Sunday, July 15, 2018

ACLU in the NYT

I was traveling last week, so I was unable to read and comment on last week's New York Times Magazine feature on the ACLU. The story emphasizes two themes--its litigation against the Trump Administration across a range of issues and the way it has looked to the NRA's political and electoral strategies for guidance.*

[*] The headline on the article in the print edition was A.C.L.U. v. Trump. The headline in the online article was Can the A.C.L.U. Become the N.R.A. for the Left.

The article does not get into the controversy over the ACLU's First Amendment work, its role in Charlottesville, or the recent controversy over its policies on representing certain speakers in First Amendment cases. None of the political and litigation effects discussed in the piece involve the First Amendment. The article downplays the degree to which this reflects major changes to ACLU activities. It states this is "not the first time the A.C.L.U's mission has shifted," pointing to its birth in the 1920s to protect radicals and unionists and the slow discovery of the benefits of litigation in those efforts. But that was a shift in tactics, not a shift in mission. The print article describes the ACLU has having become a "rapid legal assault force against the Trump Administration." But the Administration's many sins have not involved limiting speech rights, so that role has required less work on free speech and more on immigration, due process, equal protection, and voting rights. All of which is important. But it is different than what the group has historically focused on.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 15, 2018 at 07:28 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, July 13, 2018

Two interesting civil rights puzzles (Updated)

No connection, other than being news stories while on a driving vacation.

1) A Cook County Parks District police officer resigned when video emerged of a drunk man harassing a woman renting a covered picnic area, while the officer watched and did nothing, despite requests from the woman. The drunk man, who was arrested when other officers arrived, was screaming about the woman not being American and should not have worn a Puerto Rico t-shirt in America.

The fun puzzle is imagining the woman's lawsuit against the officer (putting aside that she suffered minimal or nominal damages and a lawsuit may not be worth the candle). Under DeShaney, the officer cannot be liable under due process for failing to act to stop the drunk man or otherwise protect the woman. She would have to bring her claim either under equal protection, that the officer failed to act because she is Puerto Rican, or free speech, that the officer failed to act because he disagreed with the message on her t-shirt or, perhaps, because he agreed with and wanted to support the drunk man's anti-Puerto Rico speech directed against her.

Update: Erica Goldberg argues that much of what the drunk man did was pure speech, so the officer would have violated his First Amendment rights had he intervened sooner. I interpreted the video as being more in-your-face and threatening (and thus less purely protected expression), giving the officer leeway to step-in sooner than he did. But I see Erica's point that this can be read as obnoxious counter-speech.

2) Democratic-controlled states, anticipating overruling of Roe/Casey, are moving to update and enact protective abortion laws. Many progressive states still have on the books the restrictive abortion laws from the early 1970s that became unenforceable following Roe.

This shows the downstream effects of the reality of constitutional litigation. Roe declared invalid Texas' blanket ban and enjoined Texas from enforcing that law; it not remove the law from the Texas code. It also did not repeal the laws of any other state (nor did it enjoin other states from enforcing their laws, although most states declined to enforce, knowing they would lose when courts applied Roe. That's the idea of judicial departmentalism).

Those laws remained on the books, unenforced, a vestige of a past constitutional regime and a past policy position. States lack any incentive to go through their books and remove or update those laws, assuming that the past constitutional regime does not return and the laws remain unenforceable. Facing the return of that regime of no federal constitutional protection for terminating a pregnancy, meaning plenary legislative authority on the subject, states must legislate their preferred abortion policies. For states wanting to maintain liberal reproductive freedom, that means combing the books and eliminating old laws that no longer reflect current policies.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 13, 2018 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (8)

Monday, July 09, 2018

Coase and Fireworks

493l4SRQTVOydKrgKSgSugIn my continuing effort to demonstrate what the mundane world looks like through the eyes of a nerdy law professor, today we will talk about Ronald Coase, recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics, and fireworks.

Before we had dogs, I liked fireworks, at least the professionally staged kind.  Up here in Charlevoix, Michigan, every year in late July the town has a week-long event called Venetian Festival.  The highlight on Friday night is a spectacular fireworks show out over the lake for which our deck is effectively a front row seat.  For the last seventeen years or so, however, I have not been out on the deck nor have I seen the fireworks.  No, I am back in a closet with the door closed, comforting our dog(s) who is/are going batshit crazy.

With the professionally staged fireworks, at least I know when to go into the closet and when I can come out.  It's the private ones that really drive me crazy.  In Massachusetts, where we live nine months of the year, I don't have worry.  Private fireworks are illegal, end of story.  

Here in Michigan, however, we have to deal with one aspect of the state legislature's Year of Living Stupidly.  In 2011, the same year it passed the law eliminating the requirement that motorcyclists wear helmets, Michigan first permitted the sale of fireworks in the state.  In 2013, it amended the law to permit local units of government to ban the use of consumer fireworks, but not on national holidays, the day before or the day after a national holiday.  (It also allows any city in the state with a population greater than 750,000 - there is only one - to ban them between midnight and 8 a.m. on such holidays, and only between 1 a.m. and 8 a.m. on New Year's Day.)

The reasons for my sitting on the beach and, like a complete dork, reading Ronald Coase's The Problem of Social Cost follow the break. If he had the house next door, and had the same issues I do, what might he say about it?

Our local unit of government, the City of Charlevoix, and the surrounding Charlevoix Township each enacted ordinances banning the private use of consumer fireworks to the extent permitted by the Michigan statute.  Thus, for three of the days we are here during the summer (July 3-5), we have to deal with the possibility that some *)&(*^*^&$ is going to be responsible for random and unexpected fireworks activity that turns our dogs' brains into petroleum jelly and causes them to (a) howl madly, and (b) scurry around the house wildly under beds, couches, and other areas of perceived safety.  

The rest of the summer we can be fairly sure that our nearby neighbors won't be using consumer fireworks because of the local ordinance.  If they did out of a misunderstanding of the law, and they were to ignore our friendly suggestion that they obey the law, we would be within our rights to call out Charlevoix's Finest. Fullsizeoutput_de4

Here's the problem.  If you happened by my earlier discussion of riparian rights, you saw this Google Earth picture. It so happens that I took the above picture just about at the tip of the red arrow.  The city proper is largely to the left (west) of the tip of the arrow.  The township pretty much ends at the other end of the arrow.  Every thing else to the right, including that peninsula (known as Pine Point) that looks sort of like India, is in Hayes Township.  Hayes Township has never passed an ordinance banning fireworks.  So just after it gets dark, for much of the summer, we are treated to a fireworks display that carries very nicely, sound and otherwise, across the mile or so to our house.

Where our dogs, having dog-like senses of hearing and smell, proceed to have their brains turned into petroleum jelly and thereupon to (a) howl madly, and (b) scurry around the house wildly under beds, couches, and other areas of perceived safety.

Now, I know that the reason for all of this fireworks activity under the current legal regime is the result not of, as Coase might hypothesize, a railroad needing to run a railroad even if sparks cause crops to catch fire, or industries needing to burn fuel even if it causes air pollution nearby.  It is the product of market activity in which the total value of production exceeds the cost of such production, and consumer activity in which the utility engendered by playing with toys that make loud booms and bright flashes exceeds the cost of such activity, at least for those engaged in it.

The social cost occurs across the lake at my house, where I am contemplating the purchase of doggy Xanax.

The popular takeaway - the "Coase Theorem" - applied to my situation is this.  In a world of zero transaction costs, the total net social welfare of setting off fireworks, on one hand, and my distress in dealing with the dogs does not depend upon the initial allocation of rights.  Assuming that we valued noise and peace in the appropriate ranges, either the celebrants would pay me for the right to have the rockets' red glare or I would pay them to cease and desist. 

It works like this. Let's assume that the pricing system works costlessly and the only actors are A across the lake who wants to use fireworks and me.  The cost to me of insulating my house against fireworks noise is $100.  If the default rule is that the fireworks can't be used without my consent, and the value to A of his (and it's always a "he") activity is more than $100, then A ought to be willing to pay me up to $100 to shoot off fireworks (the cap being $100 because for that amount he can pay for the insulation of my house).  If there is no regulation against fireworks, and I value silence at more than $100, I ought to be willing to pay A up to $100 to have him stop.  In short, with a smooth and costless pricing system, you get the same result regardless of the initial legal entitlement. But, of course, the idealized world of zero transaction costs doesn't exist, and so even if the world only consisted of A and me, and the transaction costs of paying off A creates a total cost to me that exceeds the value of silence, I won't do it, even if without transaction costs it would have been the more efficient result.  And it's not just A and me.  It's many of the good citizens of Hayes Township and many of the good citizens of Charlevoix.

Is there a market solution to my problem?!!?  It turns out that Coase didn't articulate a theorem (or at least that wasn't his object in the article).  There were no helpful hints on how to articulate a default rule so as to minimize transaction costs with the aim of an optimal allocation of resources.  In fact, he never used the word "theorem" or the term "transaction costs."

I recommend Pierre Schlag's critique of the morphing of what Coase said in Social Cost into neo-classical law and economics.  At the beach the other day, I confirmed Pierre's statement that you can get the entire basis for what others now call the Coase Theorem by page 8 of Coase's original 1960 article and skip the remaining 36 pages (actually there's a piece of it at pages 15-16 as well).  Pierre's critique is not of Coase's article. His point was that the popular takeaways - mainly Chicago Law and Economics - have transformed Coase's point into something else entirely. It wasn't Coase who developed the L&E focus on using neo-classical economics to justify legal rules, or to focus on the reduction of transaction costs in pursuit of an idealized efficient solution.  Moreover, in a different piece, Pierre observed that the L&E approach to transaction costs itself is neither theoretically intelligible nor operationally applicable.

To the contrary, according to Schlag (and, by my reading of Coase, he is right), Coase had a far different goal in Social Cost. Coase wanted neo-classical economics to take account of the real world, in particular the effect of law and legal institutions on resource allocation.  Coase's main object was to criticize the prevailing acceptance among neo-classical economists of the idea of Pigouvian taxes.  He wanted to demonstrate the problem with Pigou's approach to externalities - namely, to impose taxes or bounties to the extent that the social cost of an activity exceeded the private cost to the actor.  

Coase was skeptical of Pigou's entire approach.  The bounties or taxes were likely to be overbroad.  Indeed, the focus on making an actor's private costs equal to the total social cost of the activity was misplaced.  In the foregoing example, suppose the social cost of fireworks noise is $200 to me.  Coase criticized the knee-jerk remedy merely of taxing the activity in the amount of $200, because it is possible, in an appropriately free market, that it would only cost $100 to achieve an optimal allocation of resources. In short, the appropriate way to judge externalities (Coase didn't use that term either) was to assess the total effect on social costs both for the actors and those affected by the actors and not simply to add costs to deter the unwanted activity.

But, wait. If the market is not going to work, am I out of luck?  I don't think so.

If Professor Coase lived next door and I were to walk over there and find him, like me, huddled in a closet with his batshit crazy dogs, I don't think, based at least on what he said in The Problem of Social Cost, that he'd rule out the idea of having government rather than the market decide how resources are to be allocated. Firms get organized when there are opportunities for value-enhancing transactions, but only under a scheme where less expensive intra-firm administrative costs substitute for higher costs of market transactions. And then there is the case of something like fireworks noise, "which may affect a vast number of people engaged in a wide variety of activities" and so "the administrative costs might well be so high as to make any attempt to deal with the problem within the confines of a single firm impossible.  An alternative solution is direct Government regulation."  Here, Coase observed that "[t]he government is, in a sense, a super-firm (but of a very special kind) since it is able to influence the use of factors of production by administrative decision."  Coase pointed out that the "government is able, if it wishes, to avoid the market altogether, which a firm can never do."

That is an interesting point up here along the lake. Yes, government regulation can be overbroad and inefficient. 

But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when, as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high.

But you have to get down to cases and not deal in abstractions. Coase thought economists and policy-makers over-estimate the advantages of government regulation, but all that does is suggest that government regulation should be curtailed. "It does not tell us where the boundary line should be drawn. This, it seems to me, has to come from a detailed investigation of the actual results of handling the problem in different ways."  The problem even with local government regulation is that it doesn't fully account for all of the social costs, because the board of supervisors in Hayes Township has not enacted the same ordinances as Charlevoix and Charlevoix Township, and parts of Hayes Township are closer to my living room than parts of my own city.

So, here I am, 1,778 words into this blog post, and discovering that, if Ronald Coase were my neighbor, I might well get him to join me in an effort to get the county or maybe the state government to understand there is a social cost to fireworks.  Not everything needs to be dealt with in terms of markets.

In this article, the analysis has been confined, as is usual in this part of economics, to comparisons of the value of production, as measured by the market. But it is, of course, desirable that the choice between different social arrangements for the solution of economic problems should be carried out in broader terms than this and that the total effect of these arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account. As Frank H. Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals.

I suspect he'd agreed with me that, for fireworks, as elsewhere, "[in] devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total effect." We could gather up the dogs and all those suffering from PTSD and march on township hall to tell them just that.

Or maybe he would tell me that I had over-thought the issue and suggest reading more appropriate for the beach.

Posted by Jeff Lipshaw on July 9, 2018 at 09:54 AM in Deliberation and voices, Law and Politics, Legal Theory, Lipshaw, Property | Permalink | Comments (5)

Friday, July 06, 2018

How Susan Collins avoids being "disappointed" as abortion rights are eliminated

Kevin Drum predicts the Susan Collins path with respect to the confirmation of Justice Kennedy's successor (aka, the fifth vote to eliminate constitutional protection for a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy): Trump nominates a Justice certain to overrule Roe; Collins is convinced after an hour-long conversation that the nominee has "undying respect" for stare decisis; Collins declares herself satisfied and votes to confirm; eighteen month later, the Court overrules Roe; "Collins will announce that she’s disappointed." I have been saying much the same thing, which is why media coverage and interviews about Collins support for abortion rights are so mind-numbing, because it pretends that something other than what Drum says is a possibility.

But this piece by Leah Litman offers another way for Collins to avoid disappointment, by offering two paths by which the Court can eliminate the constitutional right to abortion without uttering the words "Roe is overruled." The first is by finding that the various state restrictions on abortion (short of an outright ban or criminalization) do not impose undue burdens and thus are subject only to rational scrutiny, which they survive. The second is by expanding the government interest in not "facilitating" abortion, which could be taken to its logical extreme that "allowing abortion under law facilitates abortion," so the state is justified in a ban. Either approach would eliminate abortion in many states and make the "right" impossible to exercise for many people, but without uttering the magic words.

And Collins will not be "disappointed." She can say, "well, the new justice did not overrule Roe, which is what I was concerned with." And she will not be smart enough (or care enough) to know what really happened.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 6, 2018 at 08:51 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 03, 2018

Vaccines Mandates Win in Court


Thank you, Howard, for letting me contribute as a guest blogger this month. For the past five years, I have been involved in the vaccine wars.

Vaccines have tremendous benefits. In the United States, vaccines prevent tens of thousands of deaths and millions of hospitalizations each year. Their risks, while real, are very small. And yet, a misguided minority rejects vaccines, and in some communities, their numbers are disturbingly high. One place they made little headway in are courts - as this state example, mirroring the national jurisprudence, demonstrates.

In 2015, after a measles outbreak centered on Disneyland, California, in a contentious, high intensity legal process, passed Senate Bill 277 (SB277), a bill removing the personal belief exemption from California’s immunization law. SB277 became law on June 30, 2015 when Governor Jerry Brown signed it. Since California did not have a separate religious exemption, the effect of the law was to almost completely remove non-medical exemptions to California’s school immunization law. Unsurprisingly, opponents turned to the courts. After losing in three federal district courts and two state superior courts, two groups of plaintiffs appealed. On July 2, 2018, a California Court of Appeal released the first appellate decision upholding the law. This case was brought by eight plaintiffs seeking to send their children to school unvaccinated, represented by a lawyer who was openly anti-vaccine.

There is a large literature showing  that states with easier to get exemptions have lower vaccination rates and that higher rates of exemptions are associated with more outbreaks of preventable diseases. School immunization requirements work: they increase vaccine rates, and they reduce rates of outbreaks, sometimes completely eliminating them (other things that may lead to outbreaks even when vaccine rates are high. For example, we need a better pertussis vaccine. But even there, non-vaccinating increases the risk and makes things worse).

Opponents’ strongest arguments were that the mandate violated California’s constitutional right to education, violated the First Amendment’s freedom of religion guarantee, and impermissibly interfered with parental rights. Even these, as the Court of Appeals – correctly – pointed out, were not convincing.

The Freedom of Religion arguments runs into two related precedents - Employment Division v. Smith, under which generally applicable, neutral on their face laws do not have to provide religious exemptions, and Prince v. Massachusetts, which in a statement that is not part of the ruling but still persuasive found that religious freedoms do not exempt parents from vaccine requirements, because “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”In a line of Federal Circuit courts mandates without religious exemptions were also upheld. There’s a question on how the recent religious freedom decisions by the Supreme Court will affect this jurisprudence, but that deserves a separate discussion (hint: right now, likely not at all, but it may be a warning for future).

Parental rights are not, and never have been, absolute. Even if they extend to the right not to vaccinate a child against a preventable, potentially fatal disease, they likely do not extend to a right to send that child to school unvaccinated and risk others.

I will address the right to education separately, but in short, the appellate court, following a previous federal district court decision, found that the leading case on the right to education in California – Serrano v. Priest– did not apply in this context, since it looked at a combination of the right to education and a suspect classification – wealth – and there was no such classification involved here. Even if strict scrutiny applied, the Court of Appeal said, the mandate would survive, since preventing diseases is a compelling interest and school mandates are the right means to serve it.

To repeat some of the language:

“…compulsory immunization has long been recognized as the gold standard for preventing the spread of contagious diseases. As is noted in the legislative history, studies have found that “when belief exemptions to vaccination guidelines are permitted, vaccination rates decrease,” and community immunity wanes if large numbers of children do not receive required vaccinations.”…. We agree with Whitlow’s conclusion: “The right of education, fundamental as it may be, is no more sacred than any of the other fundamental rights that have readily given way to a State’s interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and particularly, school children[.]”

 

Indeed.

At least in this area, so far, the courts stand solidly behind science and the public health.

Posted by Dorit Reiss on July 3, 2018 at 09:34 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Current Affairs, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (42)

Friday, June 29, 2018

(SCOTUS Term) Departmentalism and Kennedy's Hawaii concurrence

June guests Dan Epps and Leah Litman did a "Good Behaviour" edition of the First Mondays podcast to discuss Justice Kennedy's retirement (both clerked for Kennedy). They talked a bit about Kennedy's concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, trying to make sense of it. Their discussion triggered a thought.

Judicial supremacy (to which Kennedy long has adhered) without judicial enforcement is incoherent. Kennedy argued that, even without judicial oversight, executive officials must "adhere to the Constitution and its meaning and its promise." It is an "urgent necessity that officials adhere to these constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of foreign affairs." But Trump  and his aides and officials believe they are adhering to the Constitution, as they interpret and understand it. Trump and his administration believe that the Constitution gives the President the broad discretion to enact and enforce the travel ban, because national-security concerns outweigh any disadvantages imposed on persons of a particular faith. And if the judiciary is unwilling to review the President's actions, that presidential interpretation becomes the last and controlling word on this piece of the Constitution.

So it must be that Kennedy was urging the President to adhere to the Constitution as the Court (or just Kennedy) understands it. But this is the key insight of judicial departmentalism--the other branches are bound by the judicial understanding of the Constitution only when that understanding is reduced to a binding judgment in an action to which the executive is a party. Or, short of a judgment, the executive prediction that he will be subject to a judgment unless he follows the judicial understanding. But when the judiciary decides that it cannot intervene, no judgment is possible, therefore the judiciary cannot impose its interpretation on the executive. And we return to the executive having the final constitutional word.

Kennedy was trying to have it both ways in his concurrence--no judicial involvement and so no judgment, but a push towards the judicial constitutional interpretation. But he cannot have it both ways. Either the judiciary gets involved or the judiciary's constitutional interpretation carries no weight.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 29, 2018 at 11:15 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (9)

Thursday, June 28, 2018

Civility is the new unity

I criticized the demands last fall for "unity" in the face of various protests. The call for unity means speech that "divides"--which is to say all speech critical of the status quo or majority position--is divisive. And that is anathema to free speech.

The same can be said for recent calls for civility, to which Neil Buchanan responds at Dorf on Law, Vann Newkirk responds at The Atlantic, and Osita Nwanevu responds in Slate.  One problem is definitional. It is too easy too define criticism or protest, even measured criticism and protest, as uncivil. Another problem is New York Times v. Sullivan, "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." That means debate and criticism of public official can, will, and should be uncivil, especially when it is the powerless attempting to be heard by the powerful who otherwise have no obligation or opportunity to listen or engage. A requirement of civility means a high-ranking public official can demand silence from those who serve her cheese or who stand near her in the restaurant, It effectively creates a right for public officials to be free from proximate speech that she deems unfriendly or uncomfortable--rather than averting her eyes or ears, she can demand civility, which means demanding silence.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 28, 2018 at 11:43 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (17)

(SCOTUS Term) Trying again with First Amendment retaliation

I wrote last week that the narrow and fact-specific decision in Lozman v. Riviera Beach reflected a vehicle failure--the Court wanted to consider the effect of probable cause on First Amendment retaliation claim, but took a case in which retaliatory intent rested with members of the city council, not the arresting officer. The Court on Thursday granted cert in Nieves v. Bartlett, a decision out of the Ninth Circuit (the court most willing to allow plaintiffs to show retaliatory intent even if there was probable cause) that squarely tees-up the issue without possible intervening factual issues.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 28, 2018 at 01:17 PM in 2018 End of Term, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, June 27, 2018

(SCOTUS Term) Janus

As I have said, the outcome in Janus was so over-determined, I am surprised it took this long to come out. It was decided--and everyone knew it was decided--on the night of November 8, 2016. I figured Alito and Kagan (who sparred in the two prior cases that set this up) had their respective decisions pre-written eighteen months ago.

My one take-away is that the opinion demonstrates why asking SCOTUS nominees about stare decisis is pointless. And so is looking at their decisions as lower-court judges. Stare decisis is too easy to pay lip-service to in a hearing and too malleable (to use the word that was all the rage in the opinion) to limit Justices determined to overrule precedent. And nothing that someone does as a  lower-court judge predicts what she will do when the only limits are prudence and rhetoric.

Kagan scores an important point by arguing that the only reason that Abood had become a First Amendment "outlier" was Knox and Harris, Alito decisions that included dicta attacking Abood that the majority then used to argue that Abood had been undermined. As Kagan wrote, "relying on them is bootstrapping—and mocking stare decisis. Don’t like a decision? Just throw some gratuitous criticisms into a couple of opinions and a few years later point to them as 'special justifications.'”

Time will tell if this decision hurts public-sector unions as much as advocates (and the dissenters) fear. I do not know labor law well enough to know. The majority says the union could charge nonmembers for representing them in arbitration or grievance procedures, although I do not know if that would be sufficient. Meanwhile, Aaron Tang offers a legislative solution to provide unions with sufficient resources (as have others). But Kagan is correct that there is now an enormous gap in the degree to which government can control employee expression when it comes to unions versus individual speech activities. It cannot compel non-members to pay for work-related speech (which the majority defines as being of public concern), but it can fire workers for making the same speech in and around the workplace. Kagan argues that this will prove to be a "unions-only" protection for government employees objecting to unions, who will otherwise find their at-work speech rights quite limited.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 27, 2018 at 01:24 PM in 2018 End of Term, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Enjoining family separation

A judge in the Southern District of California certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class of "[a]ll adult parents who enter the United States at or between designated ports of entry who (1) have been, are, or will be detained in immigration custody by the DHS, and (2) have a minor child who is or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in ORR custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody, absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child" and issuing a classwide preliminary injunction  prohibiting DHS from "detaining Class Members in DHS custody without and apart from their minor children," to release minor children from detention, and to take steps to reunite parents and children within 30 days. The court found that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on a substantive due process claim, as the zero-tolerance policies and their effects "shock the conscience.

The court followed appropriate procedures. It created a class that is a unique party to the case, then issuing an injunction that protects that party. This is not the sort of universal injunction Justice Thomas and others are criticizing, because it protects only parties and the parties are defined. The class is broad, but it is manageable and seems consistent with the nationwide class and classwide injunction allowed in Califano.

I would guess that the court (or the Ninth Circuit) is going to stay the injunction, at least the mandatory portions that give the government 30 days to release detained children.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 27, 2018 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 26, 2018

(SCOTUS Term) Preliminary Adjudication

Perhaps recognizing how many constitutional cases are coming to it on immediate interlocutory review of the grant or denial of preliminary injunctions, the Court has been couching its constitutional holdings in that preliminary posture. In NIFLA, the majority held that "petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the FACT Act violates the First Amendment." In Hawaii, the majority concluded that "plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claim."

In both, the Court writes as if its constitutional decision was only for purposes of deciding whether to halt enforcement of the challenged law pendente lite. And in both the Court remands for further proceedings, seeming to suggest that this is not the final word on the constitutional validity of the challenged laws and that there may be further arguments to be made during further proceedings on remand.

This seems like something new. Significant constitutional cases have come to the Court on review of preliminary injunctions, at least where issued following a full and detailed hearing (if not a full "trial"). The Court's determination of constitutional invalidity, as part of the likelihood-of-success prong, was seen as the last word on the constitutional merits in that case, requiring only an after-notice conversion to a permanent injunction on remand. And maybe that is what the Court understands as further proceedings for these cases. But putting this in the language of the preliminary-injunction standard hints at a more interlocutory decision and the expectation that more detailed proceedings, including a full trial on the merits, may be required.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 26, 2018 at 06:05 PM in 2018 End of Term, Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

(SCOTUS Term) The goose is sauced, but the gander is not

On Tuesday, the Court in NIFLA v. Becerra declared invalid, at least preliminarily, California laws requiring crisis pregnancy centers to disclose and advertise certain information about the procedures and services (specifically related to abortion) that can be had for free at state-run facilities. I do not know how much this will hurt the state, because there should be other ways for the state to get this information out--including posting signs outside the clinics themselves.

The problem is that the Court's analysis suggests that the goose and the gander will not be sauced in the same way. The counterpart to California's compelling facilities to provide information about abortion services is states compelling doctors to inform patients about about the development of the fetus, alternatives to terminating the pregnancy, and (often false) information about the risks and effects of abortion, as well to show the patient the ultrasound and play the fetal heartbeat. The Court declared valid one such law valid in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and others have been challenged unsuccessfully in the lower courts. The majority's explanation is that Casey dealt with informed consent surrounding a "medical procedure," analysis that also applies to other abortion script laws. On the other hand, these clinics are not performing "medical procedures," so the state cannot compel providers to say things as part of informed consent. But that gives the game away--terminating the pregnancy always requires a procedure, whereas not terminating the pregnancy does not require a procedure. (Well, other than ultrasounds, prenatal tests, C-sections, and other things related to birth itself). So this decision likely will be used to declare valid speech compulsions imposed by legislatures seeking to eliminate abortion, while barring compulsions by legislatures seeking to protect women who might seek abortions.

If the "medical procedure" line does not show the one-sidedness, Justice Kennedy's short concurring opinion, emphasizing the viewpoint-discrimination in these regulations (a point Justice Thomas avoided), clinches the point. The challenged law "compels individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these." Medical providers opposed to abortion can point to such precepts. Medical providers willing to perform abortions will not be able to identify a similar philosophical, ethical, or religious precept against having to read to a patient a script containing false medical information.

Finally, a question about that concurring opinion. Kennedy wrote it for himself, the Chief, Alito, and Gorsuch--in other words, four of the five Justices in the majority, other than the author. Can anyone recall this happening--four out of a five-Justice majority join one separate opinion? What went on internally that Thomas would not include something about viewpoint discrimination, even in a footnote, when every Justice joining his opinion wanted to talk about it? And why did the four remain with Thomas as author? Surely there was nothing in the two-page concurrence with which Thomas disagrees.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 26, 2018 at 05:20 PM in 2018 End of Term, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

(SCOTUS Term) Thomas adopts universality, rejects injunctions

I may have more to say about Trump v. Hawaii later, but I wanted to start with Justice Thomas' concurring concurring opinion on scope-of-injunction. (The majority, having rejected the merits of the plaintiffs' argument, says it is unnecessary to reach that issue).

Thomas begins with a footnote adopting "universal" as the "more precise" term because the injunctions are distinctive because thet "prohibit the government from enforcing a policy with respect to anyone, including non-parties--not because they have wide geographic breadth." (Unfortunately, Thomas does not cite me for the nomenclature point). Instead, he relies heavily on Sam Bray's discussion of the history of equity and universal injunctions. He then rejects scholarly counter-arguments--protecting non-parties and constraining the executive--as not justified by historical limits on equitable and judicial power. He closes with "[U]niversal injunctions are legall and historically dubious. If federal courts continue to issue them, this Court is dutybound to adjudicate their authority to do so."

[Update: I should have included Justice Sotomayor's brief, conclusory discussion. She argues that given the nature of the Establishment Clause violation, a universal injunction was necessary to accord complete relief to the plaintiffs and was dictated by the extent of the violation established.]

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 26, 2018 at 12:07 PM in 2018 End of Term, Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, June 23, 2018

When the Nazis became "The Nazis" (Updated)

That question occurs to me reading historian Deborah Lipstadt's argument against comparing family separation and the detention of children and families to Nazis and concentration camps. She argues that the analogy is historically inaccurate, rhetorically self-defeating, and unnecessary, because "something can be horrific without being a genocide or a Holocaust."

One problem with both Nazi comparisons and criticisms of Nazi comparisons is that they assume a singularity to what the Nazis did and were. But, as one Holocaust scholar argues, the Nazi campaign against the Jews did not begin with murder or even intend towards murder. Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power in 1933 seeking to strip Jews of civil rights rights, to "degrade, segregate, and diminish" Jews--precisely how Lipstadt describes the purpose of apartheid. The plan was to keep new Jews from entering Germany and expel those present. The turn to mass murder did not begin until 1941, when officials realized they had both the need and the means.* There were concentration camps for political and other prisoners (including Jews) from the beginning of the regime and conditions in the camps were poor. But gas chambers were not installed at the camps until 1941 and construction of "death camps" designed only for murder began the same year.

[*] Some scholars argue that the Nazi turn to murder grew from a conflict between two Nazi goals--conquering nations and creating a Greater Reich and getting rid of the Jews within the Reich. Millions of Jews lived in the areas Germany invaded, so as German territory grew, so did the number of Jews in German territory.

In other words, the Nazis had between five and eight years of harassing, intimidating, isolating, and dispossessing Jews, marked with dehumanizing metaphors and language, but without resort to genocide. That is, between five and eight years of pursuing discriminatory policies that are not, in degree or kind, so different from what many other regimes (South Africa, Jim Crow South) have pursued. So focused, the analogy between German policies and some aspects of U.S. treatment of  immigrants is not entirely inaccurate.

Lipstadt's assumption is that "The Nazis" is shorthand for what Nazi Germany became from 1941-45, not what they started out as or the discriminatory policies they implemented from the beginning. And that is probably true. The power of the analogy comes from what made the Nazis different--the ultimate horrors everyone knows.

[Update: Andrea Pitzer has written a book called One Long Night: A Global History of Concentration Camps, tracing their origins (and name) to Cuba during the revolt against Spanish rule and their acceptance through the early days of Nazi rule. In this interview and this op-ed, she explains how the term and its implications changed under the Nazis and argues how and why the term applies to the current situation in the U.S.]

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 23, 2018 at 11:05 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, June 22, 2018

(SCOTUS Term): Marbury and appellate jurisdiction

Marbury v. Madison made quite the appearance in Friday's decision in Ortiz v. United States, where the Court held that there was no statutory or constitutional violation in having a military officer serve as a judge on a service's Court of Criminal Appeals (which reviews courts martial decisions) while also holding a position as a presidentially-appointed-Senate-confirmed judge on the Court of Military Commission Review.* But the Court split over whether it had Article III jurisdiction to review decisions from the non-Article III Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (the top court in the military-justice system), an issue on which the Court granted argument time to Aditya Bamzai (U Va.) as amicus.

[*] Ortiz was consolidated with Cox v. United States and Dalmazzi v. United States the latter and argued by our own Steve Vladeck. The Court DIG'd both cases, which also raised statutory issues the Court believed were unnecessary to reach.

Justice Kagan wrote for seven that the Court had jurisdiction; Justice Thomas joined that opinion but added a typically idiosyncratic concurrence; and Justice Alito dissented for himself and Justice Gorsuch. And it was all about Marbury, which both the majority and dissent discuss at length (while dropping comments that, of course, everyone knows the details of that case). Marbury establishes that SCOTUS' original jurisdiction is limited to the cases enumerated in Article III and that its appellate jurisdiction is limited to reviewing, revising, and correcting proceedings initiated in a another court, not to creating a judicial case.  Everyone agreed this was not (and could not be) an exercise of original jurisdiction. The point of departure is whether SCOTUS could exercise appellate jurisdiction over a decision of CAAF and the military-justice system.

The majority held that it could. The military-justice system, including CAAF, was judicial in character, even though located in the executive branch not Article III. Each level in that system decides cases in accordance with the Constitution and a body of federal law, wields jurisdiction that overlaps with that of state and federal courts, accords procedural protections, and produces judgments that read the same as a judgment from any tribunal. SCOTUS was not limited to reviewing decisions of Article III courts, as shown by its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of state courts, territorial courts, and District of Columbia courts; the latter two judicial systems have been grouped with military tribunals, all as resting on unique congressional powers. And CAAF's location in Article II did not make it executive, because a decision by a judicial tribunal located in the executive branch was different than the individual executive decision of James Madison not to serve Marbury's commission.

Justice Alito, largely adopting Bamzai's position, begins by arguing that the executive (non-judicial) nature of Madison's actions would not have changed if he had held a formal hearing or established procedural protections prior to deciding not to issue the commission. A decision by an executive is an executive decision, no matter its form. Only an Article III body with Article III judges can exercise federal judicial power; executive-branch officers cannot do so, so they cannot create and decide cases that can be reviewed in an exercise of SCOTUS' appellate jurisdiction. Alito distinguished territorial and D.C. courts, because they exercise the judicial authority of that territory or D.C.; this is different than exercising the judicial authority of the United States, which only can be done by an Article III court.

The dispute leaves open whether SCOTUS could review decisions by modern administrative agencies (something Congress has never purported to do). The majority disclaimed this decision speaking in any way to that issue, emphasizing its foundation on the unique constitutional and historic foundations of courts martial and of the connection to territorial and D.C. courts. Alito rejects this as "halfhearted," insisting there is no relevant distinction  for purposes of SCOTUS' appellate jurisdiction between the military-justice system and civilian agencies. In Alito's view, all are executive and cannot exercise judicial power. But if one can somehow be judicial to allow for SCOTUS review, so can the other.

All the opinions are good reads; Kagan is her breezy self, with references to General Burnside's "notorious facial hair." I am going to add this discussion to Fed Courts--I just have to decide whether to include it at the top with my discussion of SCOTUS jurisdiction or later with discussion of non-Article III jurisdiction.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 22, 2018 at 02:48 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 21, 2018

(SCOTUS Term): Trusting adjudicators on remand

The Court on Thursday decided in Lucia v. SEC (link corrected) that SEC ALJs were officers of the United States rather than employees and that the appointment of ALJ's by SEC staff (rather than the SEC itself) violated the Appointments Clause. Justice Kagan wrote for herself, the Chief, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Thomas concurred, with Gorsuch. Breyer concurred in the judgment in part, agreeing that the ALJ in this case was not properly appointed, but for statutory rather than constitutional reasons. Sotomayor dissented on the constitutional question, joined by Ginsburg.

I want to focus on the issue of remedy in the case. The Court remands for a new hearing on the charges against Lucia (involving alleged deception of prospective clients). But it insists that the new hearing cannot be before the same ALJ; it must be before a different (properly appointed) ALJ or the SEC itself. The original ALJ "has already both heard Lucia's case and issued an initial decision on the merits. He cannot be expected to consider the matter as though he had not adjudicated it before." Appointments Clause remedies are intended to incentivize parties to bring Appointments Clause challenges; a party has no incentive to bring the challenge if the remedy is a new hearing before the same adjudicator, properly appointed. Because there was no suggestion the ALJ erred on the merits, he can be expected to reach the same result from hearing the same case. Breyer dissented on this point (and Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined that portion of his opinion). He compared reversal on appeal, where the same judge typically rehears the case on remand. And because this reversal was on a "technical constitutional question, and the reversal implies no criticism at all of the original judge or his ability to conduct the new proceedings," neither due process nor the structural purposes of the Appointments Clause would be violated by the same ALJ rehearing the case.

The competing approaches reflect a paradox. For Kagan, the fact that the judge was not criticized or corrected on the merits shows that he cannot be trusted to hear the case anew, because his views on the merits will not have changed and no new or different evidence or arguments on the merits cause him to change those views. Implicitly, a decision criticizing the original decision or requiring something new forces him to reconsider those merits, whether to correct the original error or because the new information is convincing. Breyer's approach, on the other hand, presumes that a judge criticized on the merits might be put-off by the reversal (lower-court judges do not believe they were "wrong" even though a reviewing court disagreed with their decision) and more dug-in to his original position. If we trust that judge rehear that case on remand, we should trust a judge in this situation.*

[*] Marcus, Redish, Sherman, and Pfander, the Civ Pro book I previously used, included in the Discovery chapter a defamation action against Diana Ross by a former employee. The district court had dismissed the case on 12(b)(6), but the Second Circuit had reversed. The case back before the same district judge in discovery, every discovery decision went against the plaintiff and in favor of Ross, which can be seen as at least influenced by the judge's previously established views on the merits.

Kagan's approach raises the question of what other "structural" errors might be similar to an appointments problem as to require rehearing by a different judge. Denial of counsel comes to mind, although the assumption is that proper counsel will present evidence and arguments that the pro se party failed to present, changing what is available on the merits and requiring the judge to think about the merits differently. Another possibility is routine shackling in Sanchez-Gomez; if the reviewing court says this defendant should not have been shackled, it does not criticize the trial judge on the merits of any decision she made against the defendant, so that judge would be expected to reach all the same judgments.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 21, 2018 at 12:11 PM in 2018 End of Term, Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

Wednesday, June 20, 2018

Mootness, enforcement, and particularized injunctions

The mootness analysis in this Eleventh Circuit decision illustrates the importance of focusing on the particularized nature of litigation and remedies, including injunctions. This was an action against Hooter's by Haynes, a visually impaired plaintiff, alleging that the incompatibility of its website with certain software violated the ADA. Hooter's settled a separate lawsuit brought by Gomez and raising similar claims, agreeing to place an accessibility notice on its site and to improve access to the site.

The court held that the settlement in Gomez did not moot Haynes' action, for three reasons. First, whatever Hooters agreed to do had not been done, so Haynes still was suffering a remediable injury. Second, while compliance with the Gomez settlement would provide some of what Haynes sought, it did not provide everything and Haynes sought some unique remedies. Third, and this should be most important, Haynes is not a party to Gomez and so lacks the power or right to enforce that order if Hooters fails to comply or if it should reach a different agreement with Gomez.

That control over enforcement of the judgmentt is essential to party status and to injunctive relief. It is why injunctions are particularized to the parties--binding the defendant as to the plaintiff and allowing the plaintiff to enforce if the defendant fails to comply.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 20, 2018 at 10:57 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, June 18, 2018

(SCOTUS Term): Deciding little, deciding few, and competing judicial functions

I had thoughts similar to what Dahlia Lithwick and Eugene Volokh argue. This Court does not want to decide substantive constitutional issues--to make constitutional law--that can guide lower court, other branches and governments, and the public. In addition to the standing punt in Gill (which retains the gerrymandered status quo, so it is not a neutral result), Volokh points to Tuesday's decision in Lozman and last week's decision in Masterpiece as examples of the Court failing to resolve the tricky substantive issues presented in the cases. The acid test will be whether the Court does something similar with the travel ban. (Eugene also mentions Janus, although the outcome in that case is so over-determined, it feels like waiting for the inevitable).

The wisdom of so-called minimalism or reliance on "passive virtues" or what Dahlia derides as the Chief fearing political criticism must be measured against the Court's shrinking docket. The Court will decide fewer than 70 cases this Term. And the cases it decides will not have the long-term prospective effects that we expect from a Court of last resort working with an almost-entirely discretionary docket. The nature of that docket focuses the Court on its rulemaking, as opposed to its error correction, function. So what is the Court doing and how does it see its role?

On the rulemaking/error-correction line: We might think of Lozman and Masterpiece as failures of discretionary case selection, creating confusion between those competing roles of the Court. In both cases, the Court realized it had the wrong vehicle for resolving the core constitutional issue. Neither case presented the paradigm case for the supposed legal issue. And both had unique features that allowed for narrow resolution of the case at hand (in other words, correcting lower-court error) while providing little general guidance (rulemaking).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 18, 2018 at 09:59 PM in 2018 End of Term, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

(SCOTUS Term): Municipal gadflies on a busy day at SCOTUS

SCOTUS resolved five cases on Monday. This included the partisan-gerrymandering cases (about which, more later), while leaving unresolved many critical doctrinal questions.

Monday's haul included Lozman v. Riviera Beach, a victory of sorts for a local gadfly. Lozman was arrested (on later-dropped charges) in November 2006 while attempting to speak at the public-comment portion of a City Council meeting. The case was briefed and argued on the proper standard for First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims: Whether probable cause to arrest on some charge defeats the claim or whether courts must consider whether the officer would have arrested the plaintiff even absent his speech.

An 8-Justice majority resolved the case on different terms, as an unusual and narrow retaliation case. Lozman had not sued the arresting officer and he did not claim a First Amendment violation from the officer stopping him from speaking at the November 2006 meeting. Lozman sued the city, alleging that council members (one in particular) enacted a policy to retaliate against him for his pre-November 2006 expressive activity, including critical public statements and filing a state open-records action; the arrest effected that policy. That made this case unique and uniquely problematic. Retaliatory policies, as opposed to ill-motivated officers making ad hoc decisions, are a "particularly troubling and potent form of retaliation" for which a First Amendment claim is the only remedy (whereas a plaintiff could have an individual disciplined or fired--although neither happens). Probable cause plays no role in such a case, because the arresting officer's immediate concerns at the time of arrest are unrelated to the policy targeting past speech. Finally, the policy targeting high-value petition activity.

Lozman's road remains difficult, as he must show that the Council members established a policy, that the policy was retaliatory (that it would not have been established but-for his expression), and that the arrest was pursuant to that policy--all issues on which courts are notoriously stingy. The road for similarly situated future plaintiffs to take advantage of this decision remains more difficult. Lozman had the advantage of a transcript of a closed-door Council meeting at which members spoke in retaliatory terms; most plaintiffs will not be so fortunate. In essence, the court traded a difficult-to-prove issues on the effect of probable cause on individual retaliation for a different set of difficult-to-prove issues surrounding the establishment of municipal liability.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 18, 2018 at 11:52 AM in 2018 End of Term, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, June 14, 2018

(SCOTUS Term): Court rejects ban on political apparel in polling places

Although it did not deal with compelled speech on the anniversary of Barnette, the Court did knock out one of its free-speech cases--Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky. The Chief wrote for seven Justices, declaring invalid a state law prohibiting "political badge, political button, or other political insignia" being worn "at or about the polling place."

The polling place is a nonpublic forum and the statute was viewpoint neutral. But it was not reasonable. The word "political" is undefined. It is broader than "campaign" (a category dealt with in a different, unchallenged provision), but its scope remains uncertain and is not clarified by various administrative-guidance policies, which offer examples that appear contradictory. Roberts argued this "poses riddles that even the State's top lawyers struggle to solve," citing to the extensive, inconsistent hypotheticals the Court peppered counsel with during argument. That uncertainty also vested too much discretion in the election-day judges, who cannot know all the "issues" that might be reflected by a piece of apparel.

The sort of parsing for over- or under-inclusiveness that the Court does here typically is part of strict or intermediate scrutiny, rather than reasonableness. But the result makes sense, as a word like political is seemingly boundless. And the Court remained at least nominally deferential of the state's interest in making the polling place a space of calm reflection and cited approvingly to narrower laws in other states (Red and Blue) aimed at the same goal.

Justice Sotomayor dissented for herself and Justice Breyer, arguing that the Court should certify to the question of the statute's precise meaning to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Chief dropped a footnote to reject certification, emphasizing the discretionary nature of certification, the lateness of the state's suggestion of certification in the litigation, that the state had offered an interpretation for the Court to use in the case, and that there is no obvious alternative interpretation that the state court might adopt.

This is the second time in two Terms that Sotomayor has argued for certification to avoid a First Amendment decision (Justice Alito joined her prior attempt). It is interesting that Court has stated that certification (like Pullman abstention, the doctrine it arguably supersedes) should be used sparingly in First Amendment cases, given the chilling effect caused by delays in the certification process.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 14, 2018 at 11:00 AM in 2018 End of Term, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

(SCOTUS Term): Barnette at 75

Today marks the 75th anniversary of W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, which John Q. Barrett commemorates at his blog on all things Justice Jackson. Barnette must be among the Top 5 most important SCOTUS First Amendment decisions and one of the first to combine soaring free-speech rhetoric with a victory for the free-speech claimants. The decision remains relevant to modern free-speech controversies, between controversies over flag-related speech and new concerns over compelled expression. Two cases from OT17 implicated Barnette and compelled speech--Masterpiece Cakeshop although only Justice Thomas, citing Barnette, took the free speech route, and NIFLA v. Becerra, a pure compelled speech case that will certainly rely on Barntte. NIFLA is still out, although it would be ironic if the Court issued that case today.

The anniversary also gives me a chance to publicize the FIU Law Review Symposium, Barnette at 75, hosted at FIU on October 5, 2018. Panelists include John Q. Barrett (St. Johns), Ronald Collins (Washington), Erica Goldberg (Dayton), Abner Greene (Fordham), Paul Horwitz (Alabama), John Inazu (Wash U.), Leslie Kendrick (Virginia), Genevieve Lakier (Chicago), Aaron Saiger (Fordham), Seana Shiffrin (UCLA), Steven Smith (San Diego), and Brad Snyder (Georgetown).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 14, 2018 at 06:08 AM in 2018 End of Term, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, June 11, 2018

Two thoughts on the recall of Judge Persky

Having listened and read various discussions about last week's recall of California trial judge Aaron Persky, I was struck by two points lost in some of the coverage.

First, there is a lot of focus on Persky being recalled and this being the first time in 100 years that has happened. But the issue should be less about recall than about any procedure to remove judges from the bench in response to unpopular rulings. While there had not been a successful recall of a judge in California, critics have successfully targeted judges for removal through other processes. Most famously, three members of the Supreme Court lost retention elections in 1986 following a campaign targeting their decisions in capital-punishment cases. And the anti-Persky movement would have been as problematic had critics found and supported someone to run against him for the seat when it next was up in 2022, when similarly based on disagreement with the Brock Turner decision.

Second, this drives home that the issue for judicial independence is not how judges are initially selected (election, political appointment, judicial commission, some combination), but whether and how they can be removed once on the bench. It does not matter whether Persky reached the bench via election (as he tried, but failed to do) or appointment (as he did). The issue is that, once on the bench, he could be recalled (or not retained or not re-elected) because of his rulings.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 11, 2018 at 12:07 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (6)

Friday, June 08, 2018

Ali/Trump

Before leaving for Canada, the President made statements at the White House that he is "very seriously" thinking about issuing a pardon for Muhammad Ali and that protesting NFL players should let him know about "people that they think were unfairly treated by the justice system" or of "friends of theirs or people they know about." I know this was Trump speaking off the cuff, which is not something he is good at (at least if we are looking for things that make sense). And it is on a silly subject, compared with other behavior by him and his administration. But there is a lot here that illustrates how the President understands (or misunderstands) the world, politics, the Constitution, his power, and law.

• Ali's conviction for refusing induction was reversed on appeal, the United States never reprosecuted him, and DOJ conceded that Ali's objections to induction were religiously based and that his beliefs were sincerely held. As Ali's lawyer stated in response to the President's offer, there is nothing for which Ali must be pardoned, as he has no existing conviction and is not under threat of future prosecution for his past actions. Is Trump aware of that?

• In Trump's world, someone who declines to engage in a patriotic ritual derogates and insults the military and should be deported; someone who refuses to join the military and fight in time of war does not, such that a conviction for disregarding his legal obligation to fight reflects an unfair sentence warranting a pardon. Such disparate understanding of symbolic patriotism compared with fighting for the cause is striking and incoherent. But it is consistent with the NFL's symbolic patriotism. And it is consistent with the President's symbolic patriotism, as he similarly went out of his way to avoid service in Vietnam, without having to justify his reasons for not going or losing four years of his career to his efforts.

• All politics is personal. The NFL players must be speaking out about injustices done to their friends or specific people they know and want to help, just as the President uses the pardon power to help his friends or individuals he knows and wants to help. He does not conceive of systemic problems that affect thousands of people, who need help not by the individual remedy of a pardon but by systemic reform. Nor does he appear to understand why players would protest for a cause disconnected to individuals that they know and care about.

• The players are protesting systemic racism, violence, and differential treatment in the criminal-justice system This includes police killing unarmed or non-threatening persons of color with impunity. How does a pardon affect that? Walter Scott is dead, so a pardon does not do him much good. Of course, one of the President's pardons was granted to Joe Arpaio, who was convicted of contempt of court for refusing court orders to stop discriminating and using unjustified violence in his role as a police officer.This President is more likely to pardon Michael Slager, the officer who shot and killed Scott and is serving a federal prison sentence on a civil rights charge.

• Most law enforcement, and so most of what the players are protesting, involves state and local police and the state criminal-justice system. The President can pardon federal crimes, not state crimes. So even if Colin Kaepernick had ten friends wrongfully convicted, Trump could not do a thing about it. So this is demagoguery--an empty and impossible gesture, used to fool the unaware into siding with him against a group and message to which he is opposed. Or the President is unaware of the limits of his pardon power.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 8, 2018 at 04:05 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Sports | Permalink | Comments (15)

Wednesday, June 06, 2018

The White House defines free speech

When asked how President Trump reconciled his belief that a baker has a free-speech right not to sell a cake for a same-sex wedding with his insistence that there is no free-speech right to kneel (or just stay in a different location), Sarah Huckabee Sanders said: "The president doesn’t think this is an issue simply of free speech. He thinks it’s about respecting the men and women of our military; it’s about respecting our national anthem.”

Someone opposed to the position of the baker in Masterpiece could say something similar: "It isn't simply an issue of the baker's free speech. It's about respecting same-sex couples who wish to get married and to shop in the marketplace on the same terms as everyone else; it's about respecting equality." Sanders, on behalf of the President, is really saying there is no such thing as free speech. Speech should be stopped when the President agrees with the message being criticized (the flag and the power of police to use whatever force they deem necessary), while speech should be allowed when the President disagrees with the message being criticized (equal rights for same-sex couples).

That one's position on free speech depends on what is on the other side is not surprising; many people approach the First Amendment this way. It is disturbing when it becomes the official position of the White House, as opposed to the position of a bunch of college students.

Next Thursday, June 14, marks the 75th anniversary of West Virginia Bd. v. Barnette. It is ironic and troubling that the principle that a person cannot be compelled to utter patriotic tropes or engage in patriotic rituals is again up for grabs, as the rhetoric around this heats up and makes this into a significant free-speech controversy.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 6, 2018 at 08:11 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Sports | Permalink | Comments (8)

Tuesday, June 05, 2018

Another voice against replay

I could not make this argument better than Will Leitch does at New York Mag. I only would add that the failure of replay in sports to produce Objective Truth reflects the general failure of all video (say, from body cameras) to produce Objective Truth for all things.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 5, 2018 at 11:00 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Another day, another NFL protest

Two new items for today. President Trump canceled the Philadelphia Eagles White House visit, amid reports that fewer than ten players were going to show. Nikolas Bowie (about to begin teaching at Harvard) argues at Slate that NFL rules banning player protests violate several state constitutions.

On the Eagles visit. I found it interesting that the press release said that the Eagles "disagree with their President" (emphasis mine) about anthem protests. I know it is folly to parse White Statements, but "their" hints to me of some Dear Leader stuff--I am your President and how dare you disagree with your President (whatever that disagreement may be). The team visit is being replaced with a rally at which the anthem (the words of which Trump almost certainly does not know) will be proudly played for the 1000 fans who planned to attend. The question is how many of those 1000 will still show if the team--the reason most of them wanted to attend--will not be there. Congressional Democrats invited the team to the Capitol, with promises of Wawa coffee.

The President later tweeted, in response to the new NFL protest policy that has not been implemented yet (and had nothing to do with the Eagles visit) that "[s]taying in the Locker Room for the playing of our National Anthem is as disrespectful to our country as kneeling." This supports my point that players wishing to protest can make a statement by staying off the field, if in sufficient numbers or with sufficient coverage. This also should drive home to the league and the teams that appeasement does not work and only makes them look worse. The league forced through a compromise that the players (and some owners) hated and that did not achieve the one thing they wanted to achieve, pacifying the President.

By the way, at SEALS on Thursday, August 9, I will be moderating a discussion group on the NFL protests.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 5, 2018 at 08:18 AM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Sports | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, May 30, 2018

When does encouragement become overwhelming or coercive?

Depositions in Colin Kaepernick's collusion grievance reveal that President Trump spoke to at least one owner about halting the protests lest Trump make a political meal out of it. And fear of criticism by Trump, and the public being worked into a froth by that criticism, influenced other owners.

A private person or entity acts under color of law of law when there is a "close nexus" between the constitutionally violative private conduct and the government or government officials coercing, compelling, or overwhelmingly encouraging that conduct. So could we see constitutional challenges* either to the league's new protest policy or to the blackballing of protesting players?**

[*] Because the close nexus would be with a federal official, this would be a Bivens rather than § 1983 action against the NFL or individual owners. That presents two questions I leave aside for now: 1) Would the Court reject this as an improper "extension" of Bivens and 2) Whether and how the "under color" tests from § 1983 translate to Bivens, a point on which lower courts divide.

[**] This one faces the additional problem that the NLRA grievance process would qualify as an alternative statutory scheme.

The key is what coercion, compulsion, or overwhelming encouragement means. Trump wants the owners to stop the protests and he wants to make political hay out it. Do those efforts to influence the NFL and its owners qualify as overwhelming encouragement, by threatening to create a public backlash that would hurt the league and its business? Can we see Trump as coercing (through threat of harm to the league's business)  the owners to silence the players, something Trump himself cannot do? While Trump's speech is protected as government speech, can it form the link for NFL liability?

I doubt this would work. But it is worth considering.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 30, 2018 at 05:47 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

Saturday, May 26, 2018

Contempt and the recalcitrant President

Paul Rosenzweig at The Atlantic games out what would happen if Robert Mueller subpoenas the President and the President refuses to comply.*

[*] TL/DR: A stalemate in which nothing can happen legally and the only hope is a political solution. This is where Trump's attacks, and GOP buy-in on those attacks, on Mueller and on the courts matter. Neither Mueller nor the courts have any credibility, so Congressional Republicans will not see disobedience as a crisis; they will see it as a heroic stand against an overweening prosecutor and judge.

But in considering the first step of civil contempt, Rosenzweig jumps right to the prospect of jail and the impossibility of pulling that off (because the Secret Service would never allow the U.S. Marshal to arrest the President, at worst resulting in a gun fight between officers of the two agencies). But the court has discretion to enforce contempt--to attempt to compel compliance--by other means short of jailing. One is monetary fines. So could the court impose a series of escalating fines against Trump? Could those be collected without having to go through and past the Secret Service, as by by attaching some assets? Would the threat to his wallet compel the President to comply? Or to do something really stupid?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 26, 2018 at 02:32 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, May 24, 2018

Universality as judicial impatience and control

Universal injunctions reflect judicial impatience and a desire of the court issuing the injunction to maintain control over a set of legal issues. Seeing disputes likely to recur, courts use the injunction to resolve all issues for all parties, rather than allowing other doctrines, designed to handle duplicative litigation, to do their work. And the reason is that those other doctrines may take awhile to reach a conclusion (that the issuing court believes is correct) and may leave control in the hands of another court.

In my forthcoming article, I argue that it is impatience with precedent. The Seventh Circuit recognizes Santa Clara will want to maintain its federal funding despite sanctuary policies, just as Chicago does. Rather than letting the process of precedent play out--having the district court or Ninth Circuit decide the issues in the separate action, perhaps using the Seventh Circuit decision as precedent; allowing courts of appeals to work through authority; allowing SCOTUS to resolve--the Seventh Circuit uses the injunction to get the singular result at once. This is both faster, because the process of building to consensus or resolution of precedent can take awhile. And it leaves the first court in control, rather than allowing another court to perhaps reject the first court's precedent.

This dispute over the contempt citation reflects impatience and a desire for control over a different limit on duplicative litigation--preclusion. The key to this case is the district court's conclusion that individual FLSA plaintiffs (and their attorneys) are in privity with the United States with respect to the validity of the overtime regulations, a dubious proposition (and, if I had to predict, the basis on which the Fifth Circuit will reverse the contempt order). But accepting that there is privity, the proper space for that analysis is issue preclusion--for Chipotle to argue in the District of New Jersey that the first court's decision as to the invalidity of the regulations has preclusive effect on the individual lawsuits. But this takes control from the first court, since "[d]eciding whether and how prior litigation has preclusive effect is usually the bailiwick of the second court."   By proceeding via injunction, the first court retains authority to decide all related issues under the guise of enforcing its injunction.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 24, 2018 at 07:26 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 23, 2018

Irony can be pretty ironic

Does anyone recognize the tragic irony that the Milwaukee Police Department released this (and got this response from the Milwaukee Bucks) on the same day the NFL announced this.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 23, 2018 at 08:45 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Sports | Permalink | Comments (4)

Contempt and the universal injunction

Last month, I wrote about a case in which a district court in Texas enforced a universal injunction barring enforcement of the Obama Labor Department's overtime regulations (issued in a case against DOL) by holding in contempt private attorneys who brought a private action claiming that Chipotle violated those regs. The law firms have appealed the contempt order to the Fifth Circuit, calling it an "extraordinary and concededly unprecedented use of the contempt power to dictate the legal arguments that a stranger to that court may advance in another federal court." The firms question the conclusion that DOL can be in privity with millions of individuals merely because they would make the same legal arguments.

Tellingly, however, the plaintiffs accept the power to issue universal injunctions. Their challenge is to the logical conclusion that every universal injunction "against the federal government would apparently be binding, in personam, against each of the tens or even hundreds of millions of Americans that the relevant arm of the government purports to serve."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 23, 2018 at 07:03 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 14, 2018

Mootness in Sanchez-Gomez

SCOTUS on Monday decided United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, unanimously holding (per the Chief) that the constitutional challenge to a district-wide policy of shackling all pretrial detainees was moot when the prosecutions of the four defendants ended; neither the special treatment of class actions (where there had been no class certification) nor capable-of-repetition kept the case alive. My opinion analysis is on SCOTUSBlog.

The opinion contains a fair bit of language emphasizing the individual nature of constitutional litigation, thereby supporting the view that injunctions must be particularized to the parties and not accord universal protection or limitations to non-parties. The Court emphasized the "usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only" and that the "'mere presence of . . . allegations' that might, if resolved in respondents' favor, benefit other similarly situated individuals" does not matter. The Court was talking about Article III mootness and when disputes remain alive. But the principles carry to questions such as the scope of an injunction.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 14, 2018 at 03:44 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, May 12, 2018

Eighth Circuit on municipal liability

In Webb v. City of Maplewood, a class challenged various practices relating to unpaid traffic fines (H/T: Volokh Conspiracy's weekly round-up). The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of the City's defense of sovereign immunity, which was correct. The city tried to obtain immunity by emphasizing the role of the municipal court, a separate, immune entity, in enacting and carrying out the challenged practices. But the court said that the municipal court's separate liability or immunity, if any, did not shield the city from its liability. "If the municipal court rather than the City is responsible for the practices, the City will have a defense on the merits but not immunity from suit."

On that last point, many courts would treat the last point as a matter of Article III standing--the plaintiffs would be said to lack standing to sue the City, because the injury was not traceable to the City nor redressable by an injunction against the City.*

[*] This happened in many marriage-equality cases. Plaintiffs would sue the governor or attorney general, who would argue that he is not the responsible executive officer for things such as marriage licenses or vital records such as death certificates. The dismissal always was framed as 12(b)(1) lack of standing.

I have long believed that position was wrong, that suing a non-responsible defendant should be treated as grounds for the defendant to prevail on a 12(b)(6) or summary judgment. I am glad the court got this right, although with little analysis or explanation for why this should be a matter of merits (and likely because the City failed to frame it as standing).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 12, 2018 at 12:29 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, May 06, 2018

Judicial departmentalism and U.S. v. Nixon

The potential controversy over the special counsel issuing a grand-jury subpoena for President Trump offers a nice illustration of judicial departmentalism, outside my usual focus of constitutional litigation. The theory of judicial departmentalism is that Supreme Court precedent is binding within the judiciary but not on other branches and other actors, who remain free to engage in their own, independent legal and constitutional analysis, even if it diverges from controlling judicial authority and sets non-judicial actors on a contrary course of action. A corollary  is that the executive is not bound to follow precedent with which he disagrees, but must obey a judgment entered against him in a specific matter.

So how does this stand-off play out?

Step One: The President, his lawyers, and the executive-branch lawyers can decide, in their own best constitutional judgment, that a President is not subject to a testimonial subpoena (which is not precisely covered by United States v. Nixon) or even that Nixon was wrong. They also can give controlling weight to non-judicial sources of advice, such as OLC opinions. And they can act on their constitutional understanding by refusing to comply with the subpoena, without being said to be "disobeying" or "ignoring" the courts or acting contrary to law or to their oaths.

Step Two: Faced with that response, the special counsel will move in federal court to enforce the subpoena. All federal courts will be bound to follow Nixon and other judicial precedent and will order the President to testify. All levels of the federal judicial hierarchy are similarly bound, unless SCOTUS wants to overrule Nixon, which I doubt, or the document subpoena/testimonial subpoena distinction is a meaningful one. Now Trump is compelled to obey. And his refusal constitutes disregard for the courts and to his oath.

A wise lawyer at Step One will be aware and will advise his client as to what will happen at Step Two, perhaps prompting different behavior at Step One. A wise political adviser might do the same. The point of judicial departmentalism is that compliance with precedent is a matter of prudence, choice, and political incentives, not legal compulsion. Legal compulsion comes only from Step Two.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 6, 2018 at 09:52 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (12)

Friday, May 04, 2018

Elites and elitists

This piece by Elizabeth Drew of TNR makes no sense. Drew attempts to rebut President Trump's criticism of reporters, especially the D.C. press corp, as "elitists" or "snooty elites." But there are so many problems with the argument.

Drew conflates elitist with elite--one represents a position in society, while the other reflects an attitude. One can be part of society's (or sub-parts of society's) elite without being elitist. I have heard the President and others use both terms, so it is not clear which she is responding to.

Drew cites "numerous indicators" showing journalists are not elite. These include not inheriting jobs (although a family name "might get you in a door" she concedes understadedly); not making a lot of money; not becoming famous (except for a few); working long hours; and not enjoying job security. But she never explains why those indicators define elite status. I can think of many careers that we regard as elite on some level that lack all or most of those indicators. Drew also ignores other indicators or enablers of elite status. One is education, which most D.C. journalists have. Another is some modicum of power or influence, which journalists unquestionably have, because their spoken or written words are going to be seen and read by thousands or millions of people.

There are good reasons to fight back against Trump's rants against the media. Denying the elite status of political journalists within U.S. society seems, well, elitist.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 4, 2018 at 02:37 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (7)

Thursday, May 03, 2018

A solution for the wrong problem

At National Review, James Lucas argues argues for special procedures to limit the effects of nationwide injunctions, including automatic stays, de novo review, and some form of mandatory SCOTUS review. The problem is not nationwide injunctions, but their issuance by single district judges working within a narrow geographic area.

But the issue with these injunctions is not their nationwide scope, it is their universal application beyond the named plaintiffs  in individual actions, without class certification or broad third-party standing. So Lucas' proposals offer solutions to the wrong problem. (That is not, in fact, a problem at all. Injunctions should be nationwide, in the sense of protecting the named plaintiff everyone in the nation).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 3, 2018 at 02:42 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

Tuesday, May 01, 2018

Adjudicative jurisdiction and substantive merits under the ATS

Michael Dorf explains the connection between the "only jurisdictional' understanding of the ATS and the narrowing of the judge-made substantive cause of action. Although the Court has never put it in these terms, Michael argues that it makes "internal sense" to understand the jurisdictional grant as the source of the implied right of action (a substantive, non-jurisdictional issue), so the right of action should not extend beyond the circumstances cognizable in 1789. I tried to get at the same idea in discussing Kiobel.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 1, 2018 at 08:49 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, April 28, 2018

U Va Law bans non-students from library during exams

Story here (forwarded to me by a colleague with the subject line "Glad I'm Not a Dean"). Nothing wrong with that policy on the surface--many schools do that to ensure that law students have sufficient study space during the high-stress period. The potential problem is that the policy change was enacted in response to white-supremacist leader Jason Kessler using the library, which triggered a wave of protests, public forums, and demands for the school to take action. So what happens with a content-neutral policy enacted for blatantly viewpoint-discriminatory reasons?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 28, 2018 at 11:03 AM in First Amendment, Law and Politics, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (7)

Thursday, April 26, 2018

Adler on same-day audio

Jonathan Adler argues that nothing bad happened after the Court released the Trump v. Hawaii audio the same day and there is no reason not to make same-day audio the regular practice.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 26, 2018 at 08:41 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, April 25, 2018

Cosmic injunctions

Not much discussion of universal injunction in Wednesday's argument in Trump v. Hawaii. The one real exchange occurred late in Neal Katyal's argument for Hawaii, prompted by Justice Gorsuch, who questioned the "troubling rise of this nationwide injunction, cosmic injunction." Gorsuch recognized that the issue was not geography, but district courts issuing a remedy "not limited to relief for the parties at issue or even a class action" and  "assert[ing] the right to strike down a -- a federal statute with regard to anybody anywhere in the world." Katyal acknowledged sharing Gorsuch's impulse, but argued that the Court should not address the issue in this case, because of its immigration context and the need to leave it to lower courts to figure out in the first instance.

I am curious whether the lack of interest in the scope of the injunction hints at where the Court will come down on the merits.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 25, 2018 at 08:59 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 24, 2018

I only want to see you working on your Civ Pro test

Zimmer as Trustee for the Kin of Prince Rogers Nelson v. Trinity Medical Center, a wrongful death action in Illinois state court by Prince's Estate against the hospital and doctors in Moline, Illinois that treated him, and failed to recognize a possible overdose, about a week prior to his death, and Walgreen's, two Walgreen's stores, and several Walgreen's pharmacists for prescribing him medications improperly.

Consider:

• All the defendants are from Illinois, except for the two Walgreen's stores, which are located in Minnesota (where Prince was a citizen prior to his death). Those defendants destroy complete diversity, keeping the case in state court. And that likely is the reason they were sued. Of course, even without the non-diverse defendants, the case is not removable because of the forum-defendant rule.

• It is not clear how there could be personal jurisdiction over the stores. I presume they filled prescriptions for drugs for Prince in Minnesota and had no obvious connection or direction to Illinois in their prescription activities. There are allegations in the Complaint that sound in obtaining jurisdiction over the stores through their connections to Walgreen, which is an Illinois corporation with its PPB in Illinois and subject to general jurisdiction. So it is the converse of Daimler--attempting to use a parent to get jurisdiction over the underling.  I suppose there is purposeful availment through owning a Walgreen's franchise (which presumably requires some contractual or other relationship with Walgreen's), but those contacts don't give rise to this claim. (The analogy would be if someone who choked on a Burger King fry sued Rudzewicz in Florida, based on his franchise agreement with BK). Expect the stores to move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (although, because of the F/D/R, dismissing them has no removal effects).

• There is an interesting state venue question. The lawsuit was brought in the Circuit Court of Cook County. But Prince was treated at a hospital in Moline, Illinois, in Rock Island County. Illinois law makes venue proper in the county of residence of any defendant, with corporate defendants residing in any county in which it has a registered or other office or is doing business. Walgreen's headquarters is in Deerfield, in Cook County.

• The case offers a simple illustration of the fact that conduct in one state injuring someone who is from another state does not, without more, create personal jurisdiction in the injured person's home state. Hence the Estate going to Illinois rather than making the defendants come to Minnesota.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 24, 2018 at 08:23 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, April 21, 2018

More on PowerPoint

As one of the "Oh, I never use PowerPoint" people Derek mentions, I wanted to add on to a couple pieces of his post. Derek says he uses PP for three things: 1) The text of a rule or statute; 2) Visualizing a concept such as a flowchart; and 3) Photos and other AV material. And he and I teach some of the same classes.

First, not using PowerPoint is not the same as "simply sp[eaking], lectur[ing], engag[ing] in Socratic dialogue." While I (proudly) never use PP, I fill the dry-erase board with flow charts, key terms or phrases, hypothetical problems, and occasionally statutory text, especially if I want to break the pieces of the statute down. I recall a SEALS panel on using AV in class and one of the speakers presented his slide for the Erie flowchart. It was the same flowchart I use, just with more color and boxes and permanency. But the dry-erase board allows me to interact with the visuals, circling and underling things as we go, something that is impossible on the sterile slide (even with a laser pointer).

Second, the drawback to putting text on a slide is that students stare at the slide instead of the text in their books. I want them to learn to read and highlight or underline or mark-up the text as they go, by having the text right in front of them and being able to work with it. I have been aware this semester of how much students jot down what they hear about a statute in their notes and use the remembered language from their notes, rather than going back to the precise text and textual language. This is important when we are jumping around to multiple rules and they have to figure out how to read the rules together and fit them as parts of a whole. I prefer to read the rule together, with everyone looking in her own book, rather than presenting it in one spot for all.

Third, Derek says he does not churn through and read slide after slide. But the temptation to do so is overwhelming and commonplace, thus becoming expected by students and audience members.

Fourth (and this is going to be a matter of personal style), the question must be whether a visual adds something to the presentation and to the students' learning. When teaching Lujan, does it really add to the students' understanding of the case to flash a picture of the Nile Crocodile? It's nice as trivia or cocktail-party conversation--which certainly is important--but does it help the students understand the material? If my answer is no, it is something I leave out of the classroom, but perhaps present on the course-adjacent blog or web site.

Finally, while I believe I shared this story here years ago, it is worth repeating. It involves an academic talk rather rather than class, but it gets at the same thing. I was presenting my empirical study of the infield-fly rule , which had charts with numbers and pictures of fields showing location of batted balls, and the AV system was not working. The moderator told me to "do the best I can," which would have been "not at all," since the talk would have been incoherent without the audience being able to see what I was talking about. (They fixed the system by the time I got up there, so it worked out). That the moderator could believe the talk could work without the visuals tells me that many people are giving many talks using PP that adds nothing of consequence, probably with visuals that contain the text of what the speaker is saying and that are going to be read, but nothing more. If someone can do the same talk and be as understood without the visuals, the visuals add nothing essential and can be discarded.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 21, 2018 at 05:47 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (9)

Thursday, April 19, 2018

Speeding cases

Last week I flagged Suja Thoma' JOTWELL review of the study by Miguel de Figeueirdo, Alexandra Lahav, and Peter Siegelman of the effect of the six-month list on judicial decisionmaking. Those authors criticize new regulations requiring immigration judges to clear a minimum number of cases to be evaluated as satisfactory. Based on their findings on the minimal-or-negative effects of the six-month list on the quality of judicial deisionmaking, they conclude that imposing such obligations on judges who lack life tenure will "cause their decisions to suffer even more."

I continue to wonder whether there are due process concerns with these regulations, by giving judges a personal or pecuniary interest in the case--if not in the outcome, then in the way in which it is litigated (which affects the outcome).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 19, 2018 at 07:00 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

An even more unusual role

I have written before that Justice Thomas rarely assigns majority opinions, given seniority and the Court's ideological breakdown. Well, according to Slate's Mark Joseph Stern, Tuesday's opinion in Sessions v. Dimaya marked the first time in 25 years on the Court that Justice Ginsburg assigned a majority opinion, when Justice Gorsuch provided the fifth vote with the Ginsburg/Breyer/Sotomayor/Kagan block. That fifth vote, if it comes, usually comes from the Chief or Kennedy, both of whom are senior to RBG. In addition, Stern (citing Adam Feldman) says this was the sixth time a female justice assigned an opinion; the other five were by Justice O'Connor, who usually did not get to assign because she was in a majority with Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Stevens.

The assignment power remains an interesting future project. I have to figure out the different empirical routes that must be explored.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 19, 2018 at 12:35 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, April 18, 2018

What is a heckler's veto?

Paul's post about reexamining the doctrine surrounding the heckler's veto, in response to some comments on this post, leads to an open question: What is a heckler's veto and what is the doctrine surrounding heckler's vetos?

The phrase "heckler's veto" appears only 12 times in the U.S. Supreme Court's database, often in dissents or in passing, including in two non-free-speech cases. None involves the paradigm cases, which I think are the following: 1) Police arresting or restricting a speaker because the people around him become violent and threaten to hurt the speaker or damage property (this is TerminielloFeiner, and the Nazis in Skokie); 2) Laws setting a legal standard that burdens a speaker because of actual or anticipated audience reaction (this is Forsyth County); and true no-platforming, in which a university denies or rescinds a speaker invitation or permit in response to threats of disruption. Close to the center are cases in which police or other authorities do nothing and allow the hecklers to attack or otherwise physically disrupt the speaker (there might be a DeShaney problem here, unless the speaker can show the failure to act was because of his speech). The point is that overnment must do something (or refrain from acting for a speech-discriminatory reason) to create the veto. The doctrine is clear--such vetoes are impermissible,* at least outside of narrow contexts (such as the community standards prong of obscenity or the "disruption" concern for student speech) or if there is a compelling interest in not having to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on security.

[*] Although Feiner famously came out the other way, the prevailing view is that this no longer is good law.

The question--and there is no Supreme Court doctrine on this--remains if and when literal heckling, as a form of expression, becomes a heckler's veto without government action to halt the original speaker. Is it a heckler's veto if police or government officials do nothing and two speakers talk over one another until one gives up or is unable to proceed? We have to answer that question before we can figure out whether the heckler's veto doctrine must be reconsidered, because it is not obvious how that doctrine applies to these situations in the first place.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 18, 2018 at 09:31 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, April 17, 2018

Foley on appointing a special master in the Cohen case

At the Election Law Blog, Ned Foley questions the potential appointment of a special master to review and determine privilege of the materials seized from Michael Cohen. He concludes:

Thus, it seems to me that there should be an extremely strong presumption in favor of using conventional procedures to handle the Cohen case. If those procedures would be good enough if the client involved were a major business figure (like Mark Zuckerberg), or a major sports or entertainment figure (like O.J. Simpson), then they should be good enough if the client is a business and entertainment figure who later becomes president (like Donald Trump).

I would add two things in support of Ned's conclusion. First, one reason this is a "politically charged case" is that the President has been relentlessly attacking the Department of Justice, including over the seizure of Cohen's documents.There is an unfortunate irony, and perverse incentive, that the President's attacks on the prosecution politically charge the case so as to require special procedures.

Second, DOJ uses filter teams, not a special master, when reviewing materials seized from congressional offices for possible Speech-or-Debate-protected materials. Such cases are at least as politically charged as this one, with the added bonus that they implicate the Separation of Powers when the executive investigates the legislature.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 17, 2018 at 02:41 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, April 14, 2018

If everyone is a Nazi . . .

Josh Blackman wrote at length about being the target of protests at CUNY Law when he went to do a Fed Soc lecture on free speech on campus. Josh's post includes photos of the gauntlet of signs he walked in the hallway, as well as events inside the room. After several minutes of organized interruptions (including one law student exclaiming "fuck the law") and a warning from school administrators, Josh was able to engage with some audience members and the protesters left the room, after which Blackman did Q&A with the remaining students for more than an hour.

The underlying premise of many protests and attempts at "no-platforming" begin from the premise that the appropriate First Amendment rule, whatever the First Amendment's scope otherwise, should be "no free speech for Nazis and white supremacists." Putting aside the other problems with such a rule, its core problem is that it seems inevitable that everyone becomes (or at least everyone who disagrees with you) becomes a Nazi and white supremacist who must be shut down. Many of the protest signs reflect this misunderstanding.

Erica Goldberg tries to identify the line between the right to speech and the right to protest speech, drawing the line at "coordinated efforts to silence a speaker." Erica distinguishes "an errant 'hey, you're wrong'" from "an effective, premeditated campaign" to shout down a speaker invited to use a designated forum. She also suggests drawing a line around "[s]ubstantive, informed, respectful discussions" and "civil, open-minded, orderly discourse."

I have been trying to identify the same lines, focusing on location (protesters inside the forum v. protesters outside the forum). Erica suggests that some forms of protest, including some verbal protest, are permissible within the forum, which is broader than I had thought of going. But I question whether coordination or terms such as substantive, civil, and open-minded can do much work. The First Amendment does not trust the government to define these terms (and where they begin or end) anymore than it trusts the government to pay a principled line between unprotected outrageous caricatures and protected sharp political commentary. Or between a protected conservative and an unprotected white supremacist.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 14, 2018 at 04:18 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (16)

Thursday, April 05, 2018

Erie and litigation financing

Wisconsin enacted a law amending its discovery rules to require that a party's initial disclosures include "any agreement under which any person, other than an attorney permitted to charge a contingent fee representing a party, has a right to receive compensation that is contingent on and sourced from any proceeds of the civil action, by settlement, judgment, or otherwise." (§ 12 of the legislation). The political valence is that this is a victory for business defendants over the plaintiff's bar (which is how it was fought in the state), although there is some broader support for disclosure of third-party funders in the wake of Peter Thiel's funding of Hulk Hogan's suit against Gawker.

There also is an interesting Erie/Hanna question of whether a plaintiff must disclose this information in state-law actions in federal court. Since I am afraid I am not going to reach Erie (at least not in-depth) this semester, it may have to wait until next year. After the jump, I take a stab at what I think should be the analysis.

The quick answer would seem to be no, it is not required. The disclosure requirement is in the state discovery rules. The Federal Rules contain a provision that covers mandatory disclosures and does not include funding arrangements. Rule 26 is a rule of practice and procedure because it at least arguably regulates the manner and means by which rights are enforced or the fairness and efficiency of the truth-finding process. And since no procedural rule has ever been held to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right, it is unlikely this one does (especially since incidental A/E/M is permissible). Were Scalia on the Court, this would be his approach.

But the disclosure requirement is part of a broader state effort (pushed by the Chamber of Commerce) at tort reform (or "civil-justice reform," which now seems to be the lingo), in furtherance of substantive policies of protecting and encouraging businesses to relocate, expand, and remain in the state. This might raise an A/E/M concern, that applying FRCP 26(a) to not require this undermines the substantive rights created by state law. And to avoid that problem, a court might narrow 26(a) to be not controlling, as providing a list of materials that must be disclosed that does not exhaust other disclosure obligations from other sources. And that pushes us to the "relatively unguided Erie analysis." And while disclosure will not materially alter outcomes, it may affect plaintiff's choice of state or federal court. And the recognized state substantive policy at work means the analysis requires application of state law (as it almost always does). I could see Ginsburg doing something like this (this is basically how she resolved Gasperini).

On the other hand, maybe none of this matters. The real question may be whether funding arrangements are discoverable. So even if not subject to automatic disclosure, defense counsel know enough to ask for the information.

Thoughts?

 

 

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 5, 2018 at 11:24 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

Class certification and universal injunctions

Judge Chutkan of the District of the District of Columbia last week issued a preliminary injunction barring HHS and the Office of Refugee Resettlement from enforcing policies preventing pregnant unaccompanied undocumented minors in federal detention from obtaining services to terminate pregnancies. Wanting a broad injunction that would reach beyond the four named plaintiffs (all of whom had terminated their pregnancies) to all women who might be subject to the challenged regulations, the court did it the proper way. It certified a class and issued a class-wide 23(b)(2) injunction prohibiting enforcement of the policies as to all members of a class defined as "all pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minor children (UCs) who are or will be in the legal custody of the federal government."

Unlike courts in many recent cases, Judge Chutkan  followed the middle step of certifying a broad class, then issuing an injunction protecting the entire class that is the plaintiff in the action. But the case illustrates an important point. If universal injunctions are readily available, no plaintiff would bother jumping through the class-certification hurdles, but will proceed directly to asking the court for the same broad injunction while keeping the action as an individual one.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 5, 2018 at 12:42 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, April 03, 2018

Yet another qualified-immunity summary reversal (Link Corrected)

SCOTUS on Monday summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit's denial of qualified immunity in Kisela v. Hughes, which resulted from an officer shooting a woman in the mistaken belief that she was threatening her roommate with a knife. Such summary reversals of denial of qualified immunity have become commonplace, as you recall. This one brought a dissent from Justice Sotomayor joined by Justice Ginsburg, who argued that, even if the lower court was wrong, it was not "so manifestly incorrect as to warrant 'the extraordinary remedy of a summary reversal.'"

I have not had a chance to read or digest the opinion. But Will Baude offers some comments, especially about the one-side nature of qualified immunity and its evolution into an absolute bar to recovery. So does Orin Kerr, who offers an explanation for why the Court has gone down this road with immunity grounded in the distincion between conduct rules and decision rules.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 3, 2018 at 04:41 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)