Tuesday, August 23, 2016

Inside the agency class action

A quick flag for a new article from Michael Sant’Ambrogio (Michigan State) & past-guest Adam Zimmerman (Loyola-LA), Inside the Agency Class Action. This piece builds on some posts Adam wrote here, as well as some reports by the Administrative Conference of the US that Sergio Campos wrote about for JOTWELL.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 23, 2016 at 04:28 PM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Night Of (Updated)

I have been enjoying HBO's The Night Of, despite my general distaste for legal fiction. The acting and writing have been great and the show has presented a unique tone.

Some comments (with spoilers, for those of you who are not caught up) after the jump.

Two big evidentiary issues came up in the last episode: Naz's assaults of two high school classmates and his selling Adderall to college classmates. The first seems impermissible--we have not seen any indication that the defense has offered evidence of Naz as a non-violent person or that he was acting in self-defense, so the door has not been opened for the prosecution to offer character evidence, nor do these incidents have any non-character connection to the murder at issue. The second seemed impermissible while I was watching it, just more evidence to show he is a bad person (and through specific instances of conduct on direct, no less). But I think this could come in as preparation or plan--that the drugs they took (which explains why he blacked out or cannot remember his actions) were provided by him, not the victim.

Financial advisers may want to protect their client's confidentiality, but the law does not accord them a privilege akin to that between an attorney and her client. Just subpoena the guy.

Finally, and unfortunately, the show again falls into the trap described by Paul Bergman and Michael Asimow in their book Reel Justice: "Almost without exception, trial movies present women lawyers in viciously stereotypical terms. It's almost as if filmmakers are scared stiff of powerful, successful women." The show fell down this hole on Sunday by having Chandra, the young female lawyer, make-out with Naz--on surveillance camera, no less, and for no discernible reason. The show had shown her as a competent and serious, if new and overwhelmed, lawyer rising (somewhat) to the occasion. Why would she throw that all away and what is served by undermining the character like that? Narratively, I suppose the goal is to force John Stone to step-in as first chair, completing his redemption story and, perhaps, getting Naz off the hook?. But why must it be at the cost of the female attorney destroying her career? And, come to think of it, Chandra is not the only example in the show. Allison Crowe, Naz's second lawyer, is shown as a media hound who behaves unethically in a number of ways--in stealing Naz as a client (without speaking to Naz himself), in insulting John in open court, in jacking up her price (from pro bono to costly) when he did not do what she wanted, and then in dropping Naz as a client (without informing the court) by telling him, basically, "fuck off." I overlooked it at the time because she was supposed to be the bad guy in that part of the story, an antagonist to John. But now, in light of the development with Chandra, it seems to be a broader problem in how women lawyers are presented--another example of Bergman and Asimow's thesis.

Update: I should say something about the female prosecutor, who  been no great shakes, including telling a witness what to say. Interestingly, though, the attitude towards her seems to be that she is a world-weary part of a machine that continues of its own force once it gets rolling. Mostly, she is depicted as a typical prosecutor, putting the most-favorable spin on ambiguous evidence. This is how the adversary system is supposed to work.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 23, 2016 at 12:03 PM in Culture, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, August 17, 2016

JOTWELL: Steinberg on lawyers and strategic expertise

The new Courts Law essay comes from guest contributor Jessica Steinberg (George Washington), reviewing Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise (Denv. L. Rev.) (forthcoming), an empirical study of when and why having counsel matters in civil litigation.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 17, 2016 at 04:43 PM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

More sports rules and perverse incentives

Good stories in Slate and NY Mag about the zero-tolerance false-start rules in Olympic track, under which a racer is disqualified if he false-starts. This is the third version of the Olympic rule. Pre-2003, each runner was allowed one false start and was disqualified only on the second. In 2003, the rule was changed to give the entire field one false start, with a DQ imposed on whoever does the second false start. The current rule was enacted in 2010, making this the second Olympic games under that rule; we have seen two DQs this week, although not by any favorites. Usain Bolt wass DQ'd under the rule at the 2011 World Championships, the only Olympic or world championship final he has lost since 2008. French hurdler Wilhem Belocian was DQd earlier this week and was seen falling to the track in tears, but he had qualified seventh out of eight runners.

The 2010 rule change was designed, at least in part, to eliminate perverse incentives. Slower runners would intentionally false start, using up the "freebie" for the field. This forced faster starters and runners to be a bit more cautious, and thus to hesitate just a bit off the blocks, lest they pick up that second false start that would disqualify them. The new rule eliminates the intentional false start by eliminating the benefit, and thus the incentive, for the slower runner to do this.

This sounds a bit like the logic behind the Infield Fly Rule: 1) Runners were gaining a potentially big advantage (slowing down the fast starters/runners) through the intentional false start; 2) The faster runners could not really counter this move, except perhaps by not false-starting following the intentional freebie; 3) slow runners were intentionally acting contrary to expectations (you do not want to false start); and 4) the advantage offered a perverse incentive to the slower runners to intentionally false-start (although not a great one--the trick did not work very often). The second prong is weak--the faster runners could counter the strategy by not false-starting, something they could do more easily than runners can avoid a double play on an uncaught infield fly. But this is an interesting comparable situation that is worth including in my discussion of similarly justified rules in other sports. [Update: On further thought, that second prong is not weak and this is precisely the same as the I/F/R situation. The only way to counter the intentional false start was for the faster runner to slow down his start--but that is precisely what the false-starter wants]

This situation shows the role that aesthetics play in creating sports rules. Rulemakers could have disincentived intentional false starts by returning to the old rule of giving every runner one freebie. But that old rule created problems of multiple false starts by multiple runners, causing long delays, fan boredom, and television overruns. So the new rule, while harsher, is aesthetically favorable to the sport.

Finally, runners and rulemakers have minimized the effect of the harsh rule. All runners slow down their starts a bit to avoid the risk--Bolt, never a fast starter, has slowed his start even more, relying on his remarkable ability to dominate the last 30-40 meters (as he did in winning gold in the 100m this week). And the rulemakers narrowed what qualifies as a false start to exclude flinches and twitches, so a runner false-starts only if his feet leave the starting blocks or his hands leave the track.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 17, 2016 at 04:31 PM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, August 16, 2016

A call to action for civil justice reform

The following is by Linda Sandstrom Simard (Suffolk Law), who was a member of the Civil Justice Improvements Committee discussed in the post. These comments represent her own thoughts and opinions, not those of the Committee.

This summer the Conference of Chief Justices (“CCJ”), an association comprised of the chief justices of all of the state supreme courts, strongly endorsed the Call to Action and Recommendations of the Civil Justice Improvements Committee. Talk of civil justice reform is ubiquitous, but the CCJ endorsement of these Recommendations offers more than a glimmer of hope that key stakeholders in state courts around the country are ready to take serious action. The Report offers a comprehensive view of civil litigation in state courts and concludes that our legal system is too often not living up to the promise of a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil cases. The Report makes a series of evidence-based recommendations that seek to protect access to justice and restore faith in the civil justice system.  

Following is a brief description of the Report and my thoughts on the likelihood that the Report will engender reform.

In 2013, the CCJ established the Civil Justice Improvements Committee. The Committee, comprised of state court leaders from the bench, bar and academia, undertook two years of intensive deliberations, reviewing data from pilot projects around the country, implemented rule changes, empirical research, and stakeholder input. Based upon this research, the Committee found that: (1) over the last several decades there has been a dramatic rise in self represented litigants, with more 75% of civil cases involving at least one party who is self-represented; (2) high-value tort and commercial contract disputes comprise a small proportion of civil caseloads; (3) the vast majority of civil cases are debt collection, landlord/tenant, mortgage foreclosures, and small claims cases involving relatively modest monetary claims; (4) in many instances, the cost of litigating a case through trial exceeds the monetary value of the case; (5) the vast majority of civil cases are disposed of without adjudication on the merits; and (6) some litigants with meritorious claims and defenses are effectively denied access to justice because they cannot afford to engage in litigation, and those litigants with adequate resources frequently opt for private alternative dispute resolution. If action is not taken, these findings suggest that our civil justice system is in serious jeopardy.

The CJI Committee’s Recommendations are premised upon the notion that transsubstantive procedure, or “one size fits all,” is not a sustainable model for the future. Complex cases involving an abundance of disputed issues of law and fact require more procedure than streamlined cases involving few contested issues. The Committee’s Recommendations suggest that courts must manage civil cases by assigning each case to a case management pathway that provides the amount of judicial attention needed to resolve the disputed issues in a just, timely, and cost-effective manner. The responsibility for effective case management must be shouldered by the entire court staff, not just the trial judge, along with cooperative lawyers and parties. Innovative uses of technology are highly encouraged as a means to meet the enhanced demands of “right sized” case management. The Report makes special reference to recommendations that address the unique demands of cases that involve asymmetrical legal expertise. Overall, these Recommendations seek to restore faith in the civil justice system by reducing cost and enhancing fairness and efficiency.

I believe there is reason to be optimistic about these Recommendations. At its core, the CJI Report endorses the concept of proportionality.   Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that require judges to make individualized determinations of proportionality for every discovery dispute, the CJI Report identifies procedural pathways that help courts to know which cases are likely to require substantial focused judicial attention and which cases are likely to need less judicial attention.  Since state civil case loads are much larger than their federal counterparts, this modified version of proportionality is pragmatic and efficient.   The Recommendations also recognize the need for flexibility in pathway assignments and encourage courts to reassign cases if presented with reasons why a pathway is inappropriate.   The fact that these Recommendations coincide with the tenor of the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suggests that momentum may be growing for significant civil justice reform to take hold.

Of course, this is not to say that change will be easy. Implementing the Recommendations will require substantial judicial resources. Court personnel will need training to meet the enhanced demands of case management, and judicial training programs will be necessary for newly appointed judges as well as experienced judges who may need to change deeply rooted habits. Structural changes may also need to be considered. For example, judicial rotations, short terms of office and frequent elections are likely to complicate case management efforts and hinder efficiency. Finally, cultural change will be crucial. Litigation strategies that rely upon expertise and judgment, as opposed to routine reliance upon boilerplate discovery requests or vague and meaningless discovery responses, will enable lawyers to resolve disputed issues of law and fact efficiently. If we can meet these challenges, I believe implementation of the CJI Recommendations will be a significant step forward for civil justice in this country.  

 

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 16, 2016 at 06:30 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, August 13, 2016

More on names

Shima sparked a conversation over how prawfs and students should address one another. I want to explore a different issue of student names.

At SEALS last week, a co-panelist told a story relayed of a female law professor who had twice been the subject of formal administrative complaints by students whose (first) names the prof had mispronounced in class.  In the discussion that followed, some panelists recognized the concern that mispronouncing the name can send a message of exclusion or otherness, while others suggested that this provided another good reason to use last names in class (hence the connection to Shima's post).

This story unnerved me, although I recognize that there may be more to it. I am troubled that students are so suspicious and so ready to assume the worst of what was presumptively an innocent mistake that the professor (hopefully) handled with some tact. I am troubled because, if mispronouncing a name does send a message of exclusion, there is not much I can do about it; any attempt to avoid mispronouncing would send that same message of "you have a funny name." Ask the student if I am not sure? "You did not ask Jim how to pronounce his name." Ask for phonetic spellings? "You didn't need Jim's phonetic spelling." Get phonetic spellings in advance? That does not help me during the first class. Use last names? I am not sure they are so much easier to pronounce (I began using first names in part because I thought it would minimize pronunciation problems).

As I said, I hope there is more to this story than the sparse details I heard.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 13, 2016 at 11:15 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (21)

Wednesday, August 10, 2016

Florida congresswoman is anti-Trump, does not know Florida law

Florida congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen said yesterday that she would not vote for Donald Trump for President, but instead would likely write-in Jeb Bush (since she also cannot support Hillary Clinton).

But it will not be that easy. Florida law does not automatically provide a write-in space for an office, but only if one or more people qualify as write-in candidates. And then a voter only can write-in the name of that qualified candidate, not some random person; writing in a random name results in an invalid vote. I do not know whether anyone has qualified as a write-in in Florida, but presumably Jeb! has not bothered. So Ros-Lehtinen's planned move would result in an invalid vote for President (which she may not mind, if he goal is just to make a point by not voting for either of the main named candidates).

How do I know all this? Because four years ago, I wanted to use a write-in so I could vote against Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for Congress. She ran unopposed, so there was no named candidate to vote for. But since no write-in candidate had qualified, I did not have that option, either. In fact, the office did not appear on the ballot at all, also depriving me of the option of a symbolic non-vote).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 10, 2016 at 12:45 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, August 09, 2016

Attorney advertising as jury tampering

While at Amelia Island for SEALS over the weekend, we caught a TV ad for a personal-injury lawyer. The entire ad focused on the legal rule prohibiting juries in personal injury cases (the ad focused on automobile accidents) from learning that the defendant has liability insurance. This is a common law rule in Florida, codified in the Federal Rules. The ad argues that juries are too sympathetic to, and thus unwilling to find against, defendants in these cases, erroneously believing, because they lack this one piece of information, that finding for the plaintiff will impose crippling liability on a powerless individual. The ad announces that almost all drivers have insurance and will not bear the cost of civil judgment, which instead will be borne by the big, bad insurance company. And it urges viewers to "spread the word" about the state of the law. Presumably, although only implicitly, these are cases in which the evidence otherwise shows that the defendant should be liable, and the plaintiff loses because of this misplaces sympathy. Of course, it ignores the flipside concern--a jury imposing liability against a defendant despite the evidence, believing an adverse verdict is "costless" to the insured defendant.

I am being tongue-in-cheek about calling the ad jury tampering. I believe it paints with too broad a brush, unconnected to any case, geographic, or potential juror (although I welcome the correction if jury tampering can be defined more broadly). Nevertheless, we can wonder about the ethics of an attorney "spreading the word" to the public about something they are not supposed to know as jurors and encouraging them (even if not explicitly) to use something they are not supposed to use as jurors.

This reminds me of a controversy that cropped up in the '90s, where people in parking lot or sidewalks outside courthouses gave potential and actual jurors information about the power of nullification.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 9, 2016 at 04:01 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Practice your talks--with dogs

One of the worst parts of attending conferences, workshops, etc., is sitting through the obviously unprepared presentation. Speakers meander, repeat themselves, run over time, race through the final points because they wasted too much time getting started, etc.* There is a tough balance to strike. You do not want to sound overly rehearsed or as if you are reading the paper (although that is the norm in many fields, such as English). But you want to be coherent and stay within the time limits. And that requires that you practice the talk with a timer and tweak as you must.**

[*] Not for nothing, I find these problems--especially the last two--exacerbated when the speaker uses PowerPoint.

[**] This is especially true for job talks, but it applies to any presentation.

So I liked this story about a program at American University's Kogod Center for Business Communications, which provides dogs as an audience for students (especially those anxious about public speaking) to practice presentations. The dogs have a calming influence; the students practice before a non-judgmental audience; and the students have to work a bit to keep the audience attention (the director of the study says a dog is no more distracted than the typical college student, which might not be untrue). The accompanying video is after the jump.

My dog better be ready to sit through some talks in the coming years.

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 9, 2016 at 12:20 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, August 04, 2016

What type of voter fraud?

In setting up his pre-narrative of a stolen election, Donald Trump has decried recent lower-court decisions declaring invalid voting laws in North Carolina, Wisconsin, Kansas, Texas, and North Dakota, including voter ID requirements. These laws were designed to prevent impersonation fraud--someone voting as John Smith who is not, in fact, John Smith.

But note that Trump has not been complaining about impersonation fraud, but about repeat-voter fraud--"If you don’t have voter ID, you can just keep voting and voting and voting." (Chicago's old "Vote early, vote often"). But voter ID laws do nothing to eliminate repeat-voter fraud and do not seem designed to do so. The defense against that practice is the voter list; the poll worker  does not allow someone to vote  if she is not on the list (or allows only a provisional ballot) and she crosses the voter's name off the list once that person appears. Repeat voting is possible only if: 1) the poll worker fails to cross the name off or 2) the voter goes to other precincts, where she is not on the list, to vote. But requiring ID does not stop that practice. If the poll workers are not vigilant, I can repeat-vote to me heart's content with an ID, just as I could without an ID. That is, if I show an ID proving I am John Smith but the poll worker does not cross my name off the first time, I can come back again and again and vote as John Smith, showing my ID each time. Similarly, if I then drive to the wrong precinct with an ID proving I am John Smith but the poll worker allows me to vote despite my name not being on the list, I can cast that repeat vote as John Smith, showing my ID.

Unfortunately, most of the news reports of Trump's comments have repeated the (true) line that there is virtually no evidence of in-person voter fraud, without specifying that the fraud Trump is talking about is not even the type that ID laws are designed to redress. Which, also unfortunately, means the news reports are missing the fact that Trump is not aware enough to understand his own conspiracy theories.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 4, 2016 at 03:05 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (10)

Monday, August 01, 2016

He has no right . . .

Presumably because he cannot resist, Donald Trump is fighting back against Khzir Khan over his speech at the DNC. In response to Khan's move of asking Trump whether he had read the Constitution, displaying his pocket copy, and offering to lend it to him, Trump tweeted "Mr. Khan who has never met me, has no right to stand in front of millions of people and claim I have never read the Constitution, which is false."

People are having fun with the circularity of this--Trump asserts that Khan has no right to stand in front of millions of people and criticize him, but that right quite clearly is in the Constitution, thereby confirming Khan's point about Trump reading the Constitution. But I want to give Trump the benefit of the doubt. The key is the last clause--"which is false." Trump is not saying Khan has no right to criticize him, only that that Khan has no right to make a false statement about him, or, really, no right to defame him.

So let's break this out and see if Trump is right that Khan had no right to say what he did in front of millions of people.

For starters, this is why I have thought the "pulling out the Constitution" move (historically pulled by Libertarians, but now seemingly fair game) is nonsense as part of a political discussion. The language in the Constitution does not answer most specific questions. For our purposes, Khan does not have a right to stand in front of millions of people and engage in unprotected speech. But the First Amendment's reference to "the freedom of speech" does not tell us anything about what is or is not protected

Diving deeper shows how disturbingly ignorant Trump is about the meaning (beyond the simple words) of the First Amendment.* First, Khan did not say that Trump had never read the Constitution; he asked whether he had and offered him a copy to read. Second, even if Khan's rhetorical question contained an assertion and that implied statement was false, that alone does not mean he did not have the right to say it in front of millions of people, since false statements are not per se unconstitutional.

[*] This is not news, of course. Just another illustration of the obvious point.

The real question is whether, if false, Khan's statement was unprotected defamation that Khan had no right to make. That depends on what Khan was asserting.

In context, the best understanding of Khan's statement is that  Trump proposes policies and makes statements that violate, ignore, or disrespect the Constitution, suggesting a lack of understanding of what the Constitution protects (recall that, after pulling out his pocket copy, Khan pointed to liberty and equal protection, although, curiously, not free exercise, as concepts within it). Whether Trump has actually, literally "read" the Constitution is beside the point that Khan was making--someone could read the Constitution and still act contrary to it. So saying Trump has not read the Constitution is rhetorcal hyperbole, not meant literally or as a provable fact, but only as overstatement to make a larger point. The assertion that Trump's policies are contrary to the Constitution should be protected as an opinion, an expression of the speaker's own constitutional views, that is not provably false and that cannot form the basis for defamation liability. Finally, even if Khan was asserting as fact that Trump has not read the Constitution, I am not sure that is defamatory. Most people have not read the entire Constitution and there is nothing negative about not reading the whole thing; the harm comes from the negative  implication that someone who has not read the Constitution lacks knowledge or respect for it, which, again, is protected opinion.

So while it is not as simple as those on Twitter and Reddit are saying, the point is accurate--Khan had a clear constitutional right to say what he did and the suggestion from a presidential candidate to the contrary is wrong as a matter of established First Amendment law.

By the way, am I the only one imagining Trump, sitting in a gold-plated bunker, doing this:

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 1, 2016 at 10:17 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (16)

Rotations

As July turns into August (and the end of my writing summer looms), we bid thanks to our July visitors, some of whom might be sticking around for some extra days. And we welcome our August visitors--Shima Baughman (Utah), Benjamin Edwards (Barry), and Jake Linford (FSU).


Welcome and enjoy the month.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on August 1, 2016 at 08:03 AM in Blogging, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 26, 2016

Philadelphia police and public protest

Interesting discussion of how the Philadelphia police are responding to public protest during the current DNC (as well as how they have responded to more recent Occupy and Black Lives Matter events). And he contrasts it with the city's absurd overreaction to the 2000 RNC, which produced 400 arrests in four days, few or no convictions, and unknown amounts in civil settlements. I was clerking in Philly during the 2000 convention and it was walking around a police state, in the pre-9/11 days, when that was not the norm.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 26, 2016 at 04:24 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 25, 2016

JOTWELL: Campos on aggregating administrative action

The new Courts Law essay comes from Sergio Campos (Miami), reviewing a recent report of the Administrative Conference of the United States on using aggregate adjudication in administrative proceedings.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 25, 2016 at 12:24 PM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 23, 2016

Dudziak on Trump on Turkey (Updated)

Mary Dudziak (Emory) critiques Donald Trump's comments about not lecturing Turkey about civil liberties in light of our problems at home. A legal historian, Dudziak describes how this argument--that the United States could not exercise moral authority abroad because of problems at home--was made by the Soviet Union, not Presidents of the United States. Instead, those Presidents responded by seeking to remedy domestic injustice (she points to Eisenhower sending troops to Little Rock and Kennedy's response to Birmingham), expressly to bolster international standing.

But as I argued, Trump is not making the same argument that the Soviets made during the Cold War, that we cannot exercise moral standing on matters of justice because we have not corrected racial injustices at home. He is not arguing that we are estopped to exercise moral leadership because of our own failings, failings these other Presidents then tried to correct. He is arguing we should not care about exercising moral leadership until we get our house in order. And getting our house in order means not eliminating barriers to racial equality, but eliminating barriers to police maintaining law and order. Trump does not want to convince Turkey to be more like us; he wants to make us more like Turkey.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 23, 2016 at 03:02 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

More on athlete speech in the WNBA (Second Update)

Second Update (Saturday evening): The WNBA, about to enter a month-long break for the Olympics, has rescinded the fines against several teams and players and will use the break to negotiate with the players' union about rules for player protests.

Original Post:

Following on my post about protests by WNBA players: Claire McNear at The Ringer wonders when the WNBA became apolitical, given the league's reactions to previous tragedies such as the Orlando shooting (when the league gave the players official memorial t-shirts), to say nothing of the league's general promotion of LGBTQ and women's issues. It also departs from the NBA's response both to the Lynx protest (NBA Commissioner Adam Silver praised their efforts) and to individual NBA players who have spoken out in similar ways the past few seasons (notably in wearing "I Can't Breathe" shirts during warm-ups). McNear questions whether the line really can be about who made and distributed the t-shirts.

Unfortunately, I fear a different explanation. The recent deaths of police officers has made them untouchable in the realm of public debate. You no longer can criticize or protest police officers, as by memorializing the victims of police-involved shootings (even as part of a general statement against all violence by memorializing everyone). The Orlando memorials no longer work as analogue, because the shooter there was a terrorist, not to mention an "other," so honoring those victims does not implicate police. We may be entering a time in which athletes can speak through the game, but only to express certain messages or certain positions on an issue.

As I said in the prior post, this is playing out on a smaller stage. The question is whether the same limitations are imposed on NBA or NFL players.

Update (Saturday afternoon): In my prior post, I argued that the key question is the extent to which athletes should be able to use the game, on the field/court, as a platform for their expression. The answer from the WNBA, according to this ESPN story, is that the players should keep their activism off the court. The league and the union have been trying to negotiate some arrangements, such as allowing players to wear what they want during early warmups (until, say ten minutes before the game), then change into official shirts for the national anthem; so far, they have been unable to reach an agreement.

The story includes comments from USA Coach Geno Auriemma, who seems to expect some players to attempt to speak out during the Olympics, which would become a matter for Olympic and basketball authorities. I hope we have come far enough in 48 years that the USOC would not respond as it did to Tommie Smith and John Carlos, by kicking them out of the Olympic Village.

I am more surprised by the following from Auriemma:

"I respect Tina (Charles) and the players in the WNBA for their concern and their voices and the passion that they have and for their beliefs. I really do," he said, citing the former UConn player and Liberty star for wearing her warmup shirt inside-out before Thursday's game. "I'm really proud of some of my former players and the way they've stepped forward and spoken their conscience and express their feelings."

This is a change in tone from Auriemma. In 2003, a small-college basketball player named Toni Smith began protesting the Iraq War by turning her back on the flag during the pre-game playing of the national anthem (what I described as "symbolic counter-speech"). Her coaches and teammates accepted her protest. But coaches and commentators criticized her actions, if only for distracting from the team. Auriemma, among others, insisted that whatever a player's right to speak, she did not have right to be part of the UConn women's basketball team (or to speak through her participation in the UConn women's basketball team). I am happy to see he has come around on this.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 23, 2016 at 11:05 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Clinton's VP and the Senate

I do not pretend to know anything about Hillary Clinton's political calculations in choosing Tim Kaine (forever a/k/a, "The Boring Choice") as her running mate. There was a lot of media discussion about the effects on the Senate. Four of Clinton's choices were sitting Senators--Kaine, Cory Booker (NJ), Sherrod Brown (OH), and Elizabeth Warren (MA)--who would resign their seats if elected VP. All but Kaine would be replaced by a temporary appointee appointed by a Republican governor, possibly costing the Democrats control of the Senate, which might come in at 50-50. In theory, that was a factor in his favor.

But this also means the Democrats will have to defend that seat in a special election in a purple state, a low-turnout situation in which Democrats tend not to fare well. Which means if the Senate is 50-50 beginning in January 2017, Clinton may have her majority only for a year. By contrast, at least with Brown Booker and Warren, Democrats would have had the opposite problem--a lost or weakened majority at the beginning of the term (because those seats would be filled by Republican governors), but a greater chance to win the special election in a deep-blue state (Booker won his seat in a 2013 special election), giving or increasing that majority for the second year of Clinton's term. Moreover, the calculus likely assumes that Democrats will lose the Senate in 2018, when they have to defend 25 seats, including a number of people in Republican states who won on the strength of Obama turnout in 2012. So is it better to have the bigger majority in the first year or the second year? Probably the first, since by 2018, the Republicans will be gearing up for a landslide mid-term.

Advocates for selecting Warren had been pushing a way to make the appointee term even shorter. Massachusetts requires a special election 145-160 days after a vacancy occurs (in the other states, the special election would be in November 2017). So if Warren had resigned on January 20, the  election would have been in June; if she resigned November 8 (or whatever date it became clear she and Clinton had won and that she would be VP absent some catastrophe), the special election would have been in April. The Democrats likely would have won that seat (having learned the lesson of Scott Brown), so Clinton would have gotten her majority 3-6 months into the first year of her term.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 23, 2016 at 07:54 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, July 22, 2016

But if you try sometime

The Rolling Stones' "You Can't Always Get What You Want" has become a staple at Donald Trump rallies, including following last night's acceptance speech (the band objected months ago, but the campaign has not relented). Some questioned the choice, that it seems odd for a political candidate to adopt a theme of settling because you could not get what you wanted to get.

But the theme of last night's speech-- "I alone can fix it"--suggests that the key phrase is what comes later in the chorus--"if you try sometime, you might find you get what you need." Trump is positioning himself as the essential person, the only person to save the nation from, apparently, a dystopian hellscape. The American people need Donald Trump, and only Donald Trump, to be President. By electing him, the American people will find they got what they need.

Or am I giving them too much credit?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 22, 2016 at 08:48 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (10)

Thursday, July 21, 2016

Athlete speech and team dynamics

Last week, NBA stars Carmelo Anthony, Chris Paul, LeBron James, and and Dwyane Wade kicked off the ESPY Award telecast with a call for athletes to become politically engaged, particularly around the issues of violence by and against police. Players on the Minnesota Lynx wore black warmup shirts with white lettering commemorating Alton Sterling, Philando Castile, and Dallas shootings, which prompted four off-duty police officers to walk-off their security jobs there. Several other teams followed suit by wearing plain black warmup shirts, which prompted the league to fine each team $ 5000 and each player $ 500, citing its uniform policy. The league president praising and expressed pride in the players' "engagement and passionate advocacy for non-violent solutions to difficult social issues," while demanding that they "comply with the league's uniform guidelines." This, of course, is a classic example of how neutral policies can be used to restrain speech, while allowing those doing the restraining to claim to support the speech. Players responded today with a media blackout, refusing to answer basketball-related questions and only talking about the political issues at the heart of their protests. Since the league no doubt has rules about speaking with the media, expect the WNBA to follow with more praise for the players' political courage, more citation to "neutral" rules, and more fines for that political courage.

This is playing out on a smaller stage than if it were male athletes in football, basketball, and baseball. But this story illustrates important issues about athlete speech for team, as opposed to individual, sports. The athletes we remember as being most politically engaged played individual sports--Muhammad Ali, Arthur Ashe, John Carlos, Billie Jean King, Jesse Owens, Tommie Smith. A lot of the activism from Jackie Robinson and Jim Brown came after each had retired and, in any event, rarely came out on the field (except to the extent Robinson's very presence on the field was political). All athletes risk their standing with the public and fans who may object to their speech (recall Michael Jordan's apocryphal "Republicans buy shoes, too"). But team-sport athletes face another hurdle--their expression implicates the financial, business, and other concerns of teams and leagues, who have their own incentives to limit this speech. Neutral rules designed to promote the sport (speaking to the media) or to promote team unity (uniform rules) provide the perfect weapon of control, allowing leagues or teams to shut the players down without appearing to be stopping them because of their message.

The question then becomes the extent to which "athlete speech" includes (or should include) the liberty to speak through the game itself and the platform the game provides. In other words, the extent to which LeBron James not only should be able to rely on his fame to get his message out, but also the platform of the game itself to do so.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 21, 2016 at 06:25 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Trump, Turkey, and the "problem" of civil liberties

Donald Trump's interview with The New York Times would be the story of the day, but for Ted Cruz's act of political courage/political suicide. Trump was asked about the situation in Turkey, where President Recep Endrogan survived a coup attempt and is consolidating power, declaring a three-month state of emergency, purging political rivals, and imposing restrictions on speech and press. Trump's short answer was that the US has too many problems at home and has no right to lecture other countries about civil liberties.

Some have read that as Trump saying that we have issues with limits on civil liberties here, so we cannot speak to anyone else about their own limits. That is what people usually mean by "no right to X"--we don't have the right to lecture anyone about X, because we do X ourselves. It is an argument about hypocrisy and inconsistency between word and deed.

But a closer look at Trump's remarks reveals the opposite. Trump is arguing that we have anarchy here, implicitly because we have too many civil liberties. So we need to restore order (which fits with his new Nixonian Law-and-Order theme) before worrying about urging other countries to be less repressive on their own people. It is an odd use of the "no right to" argument, but it better fits with his views of dissent and speech he does not like.

Here is the exchange (from the transcript, which The Times released when--stop me if you heard this one before--the campaign denied Trump had said what the newspaper reported).

SANGER: Erdogan put nearly 50,000 people in jail or suspend them, suspended thousands of teachers, he imprisoned many in the military and the police, he dismissed a lot of the judiciary. Does this worry you? And would you rather deal with a strongman who’s also been a strong ally, or with somebody that’s got a greater appreciation of civil liberties than Mr. Erdogan has? Would you press him to make sure the rule of law applies?

TRUMP: I think right now when it comes to civil liberties, our country has a lot of problems, and I think it’s very hard for us to get involved in other countries when we don’t know what we are doing and we can’t see straight in our own country. We have tremendous problems when you have policemen being shot in the streets, when you have riots, when you have Ferguson. When you have Baltimore. When you have all of the things that are happening in this country — we have other problems, and I think we have to focus on those problems. When the world looks at how bad the United States is, and then we go and talk about civil liberties, I don’t think we’re a very good messenger.

SANGER: So that suggests that you would not, as, say, President Bush did, the last President Bush, make the spread of democracy and liberty sort of a core of your foreign policy. You would say, “We need allies, we’re not going to lecture them about what they do inside their borders.”

TRUMP: We need allies.

SANGER: And lecture inside their borders?

TRUMP: I don’t know that we have a right to lecture. Just look about what’s happening with our country. How are we going to lecture when people are shooting our policemen in cold blood. How are we going to lecture when you see the riots and the horror going on in our own country. We have so many difficulties in our country right now that I don’t think we should be, and there may be a time when we can get much more aggressive on that subject, and it will be a wonderful thing to be more aggressive. We’re not in a position to be more aggressive. We have to fix our own mess.

His point is that we should not be worried about civil liberties elsewhere. But implicitly he is arguing that we also should not be worried about civil liberties at home, but instead about the government gaining control against the "riots and the horror"and "our own mess."*

[*] The party flip between optimism and pessimism and how great America is right now is fascinating. It will be interesting to see how and if the Democrats strike at this theme next week.

Also interesting is Trump's reference to "Ferguson" as a single word with an understood meaning. But what is that meaning? To Trump, Ferguson means riots and destruction of property.  To others, however, Ferguson means a police officer shooting an unarmed Black person with impunity, generally abusive police practices,  and a massive overreaction to peaceful-if-angry public assembly speech, and protest. Trump obviously hopes that substantial numbers of people adopt his meaning of the single word. On the other hand, there is a consent decree in the Eastern District of Missouri--explicitly requiring changes in policy and training with respect to responding to public expression, handling of encounters with suspects, and the operation of fine offensives in municipal courts--that suggests the former may be the better narrative. So is the problem of Ferguson too much speech (or at least too much speech critical of police)?

Similarly, what does Trump understand "Baltimore" to represent? Wrongfully prosecuted police officers? Is outrage at the death of a person in policy custody part of the riots, horror, and mess in this country?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 21, 2016 at 03:58 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

He Who Must Not Be Named

A new paper by Diana Mutz, a political scientist at Penn, finds an association between reading Harry Potter books and opposing Donald Trump.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 21, 2016 at 03:24 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, July 20, 2016

In defense of Paul Ryan (no, really)

Paul Ryan is taking heat, from right and left, for his speech last night and his general decision to support Trump's presidency. But Ryan's decision is defensible, in terms of his political and policy goals.

He wants to enact a particular conservative agenda, which he only can do with a Republican in the White House. Ryan may sincerely believe that Trump is not Mussolini or David Duke [or other non-Hitler authoritarian], but Warren Harding with verbal diarrhea--someone who lacks the ability or interest to govern and will turn things over to those around him. So Trump will travel the world and the country talking (sometimes stupidly, perhaps, but never to any real effect), leaving the business of governing to others. Ryan must believe that he will be that other (although it could be Mike Pence), with Trump coming back to sign the bills that Ryan passes. In a sense, Ryan is trying to make himself something like a Prime Minister--the head of government to Trump's figurehead head of state. It is telling that his speech last night spoke less of electing Trump than of establishing a "conservative majority" that could enact the conservative legislative agenda. Trump is necessary for that only in that he is more likely to sign that agenda into law than Hillary Clinton.

Ryan could be wrong about what Trump is and would be as President, of course, and this could blow up in his face. But if he genuinely believes Trump is not dangerous, then this move is the logical extension of the recent trend toward a system that only works if there is party unity between the legislative and executive branches. It no longer matters who is President, only his party affiliation.

Note that Mitch McConnell is making the same calculation in the Senate (with the added bonus that he is more likely to keep his job as Majority Leader if Trump wins, since a Clinton win may flip the Senate), although without taking the same heat. That must be because no one had any illusions that McConnell was anything other than a political hack.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 20, 2016 at 02:50 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Saturday, July 16, 2016

Free assembly at the Cleveland RNC

Tabatha Abu El-Haj (Drexel) writes at Slate about the looming First Amendment disaster at next week's Republican Convention in Cleveland, given the severe restrictions on public assembly and speech the city has imposed and the current desiccated state of this area of the First Amendment. And this will be an improvement over what the city attempted; stricter regulations (for example, pushing protesters more than three miles away from the site of the Convention) were declared invalid by a federal district court.

Part of Tabatha's argument is the following:

While policing the line between constitutionally protected protest and unlawful assembly is unquestionably difficult, the fact is that cities hosting party conventions tend to do a poor job of distinguishing between the violent and the merely angry elements of assemblies. Nonviolent protesters are frequently charged with various misdemeanors from disorderly conduct and breach of the peace to trespass and disobeying lawful police orders for any minor breach of the public order. Denver police charged some Occupy participants with improperly honking car horns. Even if those charges are subsequently dropped, as with those in Denver, it will not matter much to the individual who was removed from the scene while attempting to exercise her First Amendment rights.

I will add a procedural hook to this. This individual could sue for damages for the improper arrest or for removing her from the scene. But the arresting officers likely have qualified immunity. And any damages (against non-immunized officers or the city) will be limited, if not solely nominal, damages the city already has worked into the cost of doing business. The real financial risk to the city is attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs, which similarly can be worked into the cost of doing municipal business (although they might be more substantial than the plaintiff's damages),* and, in any event, do nothing for the person whose rights were violated. These procedural realities also incentivize cities to do what Cleveland did here. Enact extreme restrictions (even ones officials believe cannot survive constitutional scrutiny) on the eve of the event, knowing there will not be enough time to redraft better (or substantially better) regulations. Even if, as happened here, a court steps in to declare invalid the extreme violations, a court, aware of time constraints, is unlikely to do the same for the entire plan and make the city start over. To the extent those regulations produce First Amendment violations during the Convention, the city can deal with the limited costs (nominal damages and attorney's fees) in ex post litigation.

[*] I have been arguing that attorneys' fees represent the greatest incentive for departmentalist states and executives to fall into line with judicial precedent.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 16, 2016 at 10:50 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, July 15, 2016

SSRN postings and copyright

The following was sent by Stephen Henderson (Oklahoma) to the Law Prof Listserv; it is reposted here with his permission. It is one experience and could be unique, but it presents something to watch for.

It appears that the corporate takeover of SSRN is already having a real impact.

When I posted a final PDF of an article for which not only do my co-author and I retain the copyright, but for which the contract also includes _explicit_ permission to post on SSRN, I received the typical happy “SSRN Revision Email” saying all was well.  Only when I went to take a look, I found there was no longer any PDF to download at all—merely the abstract.  So, download counts are gone, and no article.  Not the former working version nor the final version.  And then in the revision comments, I found this:

It appears that you do not retain copyright to the paper, and the PDF has been removed from public view. Please provide us with the copyright holder's written permission to post. Alternatively, you may replace this version with a working paper or preprint version, if you so desire. Questions and/or written permissions may be emailed to support@ssrn.com, or call 1-877-SSRNHELP (877-777-6435 toll free) or 1-585-442-8170 outside the US.

So, not only have they completely changed their model, but—at least to me—they gave no effective notice, and they pull papers without asking.  Nobody bothered to _ask_ whether I had permission; they simply took down every version of the article and said nothing.  Alas.  And when I called customer support and someone called back, I pointed out that some profs have hundreds of articles posted for which SSRN doesn’t hold the copyright agreements.  “Are you going to take all those down too?,” I asked.  The answer, in essence, “Those were posted in error.”  Unbelievable.

Of course, for years they have insisted on maintaining “citation counts” for legal papers despite knowing their algorithms don’t work for papers with footnotes as opposed to endnotes.  So, I suppose one should not expect much.  But this is new and much worse.  So, be wary, and long live Bepress Digital Commons!

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 15, 2016 at 01:16 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (27)

Thursday, July 14, 2016

As if on cue . . .

The ACLU and several other organizations have sued Baton Rouge, citing, among other events, the incident described in this story and this post. The requested TRO goes after several specific practices, including too readily declaring an assembly unlawful, arresting protesters for stepping into the street in the absence of any obstruction of traffic, and dispersing protesters off the sidewalks and into the street and then arresting them for being in the street. The suit also names the DA and seeks to enjoin continued prosecution of those previously arrested.

Note that there is no individual plaintiff named in the action. Plaintiffs are the local ACLU, local National Lawyers Guild, and three Louisiana advocacy groups.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 14, 2016 at 09:46 AM in Civil Procedure, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 13, 2016

Violence and the future of public assembly

Since the Dallas shootings, I have been concerned about the possible effect on public protest. Local governments already cite vague concerns for public safety and risks of violence as grounds for restricting public assemblies, marches, and protests, and courts already accept those concerns too easily. An event such as the Dallas shooting makes those concerns more than abstract and allows government to argue for greater restrictions (if not for closing the streets entirely) with a "it-could-happen-here" argument. Reports of a link between a Baton Rouge burglary and a plot to shoot police (which the tiny conspiracy theorist in my brain finds a bit too convenient) have been used to justify police breaking up protests there.

See, then, this post from Michael Dorf, arguing that the threat of violence is unavoidably baked into the idea of public assembly and protest. This means government efforts to maintain order and safety, while legitimate, cannot be allowed to render hollow or meaningless the rights to assemble, speak, and petition. The balance to be struck must account for the risk inherent in the very nature of the First Amendment enterprise.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 13, 2016 at 10:48 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

NBA changes to stop Hack-a-Shaq

The NBA on Tuesday announced rule changes designed to limit the "Hack-A-Shaq" strategy of intentionally fouling bad free throw shooters away from the ball. Beginning next season, all fouls away from the ball in the final two minutes of every quarter will result in one free throw and the ball out of bounds for the offensive team (this has been the rule for the final two minutes of the fourth quarter). The same rule will apply to fouls on inbounds plays (the new rage was jumping out of bounds to foul the inbounder). And jumping on a player's back during a free throw (a recent development used in the final two minutes) will be deemed a flagrant foul, punishable by one free throw and the ball, plus possible future punishment of the fouling player for repeated violations.

Unfortunately, I am not sure this gets the NBA where it wants to be, because it does nothing to deter Hack-a-Shaq outside the last two minutes of a quarter. Perhaps the league had statistics showing that the strategy was more prevalent in those times. But the rule change does nothing to stop the reductio of the strategy--a January 2016 game in which the Houston Rockets intentionally fouled DeAndre Jordan of the Los Angeles Clippers twelve times in a row (four times, using an end-of-the bench player, to put them in the bonus and eight times to put Jordan on the free throw line) at the beginning of the third quarter. I still believe the better rule would be to give the offense the choice of shooting the free throws or taking the ball out of bounds for off-the-ball fouls. Presumably, teams will choose the latter option for all but their best free throw shooters, thereby eliminating the perverse incentive to intentionally foul, at least away from the ball. But the NBA went a different way, given us temporal, if not complete, relief from this eyesore.

Update: This Deadspin piece makes a fair point: Hack-a-Blank only becomes worthwhile if the hacking team is in the bonus following the fourth foul of the quarter, so that the hacked player would shoot. If a team is otherwise playing good defense and the game is not being called unusually close, that may not happen until 6-8 minutes into the quarter. So the window left for Hack-a-Blank is not the first ten minutes of a quarter, but maybe only a 2-3 minute window before the last two minutes. Teams typically do not do what the Rockets did in the game described above, hacking right from the beginning of the quarter, using an end-of-bench player only to commit a succession of fouls; this is what drew so much attention to that game.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 13, 2016 at 12:34 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, July 12, 2016

Professor Patricia Leary

Inside Higher Ed and ATL report that Patricia Leary of Whittier Law School wrote the now-famous Black Lives Matter letter.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 12, 2016 at 04:14 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (13)

Random free speech stories for a Tuesday

1) It is sad that an even-handed attempt to mourn police and victims of police violence--and thus to show that the problem affects all sides--nevertheless devolves among those who cannot accept the possibility that some police shootings are unjustified, that an antagonistic relationship between law enforcement and those they police cannot hold, or that police conduct is a legitimate subject of public discussion and protest.

2) If this story is even a bit true, I can hear the consent decree language ordering Baton Rouge to establish policies and training regarding "the right to criticize or complain about police conduct without being subject to retaliation" and "the right to engaged in lawful public protest." Part VIII offers a good start, as the same things keep coming up.

3) If Black Lives Matter is responsible for the "horrible" and "divisive" rhetoric of some protesters, then is Donald Trump responsible for the rhetoric of some of his supporters, not to mention himself? And will anyone point that out to Trump? Obviously, Trump is not responsible for his protesters' rhetoric. But then neither is BLM. And Trump cannot have it both ways.

4) The Republican Party apparently still believes it is 1986.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 12, 2016 at 02:06 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, July 11, 2016

FIRE podcast on Nazis in Skokie

The latest edition of FIRE's So to Speak podcast features an interview with Aryeh Neier, who was the ACLU's Executive Director in the late 1970s, when the Nazis marched in Skokie and wrote a book on the controversy. Neier makes an interesting point in the interview--this case is a strong symbolic victory for speech, although not necessarily precedential victory, as the case really ended in the Seventh Circuit. Nevertheless, this case is the reverse slippery slope for free-speech advocates--"If the Nazis can march in Skokie, then ____ is permissible."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 11, 2016 at 09:31 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 09, 2016

Law professor responds to students on "Black Lives Matter" (Updated)

Update, July 10: As noted in the comments, the response states that the professor wore the t-shirt on the day the Crim Pro class discussed police violence against the Black community. But that leads me to a curriculum question: How many of you cover police violence (or, more broadly, Fourth Amendment/excessive force) in crim pro? This seems an odd fit in a course that typically focuses on how police conduct affects subsequent prosecution and the evidence that can be used in that prosecution. I think of excessive force (aside from physically coercing confessions, which has not been BLM's focus) not as a matter of the lawfulness of a search or seizure for evidentiary purposes, but only for subsequent civil damages suits.

Original Post:

This letter by an unknown crim law professor at an unknown law school responding to an anonymous student complaint about the prof wearing a "Black Lives Matter" t-shirt to class is making the rounds and drawing raves in the left-leaning interwebs, as well as Facebook accounts of law profs.

I post it and welcome responses comments. I have not yet figured out what I think.

On one hand, the substantive defense of BLM as a name and a movement is spot-on, especially the idea of focus v. exclusion. So is the defense of the opinion, philosophy, and social context involved in creating, and thus teaching, "law." The student letter is poorly written nonsense, trafficking in "freedom from speech" tropes ("alienates and isolates," etc.).

On the other, the letter comes across as pedantic (especially Part II, where she picks apart the structure of the letter).*

[*] I agree with most of her arguments, especially about the use of CAPS. It is gratuitous in a debate.

I cannot get past wearing a t-shirt (to say nothing of a politically charged one, which seems intentionally provocative) to class.** The professor's argument either means it would be permissible for me to wear a t-shirt with a Confederate flag or an IDF logo to class (a position I doubt the professor would endorse) or that the freedom-of-thought-in-the-classroom ideal is limited only to ideas with which this professor agrees. Finally, I cannot help thinking that something else is going on. Is this really about the t-shirt alone? Is the t-shirt alone the "indoctrination or personal opinions" while the class content was focused on the elements of murder, or whatever? Or is the t-shirt reflective of the broader approach to teaching crim law? This does not make the students' arguments any better, but it would make the stuff about BLM, in the original letter and the response, beside the point.

[**] I have written before aboutpolitical signs and messages in faculty offices, which raises similar issues.

Again, I do not know what I think. But I would like to hear from others.

Update: A commenter notes that the letter identifies one time when the professor wore the shirt "around campus." That being so, I take back all of the above criticism of the professor. The student letter becomes even more inane--the professor wearing that shirt, outside of the classroom, does not impose a personal opinion on them or undermine their learning of the law.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 9, 2016 at 06:59 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (26)

Thursday, July 07, 2016

Your first big news story

OK, here is a fun diversion for early July, started on Twitter:

What's the first major news story you can remember living through as a child?

(Note: This is not necessarily the same as "where were you when" or even the first story you could understand; it is the first story you remember hearing or knowing about, even in simplest terms):

For me, it was Nixon's resignation and the impeachment talk in the month-or-so leading to that.

 

Have at it in comments.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 7, 2016 at 09:20 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (30)

Friday, July 01, 2016

Rotations

Happy July. Happy Canada Day, in honor of Paul, Dan, and our Canadian readership. And happy Fourth of July weekend.

Thanks to our June guests, who may be sticking around for the holiday weekend.

And welcome to our July guests--Jessie Hill (Case Western), Michael Mannheimer (Northern Kentucky), Eric Miller (Loyola LA), Bryce Newell (Tilburg), and Scott Skinner-Thompson (NYU).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 1, 2016 at 09:04 PM in Blogging, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Against "God Bless America" at ballgames

Aside from the atheism, I could not have said this any better and could not agree more.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 1, 2016 at 08:32 PM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, June 30, 2016

Same-sex marriage, religious opt-outs, and constitutional procedure

On Monday, Judge Reeves of the Southern District of Mississippi declared that Mississippi cannot statutorily authorize county clerks to opt-out of issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples based on religious objections to same-sex marriage (the law was enacted soon after, and in response to, Obergefell). But the order was entirely bound-up in the procedure of constitutional litigation, particularly with respect to marriage. Refreshingly, Judge Reeves took his time on the process and got it right.

The plaintiffs challenged the Mississippi law through a motion to amend the existing permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the state's ban on same-sex marriage. Before the court could reach the constitutionality of the new state law it had to determine:

1) It still had jurisdiction to enforce and expand the injunction, because the same issue--the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of a state law seeking to treat same-sex couples differently than opposite couples with respect to marriage licenses--was involved in both the original injunction and the new challenge.

2) The plaintiffs have standing to expand the injunction. This one is trickier, because the named couples have, presumably, gotten their marriage licenses, so they are not injured by the new law. And this is not a class action. The court relied on basic principles that plaintiffs always have a right to protect their final judgment, although the new law does not threaten the injunction as to them. Any uncertainty was resolve by the court's third point--the Campaign for Southern Equality is a plaintiff and it has associational standing to represent any members who want a license in the future and may have it denied pursuant to the new law.

3) The named plaintiffs, and the enjoined persons, are the governor, the AG, and the clerk of one county. The plaintiffs were trying to get the clerks for the other 81 counties in the state to comply with Obergefell. The court recognized that these 81 clerks are not parties and not bound by the injunction. Instead, the court ordered the parties to ensure that these other parties have notice of the injunction and that they are subject to it, presumably by adding them as defendants and/or certifying a defendant class, to whom the injunction can be extended.

4) The injunction would be extended to state that everyone bound by the injunction must issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples on the "same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples." The court took this language from Obergefell to ensure that the Supreme Court decision, which is the law of the land and the law of the circuit, will be enforced. The judiciary, he added, should "remain vigilant whenever a named party to an injunction is accused of circumventing that injunction, directly or indirectly." Without saying so, Judge Reeves capture the departmentalist point--the injunction against specific individuals is necessary to formally bind them to Obergefell. The key is to ensure that all appropriate people are named parties subject to an injunction.

5) The court left it to the parties to figure out how to get notice to the other clerks and to agree on language for the amended permanent injunction.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 30, 2016 at 02:38 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (4)

JOTWELL: Malveaux on Marcus on public interest class actions

The new Courts Law essay comes from Suzette Malveaux (Catholic), reviewing David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action (Geo. L.J.), which considers the special role of the public-interest, equitable-relief class action and how to shield it from the Court's recent narrowing decisions.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 30, 2016 at 02:11 PM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 27, 2016

Veep, S5E10

Sunday's season finale played out the constitutional election/selection/succession contingencies to the last, producing what, in reality, would be a genuine constitutional  and political crisis. And it leaves the show in the position of a genuine reboot when it comes back next season, which presents some interesting possibilities.

We begin before the Senate vote for Vice President, which Tom James expects to win. He and Meyer are negotiating her role in his administration--she wants to be Secretary of State, he presents VP as take-it-or-leave-it. She initially leaves it by telling James she would not be his vice president if there were "a grassy knoll full of Jodie Foster fans" in the front row at the Inauguration (a great line). She relents because she believes it is the only way to continue working with China on freeing Tibet (a possibility set up two weeks ago). The scene where Meyer agrees and James cannot help laughing when he promises her that she will be an involved part of his team is a good commentary on how the vice presidency is perceived.*

[*] Although vice-presidential historian Joel Goldstein (SLU) has argued that this has not been true of the modern vice presidency, at least since Walter Mondale.

The show had been building to this since the end of last season, but, as I argued then, it gets it wrong. Under the 20th Amendment, when the House has not chosen a President, the VP elected by the Senate  "shall act as President until a President shall have qualified." That may happen in two days, when the House holds a new vote and selects a President. Or it may happen in four years, when a new election and Electoral College vote selects a President in the scheduled quadrennial election. But this VP never becomes President, although she exercises the powers of the presidency.** She remains Vice President and cannot appoint a new VP because the vice presidency is not, in fact, vacant. As I said in a comment to last week's post, this person would not be Ford after Nixon resigned, but GHW Bush when Reagan had polyps removed. And no one believed Bush could have appointed a new VP.

[**] With perhaps some informal limits on Supreme Court appointments, as Rob Kar and Jason Mazzone suggest.

The twist in the episode is that James loses the Senate election. Vice President Doyle, mad at Meyer for reneging on her promise to make him Secretary of State, orchestrates a tie in the Senate vote (by appealing to various Senators whom James had angered over the years over judicial holds, earmarks, etc.), which he then breaks to give the Vice Presidency to Laura Montez, O'Brien's running mate. And with it, the acting--not actual--presidency. This was a twist that I certainly did not see coming. Montez then is sworn in, with a huge inauguration attended by two million people. Again, this would not happen because Montez is not, in fact, the 45th President;*** formally, the presidency remains vacant.

[***] A poll discussed in the episode rates Meyer the 43d best President, just behind James Buchanan, who is "credited with causing the Civil War."

I kept waiting for some further twist back, but it never happened. My first thought was that James would go back to the Speaker to hold a new House vote**** (since that was the plot that started all this) and James would try to whip-up votes to get Meyer the win. Of course, O'Brien came closer to winning that Meyer, so it would have required not only moving the three "abstaining" states, but also one other. Then, during a discussion of Montez's Mexican-born husband, I thought it might be revealed that Montez was not a natural-born citizen, and that might blow everything up. But nothing. And that is the plan. Showrunner David Mandel has said that Season Six will focus on Selina's life after the White House, perhaps Catherine, Gary, and Amy, who are with her at the end. No word on whether other regulars from her staff will be back. Meanwhile, the agreement with China on Tibet that Meyer had negotiated is announced during Montez's address and credited to her, with talk of her getting the Nobel Peace Prize that Meyer had been craving (shades of the freeing of the Iranian hostages on January 20, 1981).

[****] A TV in the background at the White House shows a CNN chyron that the Speaker had said he would not hold a new vote. I thought that might be Chekhov's Chyron, but it turned out to be a reminder of the House role in this and a way to stop that piece of the story.

So how did the season "stick the landing" on the constitutional stuff? Not well in the details, although fun in the story. It seriously understates the political and constitutional crisis that would be involved here, producing an unrealistic result. The Twelfth Amendment was intended to prevent this "inversion" of president and vice-president. No way would O'Brien or Meyer accept the result so easily; they would be fighting like crazy for a new House vote. No way would their supporters in the House accept the result so easily. O"Brien's supporters wanted O'Brien as president; Meyer's supporters wanted Meyer; and the ones who broke were willing to go along with James's plan because they liked him better than Meyer, but would not want Montez in the White House. The Speaker could not refuse to hold a new vote if both sides demanded it; the body might remove the Speaker if he were that obstinate.

Finally, no way would the public accept this, certainly not to the tune of two million people wildly celebrating Montez's inauguration (a law the 2009 Obama inauguration)--no Meyer voter would be happy and an O'Brien voter, while perhaps happy that their party was in the White House, voted for O'Brien, not Montez. They, too, would be pushing the House for a new vote. This is exacerbated by the show suggesting that Montez is callow and ill-prepared. So was Meyer. But Montez is thrust into office because of behind-the-scenes political dealings and the refusal of the Speaker of the House to do his job.

And consider some future problems. What happens if there is a Senate tie? Montez remains the vice-president***** who should break the tie, but she is also acting as president, in which role she would sign the bill. [Correction: A commenter points to Art. I, § 3, cl.5, which provides that the President Pro Tempore presides over the Senate "in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States," which seems to capture this situation. So one problem resolved]

[*****] She cannot resign the vice-presidency, since that is the source of her power to act as president.

She presumably will decline to break the tie, as a matter of prudence. But having four years of this strange arrangement is bound to create problems. And what happens in the new House after the mid-Term elections? Might a new Speaker hold a new vote on O'Brien-Meyer, resulting in Meyer coming back to office for two more years, as President, with Montez serving as her VP? That would be a neat plot twist, which the show closed off by talking about Montez as the President; it would take too much exposition to walk it back. Anyway, it is a moot point, since Mandel's plan is to focus on Selina Meyer outside the White House.

All-in-all, I enjoyed the season. And most of the broad strokes of the story worked. They got the details wrong, which is frustrating just because it would have been so easy to correct. Put Jonah in Connecticut instead of New Hampshire and that story works. Talk about divided states rather than abstaining states and that piece works. Have the House holding multiple votes and unable to break the impasse, with no Alexander Hamilton in sight, and that piece works.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 27, 2016 at 05:09 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Culture, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (5)

Friday, June 24, 2016

Whole Women's Health

Three cases remain to be decided this term--Whole Woman's Health, McDonnell v. US, and Voisine v. US. Of these, only WWH seemed even remotely likely to be a 4-4 affirmance. The Court issued two 4-4 affirmances on Thursday, in DAPA and Dollar General. Can we conclude, therefore, that WWH is not going to be a 4-4 affirmance? Is there any reason the Court would issue two divided affirmances today but hold one out until next week?

If not a 4-4 split, the next likely result is a 5-3 opinion declaring the TRAP regulations unconstitutional, with Kennedy joining Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, and Kennedy assigning the opinion. If so, WWH will offer a nice counterpart to Fisher. As Steve pointed outFisher marks the first time Kennedy has declared valid a racial preference. WWH would mark the first time Kennedy has declared invalid a restriction on abortion since he co-authored the joined opinion in Casey.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 24, 2016 at 12:44 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 23, 2016

What now on DAPA?

Today's 4-4 affirmance of the injunction against DAPA leaves things in obvious flux. There are several considerations affecting might happen now--legal, procedural, and political.

Procedurally, the next move is a trial on the merits and, as the trial judge has tipped his hand, likely entry of a permanent injunction. Then we go back up the ladder, presumably back to SCOTUS, by which point it will be back up to a full roster. I have heard suggestions that the government might seek a quick permanent injunction (if a defendant has no new evidence, the court can  convert a preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction without a trial or further hearing) and expedited review to SCOTUS. Given my long-standing position that there will not be a ninth Justice until the start of OT 2017*, I am not sure this will achieve anything, until the hope is that SCOTUS would stay the permanent injunction pending review (which, of course, does nothing about the preliminary injunction that remains in place until final judgment).

[*] Assuming, of course, that a Republican Senate does not continue to refuse to allow an appointment because, even though the people have spoken, the real governing principle is that Democratic presidents do not get to make Supreme Court appointments.

Legally, the United States could attempt to apply DAPA outside of the eight states that brought this suit. Although the district court purported to issue a nationwide injunction, I do not believe a district court has that power. The United States is enjoined from enforcing DAPA only as to the plaintiff states, and no one else is protected by the injunction;** this was not a class action and there is nothing that legally makes this relief indivisible. The precedential force of the constitutional analysis supporting the injunction is limited to the Fifth Circuit. And SCOTUS's affirmance of that analysis does not create binding precedent. So nothing in the Constitution or any court order prohibits the United States from enforcing DAPA in, for example, California, especially if California does not object.

[**] For much the same reason that Obergefell did not, of its own force, require Texas to issue marriage licenses, a position Texas happily adopted a year ago.

Politically, I do not see this happening.  It would take too long to explain to the public concepts such as scope of an injunction, regional precedent, and non-precedential SCOTUS affirmances. Instead, this would play in the public as the administration ignoring a court order, one seemingly emanating (or at least endorsed by) SCOTUS. [Update: I imagine the government also wants to avoid a situation in which it enforces the immigration laws differently in 42 states than it does in the other eight.]

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 23, 2016 at 02:17 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

Tuesday, June 21, 2016

O.J. and Rodney King

I hope people have had a chance to watch O.J.: Made in America, the spectacular five-part ESPN documentary that traces O.J.'s life from his college career to his current incarceration, while weaving his story into the story of racial bias in society and the LAPD and O.J.'s lifelong efforts to "rise above" race (the telling line is "I'm not Black, I'm O.J."). The film links O.J.'s acquittal (by a largely Black jury) to the acquittal of the officers who beat Rodney King (by an all-white jury). On this telling, O.J.'s acquittal was "revenge" for the officers' acquittal, the long-awaited chance for an African-American to benefit from mistakes in the system. One juror explicitly acknowledges this as her reason for voting to acquit.

But the film (and every conversation about the connection) omits something: Two of the officers in the King beating were convicted of federal civil rights violations and sentenced to 30 months in prison (the other two were charged and acquitted). So if justice means that a wrongdoer is convicted and punished under some criminal law for his misconduct, there was some justice in that case. It may not have been enough justice or the right kind of justice. Thirty months was arguably too short (the court departed downward from an expected Guidelines range of 70-87 months). Perhaps it somehow would have been "more just" for them to be convicted of assault, etc., in state court rather than civil rights violations in federal court. Indeed,  that might prove the point. Congress enacted the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes because the states were incapable and/or unwilling to enforce the rights of African-Americans against whites and white public officials. Having to resort to those in 1992 demonstrated how far we had not come.* Some had a sense that the civil rights charges were illegitimate, more a result of the rioting that followed the state-court acquittals (which the Koon Court took time to call out) than legitimate prosecutorial decisionmaking or use of federal criminal law.

 [*] And still have not come, where police-abuse cases now do not even make it past a grand jury and even the civil rights backstop is increasingly unavailable.

It seems too simple to say "Stacey Koon, et. al, got off, so O.J. should have gotten off." Because Koon and Powell did not get off, at least not entirely. By contrast, two people who had nothing to do with anything were dead in a horrific manner (I had never seen the photos of the bodies or the crime scene--they were stunning) and, on the definition above, they did not receive justice.**

[**] I bracket for the moment how we consider, in terms of assessing "justice," the civil verdict that necessarily included a jury finding that Simpson killed Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman but that did not impose criminal punishment, or the absurdly long sentence Simpson received in 2008 for the events in Nevada, which everyone sees as having impermissibily taken the murders into account. In one interview segment, attorney Carl Douglas points out that the Nevada judge held the jury until late into the evening to announce the verdict on the thirteenth anniversary of the murder acquittal and sentenced Simpson to 33 years, matching the $ 33 million in damages awarded in the civil case.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 21, 2016 at 09:31 AM in Criminal Law, Culture, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, June 20, 2016

More on RJR Nabisco and extraterritoriality

Following on Andra's post on RJR Nabisco:

It makes no sense for a statute's private right of action not to be coextensive with the substantive law being applied. Ginsburg is correct that there should be a link, not separation, between prohibited activities and authorized remedies. At the very least, that should be the presumption, unless Congress provides otherwise in the cause of action itself. And a statute that says "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of some substantive law--where that substantive law has been (and, per Congress, can be) violated by that extraterritorial conduct--should allow for a claim for extraterritorial violation. By applying the presumption of extraterritoriality to the cause of action, the Court now requires Congress to draft the cause of action not only to link the right of action to the substantive law being enforced, but also to include language dealing with extraterritoriality. For example, I presume this case now means that, even if the Fourteenth Amendment applies extraterritorially, a § 1983 claim will not lie for such a violation, since nothing in the statute speaks to extraterritoriality (indeed, the purpose of that statute was bringing states into line within their own borders following the Civil War and has nothing to do with foreign conduct).

The culprit in this is Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (2013), where the Court applied the presumption of extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute, a purely jurisdictional provision. But the ATS is unique in that it grants not only adjudicative jurisdiction, but also prescriptive jurisdiction to create federal common law based on the law of nations as of 1789 and its analogues; the question in Kiobel was whether the grant of prescriptive jurisdiction could include common law applying extraterritorially. In other words, the courts were not only creating the right of action, they also were creating the law that "directly regulate[s] conduct or afford[s] relief." The end result in Kiobel is that the substantive common law the courts could create did not reach extraterritorial conduct (because Congress did not grant the courts the power to establish such common law), so neither could the court-created right of action.

Under RICO, however, the law regulating conduct does apply to extraterritorial conduct, per Congress. The right of action should, as well.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 20, 2016 at 05:16 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

12 years a President?

Following up on my discussion of Veep's penultimate episode and Tom James occupying the White House for twelve years: I asked Brian Kalt (MSU), who wrote the book Constitutional Cliffhangers, which explored various gaps in the constitutional provisions on presidential selection. He wrote the following (reposted here with his permission):

On the question of whether acting as president for four years should count, it does seem right textually. As such, I think it provides one of the strongest tests I can imagine of a person’s commitment to textualism, because it is so much at odds with the purpose of the 22nd Amendment. As with the question of whether there is a distinction between being eligible to be elected president and being eligible to serve at all, the legislative history tells us that the drafters intentionally sacrificed precision and broad coverage on the altar of supposedly simple language.

Following the path I take in my book, I would dodge the question somewhat by focusing on the practical side—positing that it is very unlikely that such a person would be able to get the people to elect him two more times. Conversely, if he did manage to get the people to elect him two more times, it would be hard for the courts or Congress to deny him his prize.

Brian described evolution of the language of the 22d Amendment, where a desire for simplicity of language collided with a desire to count at least some portion of another person's term toward the term, leading to a an unintended hole.

First, the version introduced in the House said that no one: “shall be chosen or serve as President of the United States for any term, or be eligible to hold the office of President during any term, if such person shall have heretofore served as President during the whole or any part of each of any two separate terms.”

The version that passed the House had the same effect, but was more concise: “Any person who has served as President of the United States during all, or portions, of any two terms, shall thereafter be ineligible to hold the office of President.”

The Senate Judiciary Committee loosened the restraints a bit in terms of timing (one day would not count; it had to be a year) but still did not limit it to terms to which someone else had been elected: “A person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, on three hundred and sixty-five calendar days or more in each of two terms shall not be eligible to hold the office of President, or to act as President, for any part of another term.”

Senator Magnuson was the great advocate of simplicity. He also did not want to count any partial terms. To him, then, the Veep character’s position would be just fine. His language was: “No person shall be elected to the office of President more than twice.”

The Senate’s final text (to which the House agreed) accepted Magnuson’s simplification of the “eliminated from what?” language, which was the basis of the discussion here a little while back on whether two-termers can serve as President even though they cannot be elected. But on the other part of the amendment, the “eliminated based on what?” language, the Senate was not willing to fail to count unelected service. When they restored language to count unelected service, though, they used the infelicitous phrasing that we are now discussing: “or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President.” They could have just eliminated everything after “term” and avoided our current dilemma.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 20, 2016 at 09:34 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Culture, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Veep, S5E9

We finally get to the House election, but the episode is shown through the documentary (Kissing Your Sister: The Story of a Tie) that Selina's daughter, Catherine, has been working on all season. It is a nice change of pace. It gives us scenes we already have seen in real time during the season, but from the different perspective of Catherine's hand-held camera. It also shows the background events for things we have seen on the show. For humor, we see the background shots of Jonah (unsuccessfully) chopping wood for his campaign commercial. We see into the personal lives of the staffers--Amy's attempts to get together with Dan, Kent's membership in a Spanish-speaking motorcycle gang, Mike's shifting preparations for the coming babies. And we see Selina's verbal revenge against Amy for her outburst last season.

For plot, Catherine catches the lobbyist and Speaker of the House walking into Tom James' office announcing "future calling;" this lead to the dinner at the Mongolian Barbecue that we saw live a few weeks ago. We also see Catherine's interview with Bill Ericsson, the former staffer who took the fall and went to jail last season for the Meyer Campaign's illegal activities; he says that if he were James, he would try to get three states to abstain to send it to the Senate. We know Ericsson got his conviction overturned on appeal (he was running the Widow Sherman's campaign in New Hampshire), so now we can wonder if James or the lobbyist helped Ericsson to get out of jail.

The show went with Ericsson's plan, hinted at the end of last season--the final House vote is O'Brien 25, Meyer 22, 3 abstentions (Missouri, Vermont, and a third state we never saw). The Speaker adjourns the House. And the implication is that the Senate will elect James as VP and he will become President next week, because "a President shall not have been chosen."

Selina made one Hail Mary, trying to get Jonah to switch New Hampshire's vote to O'Brien. If O'Brien won, she could run against him in four years, but if James won, she would have to wait eight years, at which point she would be too old. Unfortunately, Jonah did not get the word in time (he was late for the vote because he spent the night with a high school senior/congressional groupie, then could not find the House chamber). After the session ends, he tries to change his vote, announcing "The Gentleman from New Hampshire puts forth on the floor a do-over."

So how did the show do on the Constitution and the electoral process? Not well--yes, I know it is a TV show and a great one; it just does not pass the Con Law exam).

• They got the dates wrong. The House election is taking place on January 3d and we see a flashback to Jonah's swearing in the day before (right before hooking up with the groupie). But under § 2 of the Twentieth Amendment, the new House convenes on January 3. And under 3 U.S.C. § 15, the House does not open and count the Electoral College votes until 1 p.m. on January 6. And the House cannot hold an election until it actually counts the electoral votes and determines that there is, in fact, a tie (what if there had been that faithless elector?).

• I am trying to figure out why three was the magic number of abstentions for denying a majority. There does not seem anything significant about that number. Also, no states had evenly divided delegations, which seems unlikely as a practical matter, given the number of states with even-numbered House caucuses (including New Hampshire, more on that below).

• On that point: I cannot find the answer to this question and do not feel like researching it at midnight: Are abstentions treated the same as divided caucuses? Or is divided caucus a vote for neither candidate, while an abstention is a non-vote? And does the Twelfth Amendment require a majority of all states or all states that case votes, with abstentions being non-votes that reduce the denominator? History is ambiguous. In 1800, all the representatives in Delaware (1) and South Carolina (4) abstained on the 36th ballot. Jefferson already had won 10 states, so he had the election anyway. But it is not clear whether his majority was out of 16 (total states) or 14 (states casting votes, since Delaware and South Carolina abstained because each of their members abstained)? Were the abstentions from those two states the same as, say, Maryland's earlier non-committal vote when the caucus split between Burr and Jefferson?

In the Veep-iverse, this matters for two reasons. If they are the same, James did not have to necessarily plot to get states to abstain, he could have just counted the votes and seen that there were a sufficient number of evenly divided even-numbered caucuses. If they are different, then O'Brien won the election, because the three abstention reduce the denominator to 47 (states voting), so O'Brien's 25 votes constituted a majority of that.

[Update: A participant in the Con Law Prof listserv offers the right way of looking at this: If every member of the caucus abstains, then the vote from the state is 0-0-X; this is an evenly divided caucus, just as much as a 1-1-1 caucus would be. So there are no non-votes, which means the denominator must be 50. But then we go back to James not needing states to abstain, but simply be divided, whether through true division or through strategic abstentions by individual members in a state that create a tie (we thought that is what he was doing two weeks ago in getting the seventh member of Colorado's caucus to abstain, producing a 3-3-1 division). So the show seems to err again, confusing abstentions by states with abstention by individual members that tilt the balance one way or another.]

• The House adjourns with no announcement or plans for another vote. Of course, in 1801 the House immediately dove into additional votes over the course of that day and the following days and weeks. Catherine's movie catches a snippet of a conversation in which Selina and one of her staffers mention that James likely got the Speaker to agree not to hold additional votes once the first produced no winner. But would the members of the House, especially those who support O'Brien (and thus are politically opposed to James), tolerate that? Would the public? Yes, James is popular and competent. But it seems too pat.

• Jonah, of course, makes a fool of himself. But the problem of placing him in New Hampshire arose again. New Hampshire has two representatives, so Jonah does not exclusively control the caucus vote. New Hampshire only voted for Meyer because the other New Hampshire representative also voted for Meyer.  So, again, Jonah was not necessary. More importantly, Jonah could not unilaterally switch the state's vote; switching his vote, assuming his colleague did not switch (and Jonah never had a chance to talk to him), would only render New Hampshire a split caucus going for no one, denying both candidates the possibility of a majority (unless abstentions do not count as votes).

• The show got its numbers wrong, at least for purposes of season-long consistency. The idea was that Jonah would cast the vote that would give Selina New Hampshire and the presidency. Put aside that NH could not play that role. It only works if NH would be the 26th state for Meyer. But the final vote with NH going for Selina, was 25-22-3. Even if all three abstentions would have been Meyer states, that still would not produce a victory for her.

• The show is setting up a Tom James presidency, continuing to ignore that James is not becoming President, he is only becoming acting President. Put differently, he does not hold the office of President, he only exercises those powers. The 22d Amendment expressly draws that distinction, as does the presidential succession statute. Even if it lasts four years, he still only acts as president during a period in which no President has been chosen. Neither the Constitution nor § 19 places a limit on the period in which someone can act as president or a limit on how long the period of non-qualification can last.

What the Speaker is allowing to happen is inconsistent with the purpose of the Twelfth Amendment. The amendment was motivated, in part, by the risk of "inversion," in which a party's preferred candidate for Vice President would win the House election and become President, against the preferences of the party and perhaps the public. The Federalists who voted for Burr did so because they hated Jefferson, but also because they knew it would mess with the Democratic-Republican plans to have Jefferson as President and Burr as VP. The Speaker is allowing the very inversion the amendment was designed to prohibit. Again, because James is so popular and so competent, the public in the Veep-iverse is okay with it, as he will get things done. Thinking about it, however, it starts to sound like a coup--the VP is conspiring with the Speaker to prevent a vote for the presidency, allowing him to exercise those powers for an entire four-year term. I think there would be strong opposition. And I also would expect both Meyer and O'Brien to lobby House members from their respective parties to force a vote--perhaps on bipartisan threat of removing the Speaker if he does not continue holding elections. Again, too pat.

Since the show is coming back for another season, it must be setting up what it hinted at in last season's finale--James nominating Meyer as his vice president, so next season she will be back where she started--doing nothing and waiting for the President to call.  Too bad that is a constitutional impossibility.

• And now for the big mistake (ed: Maybe). Selina explains to Amy her plan to have Jonah switch so she could run against O'Brien in four years, whereas if James is made (acting) President, he would serve for eight years. Amy corrects her--"Twelve, ma'am. Tom's first term won't count because technically he'll be an elevated Vice President." My initial reaction was this is unforgivably wrong and I cannot believe they missed that badly, even if only as a piece of exposition. The Twenty-second Amendment makes clear that someone who has acted as president for more than two years of someone else's term can only be elected President once. Since James will act as president  for four years (we presume, because the Speaker is blocking a vote), he could be elected once for four more years, but not a second time.

But then someone pointed out that the 22d Amendment says "held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President." (emphasis mine). The argument is that James is not acting in a term to which someone else was elected; he is acting because no one was elected. Textually that seems right. And it cannot be excused as drafting for an unforeseen situation, since the 12th and 20th Amendments both contemplated a VP acting as president for some period of time if the House failed to elect a President. So if they intended to include that in the 10-year limit, the drafters of the 22d should have accounted for that. Amy's exposition ("he'll be an elevated Vice President") is still wrong, but the substance is right.

But this reading is so inconsistent with the purpose of all three amendments related to a House election and presidential succession that it cannot be right. The 22d was intended to limit the number of years anyone can exercise executive power. And it would incentivize the very manipulations we see here, both in the Electoral College and in any House contingency election. And those incentives would not be limited to the VP-elect. If the House cannot pick a President and the Senate cannot pick a VP, the Speaker would act as president under § 19(a). So imagine the plots that could be hatched.

• The process the show followed for the House election is interesting. One member from each state, in alphabetical order, cast the entire state's vote publicly, presumably with individual votes having been taken in secret and within each caucus. In both 1800 and 1824, however, individual votes were recorded and each state's ballot was written and sealed. The procedures for the House vote are left to the House and changeable for each election, so nothing is set in stone. Lawrence Tribe wrote a nice essay on the process prior to the 1980 election, when it seemed possible that independent John Anderson might win some electoral votes, perhaps enough to deprive Reagan or Carter of a majority and throw the election into the House (spoiler: He didn't).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 20, 2016 at 08:19 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Culture, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, June 13, 2016

Veep, S5E8

So the pieces are beginning to come together as we move into the final two episodes, which apparently will involve the actual House election (where find out if there is, indeed, an Electoral College tie) and the inauguration of someone.

Jonah wins the New Hampshire special election, which is revealed to be an election to replace a representative-elect, stating that Jonah will be sworn with the rest of the House at the beginning of January. He wins in typical Jonah fashion--after he shoots himself in the foot, his opponent (the widow of the former representative and Jonah's former grade-school teacher) is quoted telling Jonah he needs to be more careful because guns can be dangerous; that last part is seized by the NRA, which undertakes a massive campaign to defeat her. So Jonah wins and promises to cast the vote that delivers Meyer the presidency.

While I like the story, let me lay out why the math does not work for the plot device of Jonah casting the deciding vote as a representative from New Hampshire. Meyer needs 26 state delegations to win. Let's say she has 25 states and the idea is that NH will be 26, with Jonah voting for her. NH has two representatives, so the  delegation voting in January will consist of Ryan and Rep. X. If Rep. X supports O'Brien, Jonah's vote creates a divided delegation and does not provide the 26th state. It keeps NH away from O'Brien, but taking a state away from O'Brien does not give it to Meyer, leaving her with 25, not the required majority. If Rep. X supports Meyer, then she alone could have given the state to Meyer; there was no need to rush the special election or to get a supporter into office by January, as Meyer and her team wanted. The only possibility is that Rep. X plans to abstain, so Jonah's vote moves NH from a non-commitment to Meyer's 26th state. But that seems an odd plot move, one the writers have not set up or even telegraphed over the season, although maybe they will next week.

[Update: Upon further consideration, even that last one does not work. If Rep. X, as the lone member of the NH delegation had abstained, then the vote from NH would not have been a non-commitment, it would have been an abstention; that would drop the denominator to 49, meaning Meyer's 25 states constitute a majority. So Meyer would have a majority regardless of whether Jonah is in the House.]

By the way, the constitutional problem with the plot is not making Jonah the deciding vote (which is a cute move, given everything we know about Jonah and how the Meyer people feel about him), but putting Jonah in New Hampshire, a state with an even-numbered delegation, as the deciding vote. If you like New England, put him in Massachusetts (9 representatives), Connecticut (5), or even Vermont (a single at-large rep [update: Although, again, see above]) and the story makes constitutional sense.

I suppose another possibility is that Jonah renegs on voting for Meyer, denying her the majority and setting up a House stalemate and clearing the way for Tom James. But, again, James still only acts as president, so that hole remains.

Meyer at one point is nonchalant about losing benefits to Ohio and North Carolina from the agreement with China, in part because Jonah appeared poised to win New Hampshire. But that, too, is inconsistent with the requirement of a House majority--Meyer needs all the states she can get. Unless she is trading NH for OH and NC, which really makes no sense--why give up two states that take you past the bare majority?

I am looking forward to seeing how the writers play this out.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 13, 2016 at 12:52 AM in Culture, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, June 09, 2016

The science and linguistics of profanity

From the latest Slate Lexicon Valley. I especially liked the four division of four categories of profanity--blasphemy, sex, bodily excretions, and slurs (or, as the author calls it, "Holy shit! Fuck! N****r!"*)--and the way different linguistic cultures accept or reject any of them.

[*] Yes, I recognize the sad irony of not using the word in a post about words. I don't need the headache.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 9, 2016 at 01:31 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Permanent injunctions and no mootness in marriage equality litigation

I missed this yesterday, but Judge Granade entered a permanent injunction in Strawser v. Strange. She rejected the state's argument that the case was moot in light of Obergefell, pointing to the suspended Roy Moore and the Supreme Court of Alabama's refusal to vacate its March 2015 Mandamus and that court's continued criticism of Obergefell as demonstrating that the state officials cannot show that enforcement of the marriage ban is certain not to occur. That the court (including whoever is Chief and serving as the administrative supervisor of the state judiciary ) is especially salient in Alabama, where judicial-branch officials are charged with issuing marriage licenses.

Judge Granade's order follows on the heels (and relies on) a similar permanent injunction in Brenner v. Scott in Florida back in March (sorry to have missed it at the time). The court in Brenner was even more dismissive of the state's mootness arguments. The court pointed to the state's refusal to immediately comply with earlier orders, the legislature's failure to repeal or amend the ban on same-sex marriages and other laws affected by that ban, and requests of state officials to "clarify" the scope of the injunction on other issues that turn on recognition of same-sex marriage. For example, the State Surgeon General asked for clarification whether, under Obergefell and the injunction, they must identify a female non-biological parent on a birth certificate, even though the document says "father;" the judge insisted the answer should be easy (same-sex couples must be treated the same as opposite couples in all respects) and the request itself showed that the defendants have not "unambiguously terminated their illegal practices." These courts join the Eighth Circuit in rejecting the argument that officials' agreement to comply with Obergefell, without more, moots unrelated cases involving different parties and different laws.

There is a procedural morass here that makes this a lot more complicated and that I need to think through further.

On the one hand, SCOTUS precedent should not moot an unrelated case, given the general rule that voluntary cessation does not moot and especially given my departmentalist model in which state officials have no constitutional obligation to follow SCOTUS (or any other) precedent outside of a judgment against them as to particular parties. That keeps the controversy alive, since every new request for a license is a new controversy beyond the scope of any existing court order. That state officials are not rushing to apply Obergefell to new settings is a product of Obergefell not extending that far.

On the other hand, the limited scope of most injunctions (including the injunction in Brenner, although not Strawser, given the class certification) should make a permanent injunction inappropriate once the named plaintiffs received their marriage licenses on the strength of the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs got what they wanted and the defendants gave the plaintiffs what they were entitled to, so there is nothing more for the court order to do as to these parties. Everything else is for further state compliance with respect to people and issues not before the court and, if necessary, further litigation and a new injunction involving those new parties and new issues. For example, Brenner recognized that the birth-certificate issue is "not well presented in this case," since none of the plaintiffs seeks a birth certificate; there are two separate lawsuits by unrelated parties against the Surgeon General for refusal to issue such certificates. And if those statutes are constitutionally invalid (as they assuredly are under Obergefell), then state officials will be enjoined from enforcing those laws as to those plaintiffs. But that should not provide a basis for the type of free-standing injunction against taking any "steps to enforce or apply" Florida's prohibition on same-sex marriage, unconnected to context or party, in a case in which the plaintiffs only sought marriage licenses.

Finally, an interesting side note: I found the Strawser order on the website for Americans United for Separate of Church and States, which is undertaking representation of couples seeking marriage licenses in Alabama (and presumably elsewhere), since the refusals are now grounded in officials' religious objections to performing this function. It is interesting how the constitutional valance of marriage equality, and thus of the advocacy groups involved, has shifted.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 9, 2016 at 09:35 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 08, 2016

Stern on liberals, sexual violence, and the justice system

I was going to write something about the misguided effort by California voters to attempt to recall Judge Aaron Persky in response to his  light sentence on convicted sexual assaulter Brock Turner, arguing that anyone supporting such efforts cannot complain when state judges are removed or non-retained in response to, for example, pro-LGBTQ rulings (e.g., three members of the Supreme Court of Iowa in 2010). But Mark Joseph Stern at Slate (whose work I generally do not like), beat me to it. He ties the recall petition to a host of issues in which progressive commitment to due process, basic defendant rights, and judicial independence have run aground in cases of sexual violence, with the ordinarily progressive position abandoned; these include victim-impact statements, propensity evidence in sexual-violence cases,  the right to confront witnesses, and general abandonment of due process in campus sexual assault.

To further illustrate the shifting locus: During lunch when I was interviewing at one law school, the subject turned to summer public-interest scholarships (small-money grants for students working public-interest summer jobs). The faculty member at the table said the grants were available for students working at the public defender's, but not to students in prosecutors' offices, which did not qualify as "public interest." That is, unless they were prosecuting domestic violence and sexual assault.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 8, 2016 at 04:38 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Criminal Law, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (7)

Monday, June 06, 2016

Veep, S5E7

It is mid-December and time for the White House Christmas party with members of Congress. And we learn what Tom James was up to in meeting with the Speaker at the end of last week and during the party this week:

James is lobbying individual House members to abstain in order to create tie delegations, denying any candidate a majority. He is then counting on winning the Senate vice-presidential vote (which is by individual, not state) and, when the House vote produces a tie fails to produce a winner,* becoming acting president when no one has qualified to be President. We particularly see the fight over two members of Congress--1) Rep. Nickerson from Colorado, who's initial agreement to vote for Meyer gives her that delegation 4-3, but whose sudden abstention makes it a tie; 2) Rep. Yeager (state not mentioned that I heard), who similarly decides to abstain, denying his state delegation to Meyer. The situation is resolved by 1) Meyer and James having sex and 2) Meyer, seemingly emboldened, threatening Nickerson (in especially colorful language) and blackmailing Yeager (who was at the party with his young female "staffer") to return to supporting her. We will see if it holds up.

[*] It is not about a tie, as the show keeps saying, but about a majority. If Selina wins 25 delegations, O'Brien wins 20, and five are deadlocked, the vote is not tied, although it does not produce a winner.

The problem with James' plan remains what I argued when they began this story line at the end of last season: Under the Twelfth Amendment as modified by the Twentieth Amendment, the plan only results in James acting as president until a president (either O'Brien or Meyer) qualifies, not becoming a president. Someone could act as president for a full four-year term, but it would be an inherently unstable situation, ending at any moment that a later House vote produces a majority and a winner who qualifies as President. James also would not have an inauguration, would not appoint a new Vice President under the Twenty-fifth Amendment, and would not be listed in the line of Presidents. Would James want that position and hope it holds up for four years? Would his apparent popularity allow him to retain public support through that instability?

The show reminds us of the magic number for Meyer: 26, a majority of state delegations. Also, note that we still do not actually know if there is an electoral tie, since we still are in December and the votes will not be counted until January 6. The show could be waiting to play the faithless-elector card as late-season trump.

Update: This review of the episode proposes a fun third wrinkle: What if, while James is trying to screw Meyer by denying her a House majority, Sidney Purcell and the Speaker (the two people James met with last week) are going to screw James by denying him a Senate majority? The Twentieth Amendment gives Congress the power to provide for the failure of both the House and Senate to pick someone; that statute provides that when there is neither a President nor a Vice President for any reason (as would be the case at noon on January 20 if both the House and Senate fail to produce majorities, so that no one has qualified for the office) the acting president is . . . the Speaker of the House. That would be a legally/constitutionally accurate twist that would fit the show's screw-your-neighbor political ethos.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 6, 2016 at 12:01 AM in Culture, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, June 04, 2016

Muhammad Ali and the Law

Some law-related thoughts following the death of Muhammad Ali.

Ali's direct contribution to U.S. law is the Supreme Court decision (in a case captioned Cassius Marsellus CLAY, Jr. also known as Muhammad Ali) reversing his conviction for refusing Army induction. It was a per curiam opinion, decided on fairly narrow grounds, so nothing that would become canon or significant precedent. Ali had sought a conscientious-objection exemption, which at the time required that the person have a sincere, religiously grounded objection to war in any form. Although a hearing officer found all three elements satisfied and recommended to the Appeal Board that his status be recognized, the Department of Justice wrote a letter to the Board recommending rejection of status, based on DOJ's purported findings that Ali failed to satisfy any of the three elements. The Appeal Board denied c/o status, disregarding the hearing officer's recommendation and without explanation, although the only other available basis was the DOJ letter. Before the Court, however, the government conceded that Ali's objection was sincere and religiously based. That brought the case within precedent holding that when the basis for a selection-service (or any other government) decision is uncertain but some possible bases are unlawful or erroneous, the entire decision must be vitiated. Rather than speculating whether the Board might have relied on the one remaining basis (the objection not being to war in any form), the Court rejected the Board's decision in toto and reversed the conviction. Justice Douglas concurred; he argued that the evidence showed Ali objected to all but Islamic war against nonbelievers, a "matter of conscience protected by the First Amendment which Congress has no power to qualify or dilute" by limiting c/o status only to those who object to all war in all forms. Justice Harlan concurred in the result, concluding that the DOJ letter could be read as claiming that Ali's assertion of C/O status was untimely, an error that called for reversal under the same line of cases as the majority relied on. The inside-the-Court workings leading to the decision were the subject of the otherwise-silly Muhammad Ali's Greatest Fight.

Ali is lionized for this stand, often through the modern laments about professional athletes refusing to take political stands or become politically involved the way Muhammad Ali did. But this has always seemed unfair. Ali was not lionized at the time. His actions were unpopular with the press and much of "mainstream" America (which did not like Ali to begin with, regarding him as an uppity loudmouth). The exception was African-Americans and young anti-war activists on college campuses. He was stripped of the heavyweight title and denied a license to fight in any state, most importantly New York (Madison Square Garden remained the center of the boxing world), costing him 3 1/2 years at the prime of his career. Although ultimately vindicated by SCOTUS, it came at tremendous cost to his career. Modern athletes asked to take political stands almost certainly do not face similar exile from their sports. But to normalize Ali* as the expectation for high-profile athletes seems unfair, a burden we do not place on other people, even other famous people, anywhere else in society.

[*] The other person forwarded as the aspiration is Jackie Robinson. But Robinson was somewhat forced to take a stand by circumstance--being the first African-American player in modern baseball made him inherently political. And the abuse Robinson took no doubt took a psychological and physical toll that contributed to him dying at age 53.

Update: Case in point from the Daily News, extolling Ali for "offer[ing] a roadmap for today’s athlete to be an activist," while 1) eliding that in 1967, this columnist almost certainly would have been lining up to excoriate Ali for talking to much and dodging the draft, and 2) perpetuating the idea that the only true activist is the one who sacrifices millions of dollars and the prime of his career, something we ask of no one else.  The Big Lead provides a good critique. At the same time, it understates the point in saying "[t]here are few, if any, athletes who can match Ali’s legacy fighting for social issues. That’s what made him such an important figure." Ali's legacy is, in part, a unique product of circumstances and initially unlawful action by the United States. That is why no one can match it.

Further Update: This Slate piece goes into detail on a lot of these themes, including more background on DOJ's efforts to influence the Appeal Board and on the prosecution, which were influenced by congressional and administration pressure.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 4, 2016 at 06:16 PM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 03, 2016

Exclusive Submissions: FSU Law Review

The Florida State University Law Review will be conducting exclusive article reviews over the next few weeks. Any article submitted to the Law Review between now and June 15th will be evaluated for publication purposes by June 22nd.  By submitting an article the author agrees to immediately accept a publication offer with the Review should one be extended.  The author is not required to withdraw any article previously or contemporaneously submitted for consideration elsewhere.  However, the author may not accept an offer of publication from another journal  for any article submitted to the Law Review’s exclusive review process unless the Review indicates that the submitted article will not receive a publication offer. Author requests to further expedite the exclusive review process will be accommodated to the extent practicable. Any articles accepted through this exclusive review process will be published in the Review's third and fourth issues, which are slated for publication in summer of 2017.  

If you have an article you would like to submit, please e-mail Jazz Tomassetti a copy of the article and your CV at  jazztomassetti@gmail.com with the subject line "Exclusive Article Review." We look forward to reading your submissions.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 3, 2016 at 01:29 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (1)