Harm Versus Hurt

Recent events prompt the question of whether what we are seeing in the university setting—in terms of swift and strict sanctioning of certain speech and action—is a conflation of hurt and harm.  If so, would this be a departure from the university’s previous focus on harm?

Maybe it’s because I have con law on the brain after spending the day at the Loyola Chicago constitutional law colloquium, but I can immediately imagine the justifications for strict and immediate sanctions in response to harm, going back to Mill’s Harm Principle and fast forwarding to the justification of state intervention in an American family based on harm to a child.  I wonder what the analog framework is for strict and immediate sanctions in response to hurt, especially in lieu of an old-fashioned apology.  Admittedly, Mill preempts me here a bit by his discussion of “offense,” which I would call hurt.

I suppose the threshold question is whether hurt and harm are different.  I would say yes:  It is possible to hurt someone with a critique of her work, but ultimately to benefit her.  I do not see how it is possible to harm someone, but ultimately benefit her.  So then, should we sanction each differently? 

The problem for me, additionally, is how to draw the line between harm and hurt in the academic context in particular.  This question divides us, making strong university sanctions seem jarring to some folks, but not to others.  Until we reach more of a consensus, it seems like university responses to disapproved conduct and speech will have to be ad hoc and, thus, controversial.