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Thursday, July 11, 2024
More on Younger--Exhaustion and the limits of defensive litigation
I am thinking through some points in my post about 11th Circuit Judge Robin Rosenbaum's call for rethinking the scope of Younger, at least in electoral speech cases.
Rosenbaum argues that "Younger has evolved to allow states to impose a state-exhaustion requirement on those trying to exercise core First Amendment rights." This is a bit nit-picky, because I agree with her basic criticism. But it is inaccurate to say Younger imposes an exhaustion requirement. An exhaustion delays federal litigation by requiring the plaintiff to pursue other procedures before going to federal court. But the plaintiff should get to federal district court eventually. On the other hand, when the federal court abstains under Younger, that plaintiff will never return to federal district court in a § 1983/EpY action. The rights-holder remains in state administrative and judicial proceedings, with the possibility of a federal forum through SCOTUS review of the state's highest court. Rather than creating exhaustion, Younger limits offensive pre-enforcement § 1983/EpY litigation and compels defensive litigation on important free speech issues. Still potentially problematic, depending on one's views of the lines between offensive and defensive litigation. But not as inconsistent with the text and purpose of § 1983.
The key to Rosenbaum's argument is an objection to Younger's application to state administrative proceedings (at least in First Amendment case), which delay access to state courts. She identifies two arguable problems. First, while Younger perhaps fairly presumes parity between state and federal courts in willingness to vindicate federal rights, that presumption should not apply to state administrative agencies, even with eventual state judicial review. Second, delaying access to state court may delay the first meaningful opportunity to raise federal issues--a rights-holder has an adequate opportunity so long as he can raise issues in some state proceeding, even if it does not come until several steps down the line. That is, if the PAC cannot raise First Amendment issues before the hearing board, it is enough that it can appeal the board's decision to a state appellate court and raise the First Amendment there--regardless of how long it takes to get to that second level of review.
On the other hand, the upshot of Younger is to push rights-holders out of federal district court and into state proceedings that must run their (state-determined) multi-level course. It is not clear why the first level must be judicial rather than administrative. Nor is it clear why the opportunity to raise federal issues must come at the first stage of the multi-level process, if that process must run its course before those rights can be vindicated. That is, why does it matter whether the rights-holder can raise and prevail on his federal rights at the first stage if the state will appeal that decision in any event and force completion of those proceedings.
The answer to that goes to preliminary relief, available in offensive federal litigation but not in defensive state litigation. A rights holder (such as the PACs in the Georgia case) can obtain a preliminary injunction in federal court, allowing it to engage in political speech pending resolution of the constitutional questions. From a defensive posture, especially within an administrative process, the rights-holder must remain silent and ride out the proceeding. That, ultimately, becomes the real issue with Younger's push into defensive litigation.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 11, 2024 at 11:08 AM in Civil Procedure, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink
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