Monday, December 14, 2015
Serial, Season 2
Serial is back, this season covering the story of former-POW/current court-martial defendant Bowe Bergdahl. My colleague Eric Carpenter will blog the season here, posting weekly commentaries on each episode. Eric served in the Army for twenty years, both in JAG and as a combat officer, and he teaches military justice, so he can write about both the military and legal angles to the story.
Pete Rose remains banned from Major League Baseball
MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred announced today that it would not reinstate Pete Rose, concluding that Rose had not presented credible evidence that, if reinstated, he would not again violate the prohibition on gambling on baseball games and on his own team. Manfred emphasized both that Rose continues to bet on baseball and that he has not fully owned up to the full scope of the gambling activities that lead to the ban in the first place (for example, he continues to deny betting on Reds games as a player in 1985-86, despite records indicating that he did, and he continues to insist that he did not selectively bet on the Reds, which is contradicted by documentary evidence). There also is an interesting discussion of how the commissioner should reconcile the mandatory lifetime ban imposed for gambling under Rule 21 with the broad discretion vested in the commissioner under Rule 15 to reinstate a suspended player; Manfred's solution was to say that reinstatement was warranted under Rule 15 only with "objective evidence" that there was no risk of a repeat violation of Rule 21.
Manfred also took a short detour to emphasize that he was not making any determination about Rose's eligibility for the Hall of Fame and that any debate over his eligibility or qualifications "must take place in a different forum" and turn on different questions and policy considerations. This is only partially right, of course. Rose is not in the Hall almost almost entirely because of Rule 3E of the Baseball Writers Association of America Election Rules, which provides that "Any player on Baseball's ineligible list shall not be an eligible candidate;" that rule was passed in 1991 (two years after Rose accepted his lifetime ban) specifically to eliminate any chance that Rose (and, to a lesser extent, Joe Jackson) would slip into the Hall. So while Manfred was not deciding whether Rose is eligible, his decision here basically dictates the outcome of the Hall vote.*
* Hall criteria include integrity and sportsmanship, so there is a chance that sportswriters might decline to vote Rose in because of his gambling misconduct, even if he were not on the ineligible list, just as they have kept out suspected PED users (Clemens, Bonds, etc.) who remain on the eligible list and thus eligible for the Hall.
Apparently, crowdfunding can rely on the adage, "the way to a man's heart is through his stomach." A Baltimore crab house has offered Orioles star Chris Davis free crab cakes for his life and for the next two generations of his family for re-signing with the Orioles. It reminds me that we might have underemphasized the purely symbolic value and benefit to fanfunding. It need not be about raising significant amounts of money or outbidding competing fans, but about expressing support for the player in any way, including unique ways that reflect a connection to the particular city.
Friday, December 11, 2015
Crowdfunding college sports
The New York Times tells of a Clemson fan who has launched UBooster, a site designed to allow college sports fans to pledge money to help attract high school athletes to the donors' preferred schools--in other words, exactly what Dan, Mike McCann, and I proposed. (H/T: Gregg Polsky). According to the story, fans pledge money to a particular recruit, with a note urging him (or her) to choose a particular school; no more money can be contributed once the athlete commits to a school and the money is held in trust until after the player finishes college. The money is not funneled through the university and there is no direct contact between UBooster and either the athlete or any particular school. For that reason, the founder, Dr. Rob Morgan, believes this does not violate NCAA rules and, in fact, offers a way to allow fan involvement while easing the financial burden on universities to do more to help athletes.
The former head of the NCAA's Committee on Infractions calls this "far more sophisticated than the hundred-dollar handshake," but I am not sure it is a meaningful difference in kind. Student-athletes are still receiving money because they are student-athletes and because of their athletic ability, and the lack of a direct connection among student-athlete, school, and donor does not change that; in fact, the NCAA's point is specifically to keep "strangers" from giving student-athletes money, regardless of connection to the school. Nor does the four-year delay in getting the money change much--it is still money for playing a sport, whether the benefit is received immediately or in a few years. I also do not believe the absence of an express quid pro quo (the student-athlete gets the money, regardless of where he ultimately plays) makes a difference; the NCAA regs are designed to avoid bidding wars and allowing the athlete to keep everything is not going to alleviate (or necessarily disincentivize) such bidding wars.
Mind you, I am not speaking in support of the NCAA's regs or the current model of college sports. I am only saying that, under those rules, any student-athlete who participates in this (and any school for which he plays) is in for some problems.
Wednesday, December 09, 2015
Does it matter?
Last week, Dana Milbank insisted that Donald Trump is a bigot and racist. His point is that Trump had crossed some line: "[A]t some point, you’re not merely saying things that could be construed as bigoted: You are a bigot." Put differently, "the large number of instances over an extended period add up to a pattern of bigotry." It is a label he will not place on any other candidate, not even Ben Carson, who has said similarly stupid things, just less often.
But does it really matter whether Trump is a bigot or just says bigoted things? Does the label really mean that much? Does it make him any less qualified for the presidency? Isn't it enough that he says anti-X things and proposes anti-X policies; do we need the next step of saying he hates X to make the point? Is it that eighth instance of saying bigoted things--what pushes him over the line to "a bigot"--that makes the difference? Or can I know that I will not vote for him (and that no right-thinking person could vote for him) based on the first seven?
Tuesday, December 08, 2015
Bell v. Hood lives
I am beginning to think of Bell v. Hood the way Justice Scalia thinks about about the Lemon Test: "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried." The Court's recent turn to a broader and sharper awareness of what is merits should require the interment of Bell, which strips courts of jurisdiction over federal claims that are "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." After all, if the question of whether the conduct challenged is reached (and thus prohibited by) a law (or, as I like to say, "who can sue whom for what conduct and what remedy") is a merits question, it should always be a merits question, regardless of the strength of the claim of right.
There were some questions during argument in Shapiro v. McManus hinting that Bell might be on the table, especially given recent jurisdictionality cases that did not even cite Bell. Alas, it was not to be. A unanimous Court, per Justice Scalia, held that any case challenging the constitutional of congressional apportionment must be referred to a three-judge district court and cannot be dismissed by the single district judge. (I wrote about the case for SCOTUSblog). The limited exception, for "insubstantial" constitutional claims, incorporates Bell for "wholly insubstantial and frivolous" claims only, while "[a]bsent such frivolity," failure to state a claim for relief remains a judgment on the merits.
Bell thus survives and is now explicitly incorporated into the three-judge court analysis. In other words, some weak-on-the-merits claims, if the merits are weak enough, still can be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And so we continue to be haunted by unwarranted and unnecessary jurisdiction/merits overlap.
Technically . . .
I have no interest in wading into the morass over Judge Posner and Eric Segall's NYT op-ed suggesting that Justice Scalia believes that majoritarian religious preferences can trump minority rights--here is Corey Yung's effort, which began on Twitter. Segall responded to criticisms from NRO's Ed Whelan and Northwestern's John McGinnis. The esponse references Scalia's purported comments at Princeton that Obergefell is not directly binding on non-party public officials, to which Segall says "That sentiment is technically correct, but as expressed by a Supreme Court Justice could be considered an invitation to a form of civil disobedience."
This is why I forbid my students from using the word "technically." (Imagine Yoda voice: "There is no technically; only correct or incorrect."). And in this case, Scalia is correct, full stop. Judgments themselves are not binding on non-parties and precedent is only binding on courts in future litigation, not on executive or legislative officials. Scalia's statement is incomplete, as it does not finish the point that the subsequent litigation against recalcitrant officials is binding on those officials (note that Scalia did not suggest that lower courts are not bound by Obergefell) and may impose other costs on them, such as attorney's fees, sanctions for non-compliance, and perhaps some limits on the arguments one can offer in litigation.
It is similarly problematic to suggest that a Supreme Court Justice should not express this legally correct and accurate proposition. If Justices should not explain how constitutional litigation actually operates, who should?
Monday, December 07, 2015
My wife and I have been enjoying the tv show 'black-ish since it premiered last year. The show started as an exploration of an African-American from a hardscabble background who has "made it" (living in a wealthy, mostly white neighborhood, sending his kids to a mostly white private school, working in a mostly white ad agency) and how to maintain the family's connection to black culture. It has evolved to the story of an upper-middle-class black family, depicting and taking on (directly or indirectly) racial and cultural issues in a unique way from a unique perspective (see, e.g., this episode), usually through humor and satire. I cannot say how much the African-American perspective has been watered down for a broader audience, but the show seems to retain something of a special voice and context.
We also just started binge-watching The Goldbergs, which is similarly fantastic. It is a semi-autobiographical show about producer Adam F. Goldberg's childhood in suburban Philadelphia in the '80s. The characters are based on Goldberg's real family and friends and he intercuts photos and home movies of the real-life counterparts. The show never reveals what year it takes place (the narrator begins each episode by saying "it was [date], 1980-something"), instead combining pieces from all over the decade into a single pastiche (the kids are seeing Return of the Jedi and listening to New Kids on the Block at around the same time).
The latter show is understood as being "Jewish," but is it Jewish in the same way that 'Black-ish is black? The Jewish label seems to derive largely from the title and the names of the characters,* because showrunner Goldberg is Jewish, and because the characters behave in stereotypical Jewish ways.** On the other hand, only two of the six main actors are Jewish.*** Their house is not decorated with the background items that identify it as a "Jewish" home. And we have not yet seen an episode (halfway through Season Two) that discusses or addresses things that mark the family as Jewish--holy days, Bar Mitzvahs, Jewish culture, etc. There was one episode in which the family seemed to be discovering Chinese food for the first time. In fact, the show changes reality to pull back from one Jewish stereotype--Goldberg's real-life father was a doctor and the family lived in a large house, while on the show he owns a small discount furniture store, the home is smaller, and the family more middle class. The show seems "Jewish" in the same way that Seinfeld was Jewish. Otherwise, it really is about kids growing up in the '80s who happen to have a Jewish last name.
[*] In an interview, the actor who plays Murray Goldberg, Adam's father, said they could not get much more obvious unless they called the show "The Jews."
[**] The mother (or the "smother," as she is called) is loud, overbearing, and thinks her children are God's gift. The sons are geeky and non-athletic, but you can tell they will grow up to be "Nice Jewish Boys."
[***] The father and the grandfather, the latter played by George Segal. An older brother is played by an actor with the last name Gentile, which may be the apex of the old adage "Write Yiddish, Cast British." The actress who plays the mother is wonderful, but does not look remotely Jewish.
I am curious about this difference and why 'Black-ish offers a much more recognizable slice of black culture than The Goldbergs does of Jewish culture. Some of this may be artistic vision. Obviously, people make the show they want to make (and ABC execs insist this is Goldberg's vision). And, again, I love the show he is making and am not trying to suggest that Goldberg was somehow obligated to write 'Jew-ish.
But I am wondering whether that show would fly if he had wanted to make it. One might argue this is unnecessary, that Jewish pop culture is a big piece of American pop culture; there is no need for a distinctly "Jewish" voice on TV because so many of the voices on TV are Jewish (actually or stylistically). On the other hand, we need the distinctly black voice that 'Black-ish provides because it is otherwise non-existent. Alternatively, perhaps the vision of the "cultural" Jewish family depicted on the show is that similarly watered-down vision that can appeal to a broader audience that would not, for example, relate to an episode showing the youngest son's Bar Mitzvah. If so, then it seems that, despite the very different power positions the two groups occupy in American society, there is more of an acceptance for African-American culture (in watered-down, but still recognizable, form) than for Jewish culture in similar form.****
[****] The "Jewish" show that does go beyond last names to depict Jewish culture and people who are part of that culture is Transparent, which, of course, is far better known for the other culture it depicts.
Sunday, December 06, 2015
State action puzzle
Video captured (link contains multiple videos) numerous incidents of security getting very physical with University of Houston fans attempting to run onto the field following UH's victory in the American Athletic Conference Football Championship. The game was played at the stadium on UH's campus and security was provided by CSC, a private contractor. The most telling images are GIFs of one officer throwing roundhouse punches at a fan lying on the ground and video of another officer body-slamming a fan, only to be loudly called out by two officials in different-colored shirts. UH announced that it is terminating its contract with CSC and looking into any appropriate legal action.
First, it seems pretty clear that CSC and its employees acted under color of state law for any coming § 1983 actions. They were contracted by a state agency to perform the government function of providing security at a public event in a publicly owned stadium. Some might depend on the terms of the contract with CSC and how much control or supervision UH wielded.
Second, I cannot help but notice that most of the student-trespassers (and make no mistake, they are not allowed on the field) shown being tackled are white and many of the security officers are black. It is difficult to not read something into the swift and angry university (i.e., government) reaction, especially compared to the typical response when the victims of police violence are black. This is not to say I am disappointed but UH's response, only that I wonder if it would have been different if the student-trespassers were black and the authority figures white.
Saturday, December 05, 2015
Not a threat, still a problem
Like Paul, I lean towards the less charitable reading of the statement by the producers of Hunting Ground. But I did not read it as a threat to any action. Rather, I read it as a normative position--anyone who publicly disagrees with our position is irresponsible, shows public bias, and contributes to a hostile educational environment. This disagreement makes little practical difference, since my reading of their position still renders discussion or debate about the film impossible--why should they be expected to be debate anyone putting forth such an irresponsible and hostile position? But it is of a piece with some of what we have heard in the recent blow-ups at Mizzou, Yale, etc.--the very utterance of the contrary position deprives me of my safe space, inflicts harm, and violates my rights, thereby giving me a reason not to engage with it.
Thursday, December 03, 2015
JOTWELL: Leong on Nielson & Walker on qualified immunity
The new Courts Law essay comes from Nancy Leong (Denver), reviewing Nielson and Walker's The New Qualified Immunity (forthcoming S. Cal. L. Rev.), which explores how lower courts are and should apply the discretionary two-step approach to qualified immunity under Pearson. Both the article and Nancy's review essay are worth a read.
Monday, November 30, 2015
Happy December. Thanks to our November guests, who will be closing up shop in the next couple days.
Our December guests include Jessica Berch (Concordia), Chad DeVeaux (Concordia), Andrew Gilden (Grey Fellow, Stanford), and Scott Maravilla (an ALJ at the Federal Aviation Administration). Returning guests are Ian Bartrum (UNLV) and Jay Wexler (Boston University). Welcome and we look forward to a great month.
Tuesday, November 24, 2015
ABA-LSD realizes it screwed up
A couple of weeks ago, I wrote about the ABA Law Student Division's National Appellate Advocacy Competition, which featured an appellate court unanimously reversing a district judge in a hate-crimes prosecution by saying "We fear that [the district judge] allowed his personal feelings as a black man to color his view of the evidence."
The LSD has released a revised record, with that line removed. Good for them for coming to their senses (presumably following some loud complaints), although without explanation, apology, or acknowledgement of the change or the original mistake. And I remain appalled that the drafters would have included such a line in the first place. It will be interesting to see if there is longer-term fallout from this.
Monday, November 23, 2015
Seeking the truth
Later this term, SCOTUS will decide Bank Markazi v. Peterson, which involves a challenge under United States v. Klein to a law applicable to an action seeking to attach Iranian assets to satisfy a default judgment for victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism. I was contacted by both sides of the case about being involved in a scholars' amicus, obviously because both sides believed that my previous work on Klein supported their position. I hope that means I really was looking for the truth.
Sunday, November 22, 2015
Doonesbury on student evaluations
Thursday, November 19, 2015
Civ Pro and the lagging bar exam
Civ Pro is now a subject on the Multistate Bar Exam. But I learned earlier today that the questions are not going to incorporate the 2015 discovery amendments until 2018. In the meantime, test-takers are expected to know (and bar prep courses are going to teach) the rules as of 2012 and current jurisdiction/procedure statutes.
This strikes me as insane. I intentionally taught my Spring 2015 students the amended rules, knowing that passage was inevitable (I would have done the same this fall were I teaching the class then), knowing that this is the law they would use as lawyers, even if it won't be effective for another few months. Now it turns out they need to learn something entirely different in between. In other words, the final "vetogate" before the practice of law requires them to learn law that is different than what they learned in school and different from what they will actuallysue on the other side of the vetogate. It makes even less sense given that the Bar is using current statutes along with the old rules--if the questions can remain up-to-date on statutes without imposing an enormous exam-writing problem, they should be able to remain up-to-date on the rules.
Update I: In response to a comment, I have not heard any explanation, only a statement to bar prep/academic support folks that they should continue using the current prep manual until 2018.
Update II: An emailer points out that it may not have as great an effect on Civ Pro teachers, as the current 1Ls, the first group to deal with the amended rules, will take the Bar in 2018, the first year of testing on the new rules. But, as I noted above, it punishes the past students of profs who attempt to be proactive about rules changes (as did last spring). And it leaves questions about what to do in, for example, Advanced Civ Pro/Complex Lit, Pretrial Practice, or other upper-level courses that deal with the FRCP? For that matter, consider students doing a clinic/internship involving federal practice or a judicial clerkship--current 2Ls and 3Ls are going to deal with one version of discovery now and a very different version for the Bar.
Tuesday, November 17, 2015
Scalia (sort of) gets it, the media (still) doesn't
According to this story, Justice Scalia gave (an unrecorded) talk at Princeton. Robert George, a Princeton faculty member and a leading opponent of marriage equality, claims that Scalia "declared that though Supreme Court rulings should generally be obeyed, officials had no Constitutional obligation to treat as binding beyond the parties to a case rulings that lack a warrant in the text or original understanding of the Constitution." Needless to say, that caused the reporter from Think Progress, Ian Millhiser, to lose his mind, as well as to question the accuracy of George's recollections.
A few thoughts after the jump.
First, why did Scalia limit it only to those rulings that are not sufficiently textual or originalist--that is, rulings with which Scalia likely agrees? The departmentalist question should not turn on the "correctness" (methodological or substantive) of the decision. If political-branch officials possess authority to independently interpret the Constitution in the face of conflicting judicial rulings and to act on their own constitutional understandings, that authority applies to all constitutional decisions. If Scalia is serious, limiting it only to sufficiently originalist decisions makes no sense and undermines the accurate procedural point in service of a textualist/originalist hobby horse.
Second, Millhiser attempts to explain the procedure in the final three paragraphs, but he gets it completely wrong. His two biggest mistakes were suggesting that 1) this reduces the Court to an advisory body and 2) enforcement through future litigation is merely "conceivable." The whole point is that future litigation guarantees enforcement because, unlike executive officials, lower courts are bound by the Court's judgments; so when lower courts apply precedent to new parties in a new judgment, that new judgment is binding on those officials. He is correct that this is complex and potentially expensive. But that is inherent in the nature of the judicial power, under which a judgment in one case is generally limited to determining the rights and obligations of the parties to that case And the costs is mitigated (somewhat) by the availability of attorney's fees. Unfortunately, Millhiser does not mention (or grasp) either point.
Finally, Millhiser allows that Scalia's approach could be correct with respect to "decisions like Dred Scott or the anti-government decisions resisted by Roosevelt — decisions that are now widely viewed as evil," but not to "a decision that allows Americans to marry the person that they love." Nothing like neutral procedure applied neutrally.
Monday, November 16, 2015
Office Space explains tenure requirements
(Based on a conversation with my colleague, and current Prawfs guest, Eric Carpenter)
JOTWELL: Erbsen on Trammell and Bambauer on personal jurisdiction
Saturday, November 14, 2015
Guess we like France now
A nice gesture. Of course, it was not so long ago that Congress was banning the word "French" from its cafeteria.
Update: Mike Dorf explains and elaborates on what I had in mind.
Are you kidding me, ABA-LSD Moot Court edition
I just read the record for the next National Appellate Advocacy Competition, sponsored by the ABA's Law Student Division. The case involves prosecution of a police officer under the federal hate crimes statute, arising out of a racially charged shooting during a traffic stop; the issues involve Fourth Amendment protections for an employee's work locker and the proper causation standard under the statute. In the "case," the district court denied a motion to suppress and convicted the officer in a bench trial and the court of appeals reversed.
Buried in the "opinion" of the appellate court is this: "We fear that Judge Marshall allowed his personal feelings as a black man to color his view of the evidence."
Are you kidding me? This is the worst kind of cable-news-legal-argument crap that we try really hard (often unsuccessfully) to get our students past. Did students put the problem together? Are there any adults keeping an eye on them?
Do they really believe courts are these overtly craven? Are they really lending credence to the offensive-on-its-face notion that a black judge would let his race cloud his judgment in some way that any other person would not (which of course necessarily means that a black judge could never hear a hate-crimes case with a black victim)? And even if you accept the offensive-on-its-face notion, do they really believe that a court of appeals judge would ever say this in writing in the opinion for the court? Do they really want students making this argument (or having to address questions about this from the bench) during the competition--after all, anything appearing in the court of appeals opinion should be a basis for arguing for affirmance? At the very least, they have forced the advocates into the corner of having to deal with something totally disconnected from reality. It is difficult enough to keep moot court competitions grounded in something that looks remotely like real life--adding this bit of Fox News fantasy does not help.
The great Judge Leon Higginbotham addressed, and destroyed, the argument that an African-American with a history of involvement in civil rights could not hear a race-discrimination case. He was forced to do that in response to a motion by a party--in 1974, the Dark Ages, relatively speaking. By contrast, when supporters of California's Proposition 8 argued that Judge Vaughn Walker (who is gay) should have recused himself, they went out of their way "to emphasize at the outset that we are not suggesting that a gay or lesbian judge could not sit on this case." Now the creators of an advocacy competition, sponsored by what is supposed to be the professional association for lawyers and judges, have a federal judge saying just that, in a published judicial opinion. [Update: A reader emailed to remind me that the imaginary court of appeals judge would have had to convince two imaginary colleagues to join him in accusing a lower-court judge of misunderstanding the case because he is black]
I should say that all of this is especially unfortunate, because the problem they came up with a is pretty good, especially the hate crimes part. It has become increasingly difficult to convict police officers of civil rights violations, given § 242's specific-intent requirement--so much so that the federal government does not try very often. Going through § 249 might offer a new strategy in certain cases.
Thursday, November 12, 2015
A monkey, an animal rights organization and a primatologist walk into a federal court
Thus begins the argument section of the motion to dismiss in the copyright infringement lawsuit filed on behalf of a crested macaque whose "selfies" (the macaque pressed the shutter of a camera he pulled away from a photographer) were published by the camera owner. The motion argues both lack of standing and failure to state a claim, both based on the argument that copyright protections do not extend to non-human animals. As I argued in my prior post, I believe that under Lexmark the proper basis for dismissing is failure to state a claim.
I confess that, while I typically don't like this type of jokey writing move, it somehow works here.
Tuesday, November 10, 2015
Legal arguments and public perceptions
Beth Thornburg of SMU coined the term "pleading as press release"--plaintiffs drafting pleadings with an intentional eye towards how the most dramatic allegations will be reported in the press and how the case will be framed and understood by the public. And they do this even where occasionally over-the-top allegations have nothing to do with the needs or requirements of pleading and even as the allegations may have the unintended effect of turning the judge off.
The flip side is playing out in the Washington Professional Football Team trademark litigation, now before the Fourth Circuit. The team's opening brief devoted a great deal of space identifying dozens of other trademarks--many containing offensive words and epithets--that have been registered without incident. (See, especially, p.4 and p.24 & n.4). These examples support the sensible First Amendment arguments that 1) the government does not endorse all such marks so as to make them government speech and 2) the Washington Professional Football Team's trademark should not and cannot be singled out from the many other, offensive marks that have been registered.
Of course, that is not how the media has covered or discussed the argument. Instead, the team has been ridiculed for, essentially, arguing that it is no worse than SLUTSEEKERS dating service, TAKE YO PANTIES OFF clothing, or CAPITALISM SUCKS DONKEY BALLS. There is an obvious incoherence between the team defending the nickname as "honoring" Native Americans while also insisting that it receive the legal treatment of SHANK THE B!T@H board game. Whatever the legal merit of the argument, the press and the public cannot help but mock it and turn it into a criticism of the team--and no one mocks well as HBO's John Oliver, after the jump.
All of which is to say that legal argument in a high-profile case can be a two-edged sword, especially as it relates to sports and may draw in a new media and public audience. Sometimes the legal argument you need to make is one that will be viewed in a very different light by the public. Of course, the reality is that opposition to the nickname is so deep and so strong in some public and media segments that any legal position other than changing the name and surrendering the trademark, will be criticized and mocked.
Monday, November 09, 2015
Is Justice Breyer trying to be Judge Posner?
Justice Breyer has developed a distinctive style of asking questions in oral argument--declarative statements summing up the case, often interrupted by asides and tangents, rhetorical questions, and clipped questions demanding "yes or no" answers and often allowing for little explanation. And he asks them in a demanding, sometimes angry, sometimes confrontational tone. In the domineering tone and insistence on one-word answers (although not the rambling asides), it calls to mind Judge Posner at his most-authoritarian (think of the marriage-equality arguments).
Is this deliberate? And has it gotten more noticeable on Breyer's part in recent years?
First Amendment activity all over the place
A quick shout-out on a bunch of recent events and issues, unified by being about free speech.
1) Approximately 30 African-American members of the University of Missouri football team have announced that they are suspending participation in all football activities--in other words, they are going on strike--until Mizzou President Tim Wolfe is resigned or fired. Student are angered over his non-response to a recent series of racially charged incidents on campus, most recently the display of a swastika made of feces. Although the entire team is not on strike, Head Coach Gary Pinkel and the non-African-American team members are supporting the strike and standing behind their teammates. There is a long history of athletes as political advocates. There also is a current hypocrisy--fans wondering why athletes aren't more political like in the old days, then lambasting those who don't "stick to the game." So it will be interesting to see how this plays out. [Update: Wolfe has resigned.]
2) Yale University is up in arms in a week-long back-and-forth over the conflict between cultural sensitivity in Halloween costumes and free speech. The gist is that the university sent a campus-wide email asking students to be sensitive in their choice of Halloween costumes, which prompted two (married) administrators to question whether the university should be dictating choices of Halloween costumes. That triggered an overwhelming response, with more than 700 students signing an open letter calling the administrators' comments "offensive" and having the effect of "invalidat[ing]" the existence of historically disadvantaged groups on campus. There have multiple protests, including several directed at the two administrators, calling for an apology and/or their resignations. The common theme, as always, is that this defense of free speech has rendered Yale an "unsafe space."
3) I finally got around to reading Bible Believers v. Wayne County (which I wrote about briefly). The majority opinion is a wonderful read, a tour de force on free speech, the problem of the heckler's veto, and the obligations of police in keeping the peace when conflicting groups collide. Unfortunately, I am not sure either the qualified immunity analysis (finding that the rights were clearly established) or the municipal liability analysis (finding that the county corporation counsel was a final policymaking in advising the police officers on the scene, triggering liability for the county). [Update: In light of this, the reversal on qualified immunity seems more likely, as does the Court not even giving the question a full merits hearing.]
4) The primary dissent in Bible Believers is also interesting for the way it explores the problem of minority and majority speech, with the assumption the Bible Believers were a majority group who had succeeded not only in shouting down a minority group, but in getting money from the government to allow them to do it. Here is the dissent's encapsulation of the case:
Yes, you can get the police to help you attack and disrupt something like a minority cultural identity fair, even if the police are not inclined to do so. Tell the police your plans ahead of time, and bring photographers. Get a determined group of disrupters and go in with the most offensive and incendiary chants, slogans, insults, and symbols—the more offensive the better. The object is to stir up some physical response. Then, when things get rough (your goal), insist that the police protect you, and (ironically) your First Amendment rights, by serving as a protective guard. The peace officers cannot at that point tell you to leave, even to avoid injury to you, because if the peace officers do that, they will have to pay you damages. Faced with the choice of allowing you to be an injured martyr (keep your cameras ready) or serving as a protective guard as the disruption escalates, the peace officers will doubtless choose the latter and become your phalanx. It's a win-win situation for you, and a lose-lose situation for the minority group putting on the fair.
The court's opinion insists that minority/majority should have nothing to do with the First Amendment analysis. But the dissent framing does relate to Mark Tushnet's concerns about competing hecklers. The answer, in part, is to recall that "heckling" is protected speech--that is, assuming time and place is appropriate, the First Amendment protects me in trying to shout down a competing speaker. It only becomes a heckler's veto--and a First Amendment violation--when the state steps in to formally support one heckler by shutting down the other through legal sanction or force.
Thursday, November 05, 2015
Shapiro argument and the future of Bell v. Hood
Josh gave his thoughts having watched the argument in Shapiro v. McManus. My SCOTUSBlog recap--alas, based only on the transcript--has now posted. (Obviously, I agree with Josh that video (or at least audio) should be made available immediately). I am especially looking forward to hearing Justice Scalia say "Wow" and "It's extraterrestrial."
Let me add one additional point. There was some discussion in the case about Bell v. Hood, which stands for the proposition that a federal claim that is "wholly insubstantial" does not arise under federal law. Bell is an anomaly, an unwarranted and rarely used exception to the general (and correct) rule that failure to state a claim does not deprive a court of jurisdiction. It remains as an unfortunate barrier to a clean merits-jurisdiction line. SCOTUS had held in several cases pre-1976 (the date of enactment of the current three-judge court statute) that a single judge can dismiss an insubstantial claim. Several questions and comments from the bench suggested that those cases incorporated Bell, making the single-judge insubstantiality dismissal a jurisdictional one.
At the same time, Justice Scalia raised the possibility during the argument that those pre-1976 cases should be overruled, narrowing the situations in which the single judge can refuse to refer the case for appointment of the three-judge court (presumably to the non-satisfaction of § 2284(a)). If so, is there any chance that the Court would take Bell with it? I hope so, but it does not appear likely. The Court has largely ignored or minimized Bell in most of its recent merits-not-jurisdiction cases, without taking the time to overrule it. On the other hand, Justice Kagan offered several comments/questions indicating that she is very comfortable with Bell and the idea that some "completely ridiculous" claims can be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, even if the analysis looks "kind of mertis-y."
Wednesday, November 04, 2015
Epps on Feiner
Garrett Epps writes in The Atlantic about the continued effect of Feiner v. New York and the hecklers' veto in the First Amendment, especially as it affects minority groups whose speech may be subject to greater audience abuse and more concerted efforts by protesters to interfere. Epps' jumping-off point is the divided en banc Sixth Circuit decision in Bible Believers v. Wayne County, which held that police should have protected a Christian group protesting at the Arab International Festival in Dearborn, MI.
Update: Mark Tushnet discusses the Epps piece and describes what Tushnet calls a "puzzle" about hecklers vetos in this case. We actually had competing hecklers--1) the Bible Believers were heckling the Festival and its participants (themselves engaged in expressive activity) and 2) the festival participants tried to shout down the Bible Believers--each trying to veto the speech of the other. And there has not been another Arab International Festival since the one in 2012, meaning heckler # 1 was successful in its efforts, while also being found by the Sixth Circuit to have been subject to a hecklers' veto by heckler # 2. In other words, Tushnet argues, "the people protected against a heckler's veto used their First Amendment rights to induce others not to exercise their First Amendment right."
Argument in Shapiro v. McManus
SCOTUS hears argument today in Shapiro v. McManus, considering when a single district judge can dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) a case that is supposed to be decided by a three-judge district court. My SCOTUSBlog preview posted two weeks ago; I will have comments on the argument later today or tomorrow.
Monday, November 02, 2015
JOTWELL: Pfander on Williams on Marks
The new Courts Law essay comes from James Pfander (Northwestern-Pritzker), reviewing Ryan C. Williams, Questions Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, which discusses lower courts' misuse of Marks v. United States in identifying controlling precedent from plurality opinions.
Vanderbilt Law Review Roundtable: Spokeo v. Robins
I had the pleasure of participating in the new Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc Supreme Court Roundtable on Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (being argued today). My essay argues for William Fletcher's conception of standing-as-merits and why that approach is especially appropriate in this type of statutory case. The Roundtable features contributions from Heather Elliot (Alabama), Andy Hessick (Utah), Jonathan Siegel (George Washington), Max Stearns (Maryland), and Joan Steinman (Chicago-Kent).
Sunday, November 01, 2015
Lubet on ME/CFS and its effects on legal education
Happy November and Standard Time.
Thanks to our October guests, who may have a few final words. And welcome to our November guests--returners Eric Carpenter (FIU), Josh Douglas (Kentucky), Adam Kolber (Brooklyn), and Margaret Ryznar (Indiana-Indianapolis) and first-timers Brian Frye (Kentucky) and Caprice Roberts (Savannah).
Wednesday, October 28, 2015
Multiple sections, multiple professors
This story, about a professor at Cal State-Fullerton reprimanded for not using the department-prescribed textbook (because it costs $ 180), is only tangentially related to the law-school-specific question I want to raise:
How much coordination and identity should there be among multiple sections of a law-school course taught by different professors? Should we be coordinating syllabii, at least to ensure common coverage? Should we be using the same books? The same teaching approach? Is it enough that the students come away from any class with a knowledge base that will enable them to a) go forward in law school and b) pass the bar, regardless of which section or professor they take?
CFP: Second Annual Civil Procedure Workshop
The following is from the organizers of the second annual Civil Procedure Workshop.
We are excited to announce the second annual Civil Procedure Workshop, to be cohosted by the University of Washington School of Law, Seattle University School of Law, and the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. The Workshop will be held at the University of Washington in Seattle on July 14-15, 2016.
The Workshop gives both emerging and established civil procedure scholars an opportunity to gather with colleagues and present their work to an expert audience. Scholars will present their papers in small panel sessions. A senior scholar will moderate each panel and lead the commentary. In addition to paper presentations, we intend to engage members of the judiciary and federal civil rulemaking bodies in discussions about current developments in procedure. Our goal is for the Workshop to strengthen the study of procedure as an academic discipline, and to deepen ties among the academy, rulemakers, and the judiciary. Confirmed participants for 2016 include Robert Bone, Sergio Campos, David Engstrom, Samuel Issacharoff, Alexandra Lahav, Alexander Reinert, the Hon. Lee Rosenthal, Joanna Schwartz, and Adam Steinman.
We welcome all civil procedure scholars to attend this Workshop. Those wishing to present a paper for discussion in the Workshop should submit a two-page abstract by January 15, 2016. While we welcome papers from both emerging and senior scholars, preference may be given to those who have been teaching for less than ten years. We will select papers to be presented by March 1, 2016. Please send all submissions or related questions to Liz Porter.
The Workshop will provide meals for registrants. Participants must cover travel and lodging costs. We will provide information about reasonably priced hotels as the date approaches.
Feel free to contact us with questions.
Liz Porter (UW), email@example.com
Brooke Coleman (Seattle U), firstname.lastname@example.org
Dave Marcus (Arizona), email@example.com
JOTWELL: Mullenix on Levens on security class actions
Sunday, October 25, 2015
"No, no, thank you for that [awful] presentation"
I want to pick up on two themes from Paul's post on excessive flattering of questioners during job and paper talks.
I recall a SCOTUS case in which the lawyer responded to a question from Justice Scalia by saying, "that's an excellent question," to which Scalia responded (no doubt sarcastically--I never heard the audio), "Thank you very much." From the moment I read that, I made an effort never to use that phrase in responding to questions in talks or in class. I also made an effort to get my students never to use it in class, moot courts, etc. (usually by responding a la Scalia when they do it in practices). I agree with Paul that this is largely a tic, as well as a way to fill dead air while thinking of an answer. It also can come across as obsequious or arrogant or both, depending on the context.*
* For what it's worth, I doubt that "thank you for the question" is a noticeable improvement. There is no reason to thank me for playing my expected role in this common scholarly exercise.
Second, the flip side to the "that's an excellent question" response is the question that begins with 30 seconds of effusive praise for the paper and the talk and the presenter's brilliance and insight, whether warranted or not. This bears the hallmarks of what Paul was talking about, from the other side--a tic, verbal filler, and an overdone effort to be supportive or civil. Dan tried to eliminate such filler at PrawfsFest! under his "no foreplay" rule--commenters must get right into their comments. Yet many colleagues (here and elsewhere) resist such a rule, suggesting that taking out this filler reflects incivility or excess negativity--that in not starting off by telling the presenter how great her paper is, we turn into the worst stereotype of the University of Chicago, where faculty members do nothing but tear down papers and their authors.
Wednesday, October 21, 2015
Can a school increase citation count?
Last month, Gregory Sisk and others updated for 2015 their study of scholarly impact by the top 1/3 of law faculties. They use Brian Leiter's methodology of counting total Westlaw citations by all tenured faculty, then apply a formula of (mean x 2) + (median) to get a weighted score.
So here is a question: Is there anything a law school can do, individually or institutionally, to improve its citation counts? (let's assume hiring a senior well-cited scholar is not an option) Is it just a matter of telling people "write more and place well," which means your stuff should get cited more? Is it about picking topics to write about, such that some topics are more likely to be cited in future works? Are there publicity efforts that the school can support, such as supporting the mailing of reprints to authors in the area? Other things?
Tuesday, October 20, 2015
The rival of my rival is . . .
This defies words. (H/T: Josh Blackman). Westboro Baptist yesterday picketed outside the Rowan County Clerk's Office in a protest of Kim Davis, for her sins of being divorced and of failing to obey her oath to follow the law. Apparently "all sin" is "awful," so adultery, same-sex marriage, and oath-breaking all stand on the same footing.* I wonder what LGBTQ groups are thinking right about now.
* Never mind that Davis does not violate her oath by not following SCOTUS precedent--I do not expect the Westboro folks to understand the precedent/judgment distinction).
Monday, October 19, 2015
Merits and mootness
In my writing here and elsewhere, I have argued that much of what is labeled as subject-matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and standing are all better understood as being about the merits of a claim rather than Article III adjudicative thresholds. (I discuss standing in a forthcoming essay on next month's arguments in Spokeo v. Robins). And ripeness has somewhat been absorbed into standing. But that I thought the one threshold that might survive and make jurisdictional sense was mootness.
The issue is whether a case becomes moot when a defendant makes an offer of judgment that gives the plaintiff everything he asked for in the lawsuit and how that affects his status as representative plaintiff of a still-to-be-certified class. Counsel for Gomez and for the U.S.in support of Gomez both framed their arguments in the difference between a court entering (or even forcing) a final-and-enforceable judgment based on the parties' agreement and a court dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction as moot. The former gives the plaintiff the judicial relief he requested when he filed the lawsuit, just as if the court had decided the merits.
Counsel for the U.S. described the practice of district courts (which I recall following as a clerk): Upon notification of a settlement, the court would enter a consent decree (in a prospective case) or dismiss a damages claim while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement. No one ever thought to describe this as mootness. Both attorneys explained why what the Justices were talking about in Article III terms as an absence of adversariness could easily (and in some cases, more properly) be recharacterized in merits terms, as the end of a present dispute that gave the defendant an affirmative defense and justified the entry of judgment. When the plaintiff has received everything he asks for, the defendant has a defense against any finding of liability, since the injury (which exists) has been remedied.
This is an unusual case in which to discuss mootness, since the plaintiff was primarily seeking retrospective relief for past harm. Mootness generaly occurs where an ongoing real-world injury has somehow ceased. With retrospective relief, however, the injury already has occurred and the judicial remedy sought is merely compensation for an already-completed injury; it does not cause the injury to cease.
But even with prospective relief, the merits characterization makes more sense. Take, for example, a constitutional challenge to a repealed statute. The plaintiff's rights are no longer being violated and he no longer is being injured by the defendant's conduct, since there is no longer a threat of enforcement. But it makes more sense to say the defendant wins on the merits because the plaintiff's rights are no longer being violated and the defendant is no longer subject to liability, just as it makes more sense (under the Fletcher model) to say the defendant wins on the merits because it cannot be liable when the plaintiff's rights were never violated in the first place.
I have to give this some more thought, especially once the Court decides the case.
Sunday, October 18, 2015
In praise of lectures
Wednesday, October 14, 2015
Kevin Walsh has coined the term to perfectly capture the precedent/judgment/departmentalism distinction I have been drawing and that Josh Blackman and I make: "Judicial Departmentalism." (H/T: Rick, in a comment to my prior post). The idea is that SCOTUS precedent and vertical stare decisis control what happens within the judiciary.* But they do not control the actions of anyone outside the judiciary, particularly officials in the other branches of government, who remain free to act on their own constitutional understandings in terms of the legislation they propose, the way they enforce laws, etc. At bottom, Kevin argues, the American Principles Project is rejecting judicial supremacy in favor of judicial departmentalism.
* The APP statement acknowledges the supremacy of the Supreme Court over the federal judiciary, although does not mention state judiciaries. I default to James Pfander's argument that a state court deciding a federal issue is a "Tribunal inferior to the Supreme Court," thus part of the federal judiciary and bound by vertical stare decisis to the same extent as a federal district court.
Of course, judicial departmentalism inevitably morphs into judicial supremacy, because the actions of public officials contrary to binding SCOTUS precedent will eventually find their way into court, where vertical stare decision and judicial departmentalism will compel the court to issue a judgment compelling the officer to abide by the precedent. And the executive cannot act contrary to a judgment directed at him--stated differently, the specific judgment pulls the officer into the judicial department. Moreover, a number of rules that the judiciary applies functionally enforce, or at least incentivize, judiciary supremacy: 1) FRCP 11 requires lawyers and parties to bring cases that are supported by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for overturning that law, meaning law as established by SCOTUS; 2) qualified immunity is lost and damages possible against a public official who disregards SCOTUS precedent; and 3) the knowledge that an official will certainly be enjoined by a court applying SCOTUS precedent may cause the official to fall in line. [Ed: I guess I should add state Rules of Professional Responsibility, although I know less about these; based on comments to my earlier post, it sounds as if they limit lawyers' freedom to advise their government clients not to feel tied to judicial supremacy]
But the fact that we (likely, if not certainly) reach the same result at the end of the does not mean there are not multiple steps involved, that everyone is bound everywhere by what SCOTUS says about the Constitution, or that our system is, in fact, one of judicial supremacy.
Tuesday, October 13, 2015
Lawyerly obligations, precedent, and judgments
A group of conservative academics, under the name "American Principles Project," has issued a statement calling for constitutional resistance to Obergefell and calling on presidential candidates to refuse to treat it as binding precedent. The statement essentially relies on a comparison between Obergefell and Dred Scott--that is, between a decision allowing same-sex couples to enjoy the same benefits and protections as any other couple and a decision categorically denying rights to a group of people based on their race.
I have not blogged about this before, finding both the rhetoric in the statement and the rhetoric of the responses absurdly over-the-top (even while agreeing with the basic idea that public officials can act contrary to Obergefell if believing it wrong). But Lyle Denniston has this post at the National Constitution Center Blog arguing that lawyers who sign and follow the call are acting contrary to their ethical/professional-responsibility obligations. In particular, Denniston insists that a lawyer fails to show "respect" for precedent in arguing that it should not be treated as binding or controlling in similar cases. He also points to Kim Davis as an example of what happens when a public official refuses to treat a decision as binding.The point about ethical obligations cannot be right. Denniston analogizes to a Michigan lawyer disciplined for calling a panel of judges "Nazis" and "jackasses." Accepting that decision as consistent with the First Amendment, a personal attack on judges is a far cry from the sorts of legal arguments and positions lawyers can take on matters of public concern, including the state of the law and what the state of the law should be. It also cannot be that a lawyer can be sanctioned for arguing that a court disregard or overturn even binding precedent. Arguing that Obergefell is wrong, even egregiously, abuse-of-power wrong, is not the same as personally attacking the judge.
The reference to Davis at the end of the post is even more off-base, as it again misunderstands the meaning of precedent and the difference between judgments and precedents. Davis was not held in contempt for arguing that Obergefell was not or should not be binding precedent. She was held in contempt for ignoring a court order, aimed directly at her in a case to which she was a party, that applied Obergefell. But prior to the entry of that order, she did nothing that would subject her to contempt. And one cannot be in contempt of precedent. Denniston is right that "it is now accepted, very widely if not universally, that a Supreme Court decision . . . dictates the outcome when the same issue arises in a new case." But that still requires a new case in which the precedent dictates the outcome. And until that new case comes along, no one is in contempt. And no lawyer who signs the form or advocates resistance to Obergefell, in or out of court, can possibly be subject to professional sanction.
The first episode of C-SPAN's Landmark Cases covered Marbury. It was an interesting program, mostly a discussion between Akhil Amar and attorney Cliff Sloan, who has written a book on the case. The discussion tells the full historical and political context of the case.
I was struck by a few things. And as to all, I recognize that this program is not pitched at lawyers and law students. But if the purpose is to elevate the conversation, perhaps some better editing was in order.
First, in interview excerpts, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg entirely conflate judicial review and judicial supremacy, stating that Marbury recognized that the Court can review constitutionality and its word on that is final. The second does not follow from the first, of course. Amar pushed back; while insisting that he is not a Kim Davis supporter,* he pointed to Andrew Jackson vetoing the bank and Jefferson pardoning those convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts. How do those who espouse judicial supremacy explain those actions? It seems to me there are only two possibilities: 1) Both presidents acted unconstitutionally (because inconsistent with the Court's interpretation), but in a way not subject to judicial review or 2) Both presidents acted constitutionally, in which case the Court does not have the final say on constitutional meaning. I presume both Roberts and Ginsburg know this and were using shorthand for a lay audience.
* As I have argued, Davis only begins as a story about shared constitutional interpretation, but ends as being about the finality and exclusivity of judgments.
Second, there is an interview excerpt with Rep. Bob Goodlatte, the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, who says the problem is that there is often too much judicial review. He then complains about two situations: 1) the Court using judicial review to make up the Constitution where there is nothing to be found and 2) the Court refusing to recognize in the Constitution what "most people" know is there. For those of you scoring at home, # 1 is Roe, # 2 is NFIB. But the good or bad of judicial review should not be about decisions you happen to think are wrong. Again, I know I should not expect more from a member of Congress.
Third, even crazy people listen and try to call into C-SPAN. One of the callers started rambling about two religions that want to impose their law on everyone else: "the Jewish law and the Sharia law." To the caller's credit, when the host asked what this had to do with Marbury, the caller said "nothing."
Monday, October 12, 2015
Baseball and viewpoint discrimination?
As students are aware of my baseball allegiances, I am getting many questions and comments from students about the Cubs current position in the baseball playoffs. One student shared this story from last week--a professor at the University of Illinois moved the mid-term exam for a student because the student had obtained tickets to last week's National League Wild Card game in Pittsburgh.
Viewpoint discrimination? What about the Cardinals fans who no doubt are in the class?
Sunday, October 11, 2015
Lisa McElroy's "Called On"
Lisa McElroy (Drexel) has published Called On, a novel about law school that Tony Mauro calls "This Generation's One L." Lisa tells me that Dan encouraged her in this project early on and she mentions him in the acknowledgements.
Friday, October 09, 2015
Picking our free speech stories and heroes
Interesting discussion by James Wimberley (RBC) about Giordano Bruno, a Dominican friar burned for heresy in 1600. Bruno espoused all manner of contrarian ideas--often without proof--including that the stars floated in infinite space surrounded by their own planets and life. Bruno has been somewhat lost to history, overtaken by Galileo, who was convicted by the Inquisition 30 years later, as the great story to illustrate the importance of epistemological humility and of defending ideas that run contrary to those of the governing authorities. (The first episode of the Cosmos reboot, with Neil DeGrasse Tyson, told Bruno's story).
Wimberley argues that "Galileo is far too easy a test case for freedom of speech" and that the real challenge is a case like Bruno. Galileo was "demonstrably right" on a matter of scientific fact, meaning the censors were demonstrably wrong. Bruno was a "brilliant crank" who happened to be right about one thing, albeit without actual proof (Wimberley compares him to the people we regularly meet on the internet). Thus, the argument for defending Bruno's speech is different than for defending Galileo's--we defend Bruno "not on the grounds that he was right by chance on one thing, but simply that he was entitled to express opinions that were his own and not those of approved authorities." Moreover, Galileo suffered a forced and formal abjuration (Eppur si muove?) and a "fairly open" house arrest (among his many guests over the years was John Milton, who discussed the meeting in Areopagitica). That is nothing compared to being executed for the ideas one espoused.
Thursday, October 08, 2015
It's going to get pricey
Michigan has agreed to pay $1.9 million in attorneys fees to the plaintiffs who successfully challenged the state's same-sex marriage ban. That is in the same ballpark as Wisconsin paying $ 1.055 million in fees (that case only went to the court of appeals, not to SCOTUS).
Kim Davis must know that her stunt is going to get very expensive very quickly.
Rethinking Kitty Genovese
The New Yorker reviews a new documentary that screened this week at the New York Film Festival--a reexamination of the murder of Kitty Genovese, produced by and starring Bill Genovese, one of Kitty's younger brothers. The film attempts to reinvestigate the murder and the response to it. Similarly, a 2014 New Yorker story explored how the media created the "bystander apathy" narrative and how it almost immediately took hold, to the point that it actually affected the State's decisions in prosecuting the case.
That narrative remains sticky. In my 1L Crim Law class, we read an early New York Times story about the murder (The Times and editor A.M. Rosenthal was the great engine of the apathy narrative) for a discussion of the law/morality divide and when liability should attach to inaction. At a Torah study a few weeks ago, a participant referred to this story, and its common narrative, to illustrate some principle about how the Torah commands us to treat people.
Never mind that the best understanding of the story (as discussed in both of the New Yorker pieces and in the film) is that several neighbors did try to help. This includes at least two who called the police (police records show one call and that the response to that call was that the police were aware of the attack, suggesting at least one earlier call).
A few new themes emerge from the film and from the review.
One is that Kitty and her roommate, Mary Ann Zielonko, were in a lesbian relationship; interviews with Zielonko offer a portrait of gay life in New York in the early 1960s (when homosexual conduct was unlawful).
Another idea is that some neighbors explained that they believed the fight to be a lovers' quarrel and/or a drunken argument that spilled out of a nearby bar. Thus, the neighbors' (and the police) non-response may have been borne not of apathy, but of the common legal and social assumptions of the time--that domestic violence was not unlawful and not the concern of either police or neighbors, but was a private matter for the couple to work-out between them. In that regard, intervention would have been, in a social sense, wrong.
Of course, the apathy narrative is what has kept this story alive for fifty years. Indeed, Rosenthal (who died in 2006, but was interviewed for the film) continues to defend his coverage by the fact that it became a world-wide and historical incident. If it were just a story illustrating our then-benighted approach to domestic violence and gender issues, we probably would not still be talking about it.
Tuesday, October 06, 2015
JOTWELL: Walker on Cyr on judicial appointments in Canada
The new Courts Law essay comes from Janet Walker (Osgoode Hall), reviewing Hugo Cyr, The Bungling of Justice Nadon's Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Covering a colleague's class, or The Substitute
This morning, for the first time since I began teaching fifteen years ago, I covered a colleague's class. This presented some interesting issues, both substantively and stylistically, as to how much the class should sound like me and how much it should sound like my colleague?
Substantively, it presented the challenge of getting up to speed on the content. While I teach the same subject, I do not teach the same cases and my overall approach to the material is very different. I teach certain concepts differently or with different emphasis and in a different way. So I know I did not (and could not) run the class with the same confidence in the questions I ask, the points I make, and (certainly) my responses to their questions. There also was the question of base knowledge to be expected from the students. I cover material in a different order than my colleague. So I know what the class already knows (or should know) by the time I reach this topic in my own class; I was less sure of what these guys knew.
Stylistically, one big question was whether to use my colleague's PowerPoint slides, since that is both what she wants to do and what the students expect. I chose not to; I would not know how to interact with them, so they would have been more of a distraction than a help. The students were great about it--probably about 1/4-1/3 volunteered at least once. But it was like being a substitute teacher--everyone not knowing quite what to do with me, what to expect from the class, or what they were going to learn. I tried to make the class "mine," to the extent that is possible with a group of students who signed up for a different style of class.
Fortunately, no one threw spit balls.