Friday, June 27, 2014

The Supreme Court Reads Law Reviews

Every now and then, law reviews take heat for being not just turgid and boring but useless as well. Given that widespread lament, it's worth noting how frequently recent Supreme Court opinions have been drawing on law reviews -- and I'm not just talking about yesterday's cite to a certain Professor Elena Kagan.

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Posted by Richard M. Re on June 27, 2014 at 04:38 PM in Deliberation and voices | Permalink | Comments (2)

Posner-Watching

From Posner's recent long and fascinating interview:

"I've changed my views a lot over the years. I'm much less reactionary than I used to be. I was opposed to homosexual marriage in my book Sex and Reason, published in 1992, which was still the dark ages regarding public opinion of homosexuality. Public opinion changed radically in the years since. My views have changed about a lot of things. I've become much more concerned with long prison sentences; softer on drugs; more concerned with consumer protection, the environment and economic inequality; less trustful of purely economic analysis—the last partly because of the crash of 2008 and the ensuing economic downturn. That shook some of my faith in economic analysis. And developments in psychology have required qualification of the "rational choice" model of economic behavior. So my views have changed a lot. You don't want a judge who takes a position and feels committed to it because he thinks it's terrible to change one's mind."

--

I remember Posner's Holmes' lectures at HLS a bazillion years ago, when he suggested that it's not likely that philosophers will be able to change the moral positions of many people who read their work. I'm wondering if in light of the identified changes above, he would change his mind about *that* and attribute any of the changes to having been persuaded by normative legal/political theory--maybe having Martha Nussbaum as his friend and colleague has had some effect too. Anyway, it's an interesting array of things to have changed one's mind about, and I guess the fact that Posner changes his mind publicly is a reason I quite like him. One of my intellectual heroes, Jeffrie Murphy, made a noble career out of changing his mind, seemingly every six months, about matters of punishment theory.  Posner's public volte-face (or other admissions) strikes me as the self-laceration we academics should all be willing to inflict when the situation warrants. 

P.S. In related Posner-watching, I couldn't help but notice his reaction in Slate to Orin and by extension to Riley v. California, which amounts basically to: "Pfft. What's the BFD? I wrote that opinion two years ago."

Update: I just came across this sharp response to the Posner piece in Slate by Will Baude. 

Posted by Dan Markel on June 27, 2014 at 12:46 PM in Culture | Permalink | Comments (10)

Harmon on the fragility of knowledge in the Riley (cellphone and 4A) case

Prof. Rachel Harmon from UVA had an interesting post to the crimprof listserv that I thought warranted broader exposure, so with her permission I'm sharing it. (Rachel asked to also thank UVA law librarian Kent Olson for his help with the underlying research).

--

In light of the likely significance of the Court's opinion in Riley v. California, I may seem obsessed with the trivial, but I can’t help but note the Court’s odd support for one of its statements about policing, and the pathetic state of information about policing it reveals. On page 6, the Court states that “warrantless searches incident to arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”  Though the proposition seems intuitively obvious, data on searches and seizures isn’t easy to find, so I was curious about the Court’s support. 

Chief Justice Roberts cited LaFave’s Search and Seizure treatise, which struck me as an odd source for an empirical claim, so I looked it up.  LaFave does indeed say, “While the myth persists that warrantless searches are the exception, the fact is that searches incident to arrest occur with the greatest frequency.”  But that sentence has appeared unchanged since the first edition of the treatise in 1978.  And LaFave’s support for the proposition is itself pathetic.  It comes in a footnote which reads:  “See T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 48 (1969). ‘Comparison of the total number of search warrants issued with the arrests made is equally illuminating. In 1966 the New York police obtained 3,897 warrants and made 171,288 arrests. It is reliably reported that in San Francisco in 1966 there were 29,084 serious crimes reported to the police, who during the same year obtained only 19 search warrants.’ Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 493–94 (1975).” 

Because I’m crazy, I pulled Taylor and the Model Code too.

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Posted by Dan Markel on June 27, 2014 at 11:13 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Criminal Law, Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Cultural Thoughts about McCullen

I've now finished reading McCullen. I should preface this by saying I'm not a free speech expert (and am actually not all that interested in the doctrinal minutiae). My perspective on this comes from having lived in other cultures for most of my life and being somewhat of an outside observer of American culture, even after more than a decade here.

Coming from a culture that regulates speech more strictly, I'm often aghast at the concessions American constitutional law makes for people with hateful, non-world-improving speech, as well as with its broad definition of "speech". But I think the legal culture here is just different.

I say "legal" culture because, ironically, where I came from there may be less doctrinal legal protection in the books, but there's a lot more street confrontation in action. It's not always fun, but it's not necessarily a bad thing. I confess that, having lived here for a while, my instinct upon hearing the decision, like that of many of my friends, was to say, "well, yes, there's a right to free speech, but there's no right to have a captive audience for my speech." But I've realized another thing about American culture that pertains specifically to the audience of such speech: compared to other places in the world where I've lived, the US is very nonconfrontational. With the obvious exception of the Internet, people here tend to abide by "if you don't have anything nice to say, don't say it at all" and "be nonjudgmental" more than in other countries. There's something ironic about this avoidance and non-confrontational practices in a country whose speech doctrine is so expansive. You can talk, but because of the way things really are, you'll likely talk to the void. Because of this culture of avoidance, I often notice that my students find it really difficult to listen, in class, to opinions they dislike, and they later show up at my office traumatized by what they heard. Obviously, personal taste and confirmation bias make it an unpleasant experience for us to hear things that we disagree with, but in the long run, avoiding these conflicting messages isn't good for us, either. It makes us less engaged in the public sphere and it really limits the fruitful interactions we could have if we deigned to speak more with people with whom we disagree. Granted, there's a big difference between hearing this message when I'm going about my daily life and hearing it when I'm about to undergo a physically painful, emotionally difficult medical procedure that will irrevocably alter the course of my life after a making decision I've likely agonized about. But I suspect that, in the grand scheme of things, less trigger alerts, less protections, and less buffers will make us stronger people. There's a way in which free speech works for the audience as well as for the speaker--it expands our horizons beyond our comfort zone and makes us into better social citizens.

Two book recommendations McCullen readers might appreciate, both of which are very sensitive to the broader political and cultural context:

Josh Wilson, The Street Politics of Abortion

Laura Beth Nielsen, License to Harass

Posted by Hadar Aviram on June 27, 2014 at 10:04 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)

Acknowledgement Fun - Klum Mit Gornisht

Here in Tel-Aviv, brunching with my life scientists girlfriends at my beloved port, I hear lots of fun stories from their part of the campus. This morning they shared with me a piercing acknowledgement in a paper published in the prestigious journal Gene:

Dan Graur wishes to thank the ‘‘Klum mit Gurnisht’’ Section of the Israel Science Foundation for their consistent support in the last 17 years.

The original Yiddish expression is of course Gurnisht mit Gurnisht (nothing with nothing) but here the Hebrew word for nothing makes up the first part of the phrase. Another story going viral in their academic circles these days: a huge blow-up between two PIs has led one of them to remove the other's name as a co-author from their joint article and replace it with the name of one of the Chimps in her lab for submission to the peer-reviewed journal.

 

Posted by Orly Lobel on June 27, 2014 at 09:01 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 26, 2014

"Experiential" Scholarship?

Is there such a thing as "experiential" scholarship?  I asked this question to some of my colleagues during a recent lunch.  I asked because there has been much debate on experiential learning and what that might look like in a law class, and there has also been much debate on what relevant scholarship looks like.  I was curious if others thought there was any correlation.

After a great discussion with my colleagues, the answer (like all good law school answers) is, "it depends."  The discussion boiled down to three observations:

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Posted by Naomi Goodno on June 26, 2014 at 06:02 PM in Blogging, Life of Law Schools, Scholarship in the Courts, Teaching Law, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (1)

On soccer

Brishen Rogers has a great, long post at CoOp considering why soccer (or futbol, if you like) never caught on in the United States. He somewhat piggybacks on David Post's VC post from last week.I was always actively antipathetic towards soccer, partly because I did not understand how the overall game worked (beyond "kick the ball in the goal" and "stop using your hands"). I started watching more in recent years, when my daughter took up the game for a few years, and I have to admit to feeling pretty down on Sunday night. I also knew we were not going to beat Germany (although that may be the pessimism that comes with being a Cubs and Northwestern fan).

I like a lot about what Rogers and Post propose; I'll add a few additional points in the gaps.

First, I want to defend the "too little scoring" explanation for soccer's relative unpopularity. The counter to that (which Rogers offers) has always been "look at baseball," which can be just as low-scoring as soccer (especially now that fewer players are juicing). But we need to tweak the comparison by recognizing the differences between soccer and baseball. Even the lowest-scoring baseball game involves a series of one-on-one encounters between pitcher and batter, each of which has a "winner" (batter gets on base or batter is out) and each of which marks a step towards the ultimate result and the ultimate victor in the game; the winner of the game is based on the sum total of those individual encounters. More importantly, baseball is untimed--the point of the game is to score the greatest number of runs within the 27 outs each side is given. So each team has two simultaneous goals--to both score some runs and to get the needed 27 outs in order to win. So we should not say "well, baseball and soccer both have a lot of 2-1 games," because that 2-1 baseball game also had the 27 outs the team needed to win the game resulting from those individual encounters. Relatedly, do not ignore the effect of ties. In baseball, the aggregate of those individual encounters--and getting both runs and outs--is guaranteed to get us to a victor.

Continue reading "On soccer"

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 26, 2014 at 05:47 PM in Current Affairs, Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (6)

McCullen and intermediate scrutiny

The Court in McCullen v. Coakley invalidated Massachusetts' 35-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics. The Court was unanimous in the judgment, but not in the reasoning--the Chief (surprisingly, sans pithy quips) wrote for the Court; Justice Scalia concurred (angily) in the judgment, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas; and Justice Alito separately concurred in the judgment.

The point of departure was whether the buffer zone was a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny or whether it was content-neutral subject only to intermediate scrutiny. The majority held the latter, because on its face the legislature was concerned with public safety, patient access to clinics, and the unob­structed use of public sidewalks and roadways, none of which have anything to do with the content of the (anti-abortion) speech regulated; the majority did not rely on the rationale from Hill v. Colorado of a state interest in protecting clinic patients from having to deal with unwanted speech. Justice Scalia insisted the law was content-based, largely for the reasons he insisted the buffer zone upheld in Hill was content-based (Scalia is still fighting that case rhetorically). The law did not survive intermediate scrutiny, because there were alternative ways to ensure safety and access that would have been less speech-restrictive.

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Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 26, 2014 at 03:53 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 25, 2014

Standing and defendants

In affirming the district court and invalidating Utah's ban on marriage equality, the Tenth Circuit considered standing sua sponte. But, as with the D.C. Circuit's decision on the filibuster, the standing issue was not about the plaintiffs (who want to get married and are prevented from doing so, thus obviously have standing), but about the defendants--whether the governor and attorney general were proper defendants in this Ex Parte Young action.  (This was necessary as a preliminary to whether the governor and A/G could appeal, since the county clerk of Salt Lake County, a named defendant who is directly responsible for issuing marriage licenses to four sets of plaintiffs, declined to appeal).

Under Ex Parte Young, the named defendant must be the executive officer responsible for enforcing the challenged law. And the plaintiffs should lose if they sue an officer who is not responsible for enforcing that law. But the Tenth Circuit did not explain why this should be a component of the plaintiffs' standing, as opposed to the merits of the constitutional claim.

In fact, the unique position of the governor and A/G in this case illustrates why treating this as standing makes no sense. Under Utah law, the governor and A/G are not directly responsible for issuing marriage licenses (that rests with county clerks) or for doing things that require recognition or non-recognition of out-of-state marriages (not giving spousal benefits, not allowing joint tax returns, not giving marital deductions, etc.). But they are responsible for advising, supervising, and compellling the clerks and other state officials who refuse in recognizing same-sex marriages, which made them responsible defendants subject to suit. In essence, the court accepted "supervisory" Ex Parte Young liability (which makes sense, since executives delegate all the time).

But we regularly deal with supervisory liability in § 1983 damages actions, without ever invoking standing. For example, imagine Officer Y uses excessive force against A; A sues Supervisor X for failing to supervise Y, but it turns out that X is not Y's supervisor under state law. Without question, A loses. But the court would not say that A lacks standing; instead, that claim fails on the merits. Or compare this Eighth Circuit decision holding that an officer violated a person's rights by enforcing a flag-burning ordinance. The plaintiff also brought a Monell claim against the city for failing to properly train the officer, which the court rejected because, under Missouri law, cities are not responsible for training police officers. So the city could not be liable and the Monell claim failed on the merits. Again, no mention of standing.

So why if "you got the wrong guy" is a merits matter in these actions for retroactive relief, it makes no sense whatsoever for it to become a standing matter in Ex Parte Young actions for prospective relief.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 25, 2014 at 07:13 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

SCOTUS: No Cellphone Search Without Warrant

Screenshot 2014-06-25 09.02.43

This morning, the Supreme Court ruled in Riley v. CA and U.S. v. Wurie, 9:0, that searching a cellular phone requires a warrant

Chief Justice Robert's Op. Ct. analyzed phone searches in the context of the Search Incident to Arrest exception to the warrant requirement, comparing a phone search to a search inside a pack of cigarettes in Robinson. Robinson, you'll recall, extended the Chimel doctrine to all containers within the "grabbing area" of the suspect. But given the newness of the technology, which the framers (duh) could not anticipate, the court thankfully is unable to find "guidance from the founding era" and turns to reason and pragmatics. 

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Posted by Hadar Aviram on June 25, 2014 at 12:19 PM | Permalink | Comments (3)

Supreme Announcements

At this time of year, oral arguments are long over at the Supreme Court, but the justices nonetheless convene to announce opinions from the bench. This practice is unusual in the US judicial system. Federal courts of appeals, for example, do not orally announce their opinions. Moreover, the parties whose interests are being adjudicated have no way of knowing when their cases will be announced and so are rarely in attendance. Yet, tomorrow, the justices will ascend the bench anyway in order to read summaries of the Court's published opinions and, perhaps, salient dissents. Why would they do this? One important reason is to influence the public. Through opinion announcements, the normally apolitical Court sometimes acts much like a political institution -- with all the benefits and risks that that role entails.

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Posted by Richard M. Re on June 25, 2014 at 12:33 AM in Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

The end of umpires?

That is the proposal from John McEnroe to make tennis more interesting--have the players call their own lines, as a way to introduce greater intensity into the game. Players would be given challenges and McEnroe argues that the threat of fan anger would keep players in line. It has been said that back in the day, if the umpire clearly missed a call, the player who benefitted from the blown call would tank the next point as an equalizer (I am not sure if that is true). On surfaces where the ball leaves a mark (notably clay), a player will often point to the spot of the ball to show the opponent before an argument begins.

Continuing my previous suggestion that sports rule as enforced by umpires are analogous to rules of procedure--the framework rules regulating the process in which the players control the outcome through performance of skills: This is the sports equivalent of arbitration; the parties have privatized the dispute-resolution process into something they create and control themselves, perhaps less formally, rather than using formalized "outside" processes and arbiters that they work with but exert less control over. Maybe that means McEnroe's proposal will work about as well as arbitration.

On a different note on McEnroe's suggestion: This video is pretty funny. Latvian Ernests Gulbis is asked about McEnroe's proposal to get rid of umpires; Gulbis misunderstands and thinks the reporter asked about getting rid of vampires and begins to discuss the benefit of getting ride of vampires (in the metaphorical sense of hangers-on).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 24, 2014 at 10:37 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Purdy on our "anti-democratic court"

Prof. Jed Purdy (Duke) (Go Devils) has a piece at The Daily Beast called "God Save the United States from this Anti-Democratic Court."  (Ann Althouse writes about it, here.)  He asks, among other things, "[s]hould a self-respecting democracy have a Supreme Court like ours, with the power to overturn democratic legislation?"  In response to this question, Purdy observes, "[m]ore and more progressive observers are not so sure."  (But see, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, "Do We Need the Supreme Court," here.)   

It's an important question, for sure, and while I'm at best a faint-hearted and selective Thayerian, I'm sympathic to -- or at least think that I should be -- the answer Jeremy Waldron gave, a few years ago in The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review (That is, "pretty much no.")  The problem with Purdy's piece -- or, perhaps, the problem with me -- is that it is really hard for me to avoid the reaction, "Well, it appears to me that progressive observers, like most of the rest of us, like judicial review when they think courts get the right answer and dislike it when they think courts get the wrong answer.  Justice Breyer, for example, thinks it's really important to defer to legislative judgments, except when state legislatures enact school-choice programs."    Purdy quotes Rob Hunter’s recent conclusion that “judicial interference with democracy” should become “unthinkable," but I guess I'm skeptical that progressives, or Purdy, really want to unthink all "judicial interferences with democracy."  Few Court decisions have been as "anti-democratic" as, say, Roe v. Wade or Engel v. Vitale, but I suspect Erwin Chemerinsky's new book, The Case Against the Supreme Court (which Purdy mentions) will not criticize these rulings.

Don't get me wrong, my hands are not clean here:   I've suggested that the Court should be very deferential and hands off when it comes to the Establishment Clause but also that Hosanna-Tabor was about as right as a Court decision can be.  And, it could be that my snark is unfairly directed at Purdy's piece, since he does say:

For this reason, it’s the rare radical democrat who will denounce the Supreme Court right down the line. Whatever they think of the Court’s other decisions, progressives will generally celebrate without reservation on the all-but-certain day when the Court established marriage equality nationwide. Most Americans think of the Constitution as being ultimately on their side, and identify the Constitution with the Supreme Court. When they agree with the Court’s decision, they tend to think the country has been called back to its best self. When they disagree, they tend to think there has been a regrettable, maybe terrible, mistake.

So . . . what?  Maybe this latest uptick of expressed frustration with the strangeness of a state of things in which the Answers to Big Questions are provided by Justice Kennedy is just a reprise of the popular-constitutionalism conversation, or the inquiry into whether there really is such a thing as "judicial activism" (See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt's book), or the call for "neutral principles", or the celebration of the "passive virtues", or . . . .  I'm not sure.  I feel confident, though, that few if any of us -- despite what we might wish we could honestly say we want -- really want the Court to be entirely inert or unflinchingly "democratic."

Posted by Rick Garnett on June 24, 2014 at 05:25 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Rick Garnett | Permalink | Comments (9)

A victory for the rule of law - apparently not

I had to edit this blog because literally as I posted it, the news changed.  Monday, Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese mother of two young children who was facing a death sentence for adultery for marrying a Christian man and apostasy after refusing to denounce her faith was released by court order.  As I previously wrote, her imprisonment violated Sudanese law.  Her release was a victory for the rule of law.  International pressure influenced this outcome.   But the victory was very short (less than 24 hours).  The breaking news is that she was rearrested at the airport and was taken into custody along with her two children and husband.

Unfortunately, Ibrahim is only one of many who have suffered (and are suffering) in this way.  There are many who endure tremendous human rights violations because of the lack of rule but who do not receive media attention.  Ibrahim's story illustrates my previous point - international pressure is one way to help bolster rule of law in developing countries, however, that may not be enough as evidenced by the re-arrest of Ibrahim.  Perhaps governmental officials who are threatened with a charge of a crime against humanity for failure to enforce their countries own laws will feel the weight of international shame and act to uphold the rule of law.

Posted by Naomi Goodno on June 24, 2014 at 11:13 AM in Criminal Law, Current Affairs, Gender, International Law, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, June 23, 2014

What Happened to Chevron Step One?

Today's decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA partially sustained and partially invalidated a major greenhouse gas regulation. In doing so, the Court passed up an opportunity to clarify the famous and deceptively familiar deference inquiry established in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The question is whether Chevron (i) requires, (ii) forbids, or (iii) permits judicial decisions that uphold agency interpretations as not just reasonable, but mandatory. This issue was once thought to have been answered by Chevron Step 1, which seemed to require judicial review for mandatoriness. In UARG, however, the familiar Chevron Step 1 is mostly absent from the scene -- even though the Court expressly considered the possibility that the agency's reading was "compelled," or mandatory.

The best explanation for UARG  is that the Court views the traditional Chevron Step 1 inquiry into mandatoriness as optional. In many cases, the only relevant Chevron question is whether the agency has acted reasonably. That is particularly true when the agency reading is invalidated as unreasonable. When upholding agency interpretations, however, it sometimes makes sense for a court to go further and opine that the agency's reading is not just reasonable, but mandatory. The upshot is that what used to be called "Chevron Step 1" has effectively become an optional additional step. In this respect, Chevron resembles modern qualified immunity doctrine, which always asks whether the challenged governmental action was reasonable, but also gives courts discretion to reach the merits.

Continue reading "What Happened to Chevron Step One?"

Posted by Richard M. Re on June 23, 2014 at 11:39 PM in Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

Goldstein on journalism and SCOTUSBlog's press credential

This morning, the Standing Committee on Correspondents denied SCOTUSBlog's request for a congressional press credential. Tom Goldstein's response is here.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 23, 2014 at 01:15 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Deviance, Lawmaking, and the Global Rules of Marathon Swimming

On September 2, 2013, thousands of people stormed the beach in Key West, Florida, to welcome 64-year-old Diana Nyad to shore. News outlets all reported that Nyad's fifth attempt to swim from Cuba to Florida  was successful; she swam 110 miles in 53 hours, arriving in Florida with a flotilla including her handlers and medical crew.

Screenshot 2014-06-23 09.05.07

But as the public celebrated Nyad's messages on teamwork and perseverance, doubt and cynicism took hold of the people who were in a position to best understand Nyad's feat: The marathon swimming federation. Some of the resentment was ad-hominem and due to bad blood: Nyad has had quite a history with other marathon swimming, including her disparagement of Walter Poenisch, a man who successfully swam the distance (albeit with fins,) and her inaccuracies about swimming around Manhattan many years ago also rubbed people the wrong way. But some of it pertained directly to the swim and the conditions and terms under which it was conducted, and it sparked a lively discussion about the regulation of the sport and its culture, eventually leading to the creation of the Global Rules of Marathon Swimming.

I think an analysis of the marathon swimming community's response to Nyad's swim has a lot to teach us beyond sports law, about the way laws are made in response to perceived deviance.

Continue reading "Deviance, Lawmaking, and the Global Rules of Marathon Swimming"

Posted by Hadar Aviram on June 23, 2014 at 01:05 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Halliburton and the State of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis

Very interesting set of opinions in Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.  The continuing vitality of the efficient capital markets hypothesis is one of the big issues in the case, and there are numerous cites to law profs, including the law professors' amicus brief and articles by Lynn Stout, Don Langevoort, and James Cox, among others.  Both big opinions cite to Lev and de Villiers.  A very interesting example of when theory has a big role to play in doctrine. 

From Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion:

Even though the efficient capital markets hypothesis may have“garnered substantial criticism since Basic,” post, at 6 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment), Halliburton has not identified the kind of fundamental shift in economic theory that could justify overruling a precedent on the ground that it misunderstood, or has since been overtaken by, economic realities.

From Justice Thomas's concurrence in judgment:

The Court’s first assumption was that “most publicly available information”—including public misstatements—“is reflected in [the] market price” of a security.  [Basic, 485 U.S.] at 247. The Court grounded that assumption in “empirical studies” testing a then-nascent economic theory known as the efficient capital markets hypothesis. Id., at 246–247. Specifically, the Court relied upon the “semi-strong” version of that theory, which posits that the average investor cannot earn above-market returns (i.e., “beat the market”) in an efficient market by trading on the basis of publicly available information. See, e.g., Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. Corp. L. 635, 640, and n. 24 (2003) (citing Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Finance 383, 388 (1970)). The upshot of the hypothesis is that “the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets [will] reflec[t] all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.” Basic, supra, at 246. At the time of Basic, this version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis was “widely accepted.” See Dunbar & Heller, [Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 Del. J. Corporate L. 455, 463–464 (2006)].

This view of market efficiency has since lost its luster. See, e.g., Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 151, 175 (“Doubts about the strength and pervasiveness of market efficiency are much greater today than they were in the mid-1980s”). . . .  

For further reading: interested folks might want to check out our book club for Justin Fox's The Myth of the Rational Market, which included the author, Lynn Stout, David Zaring, & Benjamin Means. 

Posted by Matt Bodie on June 23, 2014 at 12:22 PM in Books, Corporate, Scholarship in the Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

JOTWELL: Thornburg on Hadfield and Ryan and information disclosure

The new Courts Law essay comes from Elizabeth Thornburg (SMU), reviewing Gillian K. Hadfield & Dan Ryan, Democracy, Courts, and the Information Order, 54 J. European Sociology 67 (2013), exploring the demoratizing role of civil litigation, particularly discovery and the public value of information disclosure.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 23, 2014 at 10:21 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, June 22, 2014

When Is an Anti-Homelessness Ordinance Vague?

"You know those ducks in that lagoon right near Central Park South? That little lake? By any chance, do you happen to know where they go, the ducks, when it gets all frozen over? Do you happen to know, by any chance?"

--Holden Caulfield, in J.D. Salinger, Catcher in the Rye

Screenshot 2014-06-22 06.49.30
When I teach 1L criminal law, my preference is to focus not on the sensational cases of serious crime, but on the everyday workings of the system: drugs, property, and various quality of life offenses. As it turns out, teaching the principle of legality, vagueness, and other important basic tenets of criminal legislation becomes apropos and important when using the example of anti-homelessness legislation of various stripes. Many criminal law casebooks include Chicago's ban on loitering and Chicago v. Morales. I like creating a timeline of legislation, showing how cities have consistently tried (and sometimes failed) to find ways to target the poor and get them off the streets. Sit/Lie ordinances are a classic example, as is the latest bout of litigation about this, which involved ordinances that prohibit one from sleeping or living in his or her vehicle.

In Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, decided a few days ago, the Ninth Circuit tackled a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of a vehicle “as living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise.” The ordinance itself is not new, but it became a convenient enforcement vehicle (pun intended) after an angry "town hall on homelessness" in 2010. As a result of the aggressive enforcement efforts, several folks down on their luck (read: petitioners) tried to craft their behavior to comply with the ordinance as best they understood it: one of them, thinking the ordinance probably applies only to public streets, slept in his car in a church parking lot. Another, in an effort to comply, slept in the street, but kept some items, such as his sleeping bag. Another petitioner, left without work after a head injury, slept in her RV parked in her church. And another one was cited despite not sleeping in his van, just because he stored many items in it.

Continue reading "When Is an Anti-Homelessness Ordinance Vague?"

Posted by Hadar Aviram on June 22, 2014 at 09:50 AM in Blogging | Permalink | Comments (4)

Saturday, June 21, 2014

Accusations of law prof self-delusion and mendacity; predictable cheering from the bleachers; and a basic point remains missing

Prof. Burk wades cleverly into the debate about JD advantage and law school worth with an angry post about post-law school employment and an analogy to the MLA's case for PhD humanities work.

One argument in the post is unassailably right and important to make:  Even if one supposes that a law graduate has succeeded in finding a position for which the JD degree provides a clear advantage in the work required, it does not follow that law school was the right educational path or, relatedly, that the benefits of this JD degree outweighed the costs.  Of course.  Point well taken.

But what remains missing is a careful engagement with the point made by many, including me, that there are positions which ought to count, for those who purport to do the counting (ATL is one; LST is another), although a credential as a lawyer is not formally required.  Insofar as law schools can and will describe these positions and, further, explain why substantial legal training, leading to a JD, provides special skills for these positions, then current and prospective students should evaluate whether the benefits of three years of legal education justify the costs.

Apparently Prof. Burk, channelling the irritated folks who pepper this post with "stick it to the man" comments in a redundant and wholly predictable way, simply declares that law profs and administrators who counsel students to pursue non-traditional jobs -- in a world, I hasten to add, in which the traditional silos between "practicing law" and deploying legal skills in a business setting are weakening -- and who report, happily, when their graduates in fact secure these jobs, are engaging in subterfuge and worse.

Let's talk candidly about the reconfiguration of legal practice, the growing interface among law-business-technology, and the efforts underway to shape business environments to engage law graduates in the performance of management strategy, human resources, regulatory compliance, entrepreneurship -- in short, in spaces where law and legal skills are prudent, and perhaps essential.  And, further to the critical point, let's insist that law schools be candid and transparent about exactly which jobs their students land after graduation.  Then the marketplace will be in a better position to evaluate the important claim about whether and to what extent X or Y or Z law school is worth it. 

Posted by Dan Rodriguez on June 21, 2014 at 02:35 PM in Life of Law Schools | Permalink | Comments (25)

Lance Armstrong: Another Civ Pro exam

Judge Wilkins on the District of the District of Columbia  addressed a host of motions to dismiss in the False Claims Act and common law fraud lawsuit against Lance Armstrong and others over false statements and claims relating to the Postal Service sponsorship of Armstrong and his team; the case began as a qui tam action by rider Floyd Landis and the United States intervened. For some reason, when sports disputes hit the courts, they carry procedure and jurisdiction problems with them.

If you are looking for a single source for a lot of possible exam issues, this 81-page decision has a little bit of everything: 1) Presentation of outside documents and facts on a motion to dismiss and the possibility of converting a 12(b)(6) to summary judgment; 2) when an action commences under Rule 3 and the validity of Rule 3 in the face of different state law; 3) handling lawsuits against no-longer existing corporate entities; 4) Relation back of a new party's complaint (the U.S., when it intervened) where the relevant statute of limitations provides for relation back; 5) propriety of the manner of service of process; 6) propriety of using 12(b)(6) to assert a statute of limitations defense; and 7) how to plead fraud under FRCP 9(b).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 21, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 20, 2014

Creating Good Incentives in the Correctional Market

I'm so glad I came across John Pfaff's terrific post about private prisons and their (smaller than you think) contribution to the mass incarceration project. It came just in time; I'm working on a piece that relies on neoliberalism literature AND on public choice economics to argue that focusing on private incarceration companies, as such, doesn't make much sense. First, public prisons are also privatized to a great degree; many of their functions, such as healthcare, food services, transportation, and industry, have long ago moved to private hands. And second, in a hypercapitalist environment, public and private actors alike behave in homo economicus ways, maximizing profit, minimizing cost, and largely not caring about maintaining prison conditions. There's a lot more, and I'll elaborate in a future post.

But the question I have is about solutions. If regulation is something that correctional authorities are able to circumvent, how are we supposed to do it right? How to create minimal incarceration standards? How to incentivize private and public actors to maintain a rehabilitative, recidivism-minimizing facility? Can you tie payments for services to recidivism reduction? How should the calculation be done? I have some ideas, but I'm probably more naive than you on regulation and the administrative state. Looking forward to your thoughts.

 

Posted by Hadar Aviram on June 20, 2014 at 08:43 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

When dissent rhetoric comes true

In covering summary judgment in civ pro, I teach an Eighth Circuit case called Sitzes v. City of West Memphis. A police officer drove, perhaps without lights or sirens, 80-90 mph through a residential neighborhood towards what may or may not have been a genuine emergency and hit a car, killing the driver and injuring the passenger. A divided court held that intent-to-harm was the applicable standard and granted summary judgment in favor of the officer. It is a great teaching case because both the majority and dissent parse the evidence in the record in identifying what may or may not be genuine disputes of material fact and join issue with what facts are material in light of the applicable legal standard. It is also one of the few cases in Civ Pro that genuinely seem to get students riled up.

At one point, the dissenter (a district judge sitting by designation) went into parade-of-horribles mode. The majority held that there was no intent to injure since the officer genuinely subjectively believed he was rushing towards an emergency. That being so, the dissent argued, "an officer could avoid Section 1983 liability for driving 100 miles per hour through a children’s playground during recess time, by stating that he subjectively believed there was an emergency and the path through the playground was the most direct to get to the claimed emergency." The majority's only responses were: 1) that's not this case and 2) "we think it very likely that an officer who intentionally drove through a playground . . . could be held liable even under the intent-to-harm standard, regardless of the officer’s avowed belief, at least absent some compelling exigency not described in the hypotheticals."

Well:

Continue reading "When dissent rhetoric comes true"

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 20, 2014 at 11:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Oral Argument (in Athens, GA) on Regleprudence

I had the great fortune this week to be on Christian Turner & Joe Miller's podcast, Oral Argument, which they run out of Athens, GA.  We talked about my new forthcoming paper with Nestor Davidson: "Regleprudence -- At OIRA and Beyond," 103 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) -- and many things besides, like this cover of REM's Country Feedback.  These guys run a fabulously entertaining show.  Their clever title for our show together , "Rex Sunstein?," probably is a better title than "Regleprudence."  And they have some really useful links you can scan as you listen to the podcast.  Here is the abstract for the paper we spent most of the time discussing:

There are significant domains of legality within the administrative state that are mostly immune from judicial review and have mostly escaped the attention of legal theorists. While administrative law generally focuses on the products of agency action as they are reviewed by the judiciary, there are important aspects of regulatory activity that are legal or law-like but rarely interrogated by systematic analysis with reference to accounts about the role and nature of law. In this Article, we introduce a category of analysis we call "regleprudence," a sibling of jurisprudence and legisprudence. Once we explore some regleprudential norms, we delve into one case study – the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and the legal work it undertakes through regulatory review – and gesture at how more general attention to regleprudence can improve our understanding of important corners of the Executive Branch.

Posted by Ethan Leib on June 20, 2014 at 11:22 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Weekend Reading: Driver, Reactionary Rhetoric and Liberal Legal Academia

Justin Driver has an excellent paper by that title in the new issue of the Yale Law Journal, which is an excellent issue devoted to Bruce Ackerman's new We the People book. Here's the abstract:

As celebrations mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is essential to recover the arguments mainstream critics made in opposing what has become a sacrosanct piece of legislation. Prominent legal scholarship now appears to misapprehend the nature of that mainstream opposition, contending it assumed more aggressive forms than it actually did. Upon examining the actual arguments respected figures wielded against the Civil Rights Act during the 1960s, certain patterns of argumentation become almost immediately apparent. Mainstream critics consistently opposed the legislation not by challenging it head on, but instead by employing three standard arguments that Professor Albert O. Hirschman’s The Rhetoric of Reaction identified as sounding variously in perversity, futility, and jeopardy. In addition to demonstrating how Hirschman’s taxonomy illuminates mainstream opposition to the Civil Rights Act, this essay proceeds to argue that modern legal academia accords The Rhetoric of Reaction inadequate attention. That is so because the forms of argument Hirschman explored now frequently appear in what would initially seem an improbable place: the scholarship of liberal constitutional law professors. Left-leaning legal scholars often propose revised assessments of high-profile Supreme Court opinions, asserting that—properly understood—those opinions have had perverse effects, ended up being futile, or jeopardized some larger achievement. Legal scholars also deploy such reactionary rhetoric prospectively, warning about the dangers that they assert will accompany future efforts to issue progressive judicial decisions. Given the prevalence of reactionary rhetoric among liberal law professors, it is crucial both to grapple with the reasons that may explain its current ascendance and to identify some of the undesirable consequences that could flow from its common usage.

I think it's a terrific read, although I don't necessarily agree with all of it.

It is worth noting two caveats Driver draws from Hirchsman's excellent book:

Continue reading "Weekend Reading: Driver, Reactionary Rhetoric and Liberal Legal Academia"

Posted by Paul Horwitz on June 20, 2014 at 09:46 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 19, 2014

How to Prosecute Crimes Committed Abroad?

Earlier this year, in U.S. v. Pepe, a former U.S. Marine captain was sentenced to over 200 years in prison for brutally molesting young girls while teaching in Cambodia under the pretense of being a college professor looking out for the Cambodian youth.  He was found guilty of a violation of the PROTECT Act, a laudable federal statute with extraterritorial application which prohibits U.S. citizens from molesting children abroad.  The Pepe case had been lingering for eight years.  The investigation began in 2006, the jury convicted in 2008, and since then the case has been stuck in litigation limbo (a lingering motion for new trial based on an inappropriate relationship between a U.S. law enforcement agent and translator).

I have previously written about the PROTECT Act, and how it, along with numerous other federal statutes that criminalize U.S. citizens behavior abroad, raises an interesting Foreign Commerce Clause (FCC) issue - a matter in which circuit courts are in complete disarray over.  Assuming that Congress, under the FCC, has the power to enact laws like the PROTECT Act with extraterritorial application, the next issues to address (the issues which are framing my fall research project) are the criminal procedure implications of investigations of U.S. citizens in other countries and the related evidentiary matters.

Continue reading "How to Prosecute Crimes Committed Abroad?"

Posted by Naomi Goodno on June 19, 2014 at 05:55 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Criminal Law, Current Affairs, International Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank...thanks for nothing

A few weeks ago, I complained about the Supreme Court's continued efforts to change patent law, but without any guidance as to how it was supposed to happen.  I concluded with my hope that the Court would tell the Federal Circuit what they got wrong (7 opinions issuing from 10 judges) and what the right answer was about the patent eligibility of software and computer-implemented inventions.

Well, this morning Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank issued - and remarkably, the Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit (??) and specifically declined to provide the guidance that has been lacking:  "In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the 'abstract ideas' category in this case"  I'm sure I'll have some more thoughts on this, but my initial reaction is "Thanks for nothing."

Posted by Kristen Osenga on June 19, 2014 at 10:47 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)

Changing Law Professor: Job Security and Governance

Following up on a recent post on the "changing law professor," let me comment on what the phenomenon of what might be called the separating of the law professioriate, as law schools look to experienced lawyers to teach and work full-time in the experiential (clinical and more) space and increasingly-credentialed academics to do more interdisciplinary teaching and writing.  As a couple commenters noted, this is not a brand new phenomenon; nor is it absent elsewhere in the academy.  But my claim is that the pressures on law schools to carry out two fundamentally different objectives simultaneously --   to be traditionally and successfully "academic" and to be increasingly practical -- points toward a model of a twin full-time faculty, with law teachers following more or less the principle of comparative advantage.

What implications does such a model, well underway at a number of American law schools, for important matters of security and governance?  The "job security" issue has gone through accreditation twists and turns for a number of years.  The ABA walked right up to the precipice just this past year of removing what is essentially a tenure requirement for full-time faculty members, deciding at the last moment to maintain existing accreditation standards in this area.  Yet, the requirement of tenure for full-time ladder rank faculty has not swept in the large numbers of full-time faculty whose work is principally teaching and who, usually although not always, are teaching practical, skills-training courses.  It has to a substantial degree done so with respect to full-time clinicians.  But not all faculty members who are carrying out the experiential and practical-skills parts of the academic program are rightly labeled clinical faculty.  So, the maintaining of the current structure of ABA standards does not settle the matter.  Far from it.

In any case, the crucial matter here is not whether tenure exists and persists as a requirement for "non-traditional" full-time faculty.  We could and should debate this issue, and this debate is highly to continue as the ABA (and perhaps the AALS) revisit their standards in the current environment of law school instabilities.  Rather, the internal institutional question is how best to construct a regime of job security for faculty members who continue to be deeply invested in the law school and, moreover, are carrying out major parts of the focused, innovative skills training which both the profession and academy views as essential to law schools' contemporary missions?  Let me put the point more sharply:  It makes little sense to see one big hunk of what I have called the two faculties represented by the "changing law professor" as not having the job security befitting this role and earned by the impactful work they do in the institution.  The traditional case for weak job security was flexibility in hiring, in promotion, and in administrative and financial structure.  While such flexibilities are (here putting my dean hat on) very appealing indeed, such flexibiity is at odds with a faculty configured to do both high-level research and publication and to implement a curriculum which trains skillful lawyers for the new legal economy.

Continue reading "Changing Law Professor: Job Security and Governance"

Posted by Dan Rodriguez on June 19, 2014 at 09:59 AM in Life of Law Schools | Permalink | Comments (2)

Standing is easier when you're Younger

An open issue in the standing discussion in SBA List is the extent to which the threat of an administrative proceeding, a la a complaint about false electoral speech before the Ohio Elections Commission, constitutes sufficient harm to allow standing for a preenforcement challenge to the underlying statute. The Court emphasized that adminstrative proceedings impose burdens on time, cost, and distraction to possible speakers and that a Commission finding that some speech was false may be viewed by the public as a state-imposed sanction--all genuine injuries-in-fact. The Court cited Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools for the proposition that "If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not." But the Court ultimately punted on the question because Commission proceedings might be followed by criminal prosecution, presenting an additional element of harm in this case.

But the Court's hesitancy or ambiguity on this point is unwarranted and potentially troubling. There should be no question that genuinely threatened administrative enforcement proceedings should be sufficient for preenforcement standing.

Dayton was a Younger case, which held that federal courts must abstain in deference to ongoing coercive enforcement proceedings before a state civil rights commission. The portion of Dayton quoted  in SBA List was from Footnote 1, in which the Court quickly disposed of any ripeness concerns, citing two other Younger decisions, both of which involved threatened criminal prosecutions, Steffel v. Thompson and Doran v. Salem Inn.

Continue reading "Standing is easier when you're Younger"

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 19, 2014 at 07:07 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, June 18, 2014

The Precedent Spectrum

The Roberts Court has given us a lot of interesting uses of precedent, including a proliferation of doctrines that purport to dilute the power of stare decisis. The upshot is that the familiar, old-school divide between precedent and dictum has given way to a complex precedent spectrum. Below are a few examples, as well as some misgivings about them.

Continue reading "The Precedent Spectrum"

Posted by Richard M. Re on June 18, 2014 at 10:07 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

More on SBA List and standing

Marty Lederman offers some thoughts at SCOTUSBlog on the future of standing after SBA List. He focuses on something I glossed over a bit: The seeming inconsistency between Clapper, which required that an injury be "certainly impending," and prior case law (referred to in passing in a footnote in Clapper) which only required a "substantial risk" of harm. In SBA List, Justice Thomas presents them as alternative standards. Marty parses the decision, suggesting the Court applied a uniquely forgiving standard there, given that there was little chance (not even substantial and certainly not "certainly impending") of the state bringing a criminal prosecution on top of the administrative proceedings that were more likely. He also argues that the Court has the flexibility to make the requirements looser or stricter, depending on future contexts (considering, e,g., whether free speech is involved or whether election issues are involved or something else).

That "something else" might be the difference between challenges to regulations of the public's primary conduct as opposed to regulations of law-enforcement techniques and practices.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 18, 2014 at 12:53 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (7)

Tuesday, June 17, 2014

Waiver and Forfeiture in the Court

The Supreme Court frequently relies on principles of waiver and forfeiture to limit the scope of its review. But waiver (the voluntarily relinquishment of an argument) and forfeiture (the failure to press an argument) are most naturally at home in traditional litigation that affects only a limited number of parties. In those cases, a court's main institutional role is to adjudicate the narrow dispute at issue, perhaps without even creating any legal precedent. Think, for instance, of adjudication in a small claims court. By contrast, waiver and forfeiture are in tension with some of the Supreme Court's most salient institutional goals -- namely, to provide correct precedential guidance as to important legal disputes affecting many parties and interests. Several recent cases illustrate how the Court has used waiver and forfeiture while navigating its dual identity as both a traditional adjudicator and a precedential rulemaker.

Continue reading "Waiver and Forfeiture in the Court"

Posted by Richard M. Re on June 17, 2014 at 09:46 PM in Judicial Process | Permalink | Comments (0)

IRS: "sorry, can't produce" or a bad example of hiding the ball?

Last week, the IRS stated that it lost numerous emails from Lois Lerner concerning the targeting of conservative groups for tax exempt status because her computer crashed.  And this week, the IRS is now revealing that it has lost numerous additional emails from key IRS officials.  Politics aside, it is interesting to think how this discovery issue involving electronically stored information (ESI) would be addressed in a federal court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).

The facts surrounding this issue almost read like a law school exam hypothetical.  The IRS received a subpoena to produce emails between key IRS officials and other government agents that might suggest targeting.  The IRS knew months ago, in February, that it could not produce the emails, but failed to inform Congress that the emails were lost until just the last few days.  The IRS has taken the position that the emails were lost during a computer crash in 2011 but that the IRS has made a "good faith" effort to find them having spent $10 million dollars (of tax payer money) to deal with the investigation including the cost to piece together what could be found.  The IRS does not deny that the recipients, other government officials, may still be in possession of the emails.  The IRS, however, maintains that because the subpoena was only directed at the IRS, not other government agencies, the non-IRS recipients of the emails are not required to produce them.

If this issue arose in federal court, under FRCP 26, parties are required at the outset to submit a "discovery plan" that includes how ESI will be retained and exchanged in order to prevent unnecessary expense and waste.  The FRCP requires the parties to take reasonable steps to preserve relevant ESI (a litigation hold) or face possible sanctions.  Under Rule 37's so-called safe harbor provision, however, "absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions ... for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system."  The IRS is hanging its hat on this safe harbor rule by arguing that, despite a good-faith effort, the emails were lost.  Did the IRS, in fact, make a good faith effort?

Continue reading "IRS: "sorry, can't produce" or a bad example of hiding the ball?"

Posted by Naomi Goodno on June 17, 2014 at 06:03 PM in Civil Procedure, Current Affairs, Information and Technology, Law and Politics, Tax | Permalink | Comments (7)

SLU PLR Call for Papers: The New Civil War: State Nullification of Federal Law 150 Years after Appomattox

From the Saint Louis University Public Law Review:

In recognition of the 150th anniversary of the end of the Civil War, the editorial board of the Saint Louis University Public Law Review (PLR) is soliciting articles for a special issue on the recent resurgences of state opposition to federal power.  The publication will consider articles on current federal/state tensions, as well as articles linking current events to the history of nullification in the United States.  Possible topics include but are not limited to:

* State efforts to nullify Federal Marijuana Laws

* State efforts to nullify Federal Gun Laws

* State resistance to Federally Mandated Health Care

* State efforts to constitutionalize bans on Same-Sex Marriage

Interested authors should submit an abstract of no more than 1,000 words to Managing Editor Dan Rankin (drankin3@slu.edu) by July 1, 2014.  Publication offers will be made based on an editorial board review of the submitted abstracts.  Accepted offers will receive a publication contract from PLR that will require finished articles by October 15, 2014.  All inquiries should be directed to drankin3@slu.edu.

Posted by Matt Bodie on June 17, 2014 at 02:46 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 16, 2014

Looks like President O got an early start on that coconut

After the next inauguration, quipped President Obama in a hipster Tumblr interview today, he says he'll "be on the beach somewhere, drinking out of a coconut . . ."  Maybe sooner than that, as the president proclaims at the beginning of the interview:  "We have enough lawyers, although it's a fine profession.  I can say that because I'm a lawyer."

So "don't go to law school" is the message he wants to get across.  Larger debate, of course.  But let's see what he says right afterward.  Study STEM fields, he insists, in order to get a job after graduation.  STEM study, yes indeed.  But STEM trained grads often look beyond an early career as a bench scientist or an IT staffer, or a mechanical career or . . . that is, STEM-trained young people look to leverage these skills to pursue significant positions in corporate or entrepreneurial settings.  Hence, they look for additional training in business school, in non-science master's programs, and, yes, even in law schools

Tumblr promises #realtalk, so here is some real talk:  Significant progress in developing innovative projects and bringing inventions to market require a complement of STEM, business, and legal skills.  These skills are necessary to negotiate and navigate an increasingly complex regulatory environment and to interacts with lawyers and C-suite executives as they develop and implement business strategy.   Perhaps too many lawyers, but not too many lawyers who are adept at the law-business-technology interface.  "Technology is going to continue to drive innovation," wisely insists President Obama.  But it is not only technology that is this driver, but work done by folks with a complement of interdisciplinary skills and ambition.

Posted by Dan Rodriguez on June 16, 2014 at 07:29 PM in Information and Technology, Science, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (11)

Standing, ripeness, and SBA List

Not surprisingly, SCOTUS in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that the First Amendment challenge to Ohio's prohibition on knowingly or recklessly false campaign speech was justiciable; Justice Thomas wrote for a unanimous Court in a challenge brought by a group that wanted to run ads suggesting that supporting the Affordable Care Act means supporting taxpayer funded abortions. A few things of note (in addition to Richard's comments).

Injury-in-fact is established for purposes of a preenforcement challenge when the plaintiff alleges an intention to engage in some conduct "arguably affected with a constitutional interest" that is prohibited by the challenged statute where there is a credible threat of prosecution. That threat be shown by past prosecutions against similar conduct by the plaintiff or others similarly situated and by the absence of any disavowal of intent to prosecute. Threat may also include bringing administrative proceedings (such as those at issue here), at least when combined with a threat or risk of criminal enforcement (the Court left open whether administrative proceedings alone is enough of an injury to create standing).

Continue reading "Standing, ripeness, and SBA List"

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 16, 2014 at 04:29 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Changing law professor? Changing law schools?

Interesting article in The Harvard Crimson two weeks ago notes what we have long known already:  Expectations of hiring faculty have grown, especially with regard to more published writing.  In turn, law schools are demanding more advanced academic training -- what Harvard's James Greiner says is "essentially requiring them to do a Ph.D." 

Looking principally at the positive, rather than normative, side of this issue, is it likely that these priorities will withstand turbulence in the current law school environment?  Is such a focus on ever-accumulating academic credentials a luxury in these present circumstances?  A difficult question, without an obvious answer. 

The push toward experiential learning may result in law schools looking at more legal experience, perhaps to go along with the advanced academic training.  After all, it is not uncommon to find joint degree holders with clerkships and at least a couple years of big firm or governmental lawyering experience under their belt.  At the same time, law schools are understandably skeptical of the great added value of such highly-credentialed folks in providing sophisticated experiential skills to a demanding audience.  Surely some idea of comparative advantage would see law faculty who have substantial (5+?) years of increasingly impressive legal experience as more suited to these practice-oriented educational initiatives.  Moreover, a PhD holding academic is going to see these many years of highy academic training as better amoritized through serious scholarly production, rather than designing and implementing complex experiential courses and simulations and in engaging her students principally on the terrain of practical lawyering.

Continue reading "Changing law professor? Changing law schools?"

Posted by Dan Rodriguez on June 16, 2014 at 04:27 PM in Life of Law Schools | Permalink | Comments (6)

Ripeness, In and After SBA List v. Driehaus

Today's unanimous standing decision in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus generally came as little surprise: confronted with speakers wishing to criticize candidates for office, the Court gave a green-light to a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge. Along the way, however, the Court had a few interesting things to say about ripeness. In this post, I'd like to explore the possibility that SBA foretells future changes in ripeness doctrine.

Continue reading "Ripeness, In and After SBA List v. Driehaus"

Posted by Richard M. Re on June 16, 2014 at 04:13 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Flawed NRC Report: The “Prison-Industrial Complex” Part 1: Private Prisons

(This is Part 10 in my criticism of the recent National Research Council report on incarcerationPart 1 looks at the over-emphasis on the drug war. Part 2 and Part 3 argue against assigning too much importance to longer sentences. And Part 4,  Part 5Part 6Part 7Part 8, and Part 9 look at the role of prosecutors.)

I want to turn my attention now from how the NRC report handles prosecutors to its discussions of the impact of interest group pressure on prison growth. As with prosecutors, it barely touches on this issues, despite its critical importance, and its brief analysis highlights effects that appear to be relatively unimportant and overlooks those that matter most.

In this post, I want to focus on one putative cause that receives outsized attention in the popular accounts of prison growth despite its relative irrelevance: the private prison.

When I tell people I study the causes of prison growth, I usually get one of two responses: “isn’t it just the war on drugs?” or “isn’t it just private prisons?” The former point I’ve belabored to death. Now I want to dispatch the latter.

Continue reading "The Flawed NRC Report: The “Prison-Industrial Complex” Part 1: Private Prisons"

Posted by John Pfaff on June 16, 2014 at 11:49 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wrap-Up for "Making the Modern American Fiscal State"

http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/.a/6a00d8341c6a7953ef01a3fd1b53c3970b-pi

Many thanks for all our participants, especially Ajay Mehrotra, for our club on "Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and the Rise of Progressive Taxation, 1877-1929."  Here is a list of the posts:

Many thanks to all our participants for a great club.  And if you enjoyed this club, check out the online symposium at Balkinization for Nick Parrillo's book, Against the Profit Motive: The Salary Revolution in American Government, 1780-1940.

Posted by Matt Bodie on June 16, 2014 at 11:42 AM in Books, Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, June 15, 2014

Marital Infidelity and the Public/Private Divide

I've just read this U.S. News editorial, suggesting that the American public has come full circle in its approach toward infidelity of public figures. It echoes some thoughts I had after watching a few episodes of Scandal, House of Cards, and The Good Wife. All three shows are deeply invested in exploring the public/private divide, and in particular, the connection between sexual infidelity and public political performance. But each of the shows does it a bit differently.

If the editorial is right, then we've seen the rise and fall of American concern with infidelity--from the indifference toward Kennedy's extramarital affairs to today's indifference to Vance McAllister's kiss. And during the heyday It seems that the combined message from the Clinton, Wiener, Spitzer, Petreaus et al. affairs is that evidence of marital infidelity has some bearing on one's function as a public citizen.

Continue reading "Marital Infidelity and the Public/Private Divide"

Posted by Hadar Aviram on June 15, 2014 at 10:33 AM in Culture, Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (4)

Saturday, June 14, 2014

CFP Deadline: Seventh Junior Faculty Fed Courts Workshop

The full CFP is here. The submission deadline is Friday, June 20. Send abstracts to federalcourtsworkshop@gmail.com. Contact Matt Hall or Kent Barnett (both at Georgia) with questions.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 14, 2014 at 04:02 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Economics of the Offside Rule

The recently begun World Cup allows us to think about soccer (or football, for those of you reading outside the United States) as a source of laws and rules, as opposed to our usual focus on baseball. Well, for all the complaints about the technicality and incomprehensibility of the Infield Fly Rule, it has absolutely nothing on Offside (Law 11 of Football's 17 Laws). I could not explain the rule in the space of this post, although I think I now sort-of  understand it thanks to the videos embedded after the jump.

Offside (note the singular: people get persnickety if you add an 's' at the end) is soccer's counterpart to the infield fly rule as being what marks you as someone who really knows and understands the game--you know baseball if you can explain the infield fly, you know soccer if you can explain Offside. But is Offside a limiting rule as I have defined that term--is it soccer's logical and policy counterpart to the infield fly? I am not sure.

Offside is an anti-"cherry-picking" rule, preventing teams from having one or more players hang around the goal and doing nothing but kicking long balls up the field pitch. It also prevents the defense from having to keep multiple defenders back by the goal to guard the cherry-picker. The result is to push the action up the field and keep more players involved on both ends. The underlying logic is aesthetics and the look of the game. The rulemakers did not want what one soccer web site called a "ping-pong match" of long kicks back and forth, as opposed to short passes and runs up and through the middle of the pitch. It also avoids what many would regard as "cheap" goals.

Continue reading "The Economics of the Offside Rule"

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 14, 2014 at 10:46 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (6)

An Addendum on New York Times Op-Eds and Columnists

A fun post from Neil Buchanan on why he thinks the New York Times should get rid of its op-ed columnists and run a vast rotating bunch of writers instead. (It's not clear to me whether the replacements he envisions would only be experts opining on subjects ostensibly within their expertise, or whether he would also run a mix of opinionated generalists who would at least be more varied and surprising and entertaining than the existing limited stock of permanent columnists. On the former possibility, one might enjoy this short take from Mark Tushnet, along with his acknowledgment that his criticism applies especially to bloggers like us, who have some ostensible expertise in a particular area but sound off on all kinds of things.)

I'm fine with his proposal on the whole. I would add three pieces to his discussion that I don't think got much attention from him. One is a matter of the historical background that might help explain why the Times functions as it does. Columns in the Times have often served two useful internal purposes for the paper. One, they serve as a kind of negotiated golden parachute or emeritus position to ease someone out of a job like executive editor; Abe Rosenthal and Bill Keller fall into this category. Two, they have served as a way to retain a valued Times staffer, particularly one who has lost the grand sweepstakes for executive editor or some other main masthead position. Examples here include Anthony Lewis and Tom Wicker. I'm not sure this category describes any current main op-ed columnists (Maureen Dowd and Frank Rich may have been offered columns for retention purposes, but they were not leadership competitors.) It may describe some of the Taking Note and Contributing Writer columnists. These kinds of motivation were considerably responsible for the Times op-ed page taking the shape it did. The Times initially had an editorial page; the op-ed page was a relatively recent later innovation. The columnists it slowly accumulated were mostly people who insisted on a column as the price of staying at the Times rather than going elsewhere, or who were failed heirs apparent during particular moments of change at the top of the Times's masthead. (Other columnists filled a third need for the Times, which was "casting" or changing the face of the Times in response to demands for a more prominent role for African Americans, women, conservatives, and others; past examples include Bob Herbert, Anna Quindlen, and William Safire, and there is Ross Douthat in our own era.) 

Second, I think Buchanan acknowledges but gives too little weight to the degree to which something closer to what he wants has already taken place on the Times's web site, although not its print version. The categories and backgrounds of opinion writers on the web site have expanded considerably. Whether these writers are much good is a separate question; certainly the Taking Note column, which basically consists of politically predictable blog posts by former reporters, is worth skipping on a daily basis. (Indeed, I assume that Buchanan's proposal would only promise more variety and less tedium on the op-ed page, not necessarily better quality.)

Third, I cannot resist taking issue with a couple of his judgments along the way. Pace Buchanan, losing Charles Blow would not be a blow. By the time he left, Frank Rich was not a loss. (I am surprised that Buchanan laments stale, predictable column writing but exempts these two.) And he's wrong about Manohla Dargis.   

Posted by Paul Horwitz on June 14, 2014 at 09:15 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 13, 2014

The Two Newest Faces of the Problem with the Lack of the Rule of Law - a Newborn and a 20-month Old

As a tangential follow-up to my previous post concerning the use of a crime against humanity charge as a way to bolster the rule of law, another heart-wrenching story is gaining international attention. 

Meet Maya, the first U.S. citizen to be born in a Sudanese prison while her mother was shackled to prison walls.  Meet Martin, Maya's twenty-month old bother, who is probably the second youngest U.S. citizen to be sitting in a Sudanese prison.  Their father is a U.S. citizen.  Their mother is Meriam Ibrahim, a doctor and a Sudanese citizen, who has been sentenced by a Sudanese court to 100 lashes for adultery because she married a non-Muslim man and to death by hanging (once Maya is weaned) for apostasy for refusing to denounce her Christian faith.  Ibrahim was found guilty of apostasy because it was determined that she was Muslim even though she testified she was Christian and raised by her Christian mother when her Muslim father abandoned the family.  The trial raises due process issues since three of Ibrahim's witnesses were not allowed to testify.  

There are clear human rights violations and violations of Sudanese law.  Ibrahim's imprisonment violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which, since Sudan has ratified the treaty, guarantees that all Sudanese citizens "have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion" and due process of law.  Sudan has also ratified the African Charter on Human and People's Rights which also guarantees freedom of religion and due process.  Indeed, Sudan's own 2005 interim constitution specifically guarantees the "right and freedoms enshrined in international human rights treaties" ratified by Sudan.  Ibrahim's case (and the impact on her children) graphically illustrates the rule of law problem - the laws are in place but not enforced.

Continue reading "The Two Newest Faces of the Problem with the Lack of the Rule of Law - a Newborn and a 20-month Old"

Posted by Naomi Goodno on June 13, 2014 at 05:25 PM in Criminal Law, Culture, Current Affairs, Gender, International Law, Law and Politics, Religion | Permalink | Comments (1)

Taxation, Civic Identity, and the Future of Consumption Taxes

http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/.a/6a00d8341c6a7953ef01a3fd1b53c3970b-pi

Thanks again to Matt Bodie and Prawfsblawg for hosting this discussion of my book, and for the commentators for their thoughtful questions and critiques.  As I mentioned in my previous post, I thought I’d try to address some of the more specific questions raised by the readers and comments in their earlier posts. But before I do that I also want to reply to Matt Lindsay’s fascinating comment about the historical relationship between the rise of progressive taxation and consumer citizenship.

Continue reading "Taxation, Civic Identity, and the Future of Consumption Taxes"

Posted by Ajay Mehrotra on June 13, 2014 at 02:02 PM in Books, Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 12, 2014

Tesla Surprises with Unilateral Open Source Patents Initiative

Today Elon Musk, Tesla's CEO (pictured below),  announced that "all our patents belong to you". Musk said that in the spirit of the open source movement Tesla will be from now on sharing freely all their patents. Smart move is my take on it. Here is what I told the Harvard Business Review about Tesla's plan: good for the brand, good for constituting a greater consumer market in EVs thus creating more demand, good for faster industry innovation, good for secondary EV network charging fees, and all the while, without losing Tesla's real competitive edge: the product itself, which is larger than the sum of the knowledge embedded in its patents.

Elon Musk - The Summit 2013.jpg

Posted by Orly Lobel on June 12, 2014 at 08:39 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Flawed NRC Report: Prosecutors, Plea Bargains, and Long Sentences

(This is Part 9 in my criticism of the recent National Research Council report on incarcerationPart 1 looks at the over-emphasis on the drug war. Part 2 and Part 3 argue against assigning too much importance to longer sentences. And Part 4,  Part 5Part 6Part 7, and Part 8 looks at the role of prosecutors.)

As one of my last posts about the NRC report and prosecutors, I want to return to the issue of the relationship between incarceration and longer sentences. In earlier posts, I said that longer sentences have not been a primary engine of prison growth, and that is true if "longer sentences are driving prison growth" is read to mean "people serving more time in prison is driving prison growth." But longer sentences could still be important, just in a way that the report ignores.

They could matter because of how they affect plea bargaining.

Continue reading "The Flawed NRC Report: Prosecutors, Plea Bargains, and Long Sentences"

Posted by John Pfaff on June 12, 2014 at 11:49 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Citizen-Consumer and the Origins of Progressive Income Taxation

http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/.a/6a00d8341c6a7953ef01a3fd1b53c3970b-pi

    By way of underscoring Ajay’s emphasis on the importance of the pre-crisis conceptual transformation (and adding, perhaps unnecessarily, to the already-complex question of historical causation) I wanted to build on Ajay’s notion of fiscal citizenship to propose a further way of thinking about the relationship between the evolving political economy of citizenship and the rise of progressive income taxation.  There is now a sizeable literature analyzing the shift in civic identity in the late-19th and early 20th century, from production to consumption—more specifically, from understanding work itself as a source of independence, dignity and virtue; to understanding a worker’s ability to maintain a respectable standard of living as a measure those citizenly qualities.  This capacity to consume was at the center of union movements for a living wage, and for harnessing purchasing power (though boycotts and union label campaigns) to create a more just labor system.  (I’ve argued in my own work that the standard of consumption likewise became an important measure of fitness for citizenship in debates over federal immigration policy.) 

     This left me wondering whether this shift in the political economy of civic identity helped to shape the transformation of the fiscal state by giving new resonance to the long-standing critique of the tariff and fueling support for a non-consumption-based revenue system.  Ajay demonstrates that the tariff was widely viewed as inherently regressive, extracting more from those with less by surreptitiously folding the tax into the price of consumer goods.  And even if it had, at an earlier time, plausibly served to protect infant industries, with the maturation of American capitalism in the final decades of the 19th century it was increasingly viewed as an illegitimate special privilege bestowed on political favorites.  That’s basically a neo-Jacksonian critique of class legislation that, by the 1890s, had been around for decades.  (And as Ajay notes, it had been forcefully advanced against the tariff by figures like Thomas Cooley and David Wells.) 

     I wonder, though, whether that critique gained such traction when it did because it stressed the impact of the tariff on the cost of life’s necessities at precisely the moment when a worker’s capacity to consume—to maintain a respectable standard of living—was becoming a measure of not only personal independence but also, and more broadly, of the basic compatibility between the industrial labor system and equal citizenship.  This isn’t to doubt the vitality of neo-Jacksonian critique or the important role of the progressive economists in popularizing it; but rather to propose a further, perhaps complementary, way of understanding why political receptivity to a non-consumption-based alternative to the tariff system (i.e. the income tax) gained traction after the turn of the century.  In short, was painting the tariff as a regressive consumption tax more salient at the turn of the century than it had been just a couple decades earlier, precisely because one’s capacity to consume had become so much more central to American civic identity?  And while I’m at it, does the relative prominence of “consumer citizenship” in modern American political culture continue to serve as an impediment to serious consideration of broad-based consumption taxes?

 

 

Posted by Matthew Lindsay on June 12, 2014 at 11:16 AM in Books | Permalink | Comments (0)