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Tuesday, May 05, 2009

Is Empathy "Lawless?"

President Obama's statement last week about his criteria for selecting a replacement for Justice Souter garnered a significant amount of attention.  Obama said he would "seek someone who understands that justice isn't about some abstract legal theory or footnote in a case book.  It is also about how our laws affect the daily realities of people's lives -- whether they can make a living and care for their families; whether they feel safe in their homes and welcome in their own nation."  He added that a "quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with people's hopes and struggles [is] an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and outcomes."


This echoed remarks Obama made during the campaign, and now as then some have criticized these remarks as either being code for "I will select a liberal Justice," or as relying on irrelevant criteria for judging.  Thus, Wendy Long of the conservative Judicial Confirmation Network wrote that Obama would become "the first president in American history to make lawlessness an explicit standard for Supreme Court justices."

Now, it should be said that Obama said in the same remarks that he would "seek somebody who is dedicated to the rule of law, who honors our constitutional traditions, who respects the integrity of the judicial process and the appropriate limits of the judicial role."  So statements like Long's are a wee bit on the uncharitable and inattentive side.  But is her fundamental point right? 
 Is it lawless or irrelevant to desire a Justice who is also compassionate and empathetic, on the grounds that these qualities are irrelevant to deciding the law?

I was personally not crazy about Obama's statements along these lines, partly because I still think Robert Bork got a raw deal for admitting that one of the main reasons he wanted to serve on the Court was that it would be an "intellectual feast" -- what's wrong with being candid about that? -- and partly because, the more specific Obama gets in his statement, the more problematic the statement is; while judges may be empathetic toward the people before them, I don't see it as their role as such to help people make a living and care for their families, and it's pretty evident that this part of the statement has more to do with reprising Obama's general campaign themes than with anything peculiar to the judicial role.

But that is not to say that compassion, understanding, and empathy are irrelevant to judging, let alone lawless.  Those criticisms are wrong.  Judges, it is true, are oath-bound to judge "without respect to persons."  But to do so is not the same thing as judging without interest in the persons before you, or in the broader universe of people whose affairs will be affected by a judgment in a particular case. 
Impartiality is not the same thing as indifference.  A judge must be impartial, but should not be indifferent.  She can and maybe even should have an informed and empathetic understanding of how the law interacts with people's lives -- an understanding that can and inevitably will be informed by her background, as well as by whatever personal qualities of empathy and understanding she brings to the judicial office.  

To be clear, the two are not synonymous -- a person from a rough background can lack empathy and understanding of others, and a person from a privileged background may nevertheless be capable of entering imaginatively into the situation of others.  So background isn't a perfect proxy for understanding and should not be treated as one.  Nor do these qualities demand a particular result in given cases.  One may understand why, say, sharply enforcing a textually supplied filing deadline may have sad results in particular cases, while still thinking that the law, and systemic aspects of the law, require that result.  But neither is the intellectual and emotional capacity to understand the lives of the people before the court lawless; rather, and whether or not it shapes one's methodology, it can enrich one's understanding of the nature and stakes of legal decisions.  So Obama's statement should not be taken as a recipe for lawlessness.  For more on this point, I can only recommend Anthony Kronman's writing on the subject in his fine book The Lost Lawyer.    


Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 5, 2009 at 09:57 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink

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Richard Posner, in How Judges Think (at 117):

Another . . . major factor in judicial decisions in the open area [that is, where the language of the law does not prescribe a clear answer] is “good judgment,” an elusive faculty best understood as a compound of empathy, modesty, maturity, a sense of proportion, balance, a recognition of human limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of reality and common sense. . . . It is another of the means that people have for maneuvering in situations of uncertainy. If law were logical, “good judgment” would not be an admired quality in judges - as it is even by legalists.

Posted by: Peter Friedman | May 7, 2009 3:59:29 PM

Patrick,

I am pleased that you stand by the principle of charity: So do I. But of course one's willingness to see a presumption overcome is often a byproduct of how much you trust the speaker, and it is easy to have lots of trust for someone you voted for than someone you voted against.

Posted by: Orin Kerr | May 6, 2009 7:22:56 PM

I'd like to point out that there's a huge distinction between having empathy and allowing empathy to overrule other traits. Some of this ties in to the "poor writing skills" meme in another thread (which, IMNSHO, is far to generous to the legal profession, as I've blawged before), because too often opinions expound a technical rule while forgetting that there are litigants, not just a sterile set of facts fighting like the books in St. James's library did last Friday.

Part of the ultimate point of the Rule of Law is that it necessarily does acknowledge that the dispute is between neighboring farmers, not between the bull who sired the calves and the cow who bore them. It tries to do so by focusing on the ruleset used to resolve that dispute short of bloodshed (or, in the legislative mode, to prevent that dispute from rising to bloodshed), but it largely does so by substituting "fair" for "just" and hoping that the two are close enough that the system as a whole can survive the distinction. That, however, is no reason to pretend that there is no distinction -- and justice sometimes requires acknowledging that differing points of view are less valid instead of invalid. In short, it's ok to acknowledge that persuasion often requires understanding not just the merits of two opposing arguments, but the mental state of the arguers.

Posted by: C.E. Petit | May 6, 2009 11:56:08 AM

Orin,

Because empathy is not the sole attribute or quality Obama is looking for, I accord him the benefit of the doubt that it's not a placeholder for reaching a particular set of results. Over time, Bush (and his supporters and cohorts) gave us reasons and evidence aplenty not to take him at his word; in any case, we can historically and ideologically discern how if not why such phrases as you cite here served as "code words" (such phrases had sufficient pedigree, as it were). Obama may indeed be concerned, in general, with judicial results other than those that have been reached of late, but I still fail to see how mention of empathy is merely a covert sign of such concerns. I stand by the principle of charity until actions and events suggest the need to seek other meanings and explanations than the straightforward or manifest ones (had Bush used this term, I would have been intrigued, as I was at one time by the rhetoric of 'compassionate conservatism'--perhaps I'm simply gullible or naive.)

Posted by: Patrick S. O'Donnell | May 5, 2009 7:05:30 PM

Patrick,

I think it's only in the absence of charity or under the sway of a hermeneutics of suspicion that one could look so askance at those who "suspect that 'empathy' is a sort of code word for reaching a particular set of results."

Here's a test: When you heard President George W. Bush speak about his goals for a Supreme Court nominee, did you suspect that he was using code words when he said he favored "strict constructionists" and "judges that interpret the law, not make it"?

Did you suspect -- even just for a moment -- that that meant "would reach conservative results?" Or did you see deep principles of jurisprudence elaborated without regard to any particular results that such a judge would reach?

Posted by: Orin Kerr | May 5, 2009 5:28:59 PM

There's empathy and then there's empathy. Empathy for the particular parties before the court often drives appellate decisions awry, in my opinion; it's probably the number one thing that I think drives bad decisions, or at least it's the number one thing that I notice. But empathy with the larger set of people affected by a decision is, I think, a good thing; the appellate judge needs to consider not only the effect of the outcome of a particular case, but also the effect of the rule or interpretation going forward.

Posted by: Bruce Boyden | May 5, 2009 4:45:56 PM

No more so than "strict constructionist" (Bush II's preferred descriptive for the judicial philosophy of his nominees). The question whether empathy has a place in judicial philosophy is an interesting one, but I don't think Presidents are doing much more in these situations than giving coded indications of their substantive preferences.

Posted by: Dave | May 5, 2009 2:23:53 PM

I agree with Paul, and so I think it's only in the absence of charity or under the sway of a hermeneutics of suspicion that one might "suspect that 'empathy' is a sort of code word for reaching a particular set of results." Perhaps many of us lack a clear understanding of just what empathy is. For instance, I wonder how many of us confuse or conflate empathy with such related emotions as compassion, mercy, pity, and sympathy. If I may, I would recommend several treatments of this emotion that I've found helpful:

Although I don't share their philosophy of mind presuppositions and assumptions, Allison Barnes and Paul Thagard's article is quite insightful, "Empathy and Analogy," Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (1997) 36: 705-720, available: http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/Pages/Empathy.html

Peter Goldie's discussion in The Emotions: A Philosphical Exploration (2000). Please see the index.

The late Robert C. Solomon's succinct yet provocative treatment in True to Our Feelings (2007).

Michael Slote's The Ethics of Care and Empathy (2007).

Karsten R. Stueber's Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology and the Human Sciences (2006). Stueber also wrote the entry on empathy for the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/empathy/

Posted by: Patrick S. O'Donnell | May 5, 2009 12:34:19 PM

Empathy is certainly relevant when deciding which certiorari petitions to grant.

Posted by: Steven Lubet | May 5, 2009 12:19:34 PM

Nice comment, Orin. I think you're right to focus on the level of court. I don't think that empathy or understanding are irrelevant to a Justice's work, however, in the sense that they may contribute to the Justice's understanding of the law and its relationship to facts. I don't take you to be saying otherwise; just that it may be different or less important at the SC level, with which I have no disagreement. I don't know that that makes it likelier as such that Obama is using code here; again, though, my problem with the statement is that the particular language that he uses gives rise to some of those suspicions, and would for that matter if he was referring to district court judges. My main hope with the post was simply to say that we should not *assume* that empathy is inconsistent with the rule of law.

Posted by: Paul Horwitz | May 5, 2009 12:14:39 PM

Paul,

I think it's important to factor in the level of the judiciary that you're talking about. There is no abstract category of "judging", in my view: The role of a district court judge is different from the role of a court of appeals judge which is different from a Supreme Court Justice. I think we would all agree that empathy is critical in a district court judge, as district court judges are given a great deal of discretion to exercise in individual cases. But here Obama is saying that empathy is critical in a Supreme Court Justice, and given the very different role of the Supreme Court, it becomes harder to know what he means (or rather, easier to suspect that "empathy" is sort of a code word for reaching a particular set of results).

Posted by: Orin Kerr | May 5, 2009 11:47:34 AM

What about an "abstract legal theory" that addresses "empathy"?

On another note, I'm hoping Pamela Karlan is in the mix, because eventually her dustup with Mr. Hills will be examined, and it will be the dawn of the "review the potential nominee's blog posts era".

Posted by: KeithT | May 5, 2009 10:25:44 AM

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