Monday, March 20, 2023
President Debs
Let's try out a fun constitutional counterfactual. Suppose Eugene Debs had won the 1920 presidential election from prison. (He received 1,000,000 votes.) What would have be the appropriate resolution?
- The outgoing President (Woodrow Wilson) should have pardoned Debs so that he could serve.
- The presidential electors pledged to Debs should have voted for his running mate, Seymour Steadman, who was not in prison.
- Debs should have resigned after being sworn in.
- Debs should have pardoned himself after being sworn in.
- Debs should have just served as President from prison.
Note that today you could imagine a 25th Amendment solution to this problem. But that was not an option in 1920.
UPDATE: Warren Harding did pardon Debs in 1921. Wilson refused to do so.
Posted by Gerard Magliocca on March 20, 2023 at 03:16 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Match Day for Med Students
Last Friday was "Match Day," when senior medical students learned whether they had matched with their preferred residency program. With over 43,000 applicants rank ordering programs, which in turn rank ordered the applications, the process generates plenty of data about the medical profession, given that today's residencies affect the distribution of physicians for decades to come.
According to MedPage, three of the most in-demand programs were in surgery -- orthopedic, plastic, and thoracic -- and the fourth was radiology. In contrast, the programs left with unfilled positions -- more openings than applicants -- were all forms of primary care, mostly those with frequent patient contact: family medicine, internal medicine, emergency medicine, pediatrics, and psychiatry. Not coincidentally, no doubt, those are also the lowest-paying specialties, even though they account for the most common patient interactions. This is not a good trend.
There is also some interestingly encouraging news. It appears that the Dobbs decision may have had an impact on med students' preferences. As reported in the Journal of General Internal Medicine:
In a survey of more than 2,000 current and future physicians on social media, we found that most (82.3%) would prefer to work or train in states with preserved abortion access. In fact, more than three-quarters (76.4%) of respondents would not even apply to states with legal consequences for providing abortion care. The same holds true for states with early or complete bans on abortion or Plan B. In other words, many qualified candidates would no longer even consider working or training in more than half of U.S. states.
[These] preferences persisted across medical specialties and subspecialties, underscoring the essential truth that abortion rights and access affect the entire physician workforce and, thus, the whole healthcare system.
Posted by Steve Lubet on March 20, 2023 at 10:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Northwestern University Law Review Exclusive Empirical Cycle - 2023
The Northwestern University Law Review is pleased to announce its sixth annual issue dedicated to empirical legal scholarship, to be published in Spring 2024. The exclusive empirical submission window will be open from March 20 to April 30.
Continue reading "Northwestern University Law Review Exclusive Empirical Cycle - 2023"
Posted by Sarah Lawsky on March 20, 2023 at 09:30 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, March 18, 2023
The Draft in Youngstown
In prior posts, I've mentioned that a staple of constitutional argument is: "We can draft you, therefore we can do blank to you." Another example of this is Chief Justice Vinson's dissent in Youngstown:
"Seizure of plaintiff's property is not a pleasant undertaking. Similarly unpleasant to a free country are the draft which disrupts the home and military procurement which causes economic dislocation and compels adoption of price controls, wage stabilization, and allocation of materials."
Posted by Gerard Magliocca on March 18, 2023 at 01:36 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Is the ham green?
A break for something non-serious. Although Rick and Paul still might believe me wrong:
"I do not like green eggs and ham." What color is the ham on the dish that Sam-I-Am does not like?
The cover shows both as green--he does not green eggs together with green ham. But in my mind, I always have read green to modify eggs, while ham is unmodified--he does not like green eggs together with ham, regardless of the color of the ham.
If we focus on author intent, presumably Geisel signed off on the cover and his intent is that both food products are green. But is that the best interpretation of that language? What do ordinary rules of English and statutory construction tell us?
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 18, 2023 at 12:35 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (6)
Saturday Music Post -- The Gambler
For about the past four years, I have been posting music clips every Saturday morning at The Faculty Lounge. The posts always have a theme. Sometimes it's a song, as interpreted by different musicians. Sometimes it is the work of a single artist or group. There have also been posts devoted to instruments, musical styles or eras, and sometimes just common words or ideas in the lyrics (sunshine, motherhood, birds).
Today's Saturday music post is "The Gambler," which you can find here.
Posted by Steve Lubet on March 18, 2023 at 06:47 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, March 17, 2023
Just the Last Paragraph
I also think Howard's "asymmetrical censorship" post is wrong--I think! I am sure I disagree on some issues voiced there and in his post before that. But I wanted to focus solely on my disagreement with his last paragraph. Unfortunately, the more I wrote, the less sure I was of the meaning of that paragraph. I think the problem has to do with a sudden switch from one reasonably apt point (which is not to say I agree with it) to a different and inapt point. Here's that paragraph:
This dynamic appears in the fallout from the events at Judge Duncan's Stanford speech. Judge Ho (Fifth Circuit) and Judge Branch (Eleventh Circuit)--who previously threatened to stop hiring Yale grads as law clerks--argue in the National Review that disruptive students should suffer consequences, including denying bar admission on character-and-fitness grounds. So lefty Stanford students do not want Judge Duncan to speak and wield practical actions (some of which are arguably their own form of free speech) to stop him. Righty judges respond by using the full force of the state to punish them for their speech. And everyone will treat them as equivalents.
The National Review piece urges Stanford and other law schools to discipline disruptive behavior by students, up to and including reports to the bar. (Based on other recent extrajudicial writings by Judge Ho on this subject, the editorial may be "controversial" and might even be right, but I doubt it was interesting or deep.) For public law schools, of course, imposing discipline is indeed invoking the force of the state. For private law schools, imposing discipline is only a second-order invocation of state force, which does not enter into play unless and until a student refuses to accept the discipline. At that point, however, the recalcitrant offender will be subject to ejection, ultimately backed by state force. And because law is a licensed profession that draws on delegated state power, any character and fitness examination is also backed by the force of the state. Law schools that report students to the bar for cheating, for instance, or notify the bar that a student has flunked out, has no business serving clients, and thus should not even be considered for licensure, are also engaging in Coverian violence--justified Coverian violence, in that instance. (The judges also kind of urge Stanford to notify potential employers of disruptive students. I say "kind of" because they offer this suggestion only if universities are unwilling to enforce the speech policy the judges think they should have or already have in place. As written, it's a stupid and ill-thought-out suggestion. But it does not involve state force.)
It is not clear to me from what I have read of the student protests exactly what they want, and it would be a mistake in any event to attribute a single motive to a potentially disparate group. But I take it that some of them want Stanford to take the position that certain would-be speakers should not be allowed to speak at their school. I imagine that some of those holding such a view think Stanford's policy should actually be enforced, so that a speaker barred by such a policy will be, you know, barred. In the limit case--say, a person who is refused access as a visiting speaker but shows up anyway and commandeers a room--I imagine they will desire that state force be applied to prevent the trespass. (I hope that's their desire, since the alternative would be private violence.) It is possible that some of the students do not want such a policy, and believe only that Stanford should have a policy that there are no rules governing any form of spoken response to visiting speakers, or that its policy should be that there are no rules for counterspeech for some speakers, whether designated by the university or chosen in the moment. I could imagine an unattractive but reasonably consistent anarchistic version of this view, in which the rule on campus is that there are no rules. Every other version, every version that involves any selectivity at all--for instance, the version that distinguishes sufficiently-bad-opinion-holding visiting speaker Duncan from unobjectionable-opinion-holding visiting speaker Whitebread, or the version that distinguishes Visiting Speaker Lopez from Regularly Scheduled Class Lecturer Professor Lopez-Prime, such that students may shout imprecations at Lopez during his or her talk but will face discipline for doing the same thing to Lopez-Prime while he or she is teaching a class--at some point relies on the knowledge of the availability, at the end of the road, of the use of state force. "This is our jurisdiction!" ain't just a slogan. If we're going to "unmask" state violence, or whatever the academic cliche of the day is, we might as well do so thoroughly.
So: These two judges urge universities to have one policy enforced by schools: discipline students who are disruptive in ways that, on this account, prevent speakers from speaking their piece at an appointed time and place. And they think law students who are sufficiently disruptive in this fashion should be reported to the bar, just as other students who are disciplined for misconduct are potentially reported to the bar. And the students, or some of them, appear to want schools, or at least their school, to have a different policy, one with uncertain bounds but that ultimately consists of a policy about what is or is not allowed by way of response to speech they object to in a law school. Neither are thinking of the sheriff as such, but both ultimately rely on state enforcement of whatever policy is in place. Are they wildly disequivalent or asymmetrical? No.
This is what confuses me, because Howard makes a different comparison in the paragraphs leading up to this one. He compares private or semi-private efforts to prevent people from speaking or to penalize them from speaking, which can range from the uncontroversially acceptable to the questionable but relatively trivial to the serious and wildly disproportionate, to organized legislative efforts, popular of late at least as public political tactics, and which sometimes make their way into generally applicable law, to regulate speech. One may reasonably think both are serious. But one may certainly think with some good reason that speech-suppressive legislation is more serious and different in kind from private enforcement of would-be speech norms, including those that speech to suppress speech, even if one thinks some or all of these forms of private enforcement are also bad and serious.
If that is the asymmetry he is talking about, well and good. One can argue over the particulars, but I am not disturbed as such by the view that more formal and public efforts to control disfavored speech are more serious than more informal and private efforts to control disfavored speech. (That's fine with me in part because I'm an old-fashioned civil libertarian, the sort that used to be a card-carrying member of the former version of the ACLU, with a healthy distrust of government power, who believes there is some value to the public-private distinction. I'm not sure that's the current view of the intelligentsia, both generally and within the legal academy. For those who believe that the distinction between public and private power, including in the area of speech, is vastly overstated or false or outdated, which I don't think includes Howard, I would think it should be much harder to make an argument for "asymmetry." If anything, people with those views should be drawn to the "symmetry" side of the argument.)
But the examples in his last paragraph, which he seems to present as continuous with or the culmination of his early paragraphs, strike me as entirely inapt on this point. What the last paragraph describes is two sets of stakeholders both urging law schools themselves to adopt and/or enforce particular speech policies. Neither set is urging a law, or that a policy be imposed on the law schools by someone or something else. Any serious state action in either case is only an indirect consequence of the law schools setting and enforcing their own policies about speech: it comes about only if students fail to comply with the speech policy urged by each. It is reasonable to say that it's a mistake to treat as equivalent a law requiring a particular set of speech policies, imposed on universities by legislatures, and a protest, however inconsistent with academic values it may be, attempting to deny a platform to disfavored speakers. But this is not the example he uses in his last paragraph, since this is not what Judges Ho and Branch demand in their editorial, which--like the students--is demanding that Stanford or other law schools, of their own volition, take a particular approach to campus speech. What he does discuss, if dissected a little more thoroughly, is equivalent, or at least far more equivalent than what he talks about elsewhere in his post. He simply takes a sudden wrong turn at the end.
Incidentally, the solution to such a dilemma, when presented by the stakeholders as a policy demand and not imposed by the state, is obvious and easy. Law schools considering policies that affect the exchange of ideas on campus can listen to the views of stakeholders such as students, alumni, donors, practicing lawyers, and so on. Then, acting through faculty governance and not just administrative fiat, they should select the policy that is most consistent with their academic status, their academic mission and duty, the demands of their discipline, and the trans-disciplinary norms and duties that constitute the academic profession and environment as a whole. They should make that choice and that policy clear, and they should actually insist on enforcing it. Listening to other stakeholders may be informative. But once the time to choose actually arrives, they must choose and enforce the policy most consistent with the duties and values of the academy, without regard to what any other stakeholders, including students and alumni, think or want. A law school's speech policy is a matter of faculty governance and faculty governance is not shared with students, sympathetic or otherwise, or with Judges Ho and Branch. They're all free to argue against and about it. But we are not free to delegate that decision to them, and it must ultimately be based on what academic duty demands. A law school (or a university) that does otherwise has simply failed in its duty. So there's really no hard problem on that part of the issue.
Posted by Paul Horwitz on March 17, 2023 at 04:13 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0)
On why I think I am (mostly, generally) right
I appreciate Rick's response to my post on Stanford. I want to hit a few points.
• I said at the outset of my post that I vastly overgeneralized. To the extent I overstated the point or understated lefty's willingness to use state power to target speech, mea culpa. Yes, the left (often?) uses formal state power to suppress speech (and I oppose those efforts when they happen). But I stand by the point that in the current political-cultural narrative of "both sides suppress speech," the juxtaposition is young "social-justice warriors," often but not always on campus, making a lot of noise and complaining about "harmful" speech, compared with whoever Florida went after yesterday (the state is trying to strip the Miami Hyatt Regency of its liquor license over a drag show). I cannot think of a current Democratic-controlled state undertaking efforts mirroring what is happening in Republican-controlled states. Maybe campus speech codes? Maybe states using existing public-accommodations laws against expressive businesses? What else am I missing?
• I hope my post did not read as a defense of what the students or associate dean did; I am not sure I know enough to say. We might describe their conduct many ways--rude, obnoxious, unprofessional, counter-productive, many others. I do not believe we can describe it as falling outside of the First Amendment--especially the hostile signs and questions that created a nasty environment but did not prevent him from speaking. So I am troubled by the suggestion (to be clear, from Judges Ho and Branch, not from Rick) that the government should deny bar membership because of obnoxious-but-protected speech.
• I have read reports (yes, grain of salt and all that) that Judge Duncan was videoing protesters outside the building and the room and perhaps making negative comments to them (that is not clear). But it suggests that Duncan adopted an adversarial posture with people independent of the in-room disruption, people who I think we agree behaved in an appropriate manner towards a speaker this dislike. I admit I do not know how things would have gone had the protest remained silent or outside and he been able to give his prepared remarks and then respond to questions. I infer that his response to the question about the pronoun case would have gotten the same "read the opinion" response.
• Do we have a good sense of who did what among students in the room--who silently protested,* who asked questions,** who shouted and disrupted? And how does that affect how we evaluate the behavior of other audience members and of Judge Duncan. Video shows Duncan giving dismissive responses to some actual questions. Who asked those questions? If A acts like an idiot and interrupts, does that justify a non-response or dismissive response to a legitimate-if-challenging question from B, who did not join in the circus? In a mixed audience, how should we expect the speaker--especially a speaker who is an Article III judge--to engage with those who disagree but attempt to engage?
[*] I believe silent, non-disruptive-if-distracting protest offers a fourth option to the three that Rick identifies.
[**] Can questions for an invited speaker be hostile? True, it may not be the best way to get a good answer. But does it fall outside expressive norms?
• At bottom, I think I come out that there is blame to go around here. It ought not fall on one side.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 17, 2023 at 01:43 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
The Equality Machine Symposium Essays on Yale Journal of Regulation are up
Symposium on Orly Lobel's "The Equality Machine"
Can We Build an Equality Machine? An Introduction, by Rachel Arnow-Richman
*This is the introduction to a symposium on Orly Lobel’s The Equality Machine: Harnessing Digital Technology for a Brighter, More Inclusive Future, selected by The Economist as a best book of 2022. All posts from this symposium can be found here. Further reviews can be found at Science, The Economist, and Kirkus. Consider these paradoxical […]
Posted by Orly Lobel on March 17, 2023 at 12:47 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
John Bingham and the Fifteenth Amendment
Travis Crum has an excellent new draft paper on "The Unabridged Fifteenth Amendment." One reason that I like the paper and the topic is that John Bingham is accurately depicted as a Radical Republican.
Bingham is often described as a moderate. This is wrong, as I tried to show in my book about him. He was a formalist, which in a certain sense is moderate. But the formalist positions that Bingham took were radical under any reasonable definition of that term. With respect to the Fifteenth Amendment, Professor Crum shows that Bingham consistently took the broadest view of what the Fifteenth Amendment should include. (I talked about this somewhat in my book, but "The Unabridged Fifteenth Amendment" does a far better job.) Bingham lost that debate, but he lost on the radical side.
Posted by Gerard Magliocca on March 17, 2023 at 09:48 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, March 16, 2023
On "Asymmetry" and "Civil Discourse" -- Or, Why Howard is Wrong
In my view, the treatment of Judge Kyle Duncan at Stanford Law School was awful. And, in my view, the efforts of a number of academics and commentators to downplay the awfulness of that treatment is depressing.
More specifically, though: My colleague Howard has two recent posts on the matter that, I think, are mistaken. First, in "Asymmetrical Censorship", Howard contends that the "left" censors using private power while the "right" does so using state power. This contention, it seems to me, is wrong. It's not wrong, of course, to distinguish (both normatively and in terms of effects) the censorship that is imposed by private power from the censorship that is imposed by state power (and both kinds of censorship exist). But it seems, to put it mildly, incongruent with the facts to suggest that the "left" eschews using state power to silence/punish expression. [Ed.: Insert here a gabillion links.]
In his other post, Howard returns to a position he has developed in other posts, and says that "the 'civil discourse' trope . . . is and always has been bullshit." No, it isn't. (He also says, in passing, that Judge Duncan "went to Stanford itching for a fight . . . and would have been as dismissive and rude to silent protesters." I have no reason, and neither does Howard, to think this is true. We both do have reasons, though, to think that Judge Duncan was set up, and that the Administrator prepared weird and offensively condescending remarks for delivery.) It is not "bullshit" to endorse a norm that, when speakers are invited, in keeping with established procedures, to deliver remarks, in a space that is not Speaker's Corner [especially a higher-education space], those who dislike the speaker, or his or her views, should (a) attend and listen, and ask questions in keeping with usual practice; (b) avoid the event; or (c) protest the event, outside the space.)
It's also not too much to think that students at one of our nation's best law schools should be able to better express disagreement with a speaker's (in their view) misguided views than to yell about the speaker's and his or her spouse's intimate practices. But, I guess, that's a separate question.
Posted by Rick Garnett on March 16, 2023 at 06:15 PM in Rick Garnett | Permalink | Comments (8)
Asymmetrical Censorship
Conventional wisdom holds that "both sides" want to restrict speech and lack respect for the First Amendment and free speech values. But that "both sides" framing overlooks the mechanisms through which each side disrespects speech. Vastly overgeneralizing and we can find exceptions, but:
• From the left, private persons or entities exercise some form of free speech to oppose or counter speech and speakers they do not like--shouting down speaker, banning speakers from social-media sites, boycotting speakers, etc. That is, what gets framed as "cancel culture," especially on college campuses. One can disagree with such tactics. And these tactics can run afoul of some neutral rules--such as the rules governing a forum. But we cannot deny that those exercising it are: 1) private persons and 2) exercising some form of their own expression, however stupid we might believe them to be.
• From the right, officials use the power of the state to silence speakers--banning drag shows, making some classroom speech unlawful, threatening reprisal against speakers who criticize government officials, arresting protesters and journalists, overruling speech-protective precedent to make suing critics easier, etc.
It seems to me that one is worse, because one has many more formal and practical consequences. But the intense pull of "both sides" in national coverage requires that a sophomore at Oberlin is as great a threat as the governor of Florida (and wannabee president).
This dynamic appears in the fallout from the events at Judge Duncan's Stanford speech. Judge Ho (Fifth Circuit) and Judge Branch (Eleventh Circuit)--who previously threatened to stop hiring Yale grads as law clerks--argue in the National Review that disruptive students should suffer consequences, including denying bar admission on character-and-fitness grounds. So lefty Stanford students do not want Judge Duncan to speak and wield practical actions (some of which are arguably their own form of free speech) to stop him. Righty judges respond by using the full force of the state to punish them for their speech. And everyone will treat them as equivalents.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 16, 2023 at 04:21 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)
Science Based Medicine and Masking
As some readers may know, I have been involved for many years in exposing flawed research and unfounded claims for the treatment of chronic fatigue syndrome/myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME/CFS), and more recently long Covid. This has led me to Science Based Medicine, an invaluable website that is "dedicated to evaluating medical treatments and products of interest to the public in a scientific light, and promoting the highest standards and traditions of science in health care." As explained on the website,
Online information about alternative medicine is overwhelmingly credulous and uncritical, and even mainstream media and some medical schools have bought into the hype and failed to ask the hard questions.
We provide a much needed “alternative” perspective — the scientific perspective.
Good science is the best and only way to determine which treatments and products are truly safe and effective. That idea is already formalized in a movement known as evidence-based medicine (EBM). EBM is a vital and positive influence on the practice of medicine, but it has limitations and problems in practice: it often overemphasizes the value of evidence from clinical trials alone, with some unintended consequences, such as taxpayer dollars spent on “more research” of questionable value. The idea of SBM is not to compete with EBM, but a call to enhance it with a broader view: to answer the question “what works?” we must give more importance to our cumulative scientific knowledge from all relevant disciplines.
SBM does not only critique so-called complimentary and alternative medicine (CAM), however. The site also addresses mainstream studies that are underpowered or misleading, which gets me to the point of this post. Much has been made, especially in the right-wing media, of a recent Cochrane report has been said to conclude that masking is ineffective against Covid. In fact, that was not the conclusion of the study, nor could it have been given the flaws in methodology, despite frequent talking points to the contrary.
SBM has had two extremely informative posts on the Cochrane report, which I will excerpt below.
First, from Steven Novella, a founder of SBM and a clinical neurologist at Yale:
Let’s take a look at the recent Cochrane review. This is a review only of controlled studies – the kind of study that is most likely to underestimate the effect of mask-wearing. They did not included other kinds of studies. Not all of the studies reviewed were of COVID – they included studies of other respiratory viruses (which therefore may be different) and they included studies that were not taking place in the middle of a pandemic. This is a huge red flag, as it is pretty clear from existing data that masks only work in high-risk situations.
The one study they included of health professionals in a high risk setting only compared surgical masks with N95 masks, which showed no statistical difference, but did not compare either to no mask. Also, health care professionals are the most likely to engage in the full range of protective behavior (distancing, hand washing, protective face shields, gloves and gowns). Given this, it is not surprise that the difference between a surgical mask and an N95 mask was not statistically significant.
But the biggest error I see in reporting this study is the conclusion that it shows that “mask mandates don’t work”, when that was not even studied. Studies looking specifically at mask mandates show that they do work.
Second, from David Gorski, a surgical oncologist at Wayne State:
I want to ask: What is it about Cochrane and EBM fundamentalists who promote the EBM paradigm as the be-all and end-all of medical evidence, even for questions for which it is ill-suited, that can produce misleading results?
Cochrane meta-analyses are notoriously tricky to do. First of all, you have to decide what the question is. Then you have to decide what studies out there address the question. Then, for the case of something like masks, you have to realize that you will, by the time you go through the literature and apply EBM standards to them, looking the highest quality RCTs, you will be looking at only a small, highly select part of the literature. While this is fine for new drugs and asking if they are efficacious, for a multifactorial question like whether masks slow the spread of COVID-19 at the population level, a large amount of compelling and high quality scientific evidence could well be excluded because the EBM paradigm demands it.
Yet, as I like to point out, no EBM adherent seriously doubts that smoking and tobacco can cause lung cancer, heart disease, and a host of other maladies, even though there is not and never will be an RCT testing whether smoking causes these conditions because such a study would be profoundly unethical.
There is much more to the Novella/Gorski critiques of the Cochrane report, including information about the lead author, who is a frequent confrere of anti-vaxxers.
But this is already a long post, so let me just suggest that it would be highly informative to check Science Based Medicine daily. There is almost always something interesting.
Posted by Steve Lubet on March 16, 2023 at 08:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, March 15, 2023
Stanford, preferred first speakers, and the nonsense of "civil discourse"
Grading has denied me time to write about the Stanford debacle. I somewhat was waiting for Ken White to cover it, expecting that I would share his take--and I do.
I will add the following: This demonstrates why the "civil discourse" trope--students should not protest, they should sit quietly and politely listen to the speaker, then engage with the speaker in a "Platonic dialogue"--is and always has been bullshit. The speaker bears no obligation to engage with the questions. And Judge Duncan did not engage--including with actual, thoughtful (if pointed and hostile) questions. When someone asks the speaker about something he wrote (such as the opinion refusing to allow a prisoner to use his proper pronoun), "read what I wrote" is not engaging in civil discourse. And acting as if he was not on the panel is certainly not. That the questions and questioners were hostile does not excuse non-answers; it shows how those who censor speech use "politeness" and "civility" to silence counter-speech.
I like Ken's framing of the point: "The protesting students’ rights and interests are neither inferior to nor superior to the interests of the FedSoc and Judge Duncan. Policing the civility of the response to speech and not speech itself is incoherent nonsense. Put another way, if you say “fuck you” to your classmates, they may say “fuck you” back. If you set out to provoke a response, put on your big boy pants when you get one."
I also reject the framing of this as a "shouting down" issue. Yes, the protesting students prevented him from speaking, in violation of Stanford's forum policy. But if the students had done what the policy allows and urges--oral protests outside the building, silent protests through t-shirts and signs inside the room--Duncan would have responded the same way. He went to Stanford itching for a fight--not sure whether I buy the theory that he sought to raise his profile for a SCOTUS appointment--and would have been as dismissive and rude to silent protesters. No student should have the temerity to protest him--free speech means sit there and listen to what he has to say.
Chris Walker (now at Michigan) visited FIU this week. He shared that when he taught at The Ohio State University, Fed Soc invited a speaker from the ADF. OutLaw held a bake sale outside. The speaker bought something. That is not discourse. But it is effective protest.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 15, 2023 at 12:03 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, March 14, 2023
Is Joe Biden a Confabulist?
Writing on the Lawyers Guns Money Blog, Paul Campos says that Joe Biden must have been confabulating during his recent interview with Kal Penn. The passage in question is in the clip below at :45 to 1:30.
According to Paul, the chances are basically zero that Biden's father told him, in around 1959 or 1960, that gay men would kiss each other because they were in love. Paul therefore thinks the story is a confabulation. "Biden is remembering an imaginary incident that's more congruent with his current beliefs and identity."
I don't see why Paul comes to that conclusion. I had virtually the same experience in pretty much the same era; probably when I was in sixth grade, which would have been 1960 or 1961.
My very progressive parents always had gay friends. My first baby-sitters, in the late 1940s, were a gay couple with whom my parents sometimes double-dated. And that wasn't unusual in their circle. I remember girl -- the daughter of another couple -- who admonished a kid for using an anti-gay slur.
Maybe Biden exaggerated his father’s comment about love. Maybe he confused the year or embellished the precise details. That would not be confabulation. It is not surprising that someone would long ago have accepted gay love as quite normal. My family certainly did (I take no credit for it; I was a child).
Posted by Steve Lubet on March 14, 2023 at 06:21 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
"Any"
Jim Brudney and I have uploaded our latest, Any:
Our statute books use the word “any” ubiquitously in coverage and exclusion provisions. As any reader of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation docket would know, a large number of cases turn on the contested meaning of this so-called universal quantifier. It is hard to make sense of the jurisprudence of “any,” and any effort to offer a unified approach – knowing precisely when its meaning is expansive (along the “literal-meaning” lines of “every” and “all”) or confining (having a contained meaning of “some,” related to properties provided by contextual cues) – is likely to fail. This Article examines legislative drafting manuals, surveys centuries of Court decisions, and conducts in-depth pairwise comparisons of “any” cases to show the word’s flexible meaning in its multiple statutory guises. After evaluating evidence of the variability of “any,” we recommend a new approach, a form of an “any” canon. We encourage adjudicators to appreciate the complexity of “any” more systematically and to consult a full range of sources – as even full-throated textualists have authorized from time to time – offering the relevant larger context judges will need to ascertain the meaning of “any” in any given statutory scheme.
Download it here.
Posted by Ethan Leib on March 14, 2023 at 03:06 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Ouch. And What?
I am reading the oral argument transcript in Youngstown. Here is an actual exchange with the Solicitor General:
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: In the Myers case there was a good deal of 'tall talk,' and in the Humphreys case the unanimous Court said that these principles were disproven.
MR. PERLMAN: The Court there--Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out in his book, "Struggle for Judicial Supremacy"
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: I point out what the Court said.
JUSTICE JACKSON: Justice Frankfurter did not read the book.
MR. PERLMAN: I suppose I should take advantage of this opportunity to recommend it to him.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Doctor Johnson said, you know, you can give a person knowledge, but not understanding.
MR. PERLMAN: If that is meant for me, it is a dirty dig.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: It is meant for me.
Posted by Gerard Magliocca on March 14, 2023 at 02:28 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
A Useful Opportunity for Golden-Rule Law Review Reform
There are two likely standard responses to a story in which law students demand pay for working on law review. The first is more or less reflexive support. ("At a time when lots of law schools are talking about diversity in legal academia, this is a concrete step that could go pretty far in making a material difference for those who don’t come from a privileged background.") The second is more or less reflexive ridicule. ("But rather than quit the law review, they want money because these are the days that law schools, law deans, acquiesce to the demands of students because they either can’t or won’t say no.") Let's bypass both of those and go for a somewhat sunny-sided Door Number Three.
It should be noted first that the NYU students who have launched the petition reported on above are actually demanding that "all contributors to the journals be able to choose whether to receive compensation in hourly wages or credit hours." One might reject the full demand but find it reasonable that students receive credit hours for law review work. I do. My law school offers one credit for law review work and two credits for work by a few top editors. Other law schools offer variations on this credit-granting approach. When last I wrote here about law reviews, I wrote in the assumption that this was common but discovered in correspondence that it might not be as prevalent as I had assumed. The person who wrote me indicated his school was looking to add credit hours for law review work, so perhaps it is becoming more common--or perhaps the demand is becoming more common, or both. In any event, it hardly seems crazy to me.
But for schools who don't offer credits, or who contemplate seriously the possibility of offering pay, perhaps we should think of this as an opportunity. Seeking official compensation of either sort is also a recognition of official authority. And it's an excellent opportunity for law schools to provide the kinds of conditions that a) might naturally accompany both authority and compensation and b) make sense regardless. For instance:
1: It seems appropriate, if law students are going to be offered credits or financial compensation for this work, that all students be eligible for it. This would be an excellent opportunity to insist that if such a plan is to move forward, any student who wishes to serve on law review--on any law review, including the flagship journal--be allowed to do so. This makes sense because it makes little or no sense to restrict admission to law review in the first place. What Above the Law (and just about everyone else) refers to as "grunt work" does not require an unusual amount of talent. Top editorship might, and it certainly requires an unusual level of commitment of time and effort. But I am unaware of any empirical work showing that top first-year grades correlate with excellent work as an editor. In any event, the skills required for that editorial work are not involved in the general work that occurs at the wide end of the funnel.
The only cost to the journals or the students of general admission would be the possible, and perhaps over time inevitable, loss in prestige. But the prestige that attaches to working on a law review is both silly and artifactual. It is prestigious not because of the thing in itself, but because admission to law review is restricted, and admission thus serves potential employers as a proxy for academic achievement. That proxy is unnecessary, since employers can look directly at grades. In countries with sensible law review practices, working on a student-run law review, where they exist alongside faculty-run journals, carries no unusual level of prestige--certainly not higher than clinical work, mooting, or other extracurricular activities--because it is not a proxy for grades. The people who work on either sort of journal do so because they want to work on a law journal.
In the absence of prestige, fewer students might opt to serve on a law journal at all, instead of doing some other activity. But that's a feature, not a bug. Not all students are interested in or have a vocation for scholarly editing (or editing of any kind); more of them might do something else for which they're more suited or which would provide better and more relevant professional training; some of those alternative activities might be more socially beneficial, such that both they and everyone else would be better off if more students did those activities instead; and a reduction in staff might lead to a winnowing of functions and a focus on core editing rather than citation busywork. Finally, if the concern is with diversity, allowing anyone who wishes to do so to work on law review--albeit with a relative loss in prestige--would achieve that aim far more fully than tinkering around the edges with law review admissions, in ways that seem almost calculated to change the composition of the editorial staff on the margins while maintaining a cashable system of prestige and elitism.
2: It would also be appropriate for law schools to insist, in exchange for the pay and/or credit, that part of the redesign involve faculty editorship of law reviews and a properly instituted system of genuine peer review. Under this modest reform, law students working on a law journal would become what they are elsewhere in the world and are supposed to be: editorial assistants, serving the professional faculty who exercise the ethically indefeasible disciplinary function of running and editing their field's academic journals. Such a reform would marry nicely with the demand for financial compensation. I was not paid for my work as an editor of the student-run law journal at the University of Toronto's law school, but I was most certainly paid for my work as an editorial assistant on the faculty-edited Canadian Business Law Journal, just as I was paid when I worked as a research assistant to an individual professor.
3: I think number two should be non-negotiable. But at a minimum, if law schools are to hand out credit, with grades (likely pass/fail, but grades nonetheless) and/or pay for work on a school's law journal, I think it is entirely appropriate that those schools exercise their authority to insist that those journals meet high professional standards. After all, law schools already insist that credit come only for meaningful achievement in academically sound law school courses. And when law schools outsource that teaching function, with things like externships, the schools and the ABA insist that those activities be scrutinized to make sure they are meeting high standards.
Among other things, this would entail that those journals not pursue idiosyncratic or political editorial projects or policies that the faculty consider to be inconsistent with the general professional standards and duties of an academic journal; that they welcome excellent articles (and only excellent articles) on all subjects within the discipline and representing all viewpoints; that symposium issues represent a full range of scholarly views on the subject; that they reject funding from special interests of any kind for symposia or other projects; that they institute at least some form of peer review, including review by academics in other disciplines when an article draws on that other discipline; that their articles acquisitions be subject to some level of transparency and faculty approval or ratification; that any substantive edits insisted on for articles meet scholarly standards and serve only scholarly purposes, that mere gamesmanship in articles acquisition be eliminated; and so on.
As it turns out, I think law schools should insist on all of this anyway. I'm currently writing a jot on Tarunabh Khaitan's fine article on scholactivism in constitutional studies. In working through the issue, Khaitan posits an author who, because she is seeking to influence policy on a short-fuse issue, departs from what he considers basic scholarly standards by, inter alia, submitting an article on the topic "to a non-peer-reviewed student-run law review known for its quick publishing decisions." It is a mark either of Khaitan's parochialism or of our own insanity that his example of a departure from what he considers a baseline marker of academic soundness is, in this country, just standard practice. Law schools should insist on and impose all of these things because they assert that they are an academic enterprise and that their faculty are scholars--and they should act like it. The professional duty to do so is, again, indefeasible. It is revolting to maintain the current system, laughable in the eyes of any other discipline, for no better reason than that that's how they did things when Henry IV, or the faculty, or some donor/alumnus, were law students. Regardless, if law schools are going to award credit or offer financial compensation, this is a particularly good occasion to insist on these changes. (I note that schools that already allow credit for law review don't necessarily insist on any of these things. They should.) None of this, incidentally, entails a belief that peer review is perfect; only that it is the professional norm for academic disciplines (including law, anywhere else in the world) and that it makes far more sense than what we have at present.
I don't see anything in any of my suggestions which is inconsistent with the student demands for pay or credit for working on a law journal. Indeed, insisting that any willing student be eligible to serve on the main law review is not only consistent with the students' demands but more in the spirit of their demands than the demand itself. I see only three counter-arguments. The first is that it would involve more work by the faculty, but this is work we're supposed to be doing in the first place and that harder-working faculty in lower-paid disciplines do already. The second is that it would involve a loss in prestige and independence for these journals. But neither of those things is justifiable from a disciplinary standpoint, the prestige is a pure artifact that is not worth preserving in itself, and, to put things in modern lingo, making it clear that there is a potential tradeoff between compensation and prestige would merely unmask the power and status relations that are already implicated by the United States' unique and bizarre law review system as it currently exists, with or without pay or credit. The third is that it would involve the assertion of authority by law schools over law students, insofar as the schools would be insisting that credit or compensation be accompanied by the kinds of reforms that would make our disciplinary journals look like those of every other academic discipline. But that authority is already there. It's present every time a law school does something like give or deny credit for coursework. And it's implicit in the students' own demands. Im short, instead of greeting this story with reflexive support or reflexive ridicule, we should see it as an opportunity to do the kinds of things we ought to be doing in the first place.
Posted by Paul Horwitz on March 14, 2023 at 12:48 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0)
Welcome, Steven Lubet
We are happy to announce that Steven Lubet has joined us as a perma-prawf. Steve is the Edna B. and Ednyfed H. Williams Memorial Professor of Law Emeritus at Northwestern-Pritzker School of Law, where he directed the Bartlit Center on Trial Advocacy, in addition to teaching PR and Trial Advocacy, and authoring books on, among other things, Harper's Ferry.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 14, 2023 at 11:29 AM in Blogging | Permalink | Comments (0)
Call for Papers - Northwestern University Law Review Online - Government Secrecy, Surveillance, Censorship
From the Northwestern University Law Review:
Northwestern University Law Review Online is seeking essays for its second annual Online Essay Series to be published in May 2024. The topic for NULRO’s essay series is "Government Secrecy, Surveillance, and Censorship in the New Age of Information." NULRO encourages scholarship on all aspects of the intersection of government secrecy, surveillance, and censorship. Possible subtopics include classification, national security, education, and privacy. Essays should be between 3,000 to 10,000 words and submitted to Scholastica or via email at [email protected]. The deadline to submit manuscripts is August 28, 2023. Authors can expect decisions on their submissions by September 29, 2023.
Posted by Sarah Lawsky on March 14, 2023 at 08:34 AM in Law Review Review | Permalink | Comments (0)
Whither Division III?
A current and a former basketball player at Brown filed a class action suit, challenging the Ivy League's agreement/policy not to award athletic scholarships as an antitrust violation.
To our readers with antitrust knowledge: If successful, how does this not eliminate the NCAA's Division III, comprised of smaller, mostly private, heavily liberal-arts college and which prohibits athletic scholarships? If a conference-wide policy against scholarships violates the law, how can a nationwide policy not violate the law?
Comments open.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 14, 2023 at 07:02 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (1)
Monday, March 13, 2023
UCLA Seeks Legal Research and Writing Faculty
UCLA School of Law is seeking a full-time lecturer to teach two sections of the first-year J.D. course in Legal Research and Writing. The opening is for the 2023-24 academic year. The appointment will be effective July 1, 2023.
Each section of the Legal Research and Writing is a year-long five-credit course, designed to introduce students to the fundamentals of legal reasoning, the structure of objective and persuasive arguments, legal research methods, statutory interpretation, and additional skills, such as oral advocacy, fact investigation, and client counseling. Students complete a variety of written assignments, both graded and ungraded, designed to reinforce the overarching lessons of the course.
This is a full-time academic, non-tenure track appointment as a Lecturer in Law.
For a complete job announcement, see here. The deadline for applying is April 21, 2023. Please contact Dave Marcus, Vice Dean for Curricular and Academic Affairs, with any questions ([email protected]).
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 13, 2023 at 09:31 AM in Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, March 10, 2023
Baretta Theme
Robert Blake died. I do not have anything to say about Blake. But it offers an excuse to post about the show's awesome theme song, which somehow did not make Rolling Stone's top-100.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 10, 2023 at 02:45 PM in Culture | Permalink | Comments (0)
Judicial immunity and other civil rights hurdles (Update)
Steve Lubet (Northwestern) writes in Slate about Judge Robert Benitez (S.D. Cal.), who ordered the marshall to handcuff the 13-year-old daughter of a defendant in a parole-revocation hearing and have her sit in the jury box; his intent, he explained, was to send a message: “So your dad’s made some serious mistakes in his life, and look at where it’s landed him. … And if you’re not careful, young lady, you’ll wind up in cuffs, and you’ll find yourself right there where I put you a minute ago.”
Lubet expresses concern that Benitez will incur no sanction for his actions. Life tenure means he cannot be removed from the bench other than by impeachment. The case was transferred to another, who reduced the 10-month sentence Benitez imposed. A judicial-misconduct complaint has been filed, but the sanctions are minimal--censure and perhaps an interruption of newly assigned cases.
As for civil remedies, Lubet says "He cannot be sued for damages, because he has judicial immunity for conduct on the bench."
But is the immunity issue that obvious? Immunity attaches to "judicial functions," performed not in the "complete absence of jurisdiction." That captures most conduct on the bench. But the conduct must relate to the conduct of judicial proceedings and control of the courtroom. But this may exceed even the broadest understanding of those concepts. Benitez was not maintaining order in the courtroom or ensure the proper conduct of judicial proceedings. He admits to "hoping" to get to the girl--not a party, witness, or other participant and only tangentially related to the proceeding--a "message" about how she should live her life. Above the Law called it a "bush league Scared Straight, which, despite the source, is a pretty good descriptor. Warning random teens about the danger of crime is not a judicial function; that it happens in court should not matter. The motive behind a function does not affect immunity--a judicial function performed for a racist purpose remains a judicial function. But the purpose of an action can affect whether it qualifies as a judicial function--an action that does not reasonably affect judicial proceedings cannot be judicial, even if a judge performs it.
Of course, judicial immunity is not the only hurdle the girl faces. Benitez is a federal judge, so any damages action falls under Bivens--and we know what that means. This presents a new context and thus an extension of Bivens since SCOTUS never allowed a claim against a federal judge. And the usual special factors will counsel hesitation before allowing the action--Congress never created a cause of action, the judicial-complaint system allows for alternate remedies, and a Bivens court will not want to chill other judges in managing their courtrooms in the future. And after Bivens comes qualified immunity and the absence of any precedent clearly establishing that judges should not order the handcuffing of courtroom observers without probable cause and for no legitimate judicial reason. Is the violative nature of this as obvious as leaving a detainee in a cold, feces-strewn cell or placing a prisoner on a hitching post for 7 hours? Who knows.
So Lubet is right that civil damages remedy are unlikely. But judicial immunity is the tip of that iceberg.
Update: Steve responds:
The leading SCOTUS case is Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991), which I considered when writing the essay (space limitations did not allow me to get into it). Mireles holds there is no immunity for actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. But the trial judge in Mireles had ordered the abusive seizure of a public defender who had missed a court call, and SCOTUS found that was not beyond all jurisdiction. I could be wrong, but my conclusion was that Benitez likewise had some jurisdiction over spectators in his courtroom, and especially over someone who had been invoked by the defendant as a reason for leniency – and thus as sort of a witness. She was in the courtroom to influence the outcome. Puente told the court that his daughter was in danger of drug use, so the judge had some jurisdiction to question or interview her about it, if only to determine whether to believe Puente’s assertion. Of course, his questioning was abusive, but that alone does not defeat judicial immunity.
Well, I would prefer being wrong about that, but as the abstract of the Mireles opinion put it, “That he may have made a mistake or acted in excess of his authority does not make the act nonjudicial.”
My reply (hey, my blog, my final word): We might distinguish Mireles because the order to the bailiff had a closer connection to courtroom management--the judge needed the attorney to get to court for things to proceed. I agree that Benitez could have questioned the girl, even in an abusive or threatening fashion; that would be judicial. Handcuffing her--for the purpose of teaching her a lesson rather than for determining whether to believe the defendant as part of the proceeding--is a difference in kind.
Finally, the cases distinguish actions "in excess of authority" from actions "in the clear absence of authority;" the former maintains immunity (as in Mireles), but the latter does not. Steve makes the best argument for why this is the former--she was there to influence the outcome of a proceeding and the judge can question that attempt. But the judge's statements of his purpose, to me, push this into the latter.
To be clear, I am not saying Lubet is wrong about judicial immunity. Only that it is more complex than the typical case of a judge misbehaving while conducting proceedings from the bench.
Posted by Howard Wasserman on March 10, 2023 at 02:23 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)