The Constitution as a Moral Hazard Problem

Here's an idea that I've been kicking around lately for a paper. The Constitution helps secure our freedom and well-being. In a sense, you could say that it's a kind of insurance that we rely upon. If that is so, then (like all insurance), there can be a moral hazard problem. In other words, I may feel like I need to do nothing (or not much) to safeguard my liberty because the Constitution is there. This issue is often discussed in economics or in the insurance field more generally. You could also say that this an idea behind James Bradley Thayer's famous defense of judicial deference.

How do insurers try to deal with moral hazard? Part of the answer is that they impose certain direct requirements on the insured. Part of the answer is they require the insured to take some losses in the event of an accident, to convince people not to rely totally on insurance. (A deductible, a co-pay, or an exclusion in certain situations.)

Are there constitutional equivalents for this? Sort of. There are some affirmative requirements for citizens (such as serving on juries) but not many. We do not, for example, have mandatory voting as Australia does, which might be understood as a device to avoid moral hazard. What about forcing us to have skin in the game? To the extent that laws are applied generally, we all bear the costs of a bad law or one that just imposes significant burdens. When laws are not applied generally, though, only some people bear the costs of those decisions. In that respect, the Equal Protection Clause (as Robert Jackson once famously explained) prevents invasive laws simply by requiring general application much of the time. It is the moral hazard remedy, to the extent that we have one. But is there moral hazard in relying upon that part of the Constitution? And how do we deal with that?