaintiffs do not operate or suffer harm outside of their own borders, the geographical scope of an injunction can be neatly drawn to provide no more or less relief than what is necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ injuries. This is distinguishable from a case involving plaintiffs that operate and suffer harm in a number of jurisdictions, where the process of tailoring an injunction may be more complex.

The court distinguished a case involving asylum organizations that operate in California and other states, where an injunction limited to California would not address the harm from losing a client in Texas.

On the other hand, the court "acknowledge[d] the 'increasingly controversial' nature of nationwide injunction," a framing that confuses the point. There should be nothing controversial about nationwide injunctions, which the court faced here--injunctions that protect the plaintiffs wherever they operate. The controversy is over universal injunctions--injunctions that attempt to protect beyond the plaintiffs. Still, we are slowly getting there.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 13, 2020 at 03:46 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

AALS Federal Courts Section: Calls for Nominations

After the jump is information on two Calls for Nominations from the AALS Section on Federal Courts: The first is for the Daniel J. Meltzer Award, designed to honor the life and work of the late Prof. Meltzer. The second is for the Best Untenured Article on Federal Jurisdiction.

AALS Federal Courts Section - Daniel J. Meltzer Award: Call for Nominations

The AALS Section on Federal Courts is pleased to announce that it is seeking nominations for the Daniel J. Meltzer Award, which is designed to honor the life and work of the late Professor Meltzer.  The Award recognizes a professor of Federal Courts who has exemplified over the course of their career Professor Meltzer’s excellence in teaching, careful and ground-breaking scholarship, engagement in issues of public importance, generosity as a colleague, and overall contribution to the field of Federal Courts.

Eligible nominees are those who are full-time faculty members at AALS member or affiliate schools, have not previously won the award, and have not served as an officer of the Federal Courts Section in the two previous years.  It is not required that the award be given out in any particular year, and it may not be given out more frequently than every three years. 

Nominations (and questions about the award) should be directed to Prof. Seth Davis at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law ([email protected]). Without exception, all nominations must be received by 11:59 p.m. (EDT) on September 15, 2020.  Nominations will be reviewed by a prize committee consisting of Professors Seth Davis (Berkeley), Gillian Metzger (Columbia), James Pfander (Northwestern), and Carlos Vázquez (Georgetown).  If the committee decides to make the award, it will be announced at the Federal Courts section program at the 2021 AALS Annual Meeting.

AALS Federal Courts Section - Best Untenured Article on Federal Jurisdiction: Call for Nominations

The AALS Section on Federal Courts is pleased to announce the annual award for the best article on the law of federal jurisdiction by a full-time, untenured faculty member at an AALS member or affiliate school—and to solicit nominations (including self-nominations) for the prize to be awarded at the 2021 AALS Annual Meeting.

The purpose of the award program is to recognize outstanding scholarship in the field of federal courts by untenured faculty members. To that end, eligible articles are those specifically in the field of Federal Courts that were published by a recognized journal during the twelve-month period ending on September 1, 2020 (date of actual publication determines eligibility). Eligible authors are those who, at the close of nominations (i.e., as of September 15, 2020), are untenured, full-time faculty members at AALS member or affiliate schools, and have not previously won the award.

Nominations (and questions about the award) should be directed to Prof. Seth Davis at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law ([email protected]). Without exception, all nominations must be received by 11:59 p.m. (EDT) on September 15, 2020. Nominations will be reviewed by a prize committee comprised of Professors Samuel Bray (Notre Dame), Seth Davis (Berkeley), Allison Orr Larsen (William & Mary), Marin Levy (Duke), and Leah Litman (Michigan), with the result announced at the Federal Courts section program at the 2021 AALS Annual Meeting.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 13, 2020 at 12:08 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 10, 2020

The process of Mazars and Vance (Updated)

Some process questions following Mazars and Vance, less about what happens on remand in these cases* than about what happens in future cases.

[*] I agree with what I have seen as a prevailing consensus--Trump runs out the clock on these subpoenas for this term, but may be in for a world of hurt and embarrassment as a private citizen if he loses in November. If he wins in November, all bets may be off.

Mazars

1) Which way do the incentives cut following Mazars and how likely is litigation over future subpoena disputes? The Chief's premise is that these cases historically were handled through the hurly-burly of politics until inter-branch negotiation broke down here (with no mention of why inter-branch negotiation broke down during this administration and not before). But Congress' subpoena power cannot be too broad, otherwise "[i]nstead of negotiating over information requests, Congress could simply walk away from the bargaining table and compel compliance in court."

But then why had Congress never previously walked away from the bargaining table? The majority cites four examples--from Washington, Jefferson, Reagan, and Clinton--in which Congress has negotiated for and accepted some-but-less-than-all of what it requested. He cites no examples in which Congress walked away, despite precedent hinting at a broader subpoena power than what the Court recognized.

More importantly, what about presidential incentives? He holds the information and has no desire to give it up unless and until compelled to do so. Mazars offers a more beneficial standard (how beneficial is a subject of debate and must await future cases) that must be satisfied before he can be compelled to do so. So it seems to me that "instead of negotiating over information requests, [the President] could simply walk away from the bargaining table and compel [Congress to start the lengthy process to] compel compliance in court," where the President can try to avail himself of the new standard. Moreover, time is on the executive's side--if the litigation process takes a year or more (not unlikely if SCOTUS gets involved), the President can try to hold out to the next election or to the end of the Congress and the expiration of the subpoena.

2) The President's incentive to walk away is furthered by the Speech or Debate Clause, which prevents suit against Congress. The house or the committee must make the first move by bringing an action to enforce the subpoena or holding the President in contempt of Congress and seeking to enforce the contempt order (which requires the U.S. Attorney for D.C.). Either way, Congress is the first actor. The President's incentive is not to bargain, to run out the clock, and, perhaps, try to shift political blame onto Congress for escalating the political stalemate.

3) We see a stark contrast in what gets left to the hurly-burly of politics and what is appropriate for judicial refereeing. Whether members of the legislature can rig the design of legislative districts to (try to) ensure continuation in office of themselves and their party colleagues) is politics; how one branch engages in oversight of another branch requires judicial intervention. For present purposes, it does not matter which is correct; the point is an odd disparity.

Vance

4) The procedural issue in Vance involves Younger abstention. The state grand jury issued the subpoenas, Trump sued the DA in federal court, the district court abstained in deference to pending state proceedings, and the Second Circuit held that abstention was improper. Vance did not appeal the Younger ruling, so SCOTUS never had reason to decide it. But the Court said that a President could challenge in federal court a subpoena that attempted to influence or manipulate his official actions. Later, the Court says the President can raise "subpoena-specific constitutional challenges, in either a state or federal forum," such as claims of undue influence or undue interference.

But how does a case such as this fit into Younger? The typical framework for Younger goes as follows: 1) Whether the case falls within one of three classes of cases (including ongoing criminal proceedings; 2) consideration of the Middlesex factors of whether there is an ongoing proceeding, whether the proceeding implicates state interests, and whether the federal plaintiff can raise federal issues in state court; and 3) whether the case falls within an exception, such as bad faith, harassment, or "other exceptional circumstances."

The Second Circuit's analysis did not follow this framework. It instead held that Younger's underlying concerns for comity were not implicated in a case built around a federal-state conflict and raising "novel and serious" federal issues. It could have squeezed those concerns into the exceptions (this is what Trump argued in the complaint), but instead made them macro-level policy considerations that a court must consider before jumping into that framework.

5) What about Younger going forward, in this case or a future case? With respect to subpoenas for private documents, the President seems to be an ordinary citizen able to challenge a subpoena on state and federal grounds, including unique federal presidential grounds such as non-interference with Article II functions. Are those challenges automatically a basis for federal jurisdiction and non-abstention? Can ordinary state-law arguments against a subpoena, such as overbreadth, be a basis for federal jurisdiction? Do state-law arguments become Article II arguments when raised by the President? Must there be a federal forum for all Article II arguments, in a way there need not be a federal forum for First Amendment arguments?

6) The Court's resolution arguably alters the Younger analysis in this case. The Second Circuit rejected abstention because of the President's "novel and serious claims," specifically that the President is absolutely immune from state criminal investigation or that a unique standard applies. So the same questions apply: If the President is asserting micro challenges, many under state law, to specific pieces of the injunction, is a federal forum warranted? Can the lower court, having rejected Younger, find abstention appropriate given the changed nature of the case?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 10, 2020 at 03:24 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (6)

Thursday, July 09, 2020

Teaching and evolving doctrine

I will teach 1L Constitutional Law (structure, powers, and basic 14th Amendment) for the first time this semester.

A friend who teaches the course at another school described the difficulty in this course as the rapid increase in the amount of law in a course whose time structure has not changed. Many major cases that occupied many casebook pages and many minutes of class time when he began are now one-paragraph or one-parenthetical notes. In the past two weeks, the Court has decided four cases--Seila Law, June Medical, Vance, and Mazars--that could be substantial cases in addition to or in lieu of what is in the casebook. (My momentary preference is to add Seila Law and maybe Mazars but not the others). And that is without cases radically altering the legal landscape (we are not living through either the Switch in Time or whatever we call Lopez).

Is this unique to Constitutional Law? Do other law school subjects (especially 1L course) have the same issues? Is Con Law unique because the focus is on SCOTUS decisions, so every new case seems important and necessary to the course?

I have experienced this a bit with personal jurisdiction in Civ Pro. I have moved several post-2011 cases (Nicastro, Walden, and Daimler and probably Ford when it comes out next Term) into the mix. During an early Civ Pro Unavailability Workshop someone raised which of the nearly ten recent P/J cases to include and which 1980s-era cases to replace, to say nothing of what to do with Pennoyer. Less so in Fed Courts and Civil Rights, where I use a treatise and new developments or applications (e.g., the legislative and policy move to eliminate qualified immunity) can be integrated into existing materials without displacing them.

But it feels pervasive and never-ending in trying to plan this course. Thoughts?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 9, 2020 at 01:01 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (7)

Wednesday, July 08, 2020

Universal v. Nationwide

A good illustration of why the nationwide/universal and where/who distinction matters for the scope-of-injunction question. Here is footnote 28 in Ginsburg dissent in Little Sisters:

Although the Court does not reach the issue, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a nationwide injunction. The Administrative Procedure Act contemplates nationwide relief from invalid agency action. See 5 U. S. C. §706(2) (empowering courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action”). Moreover, the nationwide reach of the injunction “was ‘necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.’ Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. ___, ___, n. 15 (2018) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 25, n. 13) (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 765 (1994)). Harm to Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the Court of Appeals explained, occurs because women who lose benefits under the exemption “will turn to state-funded services for their contraceptive needs and for the unintended pregnancies that may result from the loss of coverage.” 930 F. 3d, at 562. This harm is not bounded by state lines. The Court of Appeals noted, for example, that some800,000 residents of Pennsylvania and New Jersey work—and thus receive their health insurance—out of State. Id., at 576. Similarly, many students who attend colleges and universities in Pennsylvania and New Jersey receive their health insurance from their parents’ out-of-state health plans. Ibid.

Ginsburg is correct that protecting New Jersey and Pennsylvania is not bounded by state lines, given the number of employees, students, etc. likely to turn to the state for financial assistance. That is, the injunction should have been nationwide in where it protects the parties.  It should protect NJ and Pennsylvania and those people with some connection to NJ or Pennsylvania (on whose behalf NJ and Pennsylvania sued), regardless of where those people are.

But complete relief does not require that the regs be enjoined as to other states who may incur the same harm as NJ and PA or to individuals who might be denied coverage but have no connection to NJ and PA. That is, the injunction need not be universal (or non-particularized) in who it protects. Complete relief to NJ and PA does not require that the enforcement be enjoined as to California or those people who might turn to California for funding if denied coverage.

For what it is worth, the same should apply to the lawsuit Harvard and MIT filed to stop ICE from enforcing the rules with respect to student-visa holders and remote courses. Complete relief to Harvard and MIT does not require enjoining enforcement of the regulations as to other schools or students from schools other than Harvard and MIT. It only requires an injunction protecting Harvard and MIT and their students, regardless of where located. I recognize this is inefficient. But this is the scheme we have.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 8, 2020 at 01:49 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, July 07, 2020

The First Amendment and the preferred first speaker

Harper's has published online (and will publish in print) a letter on "justice and open debate" from a cross-section of journalists, authors, and academics, including several law professors. They decry a "new set of moral attitudes and political commitments that tend to weaken our norms of open debate and toleration of differences in favor of ideological conformity." They allude to  recent events involving fired editors and analysts, canceled books, investigated professors--what has come to be called, loosely, "cancel culture."

The authors claim to "uphold the value of robust and even caustic counter-speech from all quarters," but to fear that "it is now all too common to hear calls for swift and severe retribution in response to perceived transgressions of speech and thought." Ken White (Popehat to those on Twitter and KCRW) sees the letter as drawing an untenable (or at least elusive) distinction between "silencing" and "more/responsive/critical" counter-speech. White labels this the "problem of the preferred first speaker," the " tendency to impose norms of civility, openness, productiveness, and dialogue-encouraging on a RESPONSE to expression that we do not impose on the expression itself." In other words, the original speaker is free to say what she wants however she wants; the response must listen to, engage with, and respond to that speech. "Shut up" is not acceptable counter-speech.

This is an extension and expansion of the problem of campus speech and "controversial" speakers. The invited speaker (Charles Murray, whoever) is the preferred first speaker, entitled to have his say; those who object or oppose his views are expected to sit quietly, listen to what he says, perhaps ask a question or make a comment during Q&A (if he deigns to call on them). Anything else (such as a noisy protest outside the hall) is the dreaded heckler's veto.

Both situations create a puzzle . We do not want people to lose their livelihoods for their speech, nor do we want speakers chased off campus. But we also should not hamstring one side of the debate--to paraphrase Justice Scalia, we should not allow the original speaker "to fight freestyle," while requiring counter-speakers "to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules." I do not know the right answer or correct balance either to the recent online issues or to campus speech (the latter will not be an issue for awhile, unfortunately). But this letter does not provide it.

Meanwhile, White provides a great title for the article I hope to write.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 7, 2020 at 01:39 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

Judenhaas

At The Forward (subscription required), Stephen D. Smith argues against use of the term antisemitism (or anti-Semitism) in favor of "Jew hatred." He argues it is more accurate, less couched in pseudo-science, and less recent (Smith traces the term antisemitism to the late-19th century, whereas the concept has existed for millenia).

Unfortunately, "Jew hatred" is awkward. Fortunately, the Germans provide a single word: Judenhaas. Maybe the term (but not the concept) will catch on.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 7, 2020 at 12:15 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, July 06, 2020

On invalidating laws and universal declaratory judgments

After the jump is FN 8 of Kavanaugh's plurality in Barr v. AAPC. As I said, I wanted to include this in its own post.

The term “invalidate” is a common judicial shorthand when the Court holds that a particular provision is unlawful and therefore may not be enforced against a plaintiff. To be clear, however, when it “invalidates” a law as unconstitutional, the Court of course does not formally repeal the law from the U. S. Code or the Statutes at Large. Instead, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, the Court recognizes that the Constitution is a “superior, paramount law,” and that “a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law” at all. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). The Court’s authority on this front “amounts to little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923).

JUSTICE THOMAS’s thoughtful approach to severability as outlined in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 2–6), and Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ante, at 14–24, (joined by JUSTICE GORSUCH in the latter) would simply enjoin enforcement of a law as applied to the particular plaintiffs in a case. Under either the Court’s approach or JUSTICE THOMAS’s approach, an offending provision formally remains on the statute books (at least unless Congress also formally repeals it). Under either approach, the formal remedy afforded to the plaintiff is an injunction, declaration, or damages. One difference between the two approaches is this: Under the Court’s approach, a provision is declared invalid and cannot be lawfully enforced against others. Under JUSTICE THOMAS’s approach, the Court’s ruling that a provision cannot be enforced against the plaintiff, plus executive respect in its enforcement policies for controlling decisional law, plus vertical and horizontal stare decisis in the courts, will mean that the provision will not and cannot be lawfully enforced against others. The Court and JUSTICE THOMAS take different analytical paths, but in many cases, the different paths lead to the same place.

This is important in several respects.

It clearly explains that "invalidating" a law is merely "common judicial shorthand," that what the Court is really doing is holding that a provision "may not be enforced against a plaintiff." The Court does not say the law cannot be enforced at all or against all people, only against a plaintiff. But no matter what, the law remains on the statute books until Congress repeals it, a task only Congress can perform.

Kavanaugh perfectly describes judicial departmentalism: The injunction prohibits enforcement of the law against the plaintiff; the executive voluntarily respects decisional law in future enforcement efforts (but is not required to do so); and stare decisis means any enforcement fails in the courts. Under Kavanaugh's approach, by contrast, the declaration of a provision as invalid means it cannot be lawfully enforced against others. But Kavanaugh does not explain why this is so and I do not see why it should be. The statement conflicts with the Court's statement in Doran v. Salem Inn that a declaratory judgment does not stop a state government from enforcing a law against other persons and leaves government free to do so. And if declaratory judgment is a milder form of relief than an injunction, it should not have a broader party scope than an injunction.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 6, 2020 at 02:05 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (8)

Notes on Barr v. AAPC

There is a lot in the Court's decision in Barr v. AAPC, declaring invalid the government-debt exception (enacted in 2015) to the ban on robocalls to cell phones (enacted in 1991), but holding that the remedy is to allow government to enforce the original 1991 ban on everyone. Kavanaugh writes for the Chief, Thomas, and Alito that the exception is unconstitutionally content-based and does not survive strict scrutiny and for the Chief and Alito that the remedy is to level everyone down. Sotomayor finds the law constitutionally invalid under the less-rigid scrutiny proposed by Breyer and severable. Breyer writes for Ginsburg and Kagan that the law is constitutionally valid under less-rigid scrutiny, but that, since everyone else disagrees, they agree that the 2015 exception is severable. Justice Gorsuch agrees the 2015 exception invalid on a different analysis, but that the proper remedy is prohibiting enforcement of the entire robocall ban. So one 6-3 on the First Amendment issue, a largely different 7-2 on severability.

• The First Amendment portion is Reed redux. Five Justices (Kavanaugh's four + Gorsuch) say that the statute is content-based and requires strict scrutiny because it distinguishes based on subject matter--robocalls about government debt are ok, everything else (non-government debt, political speech, sales calls about baseball tickets) are prohibited. Breyer continues the squishier balancing he proposed in Bartnicki and then in Reed. The First Amendment is designed to protect political speech, public forums, and an airing for all viewpoints, but is not designed to interfere with commercial regulatory schemes that incidentally affect speech and that do not affect meaningful public discourse. Such incidental regulation should be subject to a less-rigid balancing of the seriousness of the speech-related harm, the importance of countervailing government objectives, the likelihood the regulation will achieve those objectives, and whether there are less-restrictive ways of doing so. Applying that, Breyer argues that the speech disadvantaged (non-government debt collection) is commercial and highly regulated, while the government has an interest in protecting the public fisc by enabling collection of government debts through calls made solely to collect government debt.

• Sotomayor argues the statute fails even under that test, because the government has not explained how collection calls about government debt are less intrusive and less privacy-invading than collection calls about private debt.

• Breyer (and the government) remain concerned that the application of strict scrutiny threatens regulatory schemes such as the SEC, FDCPA, and FDA, all of which limit what regulated entities can say in order to protect consumers. Kavanaugh dismisses the slippery-slope arguments, insisting that "courts have generally been able to distinguish impermissible content-based speech restrictions from tradition or ordinary economic regulation of economic activity."

• People have argued that the severability analysis shows that it is unlikely that the Court will declare invalid the entire ACA next Term, even if the individual mandate is invalid as a tax. Perhaps, although do not underestimate irrational hatred for the ACA. Plus, this case was as much a leveling case as a severability case--the 2015 exception was invalid because it treated the plaintiffs less favorably than collectors of government debt. The majority resolves that problem by "leveling down," leaving the 2015 exception unenforceable and placing all speakers in the same position of being unable to use robocalls. Gorsuch (joined by Thomas in this part) rejects this, arguing that the Court fails to remedy the violation of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights--they want to be able to speak, not to have others prevented from speaking. The result of the case is that no one can make robo calls, which does not give the plaintiffs anything and harms non-plaintiffs.

The point of departure is what provision is invalid in this case. For Gorsuch, it was the original 1991 ban, whose invalidity is shown by the 2015 exception. Thus, the proper remedy for the violation is to make the 1991 ban unenforceable against the plaintiffs. But that, Kavanaugh argues, harms a different group of strangers--the millions of people who will be bombarded by robocalls.

• Kavanaugh's opinion includes a discursive footnote engaging Thomas on the  what it means to "invalidate" a law and what courts should do. I save that for a second post.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 6, 2020 at 01:35 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, July 02, 2020

Rule of Four

We have been playing a weekly online pub trivia game. One of the questions this week asked how many votes were needed for SCOTUS to take a case (the formal question was whether it was more than, less than, or equal to four). 46 % got it right. I am trying to decide whether that is more or less than I should have expected.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 2, 2020 at 10:23 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

Wednesday, July 01, 2020

Law prof letter on constitutional-litigation reform

As I mentioned, A law professor letter is circulating in support of the one-two punch of eliminating qualified immunity and overriding Monell  to make municipalities liable on respondeat superior. The letter is here. Signatures close at 3 p.m. EDT (Noon PDT) today, for those who have not signed but wish to do so.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 1, 2020 at 12:52 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Kennesaw Mountain Landis and the Monument Moment (Updated)

Kenesaw_Mountain_Landis_(ca._1922)Northwestern-Pritzker School of Law (where, full disclosure, I attended law school) displays a portrait of Kennesaw Mountain Landis, a Northwestern grad, former federal judge, and, of course, long-serving first baseball commissioner. As monuments began falling and law schools contemplated their anti-racist steps, I wondered whether that portrait would come down. Now come reports that a move is afoot among former baseball MVPs (black and white) to have Landis' name and image removed from those awards. Update: The Baseball Writers' Association of America (BBWAA), which presents, the MVP awards, announced they will discuss the issue.

The standard history is that Landis actively opposed integration in his 20+ years as commissioner, during which no team signed an African-American player (Landis died in 1944; Jackie Robinson signed with the Dodgers in 1946 and made his MLB debut on April 15, 1947). That is the story Robinson told and was reflected in the authoritative Robinson biography and in a 2016 Ken Burns documentary about Robinson. MLB historian John Thorn presents that history as canon in the above-linked articles, describing Landis as "pretty damn near Confederate" with a history of documented racism.

That standard view had been questioned over the past two decades, through an award-winning 1998 Landis biography and a 2009 article in SABR's Baseball Research Journal. Neither study found evidence of Landis saying or doing anything racist, holding racist views (at least relative to the times), or preventing or even dissuading owners from signing African-American players. Landis made two public statements--in 1942 and 1943--that MLB had no formal or informal rule prohibiting signing African-American players and that he did not and would not oppose any owners who signed an African-American player. MLB owners and executives maintained segregation, not Landis. Landis did not advocate integration, as opposed to announcing a lack of opposition, and it does not appear that he attempted to force, cajole, lobby, or convince owners to integrate. (Whether he could have done so and whether his failure to do so destroys his legacy depends on whether Landis enjoyed unique commissioner powers or whether, like other commissioners, he worked for the owners).

I do not know whether the counter-narrative has been discredited as erroneous. The linked stories quote Thorn, but do not mention the counter or acknowledge that historical sources disagree, although this one does. I have not seen interviews with Landis' biographer or other critics on the subject.

But it may not matter. Part of the current reckoning is that silence in the face of racism is a form of action perpetuating that racism. Sitting by not only does not promote progress, it adds to the problem. By placing the onus on the owners to sign African-American players knowing they would not, the argument goes, Landis ensured that segregation endured. And thus he loses any claim to a continued place of honor in the game of baseball (or on the walls of a law school).

Is that how it should be? That seems to be the point that MLB and NUPLS must resolve with Landis.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 1, 2020 at 08:53 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (5)

Tuesday, June 30, 2020

How to become a legal writing professor

The new addition to the Baude/Chilton series on how to become a law professor comes from Rachel Gurvich (UNC) and Beth Wilensky (Michigan).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 30, 2020 at 03:03 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Third Circuit: Tinker does not apply off-campus

The Third Circuit held Tuesday that Mahanoy (PA) Area H.S.* violated the First Amendment by suspending a student (identified as B.L.) from the J.V. cheerleading squad for a snap showing the girl and her friends flipping the bird above the caption "Fuck Cheer." This is a great First Amendment decision.

[*] My wife's grandmother grew up in Mahanoy, which is why I bother to mention it.

The majority hit several important things.

    • The speech was off-campus. The student created the snap off-campus, on a weekend, on a non-school platform, and the fact that the comments were about the school or school personnel did not change its nature.

    • The First Amendment does not apply differently to extra-curricular activities or to students who participate in extra-curricular activities (unlike the Fourth Amendment or Due Process). Suspension from an extra-curricular activity (the punishment the school imposed) is not a lesser punishment subject to less-rigorous First Amendment scrutiny. Student-athletes are not subject to punishment for off-campus vulgarity to a greater extent than non-athletes would be.

    • Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech. This is huge, as this is the first court of appeals squarely to hold. Tinker is a "narrow accommodation" of the unique context of school, but makes little sense outside that context. School officials can control the spillover effects that make their way into school. But that has been true of off-campus real-world speech, so should be true of on-campus online speech. And while this leaves schools unable to regulate some crude, vulgar, or offensive speech, that is the point of the First Amendment, as Tinker recognized.

    • Outside of school and online, students have virtually full First Amendment rights, including to use profanity, which cannot be dismissed as "low value" or as expressing no message. "Fuck cheer," uttered by a frustrated high-school sophomore, has a meaning.

    • The student did not waive her First Amendment claims by agreeing to be subject to certain codes of student-athlete conduct.

The majority expressly does not resolve off-campus speech threatening violence or harassing particular students or teachers. Some such speech may be unprotected and subject to sanction and the school may have a sufficiently weighty interest in regulating that speech. The question of Tinker's applicability caused Judge Ambro to concur in the judgment. insisting there was no need to address the issue because the speech was obviously protected even under Tinker. Ambro is concerned about a broader swath of off-campus speech, such as  racially tinged speech or snaps reenacting and mocking victims of police violence.

The case does suggest that "Tinker" as a standard is different from the public school's regulatory authority. That is, the inapplicability of Tinker to off-campus speech does not divest a school of all authority to regulate that speech, leaving any sanction to government at large. The suggestion is that a public school has authority to sanction students for off-campus expression, but it must satisfy a different, more rigorous standard (strict scrutiny or a showing that the speech falls into an unprotected category). So perhaps a school could sanction a student for out-of-school true threats, rather than leaving it to the police and the courts. Perhaps a school could punish a student for out-of-school (constitutionally protected) racist speech, claiming a compelling interest in teaching racial justice or maintaining racial peace within the schoolhouse gates that society at large cannot claim. I have presumed that schools should have no power to regulate speech off-campus, that a student becomes an ordinary person outside of school. While affirming broad student rights, this opinion suggests otherwise.

And if that is true, what does it mean for universities, who generally are not governed by Tinker? Can a university claim a compelling interest in campus racial peace that might give it more power than society at large to sanction racist-but-protected speech?

Finally, an empirical question that I have not researched but that I would be curious if anyone knows the answer. The Third Circuit in the past half-decade has broadly protected student speech in several significant case, a seeming departure from the late-'90s/early-oo's, when schools routinely won cases involving online speech and t-shirts. Is the Third Circuit an outlier or have other courts come around?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 30, 2020 at 01:31 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 29, 2020

Assignments and female voices

Someone pointed out that June Medical produced six opinions on the right to reproductive freedom, all by male Justices and none by any female Justice. But who is responsible for that?

The first question is who assigned the majority to Breyer. Assignment is by the senior-most Justice in the majority for a judgment/outcome at conference; that means the Chief assigned the opinion to Breyer, then declined to join and wrote on his own, leaving Breyer to write a plurality. But how specific do they get during the conference? Could it be clear at conference that his reasoning was so far from Ginsburg/Breyer/Sotomayor/Kagan that he was not part of that group? For example, suppose G/B/S/K made clear the view that the Louisiana law was broadly invalid while Roberts made clear that he was going along with Whole Women's purely on stare decisis grounds. How does that affect the assignment? This would have made Ginsburg senior-most, meaning she assigned the opinion to Breyer rather than keeping it or giving it to one of her female colleagues.

All three also chose not to write a separate opinion, I presume to maintain a clear plurality (if not majority) voice. Even at the loss of a female voice.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 29, 2020 at 08:48 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

More on constitutional-litigation reform (Updated)

A law professor letter is circulating in support of the one-two punch of eliminating qualified immunity and overriding Monell  to make municipalities liable on respondeat superior. The move towards respondeat superior liability is in the Reforming Qualified Immunity Act, introduced by Sen. Mike Braun (R-IN)The letter is here, for those interested in signing.*

[*] I signed the letter, as it involves an issue on which I know something as a legal scholar, as opposed to as a citizen with a law degree.

Braun's bill also would revise, but not eliminate qualified immunity. He replaces it with a narrower immunity that protects an officer if he acts in good faith and either acted pursuant to a statute or regulation that had not been declared invalid or the conduct had not been declared invalid. In essence, the change to immunity flips the default--an officer is not immune if the law is uncertain, but becomes immune if the law is certain that his conduct is valid.

Full reform still requires two more steps. Section 1983 must be extended to states, which Congress can do by making clear that states are persons for § 1983 purposes. Otherwise, state police and sheriff's officers will be beyond these reforms, since they are not local officers. And something has to be done to codify the Bivens cause of action, otherwise federal officers will be beyond these reforms.

Update: A reader emails to offer another way to limit the effects of qualified immunity--overruling or overriding Mitchell v. Forsyth and eliminating collateral-order review of Q/I denials, which places Q/I at the heart of the case and moves cases quickly into the court of appeals and SCOTUS. Eliminating immediate review (or requiring judicial leave under § 1292(b)) would combine well with Braun's approach. I have not seen this as part of any proposals.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 29, 2020 at 01:11 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 27, 2020

So you want to be a law professor? (Updated and moved to top)

At Summary, Judgment, Will Baude and Adam Chilton have a conversation on law teaching and advising people who want to enter law teaching. The conversation is inspired by Jason Brennan's Good Work If You Can Get It: How to Succeed in Academia, applied to the unique species of the legal academy. The first posts (in order of posting, rather than order they appear on the blog) are here, here, here, and here.

Update: The topic produced a number of posts, including one guest post on becoming a clinic professor. The remaining posts (in order on the blog) are: here, here (this one is for everyone, not only budding prawfs), here, here, and here.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 27, 2020 at 01:46 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 26, 2020

Anti-racism and the First Amendment

Jaden McNeil is a student at Kansas State and the head of America First Students, an organization that believes Turning Point USA is too liberal. Yesterday, McNeil sent a tweet congratulating George Floyd on being drug-free for a month. The tweet drew responses and condemnation from several K-State football players, followed by further condemnation from the head coach, athletic director, and university president. Several players called on the university to do something to "handle" this, while another promised not to play for the school if it "tolerates ignorance such as this." The university president promised to review its "options."

But there do not seem to be any options for a public university to handle this. McNeil is an asshole and deserves (but probably does not care about) public opprobrium, but his tweet does not seem to fall within any unprotected category of expression. Universities are in a bind. They can develop anti-racism in their curricula and institutional activities, they can counter-speak to racist messages (as they have done), and they can adopt and promote anti-racist messages. But under current doctrine, they cannot stop individual students from being racist and from saying racist stuff in public spaces. And they cannot design codes of conduct and anti-discrimination policies that can stop individual students from being racist and saying racist stuff. Athletes are developing their voices and discovering their leverage, which is a good thing and a long time coming. But that leverage and the university's desire to field a football team cannot compel the university to ignore the First Amendment.

Like the 1960s, this period of protest and change could be remembered as much for the First Amendment activities and developments as for Fourteenth or Fourth Amendment developments (ideally all three). But that is a two-edged sword--the First Amendment may impose a barrier to some of the broadest intellectual goals of anti-racism and the broadest desires of those who want to stop racism. Unless the pressure of this moment compels a change in free speech doctrine, which seems unlikely and would be unfortunate.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 26, 2020 at 05:29 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (6)

Mootness, departmentalism, and universality

Here is an interesting mootness decision from the Third Circuit (written by Judge Bibas). A lot of good discussion of mootness, as it relates to my current interests in universality and departmentalism. I am not sure I agree with the conclusion, but the opinion is a great read.

The action is a challenge by a group of public-school teachers to Pennsylvania's agency-fee statute. While the action was pending, SCOTUS held in Janus that agency-fee schemes violate the First Amendment. The state and the union told school districts and other public employees to stop deducting fees and to refund fees collected to cover expenses from Janus forward. Although the state agency-fee law remains on the books and agency-fee provisions remain in the contracts, the union insists it has no intention to enforce either in the future. The district court held the case moot and the court of appeals affirmed.

• Bibas tweaks the common description of mootness as "standing set in a time frame," because they are not co-extensive. A plaintiff must show standing at the outset, but it is on the defendant (or someone else) to show mootness once the action has begun. Thus, under new circumstances, while the plaintiff might be unable to establish standing , that does not mean the defendant can establish mootness. As he puts it, "sometimes a suit filed on Monday will be able to proceed even if, because of a development on Tuesday, the suit would have been dismissed for lack of standing if it had been filed on Wednesday. The Tuesday development does not necessarily moot the suit." I am going to use that framing in class.

• He recasts "voluntary cessation" as "volitional cessation." Often, especially in constitutional cases, the government defendant continues to insist on the validity of its actions, even while agreeing to abide by an injunction or precedent knowing that the courts will rule against it. In other words, the cessation is not voluntary, because the government believes he can do something and should be able to do something, if not for some pesky hindrance (such as a court order). The issue is whether government can reasonably be expected to engage in the challenged behavior in the future. So the issue is not whether the cessation is voluntary but whether it is volitional, a deliberate act, regardless of its cause.

• The reasons for cessation are probative of the likelihood of re-engagement in the behavior. The court is more skeptical of a defendant who continues to insist on the validity of the conduct but yields in the face of a court order, while more forgiving of a defendant who yields to new precedent established in a different case. From a judicial-departmentalist standpoint, this gets it backwards. A defendant cannot ignore a court order in the instant case (without immediate consequence) even if it believes the basis for the order incorrect; that case should be moot because the defendant will not re-engage on pain of contempt. A defendant can ignore precedent from another case without immediate consequence, so a promise to abide by precedent should not moot the new case. I made this argument in using judicial departmentalism to justify voluntary cessation as a limit on mootness.

Moreover, if we accept particularity/non-universality as the norm for injunctions, there is no distinction between those situations. If the injunction binds the government only as to the plaintiff, then all future enforcement that is or is not likely to occur is in response to precedent rather than to a court order. There is no difference between Chicago promising not to enforce its law against Y following an injunction barring Chicago from enforcing against X and Chicago promising not to enforce its law against Y following a decision ordering Milwaukee not to enforce its identical law against M.

• Nonetheless, the court found this case moot. The unions conceded the invalidity of agency-fee requirements and forswore collecting fees and there was no indication they will not continue to abide by that position. That agency-fee provisions remain on the books and in the CBAs did not matter and did not create any  injury that a court could redress absent some indicia of intent to enforce.

The plaintiffs tried to avoid mootness by pointing to challenges to campaign-finance laws found not moot following Citizens United and challenges to marriage laws found not moot following Obergefell. The former was a complex decision targeting one campaign-finance provision, uncertain in its application to other laws and provisions. The latter did not address the incidents of marriage challenged in the other cases. Janus was simple--no agency fees allowed--and the case presented no additional issues not covered by Janus.

I think that is a cramped reading of the marriage case.The Eighth Circuit highlighted that Obergefell dealt with laws in states other than Nebraska (thus did not bind Nebraska in any way) and that the ban on same-sex marriage remained in the Nebraska constitution. The court understood, if implicitly, that there remained something for Nebraska to enforce and nothing, other than the state's voluntary (or volitional) acquiescence to stop that enforcement.

Perhaps the analysis is different when it is a private actor, such as the union, rather than a government with departmentalist powers. Others have argued that courts are too-quick to accept government representations of non-enforcement and moot cases. If so, this case gets the balance right--this case is moot based on the union's promise where it might not be moot if the government were making the same promises. Of course, perhaps that distinction collapses when the defendant arguably acts under color, as the unions likely do under these agreements.

• The plaintiffs argued that a live controversy remained based on their request for a declaratory judgment that Pennsylvania's statute is constitutionally invalid. But the union did not intend to enforce the law. And because the constitutional violation is the threat of enforcement rather than the existence of the law (or contract provision), the plaintiffs' rights were not violated and they had "nothing to fear."

The court captures this with a nice civics lesson:

It may seem odd that unconstitutional laws remain on the books. But until a party faces a real threat of enforcement, a statute is mere words on a page.

I like that framing (and added it to a current paper). We can go further: If this were not true, no constitutional action would become moot because no law declared constitutionally invalid disappears without further legislative action, so the threat of departmental enforcement remains.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 26, 2020 at 12:23 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 25, 2020

Meat Market cancelled, alternative hiring conversations

AALS canceled the Faculty Recruitment Conference out of concerns for COVID, although it will serve as information clearinghouse for candidates, including running the Faculty Appointments Registry, for schools that will run a hiring process remotely. (Brian Leiter wrote about changes making the FAR form more candidate-friendly).

Latisha Nixon-Jones, a VAP at Oregon, is starting a listserv for VAPs/Fellows to share information about the upcoming hiring season. Candidates interested in joining the listserv can complete this survey by June 30.

We will have our usual assortment of hiring-related posts and perhaps we can rerun some of our greatest hits. Although query how well advice about doing a good job talk translates to doing a good job talk via Zoom.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 25, 2020 at 09:18 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (6)

Wednesday, June 24, 2020

They didn't vote for you, they voted against the other guy

Republicans in and out of government have attacked the legitimacy of the last two Democratic presidents. To be clear, in talking about "legitimacy," I do not mean simple policy disagreements and opposition to proposals. I mean a rhetoric of "you do not legitimately hold the office or wield the legal authority; that is why you should not be able to appoint your preferred judges or executive officials and why your policies should not be enacted."

For Clinton, it was that he never won a majority of the popular vote (ironic, given how Bush II and Trump governed in their respective first terms despite losing the popular vote). For Obama, it was that he was never eligible for the presidency because he was not born in the United States, plus he was pushing an un-American agenda.

What will it be if Biden becomes president? Trump is obviously trying to lay the groundwork for claims of election fraud, although I do not believe that will stick for long, at least outside the fringe. I think it will be something along these lines:

The People did not vote for you, they voted against Donald Trump. You did not really win the presidency, the other guy lost it. So you do not legitimately wield presidential authority. Had you run against someone who was not so wildly unpopular (who we, of course, now disavow all connection to), you would not be President. So you lack the full legitimacy necessary to exercise the full powers of the office.

I am thinking of this after reading this Jonathan Chait piece arguing that Biden is doing a lot right in his low-key campaign. The reality is that the polls reflect at least some number of people supporting "Not Trump" (or "Any Functioning Adult," as my neighbor's law sign says) and translating that into reporting support for Biden in polls. This is not uncommon--some piece of Trump's support was "Not Hillary." But I can see it being weaponized for the next four years.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 24, 2020 at 05:22 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (10)

Mandamus issues in Flynn prosecution (Updated)

A divided D.C. Circuit panel granted Michael Flynn mandamus and ordered Judge Sullivan to remove the appointed amicus and to grant the government's uncontested motion to dismiss the charges. This is a brutal decision that leaves little meaning to the "leave of court" language in FRCrP 48(a), turns a presumption of regularity of prosecutorial decisions into a mandatory conclusion by precluding any inquiry into those decisions, and grants mandamus relief before the district court has had an opportunity to decide the motion or to do anything that might so imperil anyone's rights or interests. Mandamus is a weird duck, with judges reciting the high standard for granting, then finding that standard satisfied in the cases they want (but no others). The court also does not really address the unique element of this case--government dropping charges after the defendant twice pleaded guilty in open court--and how it might differ from a decision to drop charges at the outset. The decision also functionally prevents the district court from considering perjury charges against Flynn because there is no amicus to investigate.

My guess is that, like the decision on the tax subpoenas, the panel opinion will not survive long; the court will take it en banc and deny mandamus. Then on to SCOTUS?

Update: Orin Kerr compares this decision to Bush v. Gore for a variety of reasons, most prominently in telling a lower court to stop what it was doing, out of distrust that the lower court would conduct ordinary procedure in any appropriate way. I would add an additional similarity--both are "good for this trip only" decisions; I expect that in the next case, Judges Henderson and Rao will remind how extraordinary mandamus relief is and how high the standard is and how harm to non-parties is not a basis for relief.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 24, 2020 at 02:08 PM in Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (6)

Monday, June 22, 2020

No qualified immunity (updated)

The Court denied cert in Cooper v. Flaig, the 12th of the 13 petitions that were pending in mid-May. The remaining case is Davis v. Ermold, the sole case not arising from police misconduct. Not sure what they are waiting for on that one.

SCOTUSBlog's Petitions We're Watching includes three qualified immunity cases. One asks whether an appellate court can raise QI sua sponte and whether to overrule Pearson and another asks for clarification of the standard for how analogous precedent must be to clearly establish a right.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 22, 2020 at 09:59 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 20, 2020

No TRO/Injunction against Bolton book

Judge Lamberth denied the government request for a TRO and preliminary injunction stopping publication of John Bolton's memoir. The court found that the government is likely to succeed on the merits because Bolton "likely jeopardized national security by disclosing classified information in violation of his nondisclosure agreement obligations." But the distribution process is so far along that the court refused to stop it. The court was especially reluctant to order Bolton to, as the government requested, "'instruct his publisher to take any and all available steps to retrieve and destroy any copies of the book that may be in the possession of any third party.'" As the court put it, "for reasons that hardly need to be stated, the Court will not order a nationwide seizure and destruction of a political memoir."

The government likely will appeal, but I cannot imagine the D.C. Circuit reaching a different conclusion in four days. The complaint in this case requested a constructive trust to seize proceeds from the book and there is noise about a criminal prosecution. Lamberth was confident that Bolton had opened himself to both of those.

Some passing thoughts:

1) Another entry in the standing makes no sense chronicles: After finding no irreparable harm, Lamberth pivots to standing, pointing out that he could "reframe" the irreparable-harm factor in the equitable analysis as the redressability factor in the Article III standing analysis, while declining to do so. But it illustrates, even in passing, how standing really is constitutionalized merits and thus unnecessary.

2) He also did not address any First Amendment prior-restraint issues, again because unnecessary given the equitable analysis.

3) The irony of Bolton (likely?) losing the proceeds of the book: He was criticized in anti-Trump circles for refusing to present this material to the House or Senate during the impeachment proceedings and for choosing instead to tell the story when it is too late to help the country and when it will put money in his pocket. It looks like he may lose the money.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 20, 2020 at 12:31 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, June 18, 2020

Avoiding universality, again

The DACA decision again avoided the scope-of-injunction issue and the propriety of universal/non-particularized injunctions, in a clever way. The Court consolidated three cases--two (from New York and the Second Circuit and California and the Ninth Circuit) had entered universal injunctions prohibiting enforcement of the rescission order, while one (from the D.C. Circuit) had vacated the DHS order rescinding DACA. Only the Ninth Circuit decided the appeal and affirmed the injunction (the others were taken on cert before judgment) and the Ninth Circuit was the "lead" case in the caption. But the majority focused its review on the D.C. case that vacated the rescission under the APA without issuing an injunction. Affirming vacatur of the rescission order meant there was no rescission order, therefore nothing to enjoin. It became unnecessary to consider the propriety of the "nationwide" (unfortunately) scope of the injunction.

This may mean that resolution of the scope-of-injunction question is not on imminent, as I am not aware of any cases on SCOTUS's horizon squarely presenting the question. A reader points out that scope-of-injunction is at issue in Little Sisters of the Poor. If--as happened today and in the census case--the Chief joins the four liberals to hold that the Trump Administration messed up the APA, universality may be unavoidable.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 18, 2020 at 12:42 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (8)

Wednesday, June 17, 2020

FIU/UM Zoom Brown Bag

This summer, FIU and UM organized a joint Zoom-based brown-bag series--a two-hour workshops, one speaker from each school. We held the first on Wednesday, with Scott Norberg (FIU) presenting an empirical study of law-student borrowing and Caroline Mala Corbin (UM) presenting a piece on Barnette and parental opt-outs. It was an engaging hour.

My thoughts on online/distance education are well known. But I will say that distance scholarly workshops work pretty well. We lose something not being in the same room, in terms of communication, engagement, and sociability. But it is a good second option that allows scholars to talk with one another.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 17, 2020 at 03:01 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)