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Tuesday, June 14, 2011

District judge rejects recusal in Prop 8 litigation

Chief Judge Ware of the United States District Court for the Northern District of (the District of) California earlier today rejected a motion by Prop 8 supporters to vacate Judge Walker's decision invalidating Prop 8, on the ground that Walker, who was in a long-term same-sex relationship, should have recused himself or at least disclosed that relationship.

Three important pulls from the decision.

First, the court adopts as its controlling principle an idea I floated in a prior post:

In a case that could affect the general public based on the circumstances or characteristics of various members of that public, the fact that a federal judge happens to share the same circumstances or characteristic and will only be affected in a similar manner because the judge is a member of the public, is not a basis for disqualifying the judge . . .

Second and related, the court declined to hold that Judge Walker's status as a gay man (or gay man in a committed relationship) gave him a greater interest than the rest of the public.

[I]t is inconsistent with the general principles of constitutional adjudication to presume that a member of a minority group reaps a greater benefit from application of the substantive protections of our Constitution than would a member of the majority. The fact that this is a case challenging a law on equal protection and due process grounds being prosecuted by members of a minority group does not mean that members of the minority group have a greater interest in equal protection and due process than the rest of society. In our society, a variety of citizens of different backgrounds coexist because we have constitutionally bound ourselves to protect the fundamental rights of one another from being violated by unlawful treatment. Thus, we all have an equal stake in a case that challenges the constitutionality of a restriction on a fundamental right.

And note that the court could go there without even having to touch on the argument that same-sex marriage affects/harms opposite-sex marriage.

Third, on the issue of whether Walker should have disclosed his sexual orientation and relationship status, the court suggested that Walker was right not to do so and that doing so out of an overabundance of caution would have set a "pernicious precedent" by promoting a practice of judges disclosing highly personal information in future cases, a practice that itself would be detrimental to the judiciary.

I am curious to see whether Prop 8 supporters feel strongly enough to push this issue in the Ninth Circuit.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 14, 2011 at 10:35 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink

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Comments

Why does the opinion not seem to contain the rather obvious point that, if you are going to argue that membership to a minority might constitute basis for recusal in a case where the interests of that group are enhanced by a favorable position

Because that was not the argument the prop 8 proponents made. Judge Ware's opinion does a fairly good job of responding to the actual arguments that were actually made by the actual proponents of Prop 8, instead of other people's characterizations of those arguments.

Posted by: Praetor | Jun 15, 2011 5:54:10 PM

Why does the opinion not seem to contain the rather obvious point that, if you are going to argue that membership to a minority might constitute basis for recusal in a case where the interests of that group are enhanced by a favorable position, then you have to agree that membership to a majority group might constitute basis for recusal in a case where the interests of that majority are enhanced by a favorable decision.

The opinion is off-putting for its failure to state explicitly this most obvious logical failure in the recusal position. It's kosher and "neutral decisionmaking" when you adjudicate majority-minority conflict and when the judge is a member of the majority, but a conflict of interest when you adjudicate that same conflict as a member of a minority group.

The analogy I always see is that we don't ask women to recuse in reproductive freedom cases, but that's exactly wrong. The question should be, if what the Prop 8 supporters say is correct, then why don't men recuse in those cases.

Posted by: kovarsky | Jun 15, 2011 1:33:28 AM

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