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Friday, January 02, 2009

More on appointments madness: A Response

Rick posted on the constitutional mess that is the effort to fill the Senate seat recently vacated by Barack Obama. Norman Williams gave some detailed comments and asked for counter-thoughts; I decided to write mine in a separate post.

After the jump, I quote his comment in full in italics, then give my response:

There is another constitutional angle not too far down the road: whether the Lt. Governor, once he become Governor, may appoint a different Senator other than Burris. This is, after all, the scenario that Senate Democrats assume will take place -- that, after they refuse to seat Burris, the Illinois Legislature will impeach Blago, the Lt. Governor becomes the Governor by operation of law, and he will then appoint a new Senator. The critical question is whether the new appointment is constitutional?

I actually believe that to be the case, and, counter-intuitively, I do not think that the answer to that question depends on the constitutionality of the Senate's presumed rejection of Burris. The Seventeenth Amendment provides for temporary "appointments" by the executive pending the constitutionally mandated election. That plural form suggests that the executive authority of the state may recall a sitting, "temporary" Senator and replace him/her with a new "temporary" Senator. Thus, even if Burris were constitutionally entitled to his seat, once the new Governor appoints a new Senator, Burris' "right" to his seat evaporates and the new appointee is entitled to be seated as the junior Senator from Illinois. This suggests that, as a practical matter, Powell v. McCormack is only partially relevant. There is a difference in constitutional status between an elected House member and an appointed "temporary" Senator. Unlike the former, the latter has a right to his or her seat only by leave of the current executive authority of the state.

Finally, all of this has an important implication for Burris' presumed Powell-based lawsuit demanding the Senate seat him. Once the new Governor makes a new temporary appointment, Burris' presumed lawsuit becomes moot, at least with respect to any claim for injunctive relief. I suppose that Burris would still have standing to seek back pay for the few weeks that he was not seated, which suit would not be mooted by the new appointment, but the constitutional stakes of such a suit would be far less. Any counter thoughts?

As a constitutional matter, I think this overreads the plural of appointment(s) in the text. The entire vacancy clause is framed in the plural: "When vacancies happen in the representation of any state in the Senate, the executive authority of such state shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, that the legislature of any state may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct." (emphasis mine). This clause basically carries over the language of the original Art. I, § 3, cl.2 (selection of Senators by state legislatures).

The plural appointments simply matches the plurals "vacancies" and "writs of election." Unless we understand this only to apply when there are multiple vacancies within a single state (unlikely) or that the executive also could issue multiple writs of election for a single vacancy (impossible), the plural does not carry that much weight. An appropriate reading is that there will be the same number of appointments and elections as vacancies--one appointment and one writ of election for each vacancy. And once we limit the force of the plural, the Amendment calls for the appointee to serve until the vacancy is filled via the election.

Second, I do not agree that there is a distinction between an elected and appointment federal legislator. Both are entitled to the office by operation of state law and a determination made by a state executive officer--either that this is the person she is appointing to the position or that this is the person who she certifies has prevailed in an appropriate election. The chosen legislator then has a right to the seat for the duration of the appropriate period as determined by state law.

Finally, even accepting Norman's reading of the Amendment and the possibility of multiple appointments, this all becomes a question of state law, which determines whether the executive can appoint and the terms under which he could do so. And Illinois clearly does not contemplate multiple appointments. Illinois law phrases the power grant in the singular: "When a vacancy shall occur in the office of United States Senator from this state, the Governor shall make temporary appointment to fill such vacancy until the next election of representatives in Congress, at which time such vacancy shall be filled by election". So if the plural is significant in the Constitution, the singular must be equally significant in the Illinois statute in limiting the governor to only one appointment, with the appointee remaining until the result of the special election is certified.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 2, 2009 at 04:54 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Current Affairs | Permalink

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Two points in further response to Norman:

First, I would suggest that state law is entirely material because the 17th Amendment does not vest *any* power in the state executive; it vests power in the state legislature to, if it wishes, vest appointment power in the executive ("[T]he legislature of any State *may* empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments" (emphasis mine)). And it follows, I believe, that the state legislature could limit that power if it chose--such as by allowing only one appointment, even if the Constitution left open the possibility of multiple appointments.

Second, I actually was thinking that democratic legitimacy actually cuts the other way, in light of the purpose of the Seventeenth Amendment. In democratizing Senate selection, the Amendment has the (not unintended?) effect of limiting the control that state government (principally the legislature, although the executive as well) wields over U.S. Senators once in office. The appointment power is a vestige, intended to serve a related goal of ensuring the people of the State of their constitutionally guaranteed equal representation in the Senate. But that democratizing and that limit on state-government influence is undermined if the state executive can appoint and recall appointed Senators at will. Because if we recognize the reading Norman urges, the power to recall and reappoint (combined with the argument that the appointee has no "right" to the office) is not limited to a change of legislature or change of executive--it means that an appointee serves entirely at the whim of the executive until an election is held.

Posted by: Howard Wasserman | Jan 2, 2009 10:20:38 PM

I'm going to call "unwarranted generalization" on the following from Norman Williams's comment (emphases added):

Howard's one-appointment-for-each-vacancy reading of the text would follow only if the text read (as it does not) that the executive may make "a temporary appointment until the people fill the vacancies by election...."
It would be incredible . . . for the Seventeenth Amendment to empower the Governor to appoint a temporary Senator to represent a state for up to two years despite the fact that the appointing Governor left or was removed from office during that time.
It would surely be more in keeping with democratic principles to allow the new Governor (whether elected or assuming office by operation of law because the prior incumbent was impeached by the democratically-elected state Legislature) to replace a temporary Senator with one of his own choosing than to require the new Governor to accept the prior incumbent's choice.
It is in this respect that a temporary Senator occupies an entirely different constitutional position than did Representative Adam Clayton Powell, who was elected by the people of his district.
Finally, I agree that Illinois law (on which I am concededly no expert) plays an important part in the Blago controversy, but I disagree that it has any relevance to the specific issue that we're discussing regarding the Seventeenth Amendment.

Posted by: James Grimmelmann | Jan 2, 2009 8:25:25 PM

Howard has offered a provocative counter-reading of the Seventeenth Amendment, which suggests that the "executive authority" in a state may make only one appointment for each vacancy that arises and that such appointee has a right to the office of U.S. Senator (if so qualified) until an election is held. There is much to admire in Howard's close reading of the Seventeenth Amendment, but his reading, I think, gives too little attention to the textual language actually used. To be sure, as Howard points out, the text uses the plural form for vacancies, appointments, and writs of election, but Howard's one-appointment-for-each-vacancy reading of the text would follow only if the text read (as it does not) that the executive may make "a temporary appointment until the people fill the vacancies by election...." Moreover, even if that were not so, the text would simply be ambiguous on this point -- it would not affirmatively point toward Howard's reading. Thus, while I fully concede that the text does not conclusively answer by itself the issue of multiple appointments, I do believe that my reading fits more naturally with the text.

Even were that not so (i.e., assuming that the text is at best ambiguous), democratic theory -- which the U.S. Supreme Court consulted in Powell v. McCormack -- would point in favor of allowing multiple temporary appointments. It would be incredible (particularly under the circumstances as they exist currently in Illinois) for the Seventeenth Amendment to empower the Governor to appoint a temporary Senator to represent a state for up to two years despite the fact that the appointing Governor left or was removed from office during that time. Stated differently, the Seventeenth Amendment obviously contemplates a gubenatorial appointment, but as noted above, it says nothing about such appointment binding subsequent Governors and the Legislature of the state thereof. It would surely be more in keeping with democratic principles to allow the new Governor (whether elected or assuming office by operation of law because the prior incumbent was impeached by the democratically-elected state Legislature) to replace a temporary Senator with one of his own choosing than to require the new Governor to accept the prior incumbent's choice. It is in this respect that a temporary Senator occupies an entirely different constitutional position than did Representative Adam Clayton Powell, who was elected by the people of his district. Neither the Senate's refusal to seat a temporary Senator nor a subsequent Governor's appointment of a different temporary Senator (which necessarily removes the prior temporary Senator (e.g., "Burris") from office) trenches upon democratic principles in the way that the House's refusal to seat a democratically elected Representative would and did.

Finally, I agree that Illinois law (on which I am concededly no expert) plays an important part in the Blago controversy, but I disagree that it has any relevance to the specific issue that we're discussing regarding the Seventeenth Amendment. Assuming arguendo Howard's reading of the Illinois statute is correct -- the wording is certainly awkward, sufficiently so to cloud the issue in my view -- the Illinois Legislature cannot restrict the power of the Governor in discharging power vested in him/her by the U.S. Constitution itself. Thus, once one agrees that the Seventeenth Amendment authorizes multiple temporary appointments for each vacancy, state law becomes immaterial.

Posted by: Norman Williams | Jan 2, 2009 7:52:35 PM

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