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Thursday, January 07, 2016

Speaking of judicial selection...

Arizona has a new merit-selected supreme court justice, Clint Bolick.  And he has a scorpion tattoo on his index finger.

Posted by Jordan Singer on January 7, 2016 at 09:54 AM in Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Feminist Scholarship & Collaboration Pre-AALS

Greetings from the AALS Annual Meeting in NYC.

I had the opportunity to participate in a unique pre-AALS event yesterday: the Joint Scholars & Scholarship Workshop on Feminist Jurisprudence at Fordham Law Sponsored by a combination of the Association of Legal Writing Directors (ALWD), Legal Writing Institute (LWI), and the AALS Legal Writing, Reasoning, and Research Section, this Workshop focused on scholarly writing and teaching in the field of feminist jurisprudence, with the goal to encourage and support the work of scholars, including jurists and practitioners who write to challenge patriarchy and other hierarchical structures and critique existing jurisprudence from multicultural feminist perspectives. About 70 participants shared strategies and techniques for bringing a feminist perspective into the classroom and into the body of our laws.

The workshop was designed to extend the conversation of 50+ scholars involved in the creation of  Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court (Kathryn Stanchi, Linda Berger & Bridget Crawford, eds., Cambridge University Press (forthcoming 2016)), an ambitious project inspired by the British publication of a similar project, Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice, by Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley. In the U.S. version, the collaborators worked to re-write 25 significant US Supreme Court opinions, providing introductory commentary to explain the issues in the cases and context of the decision.

During the plenary session, panelists discussed patriarchy in the U.S. legal system, and how preliminary anecdotal research on human behavior influenced scholarship, theory, and subsequent changes in both laws and law education. Lucinda Finley discussed the transition of the "reasonable man "to the "reasonable person" in Tort law. David Cruz framed the discussion in the form of "multiple feminisms," taking into account transgender and the imbalance in medical care. Terry McMurtry- Chubb divided the feminist's goals into breaking down four structures: patriarchy, heteronormativity, classism, and white supremacy. The panelists observed that despite great strides in out legal system, in our current political climate, progressive laws (for example, reproductive rights) are in the one-step-back phase of the two-steps-forward concept. How do we all work to ensure the next generation of social justice attorneys?

Returning to the subject of collaboration, a selection of 10 participants had the opportunity to vet draft papers in a productive and supportive workshop setting during the afternoon. The genesis of the workshop was to receive supportive feedback on draft papers, and supportive it was indeed. Scholars came away from the afternoon sessions with many ideas to further develop theses, and a strong sense of support from the academic community. A closing session of more than half of the contributors to the Feminist Scholars project also described collaboration as writers and reviewers of the re-writes and the research and collaboration methods of the original Justices who drafted the opinions.

This original Workshop was a great way to kick off the annual meeting. The book and forthcoming variety of scholarship should prove to be interesting and thought-provoking reading. Keep a watch out for publication of this book and the articles that generated out of this Workshop.

Posted by DBorman on January 7, 2016 at 09:43 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

AALS Hitlist

I would be remiss if I didn't help you navigate this city a little while you are here.  I tried to tell you where to go when you came to SF for AALS.  Here is where to spend your money eating if you have to stay in Manhattan:

Lowlife:  Get your Alsatian Pinot flowing here and try a borscht that will surprise you.  Welcome.

Rebelle:  There is no better place to have your leek ash in town.

Cocoron:  You deserve soba.  Even though it is cold outside, don't ruin the consistency of this perfect soba in some kind of soup application.  Go basic or go home.

Mission Cantina:  No, Mexican is not good in NY.  But this place started in SF -- and really the only thing you should eat here is a ma po tofu burrito.  Please share it with someone.  It will blow your mind.  But a whole burrito will also blow your colon.  


Consider going to Brooklyn for these:

Roberta's:  Move over Sally's and Pepe's.  There is a new king.

Maison Premiere:  Oysters and absinthe.  Leave your panels early, for there is no better happy hour anywhere on earth.

The Four Horsemen:  Drink the funkiest most natural wines in town with small plates of vegetables and good music as companions.


And here is where to get your cocktails:

Little Branch:  It is annoying to stand on that line.  But just wait.  Then put yourself in their hands.

Evening Bar:  Intimacy is hard to come by in this town (though, sadly $16-18 cocktails are not).  But fireplaces are blazing.

Cosme:  In the end, $60 duck carnitas are only justifiable on an expense account (hmmm).  The drinks are something to write home about.

Amor y Amargo:  There are about 7 seats in this bar.  So you won't get one unless you are willing to drink at a weird hour.  Be weird.  Everything is stirred.  Nothing is shaken.  FYI.





Posted by Ethan Leib on January 7, 2016 at 09:23 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 06, 2016

Alabama (still) does not go gentle . . .

Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Supreme Court of Alabama is back. Today, he issued an order requiring Alabama probate judges to continue to refrain from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, pending resolution of the mandamus action that has been pending in the Court since March. (H/T: Religion Clause Blog). Once again, Moore is sort of right, sort of wrong, and very short-sighted. A few thoughts after the jump..

The linchpin of his analysis is that Obergefell is not directly binding on Alabama probate judges or as to Alabama law; this, Moore insists, is the "elementary principle" that a judgment only binds the parties to that case. Thus, no higher court has spoken to the validity of Alabama's same-sex marriage law or the obligation of Alabama officials to recognize same-sex marriages; instead, we are still waiting for SCoA to address the statutory and constitutional questions in the mandamus proceeding. Moore is right about the scope of SCOTUS's decision. Interestingly, he draws support from cases out of Kansas and the Eighth Circuit that rejected the argument that Obergefell mooted challenges to the laws in these other states; those courts all insisted that Obergefell was merely binding precedent in future litigation, but did not speak to laws or officials or couples in these states, thus leaving those cases as active disputes. In other words, Moore finds support for the position of the Alabama government in cases rejecting the position of these other state governments.

Unfortunately for Moore (or at least for some Alabama probate judges), he ignores the class certification in Strawser v. Strange in the Southern District of Alabama. There is an extant class-wide injunction in the district court declaring the state SSM ban unconstitutional and binding every probate judge to issue licenses to any same-sex couple that wishes to marry in Alabama. That injunction immediately took effect when SCOTUS issued its decision in Obergefell. Thus, while Obergefell is not binding on anyone in Alabama, the district court judgment is. So Moore's order is setting some probate judges up to be held in contempt of that injunction, as well as for  damages liability, since Obergefell should clearly establish the right of a same-sex couple to a marriage license, barring outside issues (Ron Krotoszynski his a similar point in The New York Times). And, unlike with Kim Davis, no new federal litigation need be filed; a couple can jump straight to enforcing the injunction.

I am not surprised Moore would ignore that inconvenient piece of information. But I also have not been able to find any indication of activity or orders in Strawser since the summer. Probate judges in several parts of Alabama have been refusing to issue licenses all along, but I have not seen anything about plaintiffs or the court moving to enforce the class injunction. It will be interesting to see whether Moore's new order shakes loose some activity in federal court.

Update: That Times piece is notable because there is no mention of the Strawser litigation. That, not Obergefell, is the key to all of this. That is what binds and compels probate judges to issue the licenses, not Obergefell simpliciter. Will no one ever get this right?

Further Update: Yes, Chris Geidner at Buzzfeed, who generally does a good and accurate job of covering this stuff.

Further, Further Update: Based on Chris' report, in concluding that Obergefell "abrogated" the SCoA decision, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. Both of those conclusions are wrong (Marty is right about that in his comment), as well as inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit mootness cases that Moore cited in his order.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 6, 2016 at 05:11 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (10)

Schwartzman, Flanders, & Robinson, eds., The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty

New from Oxford University Press and more-or-less reasonably priced: The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, edited by Micah Schwartzman (UVa), Chad Flanders (SLU), and Zoë Robinson (DePaul). Notwithstanding my cameo appearance in the book, it's a superb collection. It's unusual for an edited collection in its timeliness (a substantial section on Hobby Lobby, for instance), and in managing to combine a diversity of views and approaches with a close focus on the subject, rather than just throwing a miscellany between two covers with a conveniently broad title. Much has happened in law, politics, and culture since the conference that started off the book project, and the shape and contents of the collection have changed a lot in responding to and keeping abreast of events. It's really a very good book and a great job by the editors. Here's a description:

What are the rights of religious institutions? Should those rights extend to for-profit corporations? Houses of worship have claimed they should be free from anti-discrimination laws in hiring and firing ministers and other employees. Faith-based institutions, including hospitals and universities, have sought exemptions from requirements to provide contraception. Now, in a surprising development, large for-profit corporations have succeeded in asserting rights to religious free exercise. The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty explores this "corporate" turn in law and religion. Drawing on a broad range perspectives, this book examines the idea of "freedom of the church," the rights of for-profit corporations, and the implications of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby for debates on anti-discrimination law, same-sex marriage, health care, and religious freedom.

And, after the jump, the table of contents:

Table of Contents


Chad Flanders, Micah Schwartzman, and Zoë Robinson

Part I: From Religious Liberty to Freedom of the Church

Chapter 1: Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience

Kent Greenawalt

Chapter 2: The Jurisdictional Conception of Church Autonomy

Steven D. Smith

Chapter 3: Freedom of the Church: (Toward) An Exposition, Translation, and Defense

Richard W. Garnett

Chapter 4: Religious Corporations and Disestablishment, 1780-1840

Sarah Barringer Gordon

Chapter 5: Why Churches (and, Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women's Blue Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate

Lawrence Sager

Chapter 6: Religious Organizations and the Analogy to Political Parties

Chad Flanders

Part II: From Freedom of the Church to Corporate Religious Liberty

Chapter 7: Hobby Lobby: Its Flawed Interpretive Techniques and Standards of Application

Kent Greenawalt

Chapter 8: Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby

Elizabeth Pollman

Chapter 9: Hosanna-Tabor after Hobby Lobby

Zoë Robinson

Chapter 10: Lessons from the Free Speech Clause

Frederick Schauer

Chapter 11: Religious Institutionalism-Why Now?

Paul Horwitz and Nelson Tebbe

Part III: Hobby Lobby's Implications

Chapter 12: The Campaign against Religious Liberty

Douglas Laycock

Chapter 13: Bargaining for Religious Accommodations: Same-Sex Marriage and LGBT Rights after Hobby Lobby

Robin Fretwell Wilson

Chapter 14: Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective

Christopher C. Lund

Chapter 15: Healthcare Exemptions and the Future of Corporate Religious Liberty

Elizabeth Sepper

Chapter 16: Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby's Puzzling Footnote 37

Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van Tassell

Part IV: Challenges to Corporate Religious Liberty

Chapter 17: Some Realism about Corporate Rights

Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman

Chapter 18: Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity

Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle

Chapter 19: Freedom of the Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social Contract

Robin West

Chapter 20: Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Religious Organizations

B. Jessie Hill

Chapter 21: The New Religious Institutionalism Meets the Old Establishment Clause

Gregory P. Magarian

Chapter 22: Religion and the Roberts Court: The Limits of Religious Pluralism in Constitutional Law

Mark Tushnet


Posted by Paul Horwitz on January 6, 2016 at 01:37 PM | Permalink | Comments (5)

AALS: Scholarly Engagement Post Tenure

Deborah mentioned the AALS's Arc of Career Program at the annual meeting. I will be on a different panel for that program, Scholarly Engagement Post Tenure, exploring the life of midlevel professors (tenured-but-not-quite senior). It was organized and moderated by Scott Dodson (Hastings); panelists in addition to me are Steve, Bennett Capers (Brooklyn), Sam Jordan (SLU), L. Song Richardson (UC-Irvine), and Usha Rodriguez (Georgia). The panel is 1:30-3:15 Thursday in Gramercy East, 2d Floor in the Hilton.

And don't forget about the MarkelFest! Happy Hour at 8:30 Thursday evening.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 6, 2016 at 11:30 AM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 05, 2016

MarkelFest! at AALS Thursday Night

For those of you attending AALS in New York this week, we will have a MarkelFest! Happy Hour from 8:30 p.m.-?? on Thursday (Jan. 7) at Bridges in the Hilton (entrance on the 54th Street side). This will be on the public side of the bar. Please come join us to meet our readers, remember Dan, and carry on the social tradition that he enjoyed so much. Hope to see everyone there.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 5, 2016 at 01:11 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

JOTWELL: Effron on Moore on the amended FRCP

The new Courts Law essay comes from Robin Effron (Brooklyn), reviewing Patricia Hatamayar Moore's The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees (Cin. L. Rev.). As I get ready to teach Civ Pro this semester and to cover the new discovery rules (which Chief Justice Roberts highlighted in his year-end report), the article and Robin's review are both essential.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 5, 2016 at 11:12 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, January 04, 2016

The Last Days of Elected Judges (1966 edition)

Yes on 3

Happy New Year! It’s great to be back at Prawfs for another go-round. I thought I would start with an unusual find: while cleaning out my parents’ basement last month, I came across a yellowed but otherwise pristine copy of the Intermountain Jewish News, dated November 4, 1966. The IJN was (and is) a significant paper for the Jewish community in Denver and the Rocky Mountain West, and the edition I found was printed just days before the November 1966 general election—the last time that Colorado’s state judges would run for office. In that same election, voters passed Amendment 3, which ushered in a merit selection system: judges would henceforth be chosen by the governor from a slate prepared by a nonpartisan nominating committee, and subjected to retention elections at the end of their terms. Put another way, on Election Day 1966, Colorado voters chose their judges at the ballot box while simultaneously removing their ability to do so in the future. Fifty years later, that 1966 edition of the IJN provides a nice snapshot of a judiciary—and an electorate—struggling to balance a tradition of direct democracy with the promise of fair and impartial courts.

Colorado was the fifth state to adopt a merit selection system, and advocates of merit selection had to overcome both 90 years of state history (judges had always been directly elected) and the sense that nothing was particularly wrong with the existing system. There had been relatively little scandal or symptoms of crisis in the state judiciary in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, many of the men on the judicial ballot that November were widely viewed as persons of integrity, excellent jurists, and dedicated contributors to civic life. Sherman Finesilver, then seeking reelection to a state trial court position in Denver, would later serve nearly a quarter-century on the federal bench. Mitchel Johns was an active member of the local Elks lodge, and Saul Pinchick an active member of B’nai B’rith. Neil Horan, already an experienced incumbent, would survive the 1966 election and later preside over litigation concerning Colorado voters’ rejection of the 1976 Winter Olympics.


It was hard enough just to get merit selection on the ballot. The Colorado Bar Association (CBA) had recommended the end of partisan judicial elections as far back as 1940, when Missouri became the first state to adopt the merit selection system. But proposed ballot initiatives failed to make it through the Colorado legislature in 1949, 1957 and 1959. Still, support slowly grew. When yet another effort by the CBA failed in the legislature by one vote in 1965, the CBA and the League of Women Voters took to the streets and collected more than 47,000 signatures in favor of the ballot initiative. Merit selection, in the form of Amendment 3, would finally be up for a vote in 1966. It proposed sweeping changes to the Colorado Constitution, replacing direct election of judges with a system of nominating commissions, gubernatorial selection, retention elections, and formal judicial disciplinary measures.

The debate over Amendment 3 was vigorous and vocal in the months leading up to the election. Proponents urged adoption as a means of improving the overall quality of the judiciary, promising that judges would not be prone (or at least less prone) to the pull of partisan politics, and that nonpartisan nominating commissions could focus on finding the best people for the job. (Indeed, in a somewhat Pollyanna-ish take, proponents argued in the state’s 1966 voter guide that under merit selection, “The courts would be completely removed from politics.”) Opponents urged that citizens should not give up their right to directly choose judges, a method that both held judges directly accountable to the people and checked the influence of the governor on the judiciary.

The judicial candidates were caught in the middle of the debate. Amendment 3 was premised in part on the notion that elected judges were inferior to appointed ones. Candidates had to show that they were qualified and impartial, even as they had to work within the existing party system to have a chance at success. They walked this tightrope by tailoring their campaign ephemera for the most part to avoid any hint of politics--a strategy still used by judges even in highly partisan election states today. Only three of the ten candidates placing ads in that November 1966 edition of the IJN made mention of their party affiliation. Most emphasized only their professional qualifications: experience, professional skills, and ties to the local community.

Election Day proved to be a mixed bag for the incumbents. Justice Edward Day, a Democrat, was reelected to the state supreme court by the skin of his teeth, coming in third in the race for three open seats behind two Republican challengers. Justice Albert Frantz, who had each been elected in 1956 as part of a near-sweep by the Democrats, was not so lucky. He placed fourth in at-large balloting, just a few thousand votes behind Day, and lost his seat. The trial judges highlighted here—Pinchick, Horan, Johns, and Finesilver—were all reelected and became long-serving jurists.


Amendment 3 also fared well on Election Day, passing by a margin of 53% to 47%. One key to victory for the merit selection proponents was the emphasis on retention elections: voters were not being asked to give up their franchise, but rather to exercise it in a different, ostensibly less partisan, way. It no doubt helped reformers as well that voters in 1966 reelected John Love, a popular and trusted governor, who would be charged with the final appointment decisions under the new system.

There are some useful lessons to be drawn from this history. Colorado’s shift in 1966 was certainly in part a product of bar association’s determination, the state’s political culture, and the era itself. But merit selection was also possible because it was presented as an integrated package of reforms. Nonpartisan selection commissions, gubernatorial appointment, retention elections, and a judicial discipline commission each provided a piece of the “quality judges” puzzle. (A final piece, judicial performance evaluation, was added in 1988.) Removing any of these components, or instituting them in a piecemeal way, would weaken both the appeal and the efficacy of the merit selection system.

The ghosts of 1966 may only live in basement files, but the issues surrounding judicial selection methods are far from settled. States continue to experiment with variations of contested judicial elections, merit selection, legislative appointment, and lifetime appointment. Nor is the federal judiciary immune from the larger discussion: Senator Ted Cruz recently called for retention elections—but only retention elections—for U.S. Supreme Court Justices. I will examine that idea more closely in a coming post.

Posted by Jordan Singer on January 4, 2016 at 01:41 PM in Judicial Process, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Sunday, January 03, 2016

Legislative Jurisdiction and Adjudicative Jurisdiction

I am late to writing about the oral argument in Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, which took place early in December; the case concerns the scope of tribal court jurisdiction in civil actions against non-Tribe members. There was a great deal of discussion of the difference between legislative (or regulatory) jurisdiction and adjudicatory jurisdiction and the connection between them. In particular, there was some question whether, if a sovereign possesses regulatory jurisdiction, it also has adjudicative jurisdiction over any claims for violations of those regulations.

Since the distinction between these two forms of jurisdiction is important to the jurisdiction/merits divide, I am curious to see what the Court has to say on the issue.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 3, 2016 at 06:13 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, January 02, 2016

Hello 2016 & AALS

Thanks, Howard, for inviting me back to blog for January. (Cubs fans: this is the year!)

To begin, I will be blogging from the Annual Meeting of the AALS, where I will comment on and summarize some of the sessions you might be either attending or missing. Right off the bat, I'll promote one session I am moderating, Impossible Realities, Infinite Loops and Movable Staircases: The Impact of Institutional Marginalization on the Tricky, Unpredictable, and Inconsistent Trajectory of the Non-Tenured Track Career, the second of four sessions in the new Arc of Career programming, sponsored by the Task Force on Professional Development. Our panel is looking forward to a robust discussion about the issues facing non-tenure/tenure-track professors in the academy. Looking forward to your input.


Posted by DBorman on January 2, 2016 at 10:35 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Chief Justice Roberts on speedier civil litigation . . . and dueling?

Chief Justice Roberts' 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary focused on the amendments to the discovery and case-management portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the need for the rules, courts, and attorneys to speed-up civil litigation. Roberts calls the amendments "a major stride toward a better federal court system," but insists they work "only if the entire legal community, including the bench, bar, and legal academy, step up to the challenge of making real change." Adam Liptak covers the report; he includes interviews with several Civ Pro profs questioning the wisdom or necessity of the rules, so at least 1/3 of that triumvirate is not on board.

It is difficult not to read Roberts' facially neutral comments about delays in litigation--he calls out both those who make burdensome discovery requests as well as those who evade legitimate requests through dilatory tactics--as not reflecting the anti-plaintiff slant of much of this Court's procedure jurisprudence. "Speedier litigation" is generally code for getting defendants out of litigation more quickly. Plaintiffs do not win cases quickly, only defendants do; it takes time and effort for plaintiffs to gather the information they need and to carry their burden of persuasion (which only can be done at trial, in any event). But the incentive structure built into these amendments is almost certainly to limit what will be made available to requesting parties far more than to halt dilatory actions by producing parties. This almost certainly works against plaintiffs who depend on discovery to uncover information that in many cases is uniquely and exclusively in defendants' possession or control and unobtainable other than through discovery (e.g., employment discrimination, constitutional cases, and other cases that turn on defendant intent). And by emphasizing the need for speed and efficiency, Roberts' Report appears to be pushing district judges towards that understanding.

Roberts praises those district judges who are "knowledgeable, actively engaged, and accessible early in the process" as best able to resolve cases fairly and efficiently. But this stands in interesting tension with Twiqbal, which ratched the pleading standards precisely because the Court did not trust district judges to effectively manage cases in a way that would protect government defendants against burdensome litigation. But now we have formal rules, and official encouragement from the Chief Justice, promoting just such management. Does this mean that we trust district judges across the board and can return to pre-Iqbal pleading? Of course not, seeing as how the amendments also eliminated FRCP 84 and the Forms precisely because the Forms were inconsistent with Twiqbal. Instead, this smacks of Roberts not-so-subtly hinting which direction judges should be exercising this (not actually new) managerial discretion for those cases that manage to survive pleading and get into discovery.

Roberts begins and ends the Report with a discussion of dueling, its horrors, and its demise--just the sort of distracting and irrelevant rhetorical flourish that I often criticize in his opinion writing. And it feels just as glaring and out of place here. His point seems to be that dueling became obsolete when government began providing functional alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms. Thus, federal litigation must be speedier and more efficient so that it does not make a return to dueling look good by comparison or become the equivalent of a fictional 15-year feud between two Napoleonic-Era French cavalry officers. As he puts it, "We should not miss the opportunity to help ensure that federal court litigation does not degenerate into wasteful clashes over matters that have little to do with achieving a just result." His attempted connection seems especially strained in that dueling, at least as practiced in England and the U.S., was not primarily a method of dispute resolution; it was about restoring honor for perceived personal slights more than determining who was in the "right" in a legal dispute. Dueling thus was different than earlier practices of trial by combat, which rested on the belief that whoever prevailed in combat must have been in the right. It also means that the availability of functional courts would not have mattered all that much, since the personal conflicts settled by duel could not necessarily be transferred into a judicial proceeding.

Update: Michael Dorf argues that the Report can be seen as Roberts' attempt to shape the rules beyond his other three opportunities--appointing the rules committees, voting on the Rules themselves, and interpreting them in later litigation.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 2, 2016 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, January 01, 2016

Rotations and AALS Happy Hour

Happy New Year to all the Prawfs family.

Thanks to all our December guests. And welcome to our returning guests for January: Ann Marie Marciarille (UMKC), Zak Kramer (Arizona State), Deborah Borman (Northwestern), Jordy Singer (New England), and Jan Osei Tutu (FIU). In addition, my FIU colleague Eric Carpenter will continue covering Season 2 of Serial and Bowe Bergdahl.

Also, we will be hosting a MarkelFest! Happy Hour at AALS next week. It will be on Thursday evening, January 7; time and place TBD. We will post details as soon as we have them worked out. But mark your calendar to continue Dan's AALS tradition.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 1, 2016 at 01:58 PM in Blogging, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)