Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Helping Oklahoma

Just a quick PSA-type post from this Tuscaloosan: Here are a few sites with suggestions about how to direct your aid for the victims of yesterday's tornado in Oklahoma. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 21, 2013 at 09:26 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Monday, May 20, 2013

Beware of "Town of Greece" Bearing Gifts

The Supreme Court has granted cert. in Town of Greece v. Galloway, a case out of the Second Circuit involving prayers given by guest chaplains before monthly town board meetings. Here is the SCOTUSBlog page, and here's the Second Circuit opinion by Judge Calabresi. 

There has been a good deal of circuit court action involving legislative prayer, but the Supreme Court has basically not touched it since Marsh v. Chambers. Prediction is pointless, so I'll just say the following.

1) I talk about legislative prayers and similar cases in my book The Agnostic Age. I characterize the rulings in this area as "constitutional easements" over the Establishment Clause and argue that they are constitutionally problematic, at least, although I suggest that we might be better off letting sleeping dogs lie. (Andy Koppelman criticizes Marsh in similar terms in his excellent recent book, Defending American Religious Neutrality and says clearly that it should be overruled.) It would appear that the dogs are awake and hungry.

2) There is a good deal of consensus and friendship among law and religion scholars these days, at least in my view. The friendships will remain, I'm sure. But this is one case that will reveal the differences among us more starkly than many recent cases. I look forward to friendly disagreements with colleagues like Rick Garnett and Marc DeGirolami.

3) The best scholarly work in this area that I am aware of is by Christopher C. Lund. If you're interested in this case and these issues, you ought to read Chris's work. I hope we can get him over here for a timely guest stint at Prawfsblawg.   

Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 20, 2013 at 10:18 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

Thursday, May 16, 2013

First Amendment Institutions in the Law and Politics Book Review

My most recent book, First Amendment Institutions (it makes a good Victoria Day gift!), is reviewed in the latest issue of the Law and Politics Book Review by law professor Ruthann Robson. It's a tough but fair review. I welcome the criticism, and hope I may be forgiven for cherry-picking a couple of generous lines: the book "provides the most sustained, nuanced, and well-reasoned argument for an 'institutional turn' in First Amendment jurisprudence," and "admirably achieves" the goal of "open[ing] a conversation about First Amendment institutionalism, . . . providing a book that is worth reading, considering, and debating." Obviously, I hope people will read and even buy the book, and take part in that conversation. But it's very much meant to be a conversation, and Robson's criticisms are a valuable part of that. Read the whole review (and the book, of course!).   

Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 16, 2013 at 08:00 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Wednesday, May 15, 2013

A Jot on "Balkan Ghosts"

The latest con law "jot" from Jotwell: Pat Gudridge on Reva Siegel, balkanization, and equal protection. Enjoy!

Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 15, 2013 at 10:08 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Freedom of the Church Without Romance

I'm happy to share my latest draft paper, Freedom of the Church Without Romance. It was written for a symposium at the University of San Diego's law school called "Freedom of the Church in the Modern Era," and I must say that the articles coming out of that symposium, mine excepted, are very strong and will constitute excellent resources for those interested in the increasingly popular subjects of "freedom of the church," religious institutional autonomy, the ministerial exception, and related themes. Some of them are available for download here, and see also these pieces

Every scholar has articles they're more or less proud of for one reason or another, and I'm quite proud of this one, for two reasons: (1) it takes an idea I have championed and associated myself with and subjects it to critical analysis, rather than simply defending it one more time; and (2) it makes the important (I think) point that church-state legal scholars ought to do much more with the substantial literature on the economics of religion. I hope others enjoy it, and I welcome comments. Here's the abstract:

This Article is part of a symposium issue titled "Freedom of the Church in the Modern Era." Freedom of the church, roughly, connotes the independent nature or sovereignty of the church. The most dramatic moment in its development was the eleventh century Investiture Controversy, with its confrontation between Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV at Canossa, but it has a long prior and subsequent history. Recently, with the renewed scholarly interest in the institutional rights of churches and religious organizations and the Supreme Court's decision affirming the "ministerial exception" doctrine in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,the idea of "freedom of the church" has taken on new champions--and critics.

This Article, from an author who has written supportively about freedom of the church and/or religious institutionalism in prior work, takes a deliberately unromantic look at freedom of the church. It evaluates it through two useful disciplinary lenses: history, and the economics of religion.

Both historical and economic analysis of the concept of"freedom of the church" suggest the following conclusions: (1) The concept should be treated carefully and with a full awareness of its mixed history, without undue romanticism on the part of its champions--or a confident conclusion on the part of its critics that it is no longer necessary. (2) Whatever the concept of "freedom of the church" means today, the present version is decidedly diminished and chastened, a shadow of the medieval version. Supporters of freedom of the church should welcome that fact. Freedom of the church persists, and may have continuing value, precisely because it has become so domesticated. (3) There are solid historical and economic grounds for some form of freedom of the church or religious institutional autonomy. In particular, religion's status as a credence good, whose value and reliability is certified by religious agents such as ministers, strongly suggests that state interference with religious employment relations can be dangerous to a church's well-being and long-term survival. (4) The history and economics of religion also teach us something about the optimal conditions for freedom of the church--the conditions under which it is likely to do the most good and the least harm. In particular, they suggest that champions of freedom of the church ought to welcome religious pluralism and a strong non-establishment regime. 

The Article closes with some speculation about why there has been a recent revival of interest in freedom of the church, including the possibility that its resurgence, even if it is fully justified, also involves an element of rent-seeking by religious institutions.

There are two broader underlying suggestions as well. First, there are good reasons to support some version of freedom of the church, but it deserves a more critical and nuanced examination by friends and adversaries alike. Second, legal scholars writing on church-state issues have paid far too little attention to the literature on the economics of religion.

Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 15, 2013 at 08:32 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Two Moving Testimonies

Here are links to two recent powerful pieces of personal testimony, both dimly but only dimly law-related. The first is this moving letter-cum-tribute between law professor Charles Barzun and his illustrious grandfather, Jacques Barzun. The second, even more powerfully personal, is this piece by lawyer Tony Nitti, about suffering and recovering from a brain aneurysm, in which he observes and explains why, "when recovering from a life-threatening ailment, the real challenge often doesn’t begin until the healing is complete." Both are well worth reading. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 15, 2013 at 08:16 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Monday, May 13, 2013

Sunstein on Albert Hirschman

In the new New York Review of Books, Cass Sunstein has a very enjoyable essay on Albert Hirschman, jumping off of a recent biography. Hirschman's classic book Exit, Voice and Loyalty is well known to legal scholars, with some 870 cites in the Westlaw legal periodical database (including a good new piece by Heather Gerken in the Duke Law Journal). Indeed, I assume many of the authors who cite it have actually read the book! But Sunstein usefully shines a spotlight on other major works by Hirschman, which seem like natural reads for legal scholars but have gotten less attention from them. (In particular, Shifting Involvements, which has 54 cites, and The Rhetoric of Reaction, "a study of the reactionary’s tool kit, identifying the standard objections to any and all proposals for reform," a subject of central concern to much reform-oriented legal scholarship, which has only 84 cites.) 

I found the following passage from Sunstein's celebratory essay especially valuable:

Hirschman was a great believer in doubt—he never doubted it—and he certainly doubted his own convictions. At a conference designed to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of his first book, who else would take the opportunity to show that one of his own central arguments was wrong? Who else would publish an essay in The American Economic Review exploring the “overproduction of opinionated opinion,” questioning the value of having strong opinions, and emphasizing the importance of doubting one’s opinions and even one’s tastes? . . . [Hirschman suggested] that doubt could be a source not of paralysis and death but of creativity and self-renewal. One of his last books, published when he was about eighty, is called A Propensity to Self-Subversion. In the title essay, Hirschman celebrates skepticism about his own theories and ideas, and he captures not only the insight but also the pleasure, even the joy, that can come from learning that one had it wrong.

This sounds, alas, like the exact opposite of the behavior and incentives of junior legal scholars (and too many senior scholars) today, as well as the law review editors to whom they often cater. I've complained here before about the apparent rise of excessive novelty claims in recent legal scholarship, including articles published in many leading law reviews, which in turn will only encourage that trend. Too many articles today claim, on dubious grounds, to be the "first" or "only" paper to consider some issue or make some argument. Combine that with the frequency of "unified theory" approaches in legal scholarship and the general overconfidence that prevails in the field, and you get a lot of hubris. Some of this is surely strategic; I've heard privately from various scholars who acknowledge that their articles and abstracts overclaim but swear they'll cut out those claims by the time the article has been accepted and moved into the editing process, a move I find questionable as an ethical matter and one they don't always follow through on anyway. But much of the hubris is genuine, and even when it's not it's still there in the articles and may leach into the writer's thinking. 

It's possible that this is just a particular phase in the life-cycle of these scholars, just a function of brash youth and careerism, and that they will think better of it when they get older and wiser. Having built their careers on an insistence that they have offered a "new" and/or general theory, however, I fear that these scholars will only get older, not wiser, and that they will be boxed in by their earlier claims and by the trend in legal scholarship that they helped to encourage and benefited from. How many of them will come back to the work that launched them and consider whether it was wrong? If they do, will those sober second thoughts be prominently published, or noticed at all?

As a personal note, I should add that I have been guilty too, not so much of overclaiming as of providing sweeping general theories and approaches. And yet, the most fun I've had in my work recently has been on two pieces. One gives a more positive assessment to the use of equality in law and religion doctrine, about which I've been skeptical before. The other is a clinical and critical examination of "freedom of the church," of which I've written quite positively in several articles. Any idea worth championing is surely worth going back and reconsidering critically. Indeed, I would think a serious scholar has a positive obligation to reconsider and sometimes disclaim his own past work. I worry that the pace, structure, and incentives of legal scholarship don't much encourage this. Perhaps Ross Davies could start yet another legal journal, this one called "The Journal of Law and Second Thoughts."   

Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 13, 2013 at 08:42 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Friday, May 03, 2013

Weekend Non-Reading

This weekend, Yale Law School's Information Society Project will be holding a phenomenal conference on freedom of expression. The list of speakers and papers is here and it looks just great. I wish I could be there, but if you're in New Haven, stop by. (Why not, if you're in New Haven? You have someplace better to be?) Unfortunately, the papers are password protected, hence the "non-reading" in the title. Given that these are drafts I quite understand, but I hope the authors will be posting them on SSRN soon, or that the organizers will provide the password in a comment to this post. I hope everyone has a good time.

Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 3, 2013 at 01:30 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Wednesday, May 01, 2013

Tamanaha on Class and Law School Reform

Brian Tamanaha has posted on SSRN a short and enjoyable piece on my current favorite subject, apart from law and religion: social class and the legal academy. His paper, "The Failure of Crits and Leftist Law Professors to Defend Progressive Causes," is specifically about the failure of "progressive law professors" to do or say much about the problematic conditions Tamanaha explored in his book Failing Law Schools. From the abstract:

The pricing structure of legal education has profound class implications. High tuition will inhibit people from middle-class and poor families more than it will deter the offspring of the rich with ample resources. Law school scholarship policies, for reasons I will explain, in effect channel students with financial means to higher ranked law schools, reaping better opportunities, while sending students without money to lower law schools. A growing proportion of elite legal positions will be held by people from wealthy backgrounds as a result. For students who rely on borrowing to finance their legal education, the heavy debt they carry will dictate the types of jobs they seek and constrain the career they go on to have.

Liberal law professors often express concerns about class in American society — championing access to the legal profession and the provision of legal services for underserved communities. Yet as law school tuition rose to its current extraordinary heights, progressive law professors did nothing to resist it. This Article explores what happened and why.

This is offered in the spirit of critical legal studies — as a critical self-examination of the failure of leftist law professors. The Crits were highly critical of complacent liberal academics of their day, arguing that they had a hand in perpetuating an unjust legal system; here I charge liberal legal academia — including the Crits — with perpetuating the profoundly warped and harmful economics of legal education. What follows will offend many of my fellow liberals. It may even lose me some friends. Liberal law professors must see past their anger to reflect on whether there is a core truth to my arguments, to take personal responsibility for what has happened, and to engage in collective action to do something to alter the economics of our operation. If not, the current economic barrier to a legal career may become permanent.

Without endorsing it in whole, it's a worthwhile and certainly entertaining (if that's the right word) read. A couple of points. I'm not sure what kinds of personal responses Tamanaha has received to his book and other writings on law school reform, but he has made his point about potential personal costs before, and I'm not sure it needs to be made in general terms anymore. That's just a quibble, however. More important, I'm not sure why he focuses on the Crits and SALT. He makes his points about them well enough. But I would have thought that plain-vanilla liberals, including those who insist on calling themselves progressives, constitute a much, much larger and more influential sector of the legal academy than genuine members of the left. If their failures are less glaring and entertaining, their attention, embarrassment, and commitment are probably more important for purposes of actual reform.

Finally, as noted above, Tamanaha writes that "[l]iberal law professors often express concerns about class in American society." I would say in response: Not that often! As far as I can tell, they much prefer to write about other kinds of inequality and identity issues than about class. Understandably, perhaps. "Write what you know," the old adage goes. This is not an issue that the legal professoriate, and especially the elite legal professoriate, is likely to know as much about. I read and enjoyed, more or less, Duncan Kennedy's book on legal education, but I learned more, and more viscerally, about class from this critical review of the book than from the book itself.


Posted by Paul Horwitz on May 1, 2013 at 02:59 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (28) | TrackBack

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

ABA Committee Discusses Tenure Requirements and Law School Accreditation

An interesting article here. The gist: the ABA law school accreditation committee is looking at several alternatives to the current requirement that all ABA-accredited schools have a system of tenure or comparable security for full-time faculty.

I fail to see the point of the third alternative the committee is considering, which basically strikes me as a rent-seeking move by clinical faculty. But the second alternative seems like a reasonable move to me: "[T]o move away from any tenure requirement. Schools would afford all full-time faculty some form of security of position, but each would decide what system that would be. (The interpretation of the standard stipulates that schools at minimum must have a system of long-term renewable contracts of at least five years.) Schools could adopt different rules for different types of faculty."

Of course, the even shorter gist is probably accurately contained in the only comment currently posted on the NLJ story: "If you're betting on this question, bet on the ABA committee to avoid anything controversial. Really, bar association junkies, how often does any such committee do anything bold?"

Posted by Paul Horwitz on April 30, 2013 at 03:29 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (18) | TrackBack

Monday, April 29, 2013


The New York Times on Friday ran a long and detailed story about, to put it simply, political- and profit-driven laxity and fraud in the payout of the settlement fund in the Pigford litigation alleging discrimination against black farmers in federal lending. The story is well worth reading. Once nice anecdote, among many (and yes, the story also provides real data), involves a speech given at a Baptist church in Little Rock by the head of something called the "Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association," in which he boasts "that he and his four siblings had all collected awards, and his sister had acquired another $50,000 on behalf of their dead father." He concludes: "Let’s get the judge to go to work writing them checks! They have just opened the bank vault." 

Two observations. First, as the story notes, the political and moral pressure that led to the substantial and often nonsensical payouts in the black farmers' case is also influencing parallel litigation involving women, Hispanics, and Native Americans. Here's an excerpt about the latter category of litigation, in which the Obama administration began settlement negotations in 2009 despite the fair prospect of victory if it had proceeded to ligitation:

Only 4,400 people filed claims, with 3,600 winning compensation at a cost of roughly $300 million. That left $460 million unspent — of which roughly $400 million under the terms of the settlement must be given to nonprofit groups that aid Native American farmers.

Ross Racine, the director of the Intertribal Agricultural Council, based in Montana, said his organization, with an annual budget of just $1 million, is perhaps the biggest eligible group. But many others are lining up to share the windfall, he said.

“Everybody is looking at this money on the table and saying, ‘Give me some because I am a good guy,’ ” he said.

The remaining $60.8 million will go to the plaintiffs’ lawyers, led by the Washington firm Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll. In court papers, the firm argued that the size of the payment was justified partly by the fact that the settlement nearly equaled the maximum estimate of economic damages. Joseph M. Sellers, the lead counsel, acknowledged the unspent amount was unexpectedly big. But “absent a court order,” he said, “we don’t intend to return it.”

Second, I was curious about how legal scholars had treated this settlement. It's not my area, but I would assume that problems with this litigation and the settlement fund were or should have been well-known by anyone working in the field. Certainly, given the vagueness of the proof requirements, the political pressure to settle generously, the incentives of plaintiffs' lawyers, and the common use of distributions of massive amounts of money to public-interest groups as part of the buyoff process, it would be no surprise to anyone that both individual fraud and what we might call public interest graft are possible side-effects of such settlements, and this should be especially interesting to those working on reparations issues. My search of the literature was less than scientific, but for the most part the discussions I found were either neutral or positive, with little or no acknowledgment made of these potential problems. Nor have I seen much on the legal blogs yet about this story. I trust that the Civil Procedure & Federal Courts Blog and the Native American Law Blog, among other obvious sites, will take note of the story.    

Posted by Paul Horwitz on April 29, 2013 at 10:16 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Friday, April 26, 2013

What Happened to Occupy?

The Financial Times has a well-done roundup review of several books about the Occupy Wall Street movement, mostly by people involved in it. The short version: "A sympathetic reader of these books will end up with the slightly exasperated feeling that Occupy wasted its chance as a political movement." A couple of observations:

1) Past Prawfs guest Bernard Harcourt of Chicago appears in the review, with a quote from his essay in one of these collections. This is just a guess, but when the dean at the University of Chicago Law School sent a memo to the faculty urging them to assist the efforts of its students and recent graduates to occupy Wall Street, I doubt this is what he had in mind.

2) I love this quote from Michael Taussig, a Columbia anthropology prof who also wrote an essay for a collection. As the review puts it, "Taussig hails the coming together [in Zucotti Park] of a 'community defining itself through a new language and sense of collective': this, he reflects, is a problem for politicians and experts who 'want to channel the messianic and transgressive  impulse into their own need for pathological fame and power'." The use of "pathologicial" is especially nice here; why let people think for themsevles when you can just insert a pseudo-diagnostic adjective? But I would have thought that politicians and experts who wanted to pursue fame and power would have been delighted by the Occupy movement.

3) There are probably lessons in here for the popular front of the law school reform movement.  

Posted by Paul Horwitz on April 26, 2013 at 01:24 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Friday, April 19, 2013

Interesting Reading on Current Events

Two interesting posts from VC in the last day on current events in Boston. The first, from Stewart Baker, asserts that the ACLU and EFF were wrong about thing #1, and concludes that they therefore must also be wrong about thing #2. The second, from Eugene Kontorovich, laments (I think) that the two Chechen suspects "have succeeded in turning Boston, America’s cradle of liberty, into a prison," a situation that shows "that it is not just the civil liberties of terrorists at stake, but also those of millions of innocent civilians." He adds that, if these suspects are actually part of the group of Chechen Islamic terrorists from abroad and if that threat has come to the United States, then "dealing with such a threat would also be impossible with a politically correct approach to counter-terror that, for example, turns away from talking frankly about the terrorists['] profiles and motives," which would mean, well, I'm not sure what, but it sure would be better than "obscene lines and searches at airports."

Search me if I can figure out exactly what the hell either of them are talking about. But, like I said, interesting posts. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on April 19, 2013 at 12:58 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

Blackman on "History" and Biochemistry

In an enjoyable and well-written post, Josh Blackman asks whether originalist questions present anything more difficult or different from other complex questions the courts are called on to resolve. He writes:

A common attack on originalism is that judges are not trained historians, and lack the skills to understand the nuance and context of history. I have never found this argument particularly compelling, because judges are frequently called on to understand complicated disciplines outside the law. . . .[M]y point goes more to methodology than substance. Judges are called on to understand difficult concepts. Relying on briefs by attorneys who specialize in these areas, judges, by their best lights, come to an answer. . . . History seems to be even closer to the area judges train in than biochemistry. Considering the competing briefs of historians allows for an adversarial review of the original public meaning of certain concepts.

With respect, I think this is not yet a sufficient response. For one thing, judges could of course do both badly. The fact that judges are (or consider themselves) called on to decide complicated issues in other fields doesn't mean they do it well, so it doesn't tell us whether it's a problem with respect to history; it just tells us it's not a unique problem.

For another, in many such areas there is a substantial administrative agency structure in place to allow first-order evaluation of these questions by experts with significant experience in the field. Much of the question for judges then becomes what level of deference to apply and when. That's less true of history; there's no Federal History Agency taking a first stab at these questions. Yet again, the questions that arise with respect to biochemistry may have readily falsifiable answers that help to weed out clearly wrong opinions; the questions that arise in history may not. 

Blackman is right that it's ultimately a question of methodology, certainly. But that also suggests a difference. Courts, or courts in concert with the administrative state, may seek ways to avoid having to decide difficult technical questions outside their expertise. But originalism, of whatever variety, is an approach to constitutional law that actively forces judges into a field in which they arguably lack expertise. It increases rather than decreases the epistemological problem. If you were looking for a judicial methodology of constitutional interpretation that avoided putting judges in a position for which they're ill-suited, presumably you would focus on what judges do well and often--crunching doctrine--rather than on an approach that requires them to do history. Originalists argue that they are required to do some form of history because that is what legitimate constitutional interpretation requires. Presumably, then, they would argue that whether they can do it well or not, it's what they're called upon to do just the same, and Article V will serve as a safety valve. Fair enough, if you accept the premise (I don't). But it's still an odd ex ante choice of method if what you care about is comparative institutional expertise. 

A slightly different but related answer, and I think an accurate one, is to say that originalist judges aren't "doing history" in any sense in which actual historians would describe their own field. They're doing a legal activity that consists of deriving present meaning from text based on the original public understanding of language. They're doing so in a way that is constrained in various respects in terms of sources, goals, selection effects (the fact that judges are trying to answer a specific question about a contemporary legal issue, and so will be affected by presentist concerns, rather than at least taking on a broad question with less of an interested starting-point), and so on. The results of that method may be judged in various ways; of these, historical accuracy is one but hardly the only measure. Historians, and historians' briefs, may aid them in this endeavor, but not much and rarely definitively. (And do judges really listen to historians anyway?) What they do may be closer to etymology than history. I doubt they have much expertise here either. But it's at least valuable to have a more precise understanding of what they're doing, rather than use "history" as a catchall label or judge their efforts by the standards of a related but different field altogether. 

The ultimate question is whether originalism is required of judges engaged in constitutional interpretation or not; I can't answer that question here. But if it is, it won't matter much whether they're good or bad at it, or whether they're any better or worse at that than at deciding cases involving biochemistry. Still, we recognize in all kinds of ways that judges are lousy at biochemistry and seek ways of avoiding the necessity of doing so, or of limiting their work in this area to questions and methods they're capable of dealing with. Originalism does the opposite: it requires judges to dive headlong into an area of inquiry--but don't call it "history!"--at which they're arguably not especially able. I doubt the comparison between history and biochemistry is entirely apt, for the reasons I've given; but if it is, I don't see why it should comfort us any. 


Posted by Paul Horwitz on April 17, 2013 at 10:49 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (9) | TrackBack

Thursday, April 11, 2013

OMFG It's the Michigan Law Review Books Issue

The annual books issue of the Michigan Law Review is always one of my favorite law review issues of the year. (Yes, some of us still think in terms of law review "issues.") For one thing, I love books and am glad to see them get attention in the legal periodical literature--especially now that I've written a couple of the suckers. For another, too many law reviews, for totally understandable reasons that have to do with getting cite counts rather than actually serving the cause of legal scholarship, do too little book reviewing. Also, from a sheer reader's perspective, book reviews are often among the best-written things in law reviews, both because they can skip over the usual massive literature review section and (I am now coming to think) because the format tamps down on the need for ridiculously overextended "novelty" claims. 

Anyway, this year's issue is now out and available online. It includes my review of Brian Tamanaha's Failing Law Schools and Walter Olson's Schools for Misrule, but it also has many good pieces. Enjoy!


Posted by Paul Horwitz on April 11, 2013 at 10:28 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack

Symposium on When the State Speaks

My friends at Concurring Opinions are running an online symposium this week on Corey Brettschneider's book, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?: How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality. I'm participating and have a couple of posts up--one a set of general questions, and the other more focused on Brettschneider's discussion of religious liberty. By all means, surf on over and check out those posts and others, including Brettschneider's responses as he posts them. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on April 11, 2013 at 10:05 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Wednesday, April 03, 2013

The [tk] State of North Carolina

Here is a nice story about a House bill in North Carolina that declares that "the Constitution of the United States of America does not prohibit states or their subsidiaries from making laws respecting an establishment of religion," and that the "North Carolina General Assembly does not recognize federal court rulings which prohibit and otherwise regulate the State of North Carolina, its public schools or any political subdivisions of the State from making laws respecting an establishment of religion." It has eleven sponsors so far, all Republicans. 

Note that the bill does not appear to be making the "jurisdictional" argument that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit state establishments and has been wrongly interpreted to do so through incorporation. Rather, it appears to be based on some kind of bouillabaise of nullification, popular constitutionalism, something like federalism, and denial of the power of federal judicial review. It says:

The Constitution of the United States does not grant the federal government and does not grant the federal courts the power to determine what is or is not constitutional; therefore, by virtue of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the power to determine constitutionality and the proper interpretation and proper application of the Constitution is reserved to the states and to the people. . . Each state in the union is sovereign and may independently determine how that state may make laws respecting an establishment of religion.

The bill does not say anything about whether its theory of interpretation and authority applies to any other federal constitutional provisions, such as the Speech Clause. It also does not actually require establishment, nor does it say which religion the state would establish if it went ahead and did so. Here's hoping it goes with Islam, in the spirit of using states as laboratories of experimentation.  

Posted by Paul Horwitz on April 3, 2013 at 10:05 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

Monday, April 01, 2013

Doing Good, Doing Well, and Not Waiting in Line

My next book project will be on social class and the American legal academy, so I was fascinated by Dale Carpenter's impassioned account of his experience lining up to watch the oral arguments in the same-sex marriage cases. According to his description, after waiting all night in the Supreme Court bar members' line--along with a host of paid, mostly poor, mostly black, line-sitters--he watched a variety of individuals "arrive in a fleet of eco-friendly Priuses, alternately sipping their mocha pepperaminto skim milk lattes and chatting excitedly about egalitarianism’s next frontier," and not only taking the spaces reserved by the line-sitters but also swelling their numbers with line-cutting friends. 

There is not necessarily any hypocrisy in this, as such. Lots of well-credentialed liberals believe in a world in which all people, no matter their race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation, can amass as much wealth as possible, work every connection they have, and take full advantage, on their own behalf and especially on behalf of their children, of massive inequality of opportunity. It's just a lousy ethic, that's all. But Dale does a lovely job of describing it, and his post is well worth reading.   

Posted by Paul Horwitz on April 1, 2013 at 11:37 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (25) | TrackBack

Thursday, March 14, 2013

A Good Day to Read Anthony Gill

Given Rick's post elsewhere, I feel a little nervous about saying I'm delighted, without reading too much into it, that the new Pope has taken the name Francis.

My work on law and religion, including religious institutionalism, has tended to take one or both of two approaches: an internal perspective that tries to appreciate the views and obligations of religious individuals and institutions from within, and a more external, institutional perspective in which things like history and economics provide a useful tool with which to analyze the behavior of religious institutions as institutional actors. (I have a forthcoming paper, still in progress, that applies that approach to the "freedom of the church" debate.) I tend to think both the internal and the external approaches are necessary and valuable, and that it is possible to take an external perspective without being impious or harsh.

Here, I just want to recommend a particular author--Anthony Gill--for those who might be interested in an externalist perspective on the selection of a Pope from Latin America. Gill is the author of two excellent books. The first, Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America, uses an economic, historical, and rational-choice approach to analyze the varying relations between the Church and the state in Latin America, offering a theory about why resistance to the state became popular as a Church approach in some Latin American states and not in others. (The answer, in short: the degree and nature of competition from evangelical Protestantism in different Latin American states.) The second, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty, takes the same approach and applies it to a broader canvas; it has a chapter on Latin America.

Both are well worth reading--especially but not exclusively today. I'm sure there will be a lot of talk about this decision as reflecting the importance and growth of Catholicism in Latin America and in the southern hemisphere. What Gill adds to that picture is 1) the importance in those states of competition from other religious sects that have also made major inroads in those areas, and occasioned great concern in those places from once-dominant sects; and 2) how that fuller picture has affected church-state relations in different ways at different times, and the ways in which the dominant church has taken very different approaches to church-state/religious liberty questions in different places, even at the same time, rather than taking a universalist approach.

None of this, of course, is meant to offer any reading of tea leaves, or to deny the value of an internal as well as an external perspective. But I've found Gill's work useful and interesting and it may be of particular interest to others today.    


Posted by Paul Horwitz on March 14, 2013 at 08:48 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

Tuesday, March 12, 2013


I apologize for posting on this matter one more time. But one of the problems with these kinds of Internet teapost-tempests is that they get very ugly, everyone decides to put the matter behind them, and then everyone just repeats the same behavior the next time around. Sometimes it's both necessary and right to make a moral judgment about particular affairs before putting them behind you. So let me offer here, rather than on The Faculty Lounge, which tends to eat long comments, a response to Paul Campos, who has offered a kind of response to Dan Filler et al.'s statement from yesterday on his blog, and commendably has offered a link to it at The Faculty Lounge. I encourage those who are exhausted by this issue to skip the post. But some things demand to be judged, on the record.

Campos’s comment strikes me as totally pusillanimous. Consider everything he has been saying in the last week, and how he has said it. And note that it was all based on what he now calls “triangulation”—which is to say, inference and conjecture, which are notoriously subject to error (along with, he claims, other information that he is not revealing in order to maintain confidentiality, although as far as I can tell from today’s post he doesn’t think anyone else is entitled to be believed in such circumstances). In the course of a few days, he went from saying, “It appears the admins at The Faculty Lounge may have some explaining to do”; to saying that “the obvious suspect” for having passed along information was someone at TFL and “the obvious candidate from among the site’s bloggers is Dan Filler”; to a post on March 7 repeatedly singling out Filler as his prime suspect; to a post on March 8 saying that the conduct he was complaining of “was apparently made possible by his co-blogger Dan Filler sharing confidential email information from comments at Filler’s other blog, The Faculty Lounge”; to a statement in the same post, now fully accusatory and without qualification, saying, “let’s not forget the role of his errand boy Dan Filler in all this, who can’t even manage to get to denial, but is apparently too cowardly to confess to his role in this squalid business”; to a conclusion in the same post that Filler’s failure to issue a clear denial of responsibility removed “any” doubt for Campos that Filler was guilty. Note the hot and temperamental rhetoric; the mounting number of accusations against one person; and the increasing move from speculation to what he pronounces is utter certainty.  

Following yesterday's statement here, Campos's post today, to which he links and which you can judge for yourself, is notably lacking in that kind of rhetoric. Instead, it adopts--in what, as far as I can tell from reading Campos's blog for more than a year, is a fairly typical rhetorical move whenever he is called into question--a sober-sided, more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger, let's-put-this-late-unpleasantness-behind-us tone. He describes himself as having, in his earlier posts, "determined that Leiter’s co-blogger Dan Filler was an obvious candidate for having given Leiter access to the critics’ email addresses, and in at least one case an IP address as well." Note the difference between that more circumspect description and his actual language in repeated posts, which ended in a pronouncement that he had no doubt that Filler, who was not his own man but someone's "errand boy," was the guilty party. His post today ends by suggesting that no other explanation is possible other than that someone at TFL blog acted improperly, although he has hardly demonstrated that; but he also now identifies a range of possibilities and culprits other than Professor Filler. Apparently his doubt is back. How nice to see it again. 

 Admittedly, I would never write accusatory posts like that in the first place, and certainly not a series of them, and certainly not a series that ends by announcing my utter confidence that I am right in accusing a particular individual--and all of this on the basis of "triangulation," no less. If I did, however, and the accused then issued a denial, I would consider myself honor-bound toreply in language that was just as loud and clear as my accusations. I suppose if I thought the person was lying, I might say so, and why I thought so. But if I now admitted that there were other possibilities, I would apologize straightfowardly, even if I was not sure I was wrong, both because I might be wrong and because my earlier statements had said I was certain I was right.. I wouldn’t suddenly move from repeated, hotly voiced accusations to cool, lawyerly, passive-verbed tones; that would strike me as just another way of being less than straightforward, if not outright dishonest and dishonorable. And I sure as hell wouldn’t talk soberly about wanting to put “this sad and disturbing matter” behind me until I had first done the right thing, in clear and unmistakeable language. Anything else would strike me as cheap and cowardly.

Lots of Campos’s fans like to accuse law professors of writing about subjects they know nothing about—and not without reason! In that sense, I find it telling that Campos is the author of an article titled “Shame.”   


Posted by Paul Horwitz on March 12, 2013 at 02:46 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Saturday, March 09, 2013

On Anonymity, Professorial and Otherwise

A number of things about this latest online discussion of anonymity and its discontents strike me as somewhere between silly and disturbing. Actually, almost everything about it does, but one thing in particular is bothering me at the moment. It's the failure to actually discuss meaningfully the uses and abuses of anonymity. Without singling out anyone--and how could I, since most of the people talking about it online are doing so anonymously?--a comment on Howard's post below has set me off. The comment begins: "I would highly counsel anonymity in these posts. We are essentially mulling over legal ideas, and our speculations may or may not be correct given that we’re giving a first impression; the equivalent of going into each other’s office and talking it over rather than putting in the research, speaking to a client, and then providing a well-founded (ie. sufficient under FRCP Rule 11) advice." It is signed "anonprof." Of course, I have no idea whether the commenter is a professor at all, let alone a law professor. Assuming he or she is, however, I find it disturbing and worthy of comment, with all appropriate apologies to that individual.

The most common justification given for anonymity online, at least on the law blogs as of late, has been fear of professional repercussions for young lawyers who worry that they will be fired for speaking their mind. I can imagine cases, maybe even many cases, in which that is a valid concern. It does not, of course, say anything about how one speaks one's mind. I would have thought that a decent person who decides to speak anonymously would be more careful about what he or she says, and how he or she says it, because a decent person who refuses to put his or her good name behind a statement ought to think that circumspection is a reasonable price to pay for immunity. It's difficult to judge degrees of behavior, but obviously plenty of people who speak anonymously feel emboldened instead. Equally obviously, some people who speak anonymously behave like vulgar, uncivil asses. I assume some of them are just like that, and talk the same way even when they're using their own names. But surely some of them have decided that being anonymous frees them to be complete asses, and take full advantage of that fact. That is, I think, literally contemptible. If you can't manage to have manners, you should have a name; if you can't manage to have a name, you could at least have some manners. If you don't have either, you ought to get a life.

Leaving those people aside, surely not all of those who are civil (albeit forceful) but anonymous are justified in their anonymity by a genuine concern for disastrous consequences if they attach their name to what they write. Fear of consequences is a valid justification for anonymity, but it isn't always a valid concern. There's a difference between worrying about being fired for a careless statement, especially if one lacks resources, and worrying about slower advancement, fewer promotions, and so on. I don't think the latter concern is unworthy of anonymity, but it does suggest a certain lack of character--and all the more so if that person then uses anonymity in an especially uncivil way. This is strictly hypothetical, but if some fifth-year associate at a big law firm somewhere decided that the wise thing to do would be to remain anomymous so he or she could post "fuck off" somewhere online without worrying about losing a promotion, I wouldn't consider that an especially legitimate reason for anonymity. Could any serious person conclude otherwise? 

With academics, including law professors, the reasons for anonymity, at least in one's own professional realm, are even more limited. They are, in fact, pretty close to non-existent. I could imagine a whistle-blowing scenario in which one writes about one's own colleagues for important reasons and wants to remain anonymous. I say imagine, because I can't think of any examples of anyone having actually done so. Most of the time, though, law professors who comment anonymously aren't doing anything like whistle-blowing. They're professing some view about the law. And that, of course, is their job. For tenured professors, there is no good reason to seek anonymity in order to profess about the law, legal education, or the legal academy. As far as I'm concerned, things are generally no different for untenured professors. For one thing, as I've written here before, if you can't muster up the courage to act like you deserve academic freedom before you get tenure, then it's not clear to me that you deserve it at all. For another, if you're not sure the view you're expressing is meritorious, you don't actually have to say anything at all! And if you are still moved to speak, nothing prevents you from putting your opinion in a careful and cabined way--which, as a conscientious academic, you should be doing anyway.

I hate to sound all "kids today" about it. But I started blogging some eight years ago, pre-tenure, well after many other law professors but still relatively early in the law-blogging period. Plenty of law professors back then thought about blogging and decided they didn't want to do so, either because they might suffer blowback at their own institution or in terms of lateral hiring, or because they didn't think they could spend the amount of time they'd require to feel good about having their own words attached to their own name online day after day, or both. I completely respect those decisions, and who's to say they weren't in fact much wiser? To the extent that some of us did choose to take advantage of the medium, no one was handing out any guarantees that there would be no consequences. But that's true of everything academics choose to write or not write, regardless of the medium. Absent extraordinary circumstances, I just don't think anonymity is a valid choice for law professors who want to say things about their own profession online, in comments or elsewhere. It certainly doesn't suggest even the minimal degree of courage that I think every academic, if not every lawyer--or even every person--in a First World country ought to possess. 




Posted by Paul Horwitz on March 9, 2013 at 10:17 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Friday, March 08, 2013

Sarat Symposia--Past, Present, and Future

Today at the University of Alabama, we were pleased to have our friend Austin Sarat serving as host for a symposium titled "Civil Rights in the American Story." The lineup was terrific, and although I couldn't be there for every talk, the ones I saw were excellent.

Austin has hosted a variety of excellent symposia at Alabama and I've been delighted to participate in several of them. Here, by way of weekend reading, is an abstract for a paper I gave in response to Martin Redish at a symposium on speech and silence in American law. The paper is titled "Anonymity, Signaling, and Silence as Speech." In it, I argue, inter alia, that Internet anonymity takes a variety of forms, including genuine anonymity and consistent pseudonymity, and that rather than viewing it as a form of silence, anonymity can be understood "as an attributional decision that sends important signals about the reliability of the speech and the speaker." I would do some things differently if I were writing the paper today, but I still think the signaling point is worthwhile, and in any event I was just grateful to share a stage with Prof. Redish. I'm also very much looking forward to participating in a symposium Austin will be presenting at the Law School this fall on civility. It will be a great spur to think about those issues.  


Posted by Paul Horwitz on March 8, 2013 at 09:31 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Friday, March 01, 2013

Weekend Reading: Defending (Religious) Institutionalism

I've posted a short piece on SSRN, titled "Defending (Religious) Institutionalism." You can find it here. It builds on issues I've discussed in First Amendment Institutions (which, may I say, makes a splendid World Kidney Day gift). The issues raised here turn out to be especially timely in light of recent litigation over the ministerial exception, the contraceptive mandate, and similar issues. I should note that this piece is a reply to Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman's important article, Against Religious Institutionalism, which is coming out later this year in the Virginia Law Review; my reply will also appear there. 

The abstract follows. Emailed comments are most welcome. 

This piece is a reply to Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman's forthcoming article, Against Religious Institutionalism. The issue of the institutional status and rights of religious entities is an important and hot topic, given recent cases like Hosanna-Tabor, pending controversies over the application of the contraceptive mandate, and a spate of recent scholarship arguing for church autonomy and/or the revival of the ancient concept of "freedom of the church." Schragger and Schwartzman raise a number of tough questions about institutionalism, both in general and as it applies to churches. This reply offers a partial but forceful defense of institutionalism, in the church context and elsewhere.

Schragger and Schwartzman make some excellent points in their important article. In particular, they ask difficult questions about whether group rights stand on their own or are purely derived from individual rights, and sound an appropriate, if overly stringent, note of caution about "sovereignty talk" with respect to religious institutions. Nevertheless, they have not made out a conclusive case against (religious) institutionalism. In this reply, I offer a description of the institutionalist approach I have advocated for churches and other entities in my recent book, First Amendment Institutions, and argue that many of Schragger and Schwartzman's critiques of religious institutionalism don't apply to it. Schragger and Schwartzman argue that religious institutionalism is unnecessary because general principles of conscience and associational rights will be sufficient to protect conscience-based associations, including churches. Because they remain noncommittal about the actual scope of conscience and associational rights, however, they have not yet shown that this is true. Finally, I argue that Schragger and Schwartzman do not give an adequate sense of why religious institutionalists, and group-oriented pluralists in general, find the institutional turn attractive: why these thinkers are convinced of the importance of non-state institutions and concerned about the "pulverizing, macadamizing tendency" of the state toward those institutions. Those concerns remain very much alive, and as long as they do pluralism and institutionalism ought to have a place in our thinking.



Posted by Paul Horwitz on March 1, 2013 at 04:03 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Thursday, February 28, 2013

The Law School Crisis Continues; ITLSS Does Not

Paul Campos has announced that "the time has come" for him "to move on" from his Inside the Law School Scam blog. I wanted to announce that: whether one liked his blog or not, it was a big voice on law school crisis issues, and ignoring its demise would seem to me the equivalent of trying to sweep it under the rug. I didn't intend to say much more than that. But perhaps a couple more words are necessary in light of rather harsh comments in a blog post by Brian Leiter and in the comments on a post on TaxProf.

Early on, I was a critic of various aspects of Campos's blog, although not of the existence of the blog itself or of the existence of a blog devoted to problems with law schools. Some of my early posts speculated about Campos's motives. I think that was a mistake; I've never met him, after all. My later position was simpler and I hope fairer; there was much I found distasteful about the blog, but I had promised to read it and I did, every post, and I occasionally linked to discussions I found useful or important, basically skipping questions of motives, style, etc. There were one or two exceptions along the way where I thought he had said something especially silly, but quite few. While it's fine to discount if one distrusts a source, one should take information about an important topic where one can find it, and appreciate it. I posted less from the blog as time went by, largely because ITLSS became highly repetitive--something I don't view as a big reason for criticism; it's tough to write that much that often on a single topic--and often provided more commentary (of variable quality) than facts, and also because the quality of dialogue one gets on these topics from commenters tends to be mixed.

But, if I was not the fan of the blog that others were, I think it still had definite value. Campos seems to me to be essentially a journalist moonlighting as a law professor, and perhaps without some of the professional norms I would expect from a full-time journalist. But he offered a fair amount of good journalism along the way: a lot of digging up and examination of data that I hadn't seen elsewhere and that, good or bad interpretations of it aside, provided a useful and often distressing basis for analysis. That's a genuine contribution, for which I'm grateful; certainly, although I have written about these issues for quite some time, I didn't do the digging he did.

The "style," although I mean more than just writing style, was another matter. Many of his fans loved his writing style. I found it repetitive (how many times do you need to use the same quote from Upton Sinclair before it gets old?), self-indulgent, evasive and squirrelly, preening, and finally tedious. His analysis of the useful data he provided was often correct, in my view. But he seemed rarely content to make a basic point that would have been sufficiently devastating in itself, if the opportunity presented itself to make a far more tendentious de-haut-en-bas observation about some "big truth" that everyone but himself lacked the courage and acuity to recognize. A vivid style is one element of good writing; but so is self-restraint. Campos was much stronger on the former than the latter. Now, your mileage may vary. Clearly many people loved his writing, although of course I think my criticisms of that writing are entirely on point.

But I do think there was a relationship between style and substance here. As I said above and am happy to repeat, in my view his best contributions were those posts that provided lots of data, and at various times there were many of those posts. The more untethered his posts were from the data, however, the weaker they were, the more questionable or inconsistent or hard to pin down in their fundamental arguments. Both before and after he dropped the anonymity pose, he traded on his ostensible authority as an "insider" in various ways, by suggesting that he was sharing an insider's knowledge, or that the fact of his own quite human and understandable complicity in the system gave what he had to say extra authenticity. In the final analysis, though, what he provided was public knowledge, not private knowledge--in short, journalism. He simultaneously danced up to and shied away from saying anything meaningful about his own situation, although he might have offered some interesting thoughts about that. In doing so, he would say that the real issue was the system, not any one person in it. But that is really a mixed message: an effort to trumpet one's authority and insider status without actually drawing on it or discussing it honestly. That's what I mean by trading on authority, and it was a constant in his work; it is certainly a glaring feature of his final post. (If that's a flaw, I should note, it's not his alone; I've said much the same thing about amicus briefs by law professors, and no doubt it's often true of law professors' blog posts.)

In short, there were plenty of reasons to find aspects of his blog objectionable, and his suggestion in his final post that everyone who objected to what he wrote did so either because they were angry at his intrepid truth-telling or because of personal animus seems to me badly exaggerated and self-serving. The latter seems especially silly because, judged by his writing, Campos certainly has no objection to responding to others in a personal rather than a substantive way and drawing broad conclusions about the motives of others. (None of this, however, excuses some of the absurd defenses of the present law school regime I have read elsewhere in the last few months, or some of the dismissals-by-ad-hominem of accurate points that Campos made along the way.) But it should be said that his blog was never really aimed at law professors as a readership. Nor was there any obligation for him to do that. It was aimed at  (understandably) dismayed, dispirited, disgruntled law students and graduates, for the most part. The Internet being what it is, it would be foolish to draw any conclusions about how representative of broader views or intensity of emotion his readership was. But suffice it to say he did find and indulge a genuine readership with genuine concerns and anger. That's an important fact, I think.

Let me repeat something I argued very early in my engagement with both the Campos blog and the question of law school crisis and reform in general. The arguments that much needs to be fixed about law schools, in terms of numbers of students and schools, tuition and debt, curriculum, hiring, and so on, seems to me unassailable. The lousy and perhaps permanently changing legal economy adds a powerful element to that; one of the best Campos posts, in my view, was one about halfway through his run emphasizing just how central the lack of jobs is to the current crisis. But reform would still be necessary regardless of current conditions. I wrote early on that the danger of a "crisis" footing is that it may lead us to be even more complacent if the economy improves and fewer students are moved to complain about outcomes. But the changes needed in law schools are not just about responding to immediate stimuli; they're about doing the right thing, for students, clients, and simply for its own sake and because it ought to be part of one's ongoing academic duty. That Campos's blog is ending doesn't mean the issues aren't ongoing. Even if its discontinuation ends up turning down the temperature a little, which I'm not sure it will, that does not change the obligation to deal with these issues. And, again, for all of what I found its evident flaws, I would say his blog, at its best, contributed importantly to the discussion along the way. 




Posted by Paul Horwitz on February 28, 2013 at 09:13 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Sunday, February 24, 2013

If the Shoe Fits...

I am generally no fan of accusation by easy labeling, which is often misleading or inaccurate, rarely helpful or informative, and generally not conducive to clear thought. My pet example is Project Censored, whose annual top ten list of "censored" stories rarely involves actual censorship. Whatever merit there is in the claim that these stories deserved more coverage than they got is, for me, swallowed up by the cheap, attention-seeking misuse of the charged word "censorship."

All this is by way of talking about Senator Ted Cruz, who has been accused for the past week of engaging in McCarthyism, merely because he engaged in half-baked accusations and cheap insinuations. In the past couple of days, the New Yorker has dug up another example: in this case, a 2010 speech in which Cruz

"went on to assert that Obama, who attended Harvard Law School four years ahead of him, 'would have made a perfect president of Harvard Law School.' The reason, said Cruz, was that, 'There were fewer declared Republicans in the faculty when we were there than Communists! There was one Republican. But there were twelve who would say they were Marxists who believed in the Communists overthrowing the United States government.'"

This was a laughable assertion, but people say silly things all the time. So I am duly impressed that a spokesperson for Cruz has doubled down, saying to The Blaze in response to the New Yorker story:

“'It’s curious that the New Yorker would dredge up a three-year-old speech and call it "news,"'. . . . Regardless, Senator Cruz’s substantive point was absolutely correct: in the mid-1990s, the Harvard Law School faculty included numerous self-described proponents of ‘critical legal studies’ — a school of thought explicitly derived from Marxism – and they far outnumbered Republicans.”

I am impressed by this response on any number of levels, not least for constituting a dredger complaining about the dredging activities of others. Mostly, though, I am impressed by the claim that Cruz's earlier suggestion that a dozen HLS faculty members believed in the Communist overthrow of the United States government is "substantively correct" because the faculty included a number of adherents of critical legal studies--the most prominent among them being former CIA employee Duncan Kennedy.

I hope it's not too Tushnetian to say so, but I worry about a United States Senator, bright, well-educated, and often treated as the great non-white hope of the Republican Party, who can't tell his Reds from his red-diaper babies. I doubt that Cruz cares much whether he's accused of McCarthyism. If he does, though, he could probably avoid it more often in the future if he acts less like, well, McCarthy.

Read more: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/02/ted-cruz-sees-red-not-crimson-at-harvard.html#ixzz2Lmyx8rcW

Posted by Paul Horwitz on February 24, 2013 at 12:01 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Disconnects in the Law Review "Affirmative Action" Discussion

All the notional ink spilled in the past week on the question of whether law reviews ought to self-consciously select articles with a thumb on the scales of particular identity traits has certainly been interesting. The discussions have been interesting, and so has the amount of energy spent on it. I have little to add on the main subject, largely because I am still undecided about precisely how small the stakes are.

But I would like to make one observation. It seems to me that, in a sense, the arguments in favor of allowing law reviews to engage in this kind of activity actually end up with two very different implications, and not especially welcome ones for those making these arguments. On one reading, those arguments end up suggesting that there are good reasons why public law schools' law reviews cannot legally do so. On another, perhaps more puckish reading, the arguments in favor of "affirmative action" by law reviews amount to arguments against the constitutionality of affirmative action altogether, at least under current doctrine. Of course some generalizations follow. I think they're supportable ones, but they're not meant as definitive, so much as they're meant to make us ask what this smaller debate says about the larger issue.

Several things strike me as common features in contemporary arguments for the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions in the university context. 1) Largely because the Supreme Court requires it, it is routinely argued that such admissions programs involve a careful, holistic, nuanced, all-things-considered consideration that takes full account of the merits of each applicant and takes more than just race into account for diversity purposes. 2) For a variety of reasons, offices of affirmative action, diversity management, etc., both inside and outside of universities, routinely argue that their job is a complex one that requires a good deal of expertise and experience. 3) For both reasons, as well as for reasons relating to academic freedom, defenders of race-conscious university admissions argue that both the need for and the execution of such programs requires expert judgments of the kind that courts are ill-suited to make, and that courts therefore ought to afford universities substantial deference in this area.

Now contrast that with some of the arguments in the past week suggesting that law reviews, presumably including public university law reviews, are entitled to and perhaps ought to engage in article selection in part based on particular identity traits of the authors, including race. The arguments have been interesting and sometimes persuasive. But they still involve a brute bottom-line conclusion: that sorting according to identity trait (including race) can be undertaken by a bunch of 24-year-olds, who have at most a year's experience as journal editors and who, most people seem to agree, are not even qualified to judge the merits, such as they are, of the articles they are reading.

To the extent that it is true that journal editors are young and inexperienced--not to mention busy with a full load of coursework--I find it hard to imagine that anything they do would fall within the kinds of parameters that have led courts to defer to and permit race-conscious actions by other sectors of public universities. (Of course, it may be that the law reviews' actions fall outside the legal scope of any 14th Amendment prohibitions, if only because the law should not concern itself with trifles and law reviews are just that.)

Understandably, I haven't seen any suggestion, from defenders of law review editors engaging in this kind of authorial sorting, that those editors are simply unqualified to engage in what everyone has been calling "affirmative action." They seem to assume they are competent to do so. That leads me to my second, somewhat more provocative question. To the extent that they, or anyone else, think that law review editors are qualified to do so, and draw on broader arguments about race-conscious university admissions in talking about what law reviews might be doing or ought to do, shouldn't that lead us to doubt all the claims concerning complexity, expertise, holistic consideration, and so on that are made on behalf of public universities? Shouldn't it lead us to wonder whether any deference at all is warranted on the part of courts toward those universities? And if universities didn't receive that kind of deference, isn't it much more likely that race-conscious policies by universities would be struck down altogether? In short, if, for God knows what reason, the Supreme Court justices are sitting in Washington, taking a break from working on their opinions in the Fisher case to read the blog arguments in favor of affirmative action in law review article selection, shouldn't they conclude that Grutter v. Bollinger ought to be overruled?

Just a thought.

Posted by Paul Horwitz on February 17, 2013 at 11:57 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Friday, February 15, 2013

Blocher on "First Amendment Institutions"

The New England Law Review has a review of my recent book, First Amendment Institutions (available for Kindle readers! Makes a lovely Purim gift!), written by Duke's Joseph Blocher. Joe has some very generous things to say about the book and, more important, some good tough but sympathetic questions and criticisms concerning the institutional First Amendment project. It's an excellent read. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on February 15, 2013 at 02:37 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Thursday, February 14, 2013

LaPierre on Mad Max's America

This column by the NRA's Wayne LaPierre is well worth reading, even though it appears in the Daily Caller, for at least two reasons:

1) Proof, just in case it was needed, that the paranoid style is alive and well in American politics, and of the continuing deterioration of rhetoric on the Internet.

2) The total absence of mention of the NRA's post-Newtown proposal that Congress "act immediately, to appropriate whatever is necessary to put armed police officers in every school — and to do it now, to make sure that blanket of safety is in place when our children return to school in January." At the time, LaPierre described that proposal as urgent and necessary. Today, it doesn't even make the list of priorities, the first two of which are litigating and making sure the NRA receives more money. Incidentally, I wrote a while back that "[i]f the organization does not actually make a concerted and resource-heavy effort to see legislation proposed, advocated, and scored, then, at that point, I think it would be more than fair for even his supporters to conclude not only that the whole thing was political theater, but that--for professional purposes!--LaPierre does not really care all that much about the safety, well-being, or death of children." 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on February 14, 2013 at 08:35 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Wednesday, February 06, 2013

Conversation on First Amendment Institutions

I am extremely grateful to Marc DeGirolami, who conducted both a print and a telephone conversation with me about my new book, First Amendment Institutions, which incidentally makes a great Doppelganger Week gift. 9780674055414 Marc has posted our print conversation at the Center for Law and Religion Forum; a podcast of our phone conversation should be available soon through the Federalist Society, which is initiating a series of podcasts on new books. Marc's own book, The Tragedy of Religious Freedom, will be out later this spring. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on February 6, 2013 at 10:16 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

On Hatred--and Radical Love

I haven't been blogging much lately, for the usual reasons--ie., despair at the whole enterprise, with a smidgeon of being too busy with other things. (Happily, we've got you covered here with our series on Erie.) But I am moved to write by a post by Eugene Volokh yesterday (Martin Luther King Day, not incidentally) in which he writes to 

state for the record that I think it’s eminently fitting for us — and for anyone else — to feel and express hatred for those who are evil, and in particular to think that they eminently merited death and indeed would have merited an earlier one. Hatred is the normal and proper reaction to those who murder, those who enslave, and the like, both on Martin Luther King Day and on other days. 

You can read my comments on that post for the reasons why I found the post distressing, a feeling that has not abated with the passage of a day. So I thought, by way of antidote, that I'd post a link to a moving piece I read yesterday, a review in The New Yorker of a couple of recent biographies of Francis of Assisi. He does not provide an easy model for any of us to emulate, and most of us (of whatever faith) don't, really. But I can't help but find his example a more inspiring one. Enjoy.   

Posted by Paul Horwitz on January 22, 2013 at 04:26 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Tuesday, January 01, 2013

What Does Robert George Want, Exactly?

I reprint, with comment, this post from Robert George:

So now, it seems, we have rather a good test for the elite media. We know how reporters and commentators would be reacting to this story if the people arrested were (or were thought to be) tea party activists, do we not?


So how will they react now?

I predict that the story will be covered by Fox News and some conservative journalists (the link I provided is to the report in the conservative-leaning New York Post) and largely ignored by most of the mainstream media--print, broadcast, and on-line.  I hope I'm wrong about that.  In any event, the folks at the New York Times, NBC, CNN, etc. will certainly not use the story to blacken Occupy Wall Street or the political left.  They will not do what they almost certainly would be doing if the persons arrested had been tea party people.  Of course, we've all more or less gotten used to this double standard; at this point even most conservatives have resigned themselves to it.  But that doesn't mean it's not a problem. The common good of a democratic polity does not require a pristinely unbiased media, but it requires far more evenhandedness than ours gives us. Especially in circumstances of pluralism such as ours, groupthink in the media is not a good thing.  It is even worse than groupthink in academia, though that too is bad--for everyone.

The story is new to me, although one can find an "elite media" report on it here, and another story with a statement from Occupy Wall Street here

A couple of comments.

First, I'm not clear on whether George includes Fox News or the New York Post under the rubric of "elite media" or not. Obviously, one or both belong there (and, also obviously, both are terrible news organizations), but his post is a little ambiguous on this point.

Second, it would surely be helpful if George were a little more upfront about what he wants. Is it equality, or quality? Does he think stories of either kind should be played up for all they're worth, or that stories of both kinds should be covered to the extent and with the care they deserve? I assume he thinks the Times would be wrong not to cover such a story (but it did cover it), but I can't tell whether he thinks the Post played it fairly or not. I gather, although I'm not sure, that he thinks that the "elite media" have used other stories to blacken the "political right" unfairly; so does he think the Post's story unfairly blackens the political left, or that it gets it just right (and thus, presumably, that some of those other stories blackening the political right also got it right), or what? 

Finally, I do think George has a point, of course. But he also demonstrates the capacity of stereotyped, lazy thinking and reading to weaken an otherwise presumably able mind. The plural of anecdote is not data, of course. I have read stories along the way about the Tea Party in elite media sources (I don't pay attention to television news of any sort, as a rule) that have, in my view, unfairly tarred it by association with its most extreme members. Those stories were most common, unsurprisingly, when the Tea Party was in its earlier, less organized or co-opted stages and the story was new; that's generally when the media makes the most mistakes. Those stories hardly constitute the common run of stories about the Tea Party in the elite media, many of which may be critical of the "group" but also take it entirely seriously as a large political movement--more seriously, certainly, than they do Occupy Wall Street (and with good reason).

I do find it necessary, in reading the "elite media," to separate the wheat from the chaff; it's also fairly clear to me that its work consists more of wheat than chaff. I'm not sure that is true of the work of the Post or Fox News. I'm sorry that George has resigned himself to any double standards in the elite news media at all; he shouldn't. But it's also clear to me that if these stereotypes are all he is getting from his reading of those media (if he reads them), then he is operating under a heavy dose of groupthink himself. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on January 1, 2013 at 12:19 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Happy New Year

On a cheerier note, happy new year to all our readers. Speaking only for myself, I must say that the regular posters here are blessed by our guests, who have written some great material and made the intermittent nature of our own posts less glaring. I am also grateful for our commenters. We sometimes joke about, and sometimes take criticism for, our efforts to maintain a balance between allowing and encouraging anonymous commentary and criticism and trying to avoid descending too much into the mire. I doubt we always strike that balance right, although we try. There are some deleted comments that I wish had stayed up, and vice versa. But I am generally extremely pleased by the conversations here.

In any event, any year that will see both the induction of Rush into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Alabama's victory over the fine folks at Notre Dame can't be all bad. I hope yours is a good one.  

Posted by Paul Horwitz on January 1, 2013 at 10:08 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Hillary Clinton Suffers From Blood Clot Near Brain

One update is here. What can one say, except...


P.S.: Now that I think about it, if one were a decent human being and not unduly plagued by paranoia, "Get well soon" might work. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on January 1, 2013 at 10:00 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack

Thursday, December 27, 2012

NRA Scoring: Not "Pernicious" But Still Important (and Revealing)

Orin links this morning to the same story that caught my eye today: Linda Greenhouse's opinion piece on what she calls the NRA's "increasingly pernicious role in judicial confirmations." Greenhouse writes that the NRA has become increasingly willing to "score" votes on particular judicial nominees, both for the Supreme Court and for lower federal court slots, and even where there is little strong evidence of that nominee's views on gun rights. Because of the NRA's political and financial clout, its vote scoring can make a significant difference in individual senators' positions on such nominees. Greenhouse writes that these positions can only be explained as a part of the NRA's "maintenance of its symbiotic relationship with the Republican Party." She calls it "totally unacceptable for the N.R.A. . . to be calling the tune on judicial nominations for an entire political party." Orin writes, contra Greenhouse, that there is no principled difference between what the NRA has done in this situation and other efforts by advocacy groups across the political spectrum to influence legislative decisions.

I agree. I won't rehash Orin's points, but I'll add a couple. First, Greenhouse describes the NRA's clout and its power to influence senators through scored votes as purely a matter of Republican politics. Clearly the NRA's relationship to the GOP is stronger than its relationship to the Democratic Party, but in doing so glosses over the fact that, for political reasons, the Democratic Party as a whole has run away from gun control for the last decade or so, and championed the rise of many pro-gun or anti-gun-control Democratic politicians. Second, Greenhouse writes that "[t]here was, in fact, no plausible reason for any senator to vote against" Sonia Sotomayor. That's a silly statement, one that depends on an incredibly loaded interpretation of advice and consent; of course it was plausible to imagine that Sotomayor would be a "liberal" justice, in various meanings of that word, and reasonable (on some meanings of that word) to vote against her on that basis, just as it would have been reasonable to vote against the eminently qualified John Roberts on the opposite basis. For similar reasons, it's not accurate for Greenhouse to write that NRA opposition to liberal judicial nominees is somehow incoherent unless it's based on undefined substantive reasons. What it is, for better or worse, is a plausible prediction of future performance, and it's the same prediction that other advocacy groups make in opposing conservative judicial nominees.

That said, I think one could say more than Orin does in his post. Without assuming that the NRA's political clout, relative to most other interest groups, is unearned or illegitimate, it is still substantial (although hardly invincible, as Richard Mourdock could tell you). So when the group extends its ambit, surely that is worth noting and reflecting upon, particularly when that ambit extends past gun-specific issues to include carveouts intended to preserve its own political power (a carveout, incidentally, to which congressional Democrats agreed, contrary to Greenhouse's all-Republican narrative). And when it does so apparently as much to secure a tradeoff with particular political leaders as for reasons related to the group's mission, that's worth noting too: Greenhouse reports that one reason the NRA scored the vote on Sotomayor was because it was asked to by Senator McConnell, in order to keep the Senate Republican caucus in line on the vote. I agree with Orin that that's just how politics goes, but that doesn't preclude our noting and being concerned by it. 

Finally, the political power of the NRA's scoring mechanism is worth noting because, as I noted in my earlier post, the group made clear last week that it thinks it is urgently necessary, in order to save the lives of innocent children, to push a legislative effort to put armed guards in every school in the United States before those schools reopen in January. Orin writes: "I realize that the NRA is in the news for its proposals for responding to the Sandy Hook shooting—proposals that I find, um, unhelpful. But I want to focus this post on the proper role of groups in influencing the judicial confirmation process." That's his prerogative, and it's a delight to see someone on his blog mentioning the NRA proposal at all. But, as I wrote earlier, a key indicator of whether the NRA was at all sincere in its statement will be whether the lobby is able to get one of its many congressional allies to put a bill on the floor in that timeframe, and an even better indicator of sincerity will be whether it treats this as a scored vote.

Opponents of the NRA already think the group doesn't care about the deaths of children and are unlikely to be persuaded otherwise. That's not a view I share, particularly given its gun safety programs, which could be viewed as self-serving but don't have to be. But if the group doesn't get a bill on the floor and doesn't score any vote on that bill, particularly having scored things like the Sotomayor vote, then I think even its allies--who have mostly been silent in recent days--would be entitled, if not obliged, to conclude that the NRA doesn't care about dead children anywhere near as much as it says it does. Surely that would be worth more than shrugging and saying, "Forget it, Jake; it's Chinatown."  

Posted by Paul Horwitz on December 27, 2012 at 10:29 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack

Sunday, December 23, 2012

An Interesting Supportive Conservative Take on the LaPierre Statement...

That title may be a bit misleading. Actually, what I find interesting is that an interesting, supportive take on the LaPierre statement has been difficult to find. As I said in my last post, I already know what my liberal/pro-gun-control friends thought about the statement, and found it mostly uninteresting (and somewhat unpersuasive). But I had hoped to get out of my own epistemic bubble to find an upside take on LaPierre's statement from my usual go-to sites for those towing a more pro-gun, anti-gun-regulation, or conservative take on these and other issues. I suppose my own views on the issue are clear, but it's nice to look for challenges to those views.

But the usual sites I go to have either been silent or strategic (or both) in their reactions. The VC is the first place I go to for such things. Eugene Volokh had a post yesterday on a press release by Senator Feinstein proposing an assault weapons ban, but that post didn't mention the LaPierre statement. David Kopel, who can generally be relied on to be vocal on such issues on the VC, oddly hasn't put anything up on that site since December 11. The Corner, the National Review blog, had one more or less substantive post on the proposal, one purely descriptive piece, and a couple of posts detailing news show appearances by LaPierre or David Keene (but without discussing Friday's proposal). But mostly, it focused on criticizing reactions to the NRA's statement. (By comparison, it's had four posts on Chuck Hagel in the last three days.) For my sins, and so you, dear readers, wouldn't have to, I visited Instapundit. I don't expect substance from that site, but was still surprised by what I found, which basically was the same "the enemy of my friend is my enemy" approach that the NRO took, criticizing reactions to the statement rather than addressing the statement itself--i.e., "Well, he had journalists seething, which is probably a good sign."

I should add two points, but also two counterpoints. 1) Although this was the only major statement or proposal since Newtown by the leading pro-gun interest group, and one might expect to find something meaningful about it on these sites, it is of course possible that substantive commentators might be more interested in serious ideas than in evaluating every picayune press release or statement that comes down the pike. On the other hand, one would think that if Eugene had time to write about a press release from Senator Feinstein's office, he might have something to say about this. 2) People have lives, of course--even bloggers. They don't have always have time to write about everything. On the other hand, Kopel has published two op-eds and one NYT Room for Debate piece, and done six media appearances, since Newtown, but has written not one word on the VC since the 11th, let alone anything on what the NRA described as an urgent and necessary proposal to address mass murders of children in schools.

I think this is fair evidence that the usual suspects either found LaPierre and the NRA's proposal beneath discussion, or thought it politic, for some reason, to simply not mention it. I'm sure there are more charitable conclusions that could be drawn, or that one could draw no conclusions at all. I still found it downright bizarre, though, and frankly disappointing. I did not search very far outside my usual sources, to be sure, and perhaps there were good defenses of the proposal out there. But I didn't see them where I would expect to see them. My own view, as I said in my earlier post, is not that the proposal was horrifying or morally monstrous as such; just that, unless the NRA actually devotes resources to getting a bill on the floor and scores that vote, then we can quite fairly treat it as cynical political theater.

On a marginally cheerier note, check out the very interesting discussions of the gun/gun-control issue from a Catholic point of view, including a couple post-LaPierre statement, at Mirror of Justice--especially, with all due respect to the other posters there, the posts from Rob Vischer and Patrick Brennan. The comments to those posts offer some slightly interesting natural law perspectives, although what is startlingly absent from those comments is even the slightest hint of the imitation of Christ or the emulation of the saints. (When a commenter there writes about the possibility of a Katrina-like disaster, "Unfortunately, in cases like this, you may have little choice but to either fire a weapon against someone...or be killed for your food," I wonder whether he even considered the option of simply giving away his food to those who hunger--which is, you know, what Christ would have done.) I particularly admired the posts by Prof. Brennan, who is what outsiders would call a conservative Catholic (although I think he would reject that term), but who offers a powerful reminder, on the eve of Christmas, that committed Christianity may call for a radical peace that demands much more than hobbyists, or lovers of the bourgeois American lifestyle, may find comfortable.  

Posted by Paul Horwitz on December 23, 2012 at 02:11 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Saturday, December 22, 2012

The NRA Proposal Judged From an Internal Point of View

It's unsurprising that the gun control/response to Newtown debate has not remained terribly focused or productive for very long. This isn't my field, and I've been occupied with other things anyway, so I haven't written on it this week. But I did want to add two observations. Both of them are admittedly consistent with my biases on the issue, but both are also aimed at trying to say something that could and perhaps ought to be said by those who don't share those biases.

The first has to do with the NRA statement to the press yesterday. (More a statement than a "press conference," since the organization imposed a three-day waiting period before answering any questions.) Here is Wayne LaPierre's statement in full. Unsurprisingly, gun-control advocates did not care for the statement. For present purposes I won't take a position on it. But if one takes something like the NRA's point of view, a question worth asking is whether the statement was essentially political theater or whether it had any shred of sincerity to it. Admittedly, I think it was theater. But how might one evaluate it from an internal point of view?

Two factors seem relevant. First, the statement does not amount to saying, putting more armed guards in school is the best we can do, or that it is acceptable legislation, or a reasonable starting point for discussion. It says doing so is utterly, immediately necessary. "[W]e must speak ... for the safety of our nation's children," LaPierre said. "[W]when it comes to the most beloved, innocent and vulnerable members of the American family — our children — we as a society leave them utterly defenseless, and the monsters and predators of this world know it and exploit it. That must change now!" Here was his specific call for action:

I call on Congress today to act immediately, to appropriate whatever is necessary to put armed police officers in every school — and to do it now, to make sure that blanket of safety is in place when our children return to school in January.

Before Congress reconvenes, before we engage in any lengthy debate over legislation, regulation or anything else, as soon as our kids return to school after the holiday break, we need to have every single school in America immediately deploy a protection program proven to work — and by that I mean armed security.

And he concluded: "This is the time, this is the day for decisive action. We can't wait for the next unspeakable crime to happen before we act. We can't lose precious time debating legislation that won't work. We mustn't allow politics or personal prejudice to divide us. We must act now."

The second factor is this: If that's what the NRA thinks is immediately necessary to resolve a pressing issue of public safety, it has plenty of resources and influence to devote to the task. It spent some $19 million in the last election cycle. Its lobbying power is evident. It is willing to spend to defeat incumbent Republicans as well as Democrats. It devoted ample resources to the primary defeat of Senator Richard Lugar, who enjoyed a one-time A rating from the group and almost has an NRA-worthy last name. And one key aspect of its power is its determination which congressional votes to "score" in coming up with its ratings. 

So, in judging the good faith of yesterday's proposal, which again was described not as a compromise or possible idea but as urgent and mandatory, look to three things. First, will it actually expend any resources on it? Yesterday's statement said that former congressman Asa Hutchinson would "lead [our] effort as National Director of the National School Shield Program, with a budget provided by the NRA of whatever scope the task requires." The NRA has the money, and can raise more. How much will it spend? Second, how long will it take for it to get a bill into the hopper? It ought not take terribly long. Third and by far the most important, will the NRA treat any vote on this issue as a scored vote, regardless of any reasons, such as fiscal conservatism, that individual members might have for voting against it? If it can't get a bill on the floor, or doesn't score that vote, then I think it would be quite fair to say it never really gave a damn about what it described as an urgent and necessary proposal.

Again, I appreciate that those who oppose the NRA in general, or found yesterday's statement insufficient or horrifying, already think the proposal was political theater. For present purposes, I'm not interested in that; I'm interested in how those who either support the NRA in general, or think the proposal was a good or at least reasonable idea, and in any event who think the NRA is sincere in its statements, should evaluate the proposal--which, obviously, they should.

It's not all that hard for those who already hate LaPierre to continue hating him. But for those who think highly of him, and/or of the organization, I think it's fair to say this: LaPierre made clear that his proposal, in his view, was urgent, important, and necessary to protect "the most beloved, innocent and vulnerable members of the American family — our children." If the organization does not actually make a concerted and resource-heavy effort to see legislation proposed, advocated, and scored, then, at that point, I think it would be more than fair for even his supporters to conclude not only that the whole thing was political theater, but that--for professional purposes!--LaPierre does not really care all that much about the safety, well-being, or death of children. His adversaries, of course, already think that, but I'm more interested in how his supporters should judge him.    

Posted by Paul Horwitz on December 22, 2012 at 09:30 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Friday, December 21, 2012

Introduction to a Discussion: Koppelman on "Defending American Religious Neutrality"

Here's another piece of weekend reading. As Rick noted on this page a while back, our friend and colleague Andrew Koppelman has just published an excellent book on law and religion, Defending American Religious Neutrality. (Note that the Amazon page offers an excellent deal when you buy it with another particular book.) Here's what Steve Smith of San Diego has to say about it: "Neutrality has been the central but embattled ideal in the modern jurisprudence of religious freedom. Andrew Koppelman offers the most serious and sophisticated defense of that ideal now available. For anyone interested in these important debates, this book is not recommended reading: it is required." That seems right to me. It offers a wide-ranging and sophisticated explanation and defense of the role of neutrality in the American law of religious liberty, and even those of us who do not share all his views (and I think Andy has convinced me that he and I actually have a good deal of common ground) will find it a book to be reckoned with.

Andy has kindly offered an introduction to his book below and, God (or not God) willing and the creek don't rise, Rick and I should be posting some responses to the book in the next week or two, hopefully with some replies by Andy. We're grateful to have him. His post begins below and continues after the fold.

* * * 

The American law of freedom of religion is in trouble, because growing numbers of critics, including a near-majority of the Supreme Court, are ready to cast aside the ideal of religious neutrality.  My new book, Defending American Religious Neutrality (Harvard, 2013), defends the claim, which unfortunately has become an audacious one, that American religious neutrality is coherent and attractive.

Two factions dominate contemporary discussion of these issues in American law.  One, whom I’ll call the radical secularists, tend to regard the law of the religion clauses as a flawed attempt to achieve neutrality across all controversial conceptions of the good – flawed because it is satisfied with something less than the complete eradication of religion from public life.  The other, whom I’ll call the religious traditionalists, think that any claim of neutrality is a fraud, and that law necessarily involves some substantive commitments.  They claim that there is thus nothing wrong with frank state endorsement of religious propositions: if the state is inevitably going to take sides, why not this one?  One side regards religion as toxic and valueless; the other is untroubled by the state’s embrace of an official religion.  Neither sees much value in the way American law actually functions.

Yet America has been unusually successful in dealing with religious diversity.  The civil peace that the United States has almost effortlessly achieved has been beyond the capacities of many other generally well-functioning democracies, such as France and Germany.  Even if the American law of religious liberty were entirely incoherent, it might still be an attractive approach to this perennial human problem.  There is, however, a deep logic to the law that its critics have not understood.

Prominent scholars of religion have ridiculed President-elect Dwight Eisenhower’s 1952 declaration:  “Our form of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is.”  Eisenhower nonetheless revealed a deep insight into the character of American neutrality.  This book aims to recover that insight.


Contrary to the radical secularists, First Amendment doctrine treats religion as a good thing.  It insists, however – and here it parts company with the religious traditionalists - that religion’s goodness be understood at a high enough level of abstraction that the state takes no position on any live religious dispute.  It holds that religion’s value is best honored by prohibiting the state from trying to answer religious questions.

American religious neutrality has over time become more vague as America has become more religiously diverse, so that today (with the exception of a few grandfathered practices) the state may not even affirm the existence of God.  This kind of neutrality is not the kind of neutrality toward all conceptions of the good that many liberal political theorists have advocated, but it is the best response to the enormous variety of religious views in modern America.  It is faithful to the belief, held by the leading framers of the First Amendment, that religion can be corrupted by state support.

Defending American Religious Neutrality offers new answers to three questions:  What conception of neutrality is relied on in the interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?  Is it coherent?  Is it defensible?

     The First Amendment of the United States Constitution says “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or abridging the free exercise thereof.”  The interpretation of this provision has been controversial for a long time, and indeed may be ripe for revolution.  A growing number of writers, including several Supreme Court Justices, have argued that religion clause doctrine is both incoherent and substantively unattractive.  They propose to replace it with a new set of rules that are far friendlier to official endorsement of religion.

     If these proposals are adopted, the result would be heightened civil strife, corruption of religion, and oppression of religious minorities.  One proposal, for example, is to permit states to endorse general principles of Abrahamic monotheism.  Official religious pronouncements not only brand as outsiders anyone whose beliefs do not conform to the official line; they tend to produce religion of a peculiarly degraded sort.  If the state gets to discern God’s will, we will be told that God wants the reelection of the incumbent administration.  Another proposal is that religious activities should be eligible for direct funding so long as there is a plausible secular reason for doing so.  Such funding for religious entities, particularly when those entities are relied on to provide public services such as education, aid to the homeless, prison rehabilitation, or drug treatment, can easily lead to a situation where the only option is a religious one, and people are bullied into religious activities.  The most radical proposal would discard the requirement that every law have a secular purpose.  Some religious justification is available for nearly anything that the state wants to do to anyone.  Permitting such justifications would devastate many constitutional protections that have nothing to do with religion.

And this exorbitant price will have been paid for nothing. Present doctrine already allows for what the doctrine’s critics most value: state recognition of the distinctive value of religion. The law treats religion as something special in a broad range of legislative and judicial actions. What the state may not do—what the doctrine properly forbids it to do—is declare any particular religious doctrine to be the true one, or enact laws that clearly imply such a declaration of religious truth.

     There is, indisputably, a deep coherence problem in First Amendment law.  The Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that “[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”  But the Court has also acknowledged that “the Free Exercise Clause, . . . by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”

          Accommodation of religion as such is permissible.  Quakers’ and Mennonites’ objections to participation in war have been accommodated since Colonial times.  Other such claims are legion.  Persons whose religions place special value on the ritual consumption of peyote or marijuana (or wine, during Prohibition) seek exemption from drug laws.  Landlords who have religious objections to renting to unmarried or homosexual couples want to be excused from antidiscrimination laws.  Churches seeking to expand sometimes want exemption from zoning or landmark laws.  The Catholic church wants to discriminate against women when ordaining priests.  Jewish and Muslim prisoners ask for Kosher or halal food.  These scruples have often been deferred to, and religious objectors have frequently been exempted from obligations that the law imposes on all others.

          There is considerable dispute about whether the decision when to accommodate ought to be one for legislatures or courts, but that debate rests on the assumption, common to both sides, that someone should make such accommodations.The sentiment in favor of such accommodations is nearly unanimous in the United States.  When Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which attempted to require states to grant such exemptions, the bill passed unanimously in the House and drew only three opposing votes in the Senate.  After the Supreme Court struck down the Act as exceeding Congress’s powers, many states passed their own laws to the same effect.  Many of those opposed to judicially administered accommodations, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, think that it is appropriate for such accommodations to be crafted by legislatures. 

   Each of these measures raises the same dilemma.  If government must be neutral toward religion, then how can this kind of special treatment be permissible? 

It is not logically possible for the government both to be neutral between religion and nonreligion and to give religion special protection. Some justices and many commentators have therefore regarded the First Amendment as in tension with itself.  Call this the free exercise/establishment dilemma.

This apparent tension can be resolved in the following way.  Begin with an axiom: The Establishment Clause forbids the state from declaring religious truth.  A number of considerations support this requirement that the government keep its hands off religious doctrine.  One reason why it is so forbidden is because the state is incompetent to determine the nature of this truth.  Another, a bitter lesson of the history that produced the Establishment Clause, is that the use of state power to resolve religious controversies is terribly divisive and does not really resolve anything.  State involvement in religious matters has tended to oppress religious minorities.  Finally, there is a consideration that is now frequently overlooked, but which powerfully influenced both the framers and the Justices who shaped modern Establishment Clause doctrine:  the idea that establishment tends to corrupt religion.

These considerations mandate a kind of neutrality.  The state may not favor one religion over another.  It also may not take a position on contested theological propositions.

     It is, however, possible, without declaring religious truth, for the state to favor religion at a very abstract level.  The key to understanding the coherence of First Amendment religion doctrine is to grasp the specific, vaguely delimited level of abstraction at which “religion” is understood.

     What in fact unites such disparate worldviews as Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism is a well-established and well-understood semantic practice of using the term “religion” to signify them and relevantly analogous beliefs and practices.  Efforts to distill this practice into a definition have been unavailing.  But the common understanding of how to use the word has turned out to be all that is needed.  Courts almost never have any difficulty in determining whether something is a religion or not. 

The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of “religion” is a remarkably short one.  The reference I rely on here, Words and Phrases, is one of the standard works of American legal research, a 132 volume set collecting brief annotations of cases from 1658 to the present.  Each case discusses the contested definition of a word whose meaning determines rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities of the parties.  Some words have received an enormous amount of attention from the courts.  Two examples, Abandonment and Abuse of Discretion, drawn at random from the first volume of this immense compilation, each exceed 100 pages.  Religion, on the other hand, takes up less than five pages.  The question of what “religion” means is theoretically intractable but, as a practical matter, barely relevant.  We know it when we see it.  And when we see it, we treat it as something good.

     American religious neutrality is studiedly vague about the good that it is promoting, and this may be a source of frustration to its admirers.  But there is wisdom in this vagueness.  Citizens do need to share an understanding of what is valuable. But when the details of this particular Valuable Something are so hotly disputed, the most effective way for the government to pay it reverence is just to shut up about it.


Posted by Paul Horwitz on December 21, 2012 at 09:14 AM in Books, Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack

Friday Reading

Since it's the 21st of December, here's a little extracurricular reading to start your weekend.

Posted by Paul Horwitz on December 21, 2012 at 08:13 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Wednesday, December 12, 2012

To Avoid a Pile-On...

...I will simply point readers to Orin Kerr's critique of Jay Silver's recent critical review of Brian Tamanaha's Failing Law Schools book. I certainly don't mind criticisms of that book; I had some, and so have others. But I don't think Silver's criticisms are sound, both because they overstate Tamanaha's arguments and because they consist more of bromides than well-supported arguments. To pick just one extraordinary example, is it really the case, as Silver writes, that "[t]he time-honored Socratic and casebook method of legal instruction, administered by professional educators, is a snug fit with the pedagogical needs of future attorneys?" In any event, read Orin's post.



Posted by Paul Horwitz on December 12, 2012 at 08:54 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (9) | TrackBack

Thursday, December 06, 2012

On Epigraphs and Book Sales

Here's a fairly interesting review of a book called, "The Art of the Epigraph: How Great Books Begin." The review is critical of the book for collecting the epigraphs in a format that strips them from the context of the book, but both the review and the book offer plenty of interesting examples of epigraphs.

The usual advice for law review authors is to kill your epigraph. It's fair advice, insofar as the key piece of advice for law review authors is to kill as much as you can and leave just what you need. But I like an epigraph--a good one, anyway, and they're somewhat rare--even on a law review article. Readers are welcome to add their own examples of good (or bad) epigraphs on law review articles.

And, yes, this is also a back-door effort to drum up sales of my new book, First Amendment Institutions, which makes an excellent last-minute Hannukah gift. My book opens with an epigraph that had occurred to me long before I started the book itself, and that happens to be a gem of a quote for anyone interested in First Amendment institutions, intermediary institutions, pluralism, "freedom of the church," "little platoons," and so on. I won't quote it here, but it's from Dire Straits' terrific song "Telegraph Road." Here's my favorite version; enjoy. 



Posted by Paul Horwitz on December 6, 2012 at 09:37 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Friday, November 30, 2012

Schrag and Tamanaha on Legal Education

Two very valuable contributions to the discussion of legal education and its financing were made this week, and neither of them appeared in the New York Times (or Salon). The first is this review by Philip Schrag of Brian Tamanaha's Failing Law Schools book. It argues, in brief, that while Tamanaha usefully collects many stinging criticisms of American legal education and its cost, he "understates the benefits offered by the federal income-based repayment plan." The second is this reply by Tamanaha, along with interesting comments by, inter alia, Schrag and Tamanaha.

Having written my own (positive) review of Failing Law Schools, I should note one area of overlap and agreement between my review and Schrag's. It is my closing point, and Schrag's as well: in thinking about reforming legal education, our focus should include clients as well as students, and specifically the mismatch between the number of lawyers and law school graduates and the number of middle- or low-income clients who need but do not receive or cannot afford legal services. Neither of us charge Tamanaha with being indifferent to this state of affairs; we simply argue that it was worth more discussion. I should add that, even with IBR factored in (and not everyone will avail themselves of IBR), I think Schrag undersells the extent to which high tuition and debt are responsible for the mismatch, asserting that "the cost of law school may be a relatively minor factor in the high cost of service."

As Tamanaha agrees in his post, Schrag offers a good deal of valuable detail about current loan repayment programs, and his discussion is a valuable supplement to Tamanaha's book. There are, however, a couple of areas where I think Schrag is wrong and Tamanaha is right, and Schrag's paper doesn't persuade me to change my mind.

The first is his argument that Tamanaha's proposal to loosen accreditation requirements and permit greater flexibility in law school programs would "accelerate and perpetuate" the division of law schools into "elite and non-elite wings." Schrag seems to think that Tamanaha's intention is to create, or permit, a "two-tier" system of legal education. That's not how I read him; I think he's pretty clear that his interest is in allowing a variety of models of legal education to emerge.

In any event, like Tamanaha, I agree that we already have a two-tiered system of legal education. The question is whether we can do anything to make sure that the second tier need not take on all the expenses of the first tier, with fewer of the benefits. As far as I can tell, Schrag doesn't ultimately make any actual arguments against a stratification of legal education, beyond the unsupported assertion that "I doubt that many members of the profession desire further acceleration of the trend toward two hemispheres" in the legal profession. Instead, he just assumes some kind of egalitarianism that makes such a prospect (which, again, is already the current reality) unacceptable. I don't think he's right; but even if he is, his paper doesn't offer any substantial arguments for his position.

Second, although Schrag's expansion of the IBR discussion is helpful, I agree with Tamanaha that it does not adequately justify the large number of schools with large tuitions and so-so outcomes. As Tamanaha writes in his post: "The intended purpose of IBR is to rescue grads who find themselves drowning under large educational debt--but it was not set up to be utilized by schools (fighting for their own survival) as an inducement to persuade prospective students to leap into risky financial waters that will likely leave them foundering." In my own review, I suggested that the dependence of law schools on things like IBR is something like a canary in a coalmine. As Tamanaha notes, that dependence has, for some law schools, become a marketing point to prospective law students. That seems perverse to me. 

Schrag's response to this, both in his paper and on Balkinization, is, again, a general appeal to egalitarian values. Many countries subsidize higher education, he writes, and the US offers public subsidies for many things, so why pick a fight with IBR? That's a bigger discussion than anyone can have here. But it's really an argument about values, not facts. He writes in his paper that he "would not want to try to construct a principled basis on which to assert that partial subsidies were less warranted for lawyers than for philosophers, dentists, architects, business executives, journalists, political scientists, poets or many others who have graduate educations." I can see perfectly sensible reasons to subsidize some professional educations less than other fields. Or more: I can also see excellent reasons to offer fewer public subsidies to would-be poets! Having lived through three years as a student at McGill of annual student marches favoring tuition freezes, I was delighted by Quebec's efforts to raise university tuitions, and I was also pleased when Ontario allowed universities to substantially increase tuition for various professional schools. We may just have a philosophical disagreement here.

What I don't get, however, is why, if he favors the continuation of direct or indirect subsidies to law schools, Schrag isn't more eager to insist that those subsidies carry substantial expectations or conditions with them. "While we are at it," he writes on Balkinization, "would [Tamanaha] also eliminate the subsidies that Congress has provided for farm products, the oil industry, airlines, housing, etc.?" It's always tough to gauge tone on the Internet, but I sense that Schrag would not complain too hard if Congress did eliminate subsidies for, e.g., the oil industry. At the very least, I doubt he would complain if those subsidies were strongly linked to monitoring, transparency requirements, some required showing of efficiency, and some demonstration of a link between the subsidies and actual outcomes. If we are to heavily subsidize law schools, shouldn't we require the same thing there? England, among other countries that heavily subsidize higher education, also imposes heavy accountability burdens on schools and educators. Shouldn't he at least be willing--indeed, eager--to link IBR to a showing that law schools are keeping costs and tuitions as low as possible and providing decent outcomes for their students?

Finally, if I may pick a smaller bone, Schrag writes in criticism of Tamanaha's advocacy of loosening accreditation requirements to make lower-cost legal educations possible that such an approach ultimately might lead to the "jettison[ing] of many of the goals of the current system of legal education, such as teaching students to think critically about social problems that are caused or remediated by legal doctrines and institutions." Even if this is a sound goal, I'm not sure why it has to be the goal of every law school, or why accreditation requirements need to be uniform along the dimensions in which they're currently uniform in order to achieve it. In any event, to put it mildly, I doubt we are doing all that great a job of achieving this goal currently, or that current tuitions would be justified even if we were.

Again, both Schrag's paper and Tamanaha's response, as well as the comments on his post, are well worth reading--instead of, with all due respect, wasting one's time on this week's New York Times op-ed or responses to it.


Posted by Paul Horwitz on November 30, 2012 at 11:23 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

Sunday, November 25, 2012

NOW AVAILABLE: First Amendment Institutions

I'm proud to announce that according to Amazon my new book, First Amendment Institutions, is now in stock and available for purchase. (It has a listed publication date of January 2013 but the books are already starting to ship.) Here is the link to the catalogue page from the publisher, Harvard University Press. 

Although the book offers a fairly full and detailed argument for and description of First Amendment institutionalism, and applies it in a wide range of cases, it is still very much an attempt to begin a conversation about its ideas, not to present itself as the last word on the subject. Moreover, the book draws connections between First Amendment institutionalism and other developments in legal and constitutional theory, and thus may be of interest to folks other than students of the First Amendment.

Still, the First Amendment is its focus, and I hope that it will be worth reading by those interested in at least the following current issues: 1) the contraception mandate; 2) the pending university admissions case, Fisher; 3) cases like the recent University of Iowa law school discrimination suit; 4) recent decisions like CLS and Hosanna-Tabor; 5) government speech doctrine; 6) the public-private distinction; 7) unconstitutional conditions doctrine; 8) New Governance, constitutional experimentalism, and/or New Legal Realism; and, of course, 9) Niklas Luhmann. There is also a basic chapter on First Amendment theory and doctrine that law students taking a basic con law or First Amendment course might find useful as a short practical introduction to the field.

If I may, here are the blurbs for the book:

“As the world becomes more socially, industrially, governmentally, and technologically complex, it is increasingly implausible to imagine the protections of freedom of speech and press applying in exactly the same way in all contexts. An important dimension of the First Amendment is institutional competence. Which institutions should be trusted to make which kinds of content-based determinations of what is or is not said, or published? Paul Horwitz sets out the case for an institutional perspective on the First Amendment with careful argument, admirable balance, and meticulous scholarship.”—Frederick Schauer, University of Virginia

“In this comprehensive and original analysis of the First Amendment’s multifaceted applications,Paul Horwitz deftly argues that constitutional law should take institutions and their variety into account—libraries, newspapers, churches, and beyond. This book opens new lines of discussion and criticism for a new generation of scholars.”—Mark Tushnet, Harvard University

I'm glad it's out and hope it will provoke some useful and interesting discussions. Doubtless I'll keep promoting it from time to time, while trying not to go overboard. In the meantime, enjoy. P.S.: It makes a fine Christmas or Hannukah present!



Posted by Paul Horwitz on November 25, 2012 at 12:09 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack

Wednesday, November 07, 2012

Religion and Politics, circa 2012

At the New Republic, Amy Sullivan has a pretty good takeout on why religion didn't figure as much, at least in terms of public discussion, in the 2012 election. The relationship between religion and politics, of course, is of perennial interest to law and religion scholars, so I hope this post is at least tangentially related to "law" and not just politics. Sullivan certainly has a point of view in other posts and pushes it, and I don't always agree with that viewpoint, but she has also done a lot of good reporting in this area and this is a pretty decent piece.

One thing I think she underemphasizes is that both parties, in addition to what I hope was the fundamental decency of their nominal leaders on this issue, had good reasons to bilaterally disarm with respect to each others' religion. There was also some plain old cognitive dissonance involved: some evangelical voters who really do hold strongly negative views about the LDS were forced to reconcile themselves to it in this cycle. (And I should add that those views, for all I know, may have affected their turnout; and, for that matter, that every now and then I saw an anti-Mormon letter in the local paper, or fairly anodyne but quite unnecessary Mormon jokes from Democratic friends on Facebook.) Still, in general it is interesting how little of a real role religion played in this race.

Given the circles I travel in, many of my friends may find most interesting, and perhaps irksome, the third part of Sullivan's article, titled "The Catholic Bishops' Religious Liberty Campaign Has Flopped" and linking in part to an interesting essay written by a local priest in Washington, DC. I've pasted it in full below the fold. Here I think she is a little too forceful, and would add some counterpoints: 1) Catholic doctrine isn't, and by its lights shouldn't be, determined by vote; 2) that doctrine may legitimately hold that specific life issues are more doctrinally central than a variety of "seamless garment" issues; and 3) some of the reactions to the Church's views on these issues still held more than a little whiff of anti-Catholic sentiment, or at least ignorance about Catholicism.

But...I think Sullivan, and the writer she links to, make two important points, points that are relevant both for observers of these issues and for the leadership. The first is that the "religious liberty campaign," with specific regard to the contraception mandate, takes place in a context in which Americans seriously distrust many institutions, often including their own institutions and certainly including the Church. The second is that, although I happen to think the scope of exceptions to the mandate should be wider and that there are real religious liberty issues involved here, there is genuine room for reasonable disagreement about how religious liberty doctrine should be structured: whether generally applicable laws should require or merely permit accommodations, about whether those accommodations should be absolute or subject to a balancing test, about which entities should be able to claim those accommodations, and so on. I'll let the priest's op-ed speak for itself here, as Sullivan does, while noting that it's possible to agree with him on this and still support greater accommodations in this area:

“Bishops and Catholic publications used words like ‘alarming,’ ‘unprecedented’ and ‘unconscionable’ about the HHS mandate. But most people did not see it as an existential threat to our religious liberty. They saw it as a disagreement over government policy.”    

"3. The Catholic Bishops’ Religious Liberty Campaign Has Flopped. Despite focusing its nearly-undivided attention on opposition to Obamacare and the accompanying contraception mandate, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops has not managed to convince a majority of American Catholics that this is the issue that should determine their decision in the voting booth. Nor have they even won the ideological debate over whether this issue (referred to by the bishops with the much broader term “religious liberty”) should be the top priority of the U.S. Catholic church. In a recent poll by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), a majority of Catholics thought that the church’s public statements and engagement on public policy should “focus more on social justice and the obligation to help the poor, even if it means focusing less on issues like abortion and the right to life.” A majority of Catholics—that includes Catholics who attend Mass at least weekly, as well as Catholics who support Romney.

At the same time, Barack Obama opened up a large lead over Romney among Catholics in the months that followed the bishops’ “Fortnight for Freedom”—a national teach-in about threats to liberty that focused on Obama’s contraception coverage policy. Nor does the Fortnight campaign appear to have moved Catholic opinions regarding the contested policy. According to PRRI polls taken both before and after the Fortnight, white Catholics are split precisely down the middle when asked whether “religiously-affiliated colleges and hospitals should have to provide employees with no-cost contraception coverage.”

What happened to the bishops' influence? One problem they face is the continuing erosion of trust in institutions—including religious institutions—that has taken place across American society. The Catholic church and its slow response to clergy sex abuse scandals has suffered a particular serious blow to its reputation for moral leadership. But it has also severely bungled its opposition to the Obama administration. A local Washington, DC priest penned an essay for the National Catholic Reporter this week with his thoughts about the religious liberty campaign's failure. It’s worth reading in full, but I want to quote his observation about the hyperbolic rhetoric of Catholic leaders: “Bishops and Catholic publications used words like ‘alarming,’ ‘unprecedented’ and ‘unconscionable’ about the HHS mandate. But most people did not see it as an existential threat to our religious liberty. They saw it as a disagreement over government policy.”

The bishops also seem not to have recognized that they have lost the edge they once held in the media as well. Not so long ago, if the Catholic bishops came out against a Democratic administration with the energy they have marshaled against several aspects of Obamacare, the story would not only make headlines but would dominate the storyline about that administration. But while journalists made note of the Fortnight for Freedom and have duly covered the bishops’ objections, the coverage is more pro forma, the way reporters cover a Glenn Beck rally or provocative remark from Pat Robertson. Whether they realize it or not, the bishops risk being seen as just another arm of the Religious Right, saved only by their occasional statements supporting anti-poverty programs or immigration reform." 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on November 7, 2012 at 08:50 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack

The Libertarian Case for Positive Educational and Welfare Rights

OK, not exactly. I'm not sure whether he'd consider it a post about his libertarianism. And he doesn't argue for positive educational and welfare rights, constitutional or otherwise. Apart from that, though...

What spurred this post is Ilya Somin's argument on the VC yesterday that knowledgeable children ought to be allowed to vote. He addresses some standard objections in his post, but a number of his commenters wrote to argue that such a rule, if enforced by knowledge or literacy tests, would end up privileging some groups and disadvantaging others (as, indeed, previous tests have done in the United States). Indeed, given massive educational inequality in this country, it's hard not to see how this proposal wouldn't give much more electoral power to the wealthy, well-educated, mostly white elite. Unless....perhaps Ilya would welcome a trade-off: knowledgeable children get the vote, in exchange for guarantees of massive public/private efforts to assure meaningful educational and welfare rights to ensure that the opportunity to be a knowledgeable child voter is fairly and widely distributed among the entire population rather than limiting that vote to enclaves with better resources. I'm just going to go ahead and consider this Ilya's very subtle case for overruling San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on November 7, 2012 at 08:23 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (9) | TrackBack

Tuesday, November 06, 2012

An Election Day Question: Is Joe Biden Demented?

Yesterday, I linked to a nonprofessional's diagnosis suggesting that the Republican leadership is sociopathic. Today, I thought it only fair to link to a story providing further diagnoses, one by a nonprofessional and the other by a professional (which is not to say he was acting in a professional fashion). They suggest, respectively, that Mitt Romney is suffering from mental problems and/or that Vice President Joe Biden is suffering from dementia. The story containing those diagnoses, as it turns out, is actually about the increasing partisanship and bitterness of cable news networks. Talk about burying the lede! What if one or more of those diagnoses are right?

Admittedly, others might take other lessons from this rash of diagnoses, such as: 1) practicing politics through long-distance DSMification is unhelpful, both as politics and as psychology; or 2) just as we might look for structural and environmental causes and cures if a large number of people in some particular area turned out to suffer from mental illness, so if we conclude that large numbers of politicians are crazy, we might focus more on the pathologies of the entire American political and cultural system than on partial analyses--analyses that also, coincidentally, confirm our own sense that we are rational and just, while the only explanation for our opponents' beliefs and conduct is that they are not. Granted, the latter approach is something that even those Americans who usually focus on structural pathologies of American politics sometimes forget. You Americans must get tired of commentary from foreigners that begin "You Americans..." Still, I've got to say it: From my perspective, it sometimes seems to me that you Americans are all crazy, or at least that many aspects of your political structure and culture are.  

And with that, have a great Election Day!

Posted by Paul Horwitz on November 6, 2012 at 08:26 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack

Monday, November 05, 2012

An Election Eve Message

Elections can be emotional times, I know, so I thought a quick personal message might be appropriate and help provide some balm in this season. This is what I told my Facebook "friends," at least:

My own position on whom to vote for is fully thought-out, rational, and virtuous, most evidence of human limitations to the contrary. If you choose to vote for the other candidate, it cannot come down to a different but reasonable set of priors, priorities, and judgments. It must mean that you are ignorant at best, and possibly evil.* And although this country's two-party system and government structure is subject to a wide range of pathologies, those considerations are irrelevant to the basic fact that my position on any given candidate, although it necessarily involves a host of complex considerations and an overall balancing of interests, is wholly right and yours wholly wrong. Now let's have a clean, civil fight and remember our ultimate common brotherhood.


* After posting this, I realized I had misspoken. Apparently I should have said, ignorant, evil, and sociopathic.

Posted by Paul Horwitz on November 5, 2012 at 03:47 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Friday, November 02, 2012

Bishop Jenky's Letter

Bishop Daniel Jenky received some attention today for his order to priests in his diocese to read a letter this weekend, on the verge of the election. The letter can be found in full here. Some relevant excerpts:

Since the foundation of the American Republic and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, I do not think there has ever been a time more threatening to our religious liberty than the present. Neither the president of the United States nor the current majority of the Federal Senate have been willing to even consider the Catholic community’s grave objections to those HHS mandates that would require all Catholic institutions, exempting only our church buildings, to fund abortion, sterilization, and artificial contraception.

This assault upon our religious freedom is simply without precedent in the American political and legal system. . . .  

I therefore call upon every practicing Catholic in this Diocese to vote. Be faithful to Christ and to your Catholic Faith. May God guide and protect his Holy Church, and may God bless America.

I should be clear that I don't agree with much of the hyperventilating that this letter has occasioned. But the bishop does some hyperventilating of his own. His letter strikes me as a document that wavers between wrong and bizarre--and I say that as a critic of the mandate.

Let me offer a few examples of things that either distress or bewilder me about the letter. First, I find the suggestion that "there has [n]ever been a time more threatening to our religious liberty than the present" in American history astounding, especially for a one-time history student. Leaving aside the pregnant phrase "Know Nothing," I must imagine that many native Americans, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mormons, to say nothing of more historically aware Catholics, would have to take issue with Bishop Jenky on this one. I grant that this involves a matter of opinion as to which there can be no final resolution; I think I could make an equally strong case that the years 1980-1992 represented a greater threat to religious liberty than the present day, but I wouldn't expect to persuade the bishop to change his mind. That said, he is quite obviously wrong. For similar reasons, I'm not sure what to make of the claim that "This assault upon our religious freedom is simply without precedent in the American political and legal system," except that it is either wrong or silly.

Finally, I find the closing statement urging the faithful to vote fairly remarkable for a number of reasons. The letter is about the mandate, not about abortion or contraception themselves. I could full well understand a letter urging every member of the faithful to vote against any politician who supports either abortion or contraception, and arguing that a vote to the contrary would be a mortal sin. But the subject of this letter is a contested and contestable issue concerning the scope of government power to promulgate generally applicable (in a colloquial rather than technical sense) regulations and the extent to which the government, having already accommodated churches to some extent, is obliged to go further. I'm not one of the faithful, but this strikes me as moving well beyond either the bishop's expertise or his flock's obligations. Indeed, I'm surprised that he calls upon the faithful to vote at all. Again, I can understand him commanding the faithful not to cast a vote that constitutes mortal sin, but are they not free in good conscience to refuse to vote at all--if, say, they believe (and I don't necessarily share this view) that the President's leading opponent would repeal the mandate but otherwise act in ways that increased human suffering?  




Posted by Paul Horwitz on November 2, 2012 at 10:19 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (9) | TrackBack

Wednesday, October 31, 2012

LST's "Score Reports"

The folks at Law School Transparency sent out an announcement today that they are offering an online "alternative to the U.S. News law school rankings," called the LST Score Reports. More information and links are available after the jump.

As I've said here before, I've been very impressed by my dealings with Law School Transparency and think it deserves attention and support. I'm afraid I haven't had a chance to dig in to the information, so I'm not in a position to vouch for it (or to say how my own institution fares). I hope and expect that it will receive analysis and critiques from other quarters, and no doubt there will be room for improvement. But I'm happy to get the ball rolling by linking to the project.

I will add that I think the most important statement in the announcement is the following: "[U]nlike rankings, the Score Reports do not reduce complex data to a single metric. Instead, the Score Reports focus on observable relationships to specific legal markets and job types. Only a small handful of schools have a truly national reach in job placement. The rest have a regional, in-state, or even just local reach. A decision tool should not obfuscate this reality; it should embrace it." Amen. I'm not adamantly opposed to national rankings, but I worry that they tend not only to overlook the degree to which law schools mostly serve regional markets; they also actively encourage law schools to focus on nationally measured metrics rather than local needs, and end up creating an undue amount of homogeneity in curricula, faculty, and other areas.  

The announcement and links follow; judge for yourselves, and feel free to contact the LST folks if you have questions, comments, or constructive criticisms.  

Today, Law School Transparency announces an alternative to the U.S. News law school rankings: The LST Score Reports.

LST has developed the Score Reports in an effort to produce a tool to help prospective students make application and enrollment decisions, keeping in mind that each person has a different risk tolerance, financial situation, and set of career aspirations.

The Score Reports are user-friendly tools for sorting law school employment outcomes, projected costs, and admissions stats. There is a Score Report for every state (includes only schools that place graduates there), every school (called a profile), and job types. They measure job outcomes, use a regional scope, and use real terms about the outcomes to allow prospective students to make an educated decision about not just which school to attend, but whether any school happens to meet their needs.

The Score Reports are not rankings, although they do serve as an alternative to conventional law school rankings. But unlike rankings, the Score Reports do not reduce complex data to a single metric. Instead, the Score Reports focus on observable relationships to specific legal markets and job types. Only a small handful of schools have a truly national reach in job placement. The rest have a regional, in-state, or even just local reach. A decision tool should not obfuscate this reality; it should embrace it.

You can view the Score Reports, and read more about them, by following these links:

The Score Reports

Guide to Using the Score Reports

The Value of the U.S. News Rankings

Methodology (published in the Journal of Legal Metrics)


Posted by Paul Horwitz on October 31, 2012 at 10:59 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Thursday, October 25, 2012

Legal Intellectuals on Law School Reform

Concurring Opinions has been having a long and fairly interesting group discussion, with plenty of guests, about Robin West's new book Normative Jurisprudence. I think these CoOp book discussions are great, although I think the authors should be encouraged to delete the first one or two sentences of each post, in which a good deal of general flattery is thrown around. (The same accusation, in fairness, has been made by others about plenty of posts and comments here.)

I want to link to a couple of posts that appear to focus on curricular reform in law schools: this one, by Rebecca Lee, and this one, by Chai Feldblum. They are certainly thought-provoking, although rather hard to pin down; and it should be said that Feldblum has done a good deal of well-known and highly practical work in training lawyers. Still, these entries strike me both as highly problematic, and as potentially indicative of a serious gap between the ways different law professors discuss things like law school reform, curricular or otherwise, and also of a gap between the ways that some legal academics discuss law school reform compared to the ways that students, lawyers, and recent graduates struggling to find actual jobs discuss it. I won't say much more, because 1) I'm not sure my reasons for feeling this way are fully thought out, 2) I'm not sure I wholly understand their posts, and 3) to some extent I think my point, even if not fully thought out, will be evident to anyone who reads those posts.

I will add one thing, though: It seems to me if Feldblum is serious about thinking that "it is essential for law schools to give students a rich grounding in theories of justice concomitantly with teaching them such legal skills," and that "giving students a rich grounding in theories of justice is imperative both to changing our legal approach and our scholarship in the manner that [West] is suggesting, then there are models out there of law schools that combine "a thick understanding of justice and moral goods" with efforts to train and help students to implement those thick understandings in the real world of lawyering. The one that comes most to mind is Regent Law School.  

Posted by Paul Horwitz on October 25, 2012 at 08:35 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

More Allegations Against Thomas Jefferson

The law school, not the slave-owner. In this case, they come via Law School Transparency, which reports that a former assistant career services officer at TJ, in a sworn statement, "admits that she fabricated graduate employment outcomes for the class of 2006. [She] alleges that her fraud was part of a deliberate scheme by the law school’s administration to inflate its employment statistics." The release, along with the statement, is available here. Three things about this: 1) Obviously, I am in no position to make a statement about the accuracy of the allegations. 2) Without seeking to minimize the allegation, I will note that it describes only conduct by one school in one year. The statement was made in August, in connection with current litigation against TJ. I'm not sure why it is being publicized now, whether because it was just recently noticed or as part of a media strategy on the part of plaintiffs. The school says it "stands behind the accuracy of the data that we submitted to the American Bar Association," which certainly seems like a denial, albeit in some ways not a full-throated one. 3) I have had some limited dealings with the folks at Law School Transparency and have been very impressed by the group and its efforts.  

UPDATE: A response from TJ is here.

Posted by Paul Horwitz on October 23, 2012 at 02:11 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack