Thursday, July 31, 2014

SEALS

For everyone headed to SEALS on Amelia Island beginning Friday, a reminder of two upcoming events (in addition to everything on the Program):

The first MarkelFest!, co-sponsored by PrawfsBlawg and CoOp, on Saturday, August 2, from 8:30-? in the Seaglass Lounge (located directly off the lobby of the Omni). Beer and other drinks are $ 1 off and lounge food is on the menu. Come continue Dan's tradition of blog-sponsored conference gatherings.

Florida State College of Law will sponsor a formal memorial for Dan on Monday August 4, from 6:15-7:15 in Magnolia D. Approximately 50 people already have expressed  interest in attending and/or speaking; Wayne Logan (FSU) will be reaching out with more details. If you have not responded and are interested in attending, please fill out this form.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 31, 2014 at 12:01 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 28, 2014

Bay Area Memorial

Jonathan Simon, Malcolm Feeley, and Ashley Rubin have organized a small Bay Area gathering for Dan's friends at 4:30 p.m., this Wednesday, July 30, at Berkeley Law. You can email Jonathan (jsimon@law.berkeley.edu) or Malcolm (mfeeley@law.berkeley.edu) for more details.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 28, 2014 at 05:28 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (2)

First MarkelFest! at SEALS

The first MarkelFest! will be at SEALS this Saturday, August 2, from 8:30-?, in Seaglass Lounge at the Omni Amelia Island Plantation. Drinks and lounge food are available. Continuing Dan's tradition of blog-sponsored conference get-togethers and now under a new moniker, this is co-sponsored by PrawfsBlawg and Concurring Opinions. Seaglass is located directly off the lobby of the hotel.

Come remember Dan with your best tales and stories and continue his beloved tradition of blog-sponsored gatherings. Hope to see everyone there.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 28, 2014 at 04:30 PM in Blogging, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

FSU Memoral at SEALS

Florida State will sponsor a formal memorial program on Monday August 4, from 6:15-7:15 in Magnolia D. Approximately 50 people already have expressed  interest in attending and/or speaking; Wayne Logan (FSU) will be reaching out with more details. If you have not responded and are interested in attending, please fill out this form.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 28, 2014 at 04:28 PM in Blogging, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

Memorials for Dan Markel (Updated)

So much outpouring of affection for our friend.

1) At Brooklyn Law School as we speak (it began around 5:30). It is on the 22d floor of Feil Hall, 205 State Street (building # 3 on this map). Sorry for the late notice; get there if you can.

2) Correction: The informal gathering at Harvard Hillel happened on Wednesday (yesterday). aplogies for the confusion. You can email Jill Goldenziel at "Jill underscore Goldenziel at hks dot harvard dot edu" for further information. Apparently, HLS Dean Martha Minow and the director of Hillel both indicated a desire to do something more formal in the future. Stay tuned.

3) Funeral and shiva in Toronto on Thursday. You can email any of the perma-Prawfs for more details and information on these events and on memorial tributes.

4) Florida State will sponsor a memorial at the upcoming SEALS Conference at Amelia Island on Monday August 4 from 6:15-7:15, right after a discussion group in which Dan was to participate. Precise location will be announced soon. If you plan to attend, please fill out this form.

5) Also at SEALS, will be the first-ever MarkelFest! on Saturday evening, August 2 (Time and Location T/B/D). As you know, blog-sponsored happy hours have been a regular feature at the major prawf conferences, thanks to Dan's energy and organizational skills. Steve Vladeck suggested that all such gatherings should henceforth be known as MarkelFest!(s) and we agreed.

6) Law and Society's Collaborative Research Network # 27 (Punishment and Social Control), will host a panel in Dan's memory on retribution at the 2015 Law & Society Association Annual Meeting in Seattle, May 28-31, 2015. Regular Guestprawf Hadar Aviram is co-chairing the group. Anyone whose work corresponds with Dan's or retributivism and is interested in participating on that panel can send an abstract to Hadar.

We will post information about other local gatherings and memorial efforts as we receive them.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 22, 2014 at 05:53 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 19, 2014

Chokeholds and clearly established rights

This is a tragic story and has all the trappings of yet another racially polarized split involving police, city government, and the public. Plus, we have video, with all the confusion and false certainty that goes along with visual images of police-public encounters gone bad. The NYPD, the City, and the DA all are investigating, and I would not be surprised if DOJ jumped into the mix at some point (likely depending on what the City and DA do).

I want to skip ahead to several interesting issues that likely will arise in the inevitable § 1983 action:

1) What will the court do with the video on summary judgment? As I wrote in a  draft paper for a SEALS discussion group, the Court last term in Plumhoff v. Rickard, just as in Scott v. Harris, was all too willing to interpret the video for itself and identify its single meaning (in favor of the defendant officer) as a basis for granting summary judgment. Will courts be similarly bold with potentially more damning video or will they be less willing to find a single message and leave it all to the jury? On that note, check out the lede of The Times article describing the officer "holding him in what appears, in a video, to be a chokehold." (emphasis added). That is the proper way to report on video, since it is about appearances and what different viewers will or might see. But it is veery different than what everyone (press, government officials, and courts) has done in, for example, describing video of high-speed chases.

2) According to The Times, chokeholds are expressly prohibited by NYPD regulations. How will that affect the qualified immunity analysis? In Hope v. Pelzer and Wilson v. Layne, the Court looked at department regulations and whether they endorsed or prohibited some conduct as indications of whether theright at issue is clearly established. While not conclusive, administrative regs can support a doctrinal consensus or demonstrate the absence of that consensus. Absent case law holding that chokeholds always violate the Fourth Amendment or violate the Fourth Amendment when in furtherance of arresting non-violent offenders, what will the court do with this officer violating clear departments regulations in dealing with a non-violent offender (they were trying to arrest the victim for selling loose cigarettes on the street).

3) What happens when the plaintiff tries to make his Monell claim against the city? On one hand, the express prohibition on chokeholds in department regs would seem to weigh against any argument that the city had a policy of allowing its officers to utilize such holds, since the very opposite is true--he really is the "bad apple" expressly disobeying how we told him to behave. On the other hand, according to The Times, more than 4% of excessive-force complaints to the Civilian Complaint Review Board involve allegations of officers using chokeholds, a number that has gone up in the past decade; this could support an argument that the city is failing to train its officers on its own policies or that the city is being deliberately indifferent to the actual practices and actions of officers who are employing chokeholds despite department prohibitions. (Note that many of those complaints never go anywhere or are unsubstantiated--the point is that many citizens are talking about officers using chokeholds).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 19, 2014 at 10:25 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (6)

Thursday, July 17, 2014

Marriage equality in Florida

Judge Luis Garcia of the 16th Judicial Circuit of Florida (the higher-level trial court covering the Keys) has invalidated Florida's prohibition on same-sex marriage, finding that marriage is a fundamental right for Due Process purposes and that there is no rational basis for prohibiting same-sex marriage. The ruling does not take effect until next Tuesday, July 22. This is one of three actions in Florida challenging the anti-equality constitutional amendment passed in 2008--the other two are in state court in Miami-Dade County and in federal court in the Northern District of Florida.

Several quick thoughts:

1) Judge Garcia is up for non-partisan election this fall; let's see what happens in that race.

2) I genuinely expected Florida to be one of the stragglers that would get marriage equality only when SCOTUS finally spoke after 40 other states had eliminated SSM bans.

3) At this point, we need to stop reporting on trial-court decisions, since they are all going in one direction, but their coverage is so limited. It really will matter when federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts begin speaking out.

4) Is it even remotely possible that these lower courts are all getting it wrong? Is there any chance that appeals courts will split or go in different directions or that SCOTUS will ignore the singular position of these lower courts and hold that SSM bans do not violate the Constitution?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 17, 2014 at 04:05 PM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

Weird Al teaches English

And Slate evaluates the rules he espouses in the song. Someone said this could be the new generation's "Conjunction Junction."

 

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 15, 2014 at 05:48 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (2)

JOTWELL: Levy on Bray on declaratory judgments

The new essay for JOTWELL's Courts Law comes from Marin Levy (Duke), reviewing Samuel Bray's The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment (Duke L.J.). Sam's article is terrific and both it and the review essay are worth a read.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 15, 2014 at 10:46 AM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, July 13, 2014

The risk to catalyzed fans

As everyone in the Free World now knows, LeBron James chose not to re-sign with the Miami Heat and is on his way back to Cleveland to play for the Cavs, the team he abandoned (to angry rants and burned jerseys) four years ago. So it appears the efforts of two Miami sports-radio hosts to use charitable fan contributions to help keep James did not work.

This demonstrates the risk in Dan, Mike McCann, and my idea about fan action committees--it might not work and if it might not work, fans might not want to participate (I have not been able to find out how much money was donated to Boys & Girls Club or how many fans contributed). One way around that is to utilize a trigger, as many kickstarter campaigns do--the contribution remains only a pledge until and unless the player signs; this one did not have a trigger, and I imagine most charities will not allow triggers when the program is set up directly through the organization (as this one was). Alternatively, organizers hope fans still contribute despite the risk. Perhaps fans continue to donate as a way of engaging in the purely expressive act of showing their support for team and player; fans spend money on many things to support their team--why not charity? Alternatively, fans may be willing to participate because contributing to the charity is a social good (note the non-political nature of the chosen charity) and worth the donation, even if not achieving the alternative goal of convincing James to stay.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 13, 2014 at 07:38 AM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 08, 2014

Determining the effect of video

Just coincidentally, three stories are simultaneously in the news involving potential police misconduct caught on video. The recordings are after the jump (these are partial, although fuller recordings of some are available):

1) A California Highway Patrol officer (Erik Estrada never did this) takes a woman to the ground on the side of the highway.and repeatedly punches her, including in the head. The video was taken by a passing driver. The matter is under investigation.

2) A South Carolina state trooper arrests Sam Montgomery, an NFL player, for driving more than 25 m.p.h. over the speed limit. The officer threatens to TASE Montgomery for not cooperating. This is dashcam video. The trooper was suspended for failing to treat Montgomery with the expected courtesy.

3) A Lafayette, Indiana police officer shoves a man in a wheelchair with two hands, causing the chair to tip over and the man to go sprawling on the sidewalk. The shove occurred after the man rode over the officer's foot while departing an encounter with the officers, who had been called to the scene when the man allegedly told officials at a school that he had a gun. The department sought to fire the officer, but a civil service board reduced the punishment to a 30-day suspension without pay, demotion, and probation. This is dashcam video.

These three stories tell us a few things about video and its role in parsing events.

First, it should call into doubt the argument that allowing citizens free-range to video police in action will change officer behavior, making them over-cautious because of how things will "appear" on the video and the snap judgments people might reach. But video in two of these cases came from the officers themselves and, even knowing they were being filmed, they still engaged in some, at least, questionable behavior. So if officers are threatening and shoving people knowing they are being filmed by their own cars, there is no reason to believe that thei behavior will change by the possibility of being filmed or recorded by someone else. And that is before any argument that we want the chilling effect that the threat of video might have on officers.

Second, these videos show why the Supreme Court was wrong in its treatment of video on summary judgment in Scott v. Harris and this past term in Plumhoff v. Rickard. The videos do not "speak for themselves," as demonstrated by the wide range of responses to them, responses that seemingly confirm the Kahan thesis about how personal characteristics and political preferences affect perception of video. There likely is more that each video does not show or fully contextualize. If we would not grant summary judgment in favor of the arrestees in any of these cases (and I doubt we would), then we should not grant it in favor of the police in other video cases.

Third, I have to admit to feeling some sympathy for the trooper in # 2. Reading press accounts, it sounded like the officer simply started out acting in an overbearing and overofficious manner. But in watching the video,  Montgomery is not following the officer's instructions to put his hands behind his back with his palms up in the air, keep his feet apart, and face away from the officer. The reason appears to be not resistance but confusion about what the officer wanted and how to do several things at once (try putting your hands behind your back with palms up--it's not a natural position). So while the officer perhaps jumpted to the TASER pretty quickly, it sometimes is hard to distinguish confusion from disobedience. Of course, given my political and social views, my viewing the video in that way flies in the face of everything Kahan, et al. would have predicted.

And now the videos. Draw your own inferences as if you are a juror, think about inferences if you are a judge on a motion for summary judgment.

1)

  

2)

  

3)

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 8, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, July 03, 2014

Federalism, RFRA, and Free Exercise in the next Hobby Lobby

Someone please tell me if I am wrong on the following points in the potential next round of Hobby Lobby-type litigation.

A major concern after Hobby Lobby is that similar closely held corporations will raise similar objections to legal obligations to hire (and not create hostile environments for) women, racial minorities, pregnant women, religious non-believers and other-believers, LGBTQ people, etc., as well as obligations to serve and do business with those groups.

Here is the thing. Protections for LGBTQ employees and customers are, at this point, not federal; they exist only in some states and/or some municipalities. But RFRA and strict scrutiny does not apply to state or local laws under City of Boerne. So any such claims to avoid those state or local obligations must be brought under the Free Exercise Clause and are likely to fail under Smith, since laws prohibiting discrimination in employment or public accommodations appear to be neutral laws of general applicability. The only way around that is if the company can tie some other constitutional liberty in (such as Free Speech in the wedding photographer case). So, ironically, LGBTQ people may be better off in this realm than women, since the corporation can rely only on the First Amendment, not a statutory strict scrutiny, to avoid its non-discrimination obligations.

Pushing it a bit further: Every state has a prohibition on race, gender, etc., discrimination that parallels federal law. So even if a hypothetical company could claim an opt-out from Title VII's ban on sex discrimination in hiring based on RFRA, that company still must comply with the state ban on sex discrimination in hiring, which, if challenged, again would only receive Smith-level Free Exercise scrutiny and the challenge likely will fail.

On the other hand, many states have their own RFRAs, which would require strict scrutiny of state anti-discrimination laws and might require analysis similar to Hobby Lobby. But that case at least would be litigated in state court, with the state's highest court having the last word; that court would not be bound by Hobby Lobby, may be less solicitous of accommodation demands (depending on the state), and might adopt the Ginsburg view on the question. Such a case would not be reviewable to SCOTUS, because a decision applying state RFRC would be an independent and adequate state ground for the decision. So the future of Hobby Lobby may produce some interesting federalism angles.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on July 3, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (8)

Monday, June 30, 2014

Catalyzing Miami Heat fans

Catalyzing Fans--the article by Dan, Mike McCann, and me--is forthcoming in Harvard Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law. But its basic idea may be taking root.

LeBron James has opted out of the final year of his contract with the Miami Heat and become a free agent (although he is generally expected to re-sign with the Heat for less money, allowing the team to sign better surrounding players). Just to be sure, the hosts of a show at a Miami sports radio station have announced LeBron-a-Thon, expressing support for James by raising money for Boys & Girls Clubs of Broward County. One of the hosts kicked things off with a $ 1000 donation.

This is an example of what we describe in the paper as a charitable FAC. James is a big supporter of Boys & Girls Club--"The Decision," the ESPN media circus in which James announced his intention to sign with the Heat in 2010, was designed to raise money for that organization. This also shows how easy it is to set something up, although we obviously will have to wait to see if it succeeds in 1) raising significant amounts of money or 2) helping keep James in Miami (causation will be impossible to show, of course). This is slightly different than what we discuss, as there is no trigger--money is donated to the charity regardless of what James does. But this highlights the purely expressive nature of such FAC contributions--fans are saying, in essence, "we appreciate you and so want you as part of our team that we will contribute to a worthy cause that is dear to you." Moreover, the monetary benefit to this reputable charity from fan donations likely represents a net public good, as charity presumptively does, regardless of what James chooses to do.

Now we wait to see what teams beside the Heat emerge as suitors for James and whether fans of those teams launch a similar campaign.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 30, 2014 at 09:01 AM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 26, 2014

On soccer

Brishen Rogers has a great, long post at CoOp considering why soccer (or futbol, if you like) never caught on in the United States. He somewhat piggybacks on David Post's VC post from last week.I was always actively antipathetic towards soccer, partly because I did not understand how the overall game worked (beyond "kick the ball in the goal" and "stop using your hands"). I started watching more in recent years, when my daughter took up the game for a few years, and I have to admit to feeling pretty down on Sunday night. I also knew we were not going to beat Germany (although that may be the pessimism that comes with being a Cubs and Northwestern fan).

I like a lot about what Rogers and Post propose; I'll add a few additional points in the gaps.

First, I want to defend the "too little scoring" explanation for soccer's relative unpopularity. The counter to that (which Rogers offers) has always been "look at baseball," which can be just as low-scoring as soccer (especially now that fewer players are juicing). But we need to tweak the comparison by recognizing the differences between soccer and baseball. Even the lowest-scoring baseball game involves a series of one-on-one encounters between pitcher and batter, each of which has a "winner" (batter gets on base or batter is out) and each of which marks a step towards the ultimate result and the ultimate victor in the game; the winner of the game is based on the sum total of those individual encounters. More importantly, baseball is untimed--the point of the game is to score the greatest number of runs within the 27 outs each side is given. So each team has two simultaneous goals--to both score some runs and to get the needed 27 outs in order to win. So we should not say "well, baseball and soccer both have a lot of 2-1 games," because that 2-1 baseball game also had the 27 outs the team needed to win the game resulting from those individual encounters. Relatedly, do not ignore the effect of ties. In baseball, the aggregate of those individual encounters--and getting both runs and outs--is guaranteed to get us to a victor.

If we want to test the "not enough scoring" explanation, the proper comparison is other timed sports, sports in which the only goal is score more points than the other team within a given period of time. And the two major timed U.S. sports--football and basketball-- both involve a lot of scoring.

Second, Post argues that there is "wa-a-a-y too much failure" in soccer and Americans do not like failure. (He adds that the hardest skill in sport is not hitting a baseball, but kicking a soccer ball into the net in a game). Comparisons aside, there still is an awful lot of failure in baseball--the offense fails in more than 75 % of those individual encounters and the greatest individual hitter fails 65 % of the time. Of course, if we focus on the individual encounters in baseball and getting outs as a team's contemporaneous goal, that sense of failure goes away, because we can say the pitcher/defense succeeds in 75 % of those individual encounters.

Third, Americans and American sports media gravitate to individual star players and those stars are more obvious in the big American sports than in soccer because it is easier to see the "star" plays they make. We see LeBron James making shots, we see Peyton Manning throwing touchdown passes, we see Mike Trout hitting home runs or Stephen Strasburg striking people out. And, particularly in basketball, one player makes the difference--in the NBA, the team with the best player in a series generally wins the series. Because we see Lionel Messi score less frequently, we have less of a sense of him as a star making "star plays" (at least plays that produce success). And one star player is less able to dictate soccer outcomes--after all, Portugal's Cristiano Ronaldo is regarded as the best player in the world and his team did not get out of the "Group of Death."

Fourth, I agree with Post about the randomness and caprice involved in soccer. Football, and to a lesser extent basekball, involves precise plays and much less of the free-wheeling running that soccer seems to entail. While all sports involve a bit of luck at the margins, soccer seems to rely on more of it.

Finally, Rogers makes some good cultural and sociological arguments for why America went in the direction of football and basketball rather than soccer. I would add one pont. MLS and professional soccer in this country is said to not be successful because it is not as big as the NBA, NFL, and MLB. But part of the problem has been the insistence on measuring MLS success (monetary and attendance) compared with the sucess of today's other leagues, as opposed to how those leagues looked when they were ten years old.  The NFL was founded in the 1920s (and no one one really cared about it until the 1950s), the NBA in the 1940s; it is ridiculous to measure a nascent soccer league against those mature leagues. In 1925, the early days of modern Major League Baseball, no team had more than 1 million in attendance; in 1955, the midpoint of baseball's so-called Golden Age, only eight teams had more than 1 million in attendance and only one had more than 2 million; in 2013, every team had more than 1 million and eight teams had more than 3 million. So the question should not be if soccer is earning the same attendance or money as the other three leagues; it should be how it is doing for a new sports league. And by most measures, the answer to that question seems to be "quite well."

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 26, 2014 at 05:47 PM in Current Affairs, Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (6)

Wednesday, June 25, 2014

Standing and defendants

In affirming the district court and invalidating Utah's ban on marriage equality, the Tenth Circuit considered standing sua sponte. But, as with the D.C. Circuit's decision on the filibuster, the standing issue was not about the plaintiffs (who want to get married and are prevented from doing so, thus obviously have standing), but about the defendants--whether the governor and attorney general were proper defendants in this Ex Parte Young action.  (This was necessary as a preliminary to whether the governor and A/G could appeal, since the county clerk of Salt Lake County, a named defendant who is directly responsible for issuing marriage licenses to four sets of plaintiffs, declined to appeal).

Under Ex Parte Young, the named defendant must be the executive officer responsible for enforcing the challenged law. And the plaintiffs should lose if they sue an officer who is not responsible for enforcing that law. But the Tenth Circuit did not explain why this should be a component of the plaintiffs' standing, as opposed to the merits of the constitutional claim.

In fact, the unique position of the governor and A/G in this case illustrates why treating this as standing makes no sense. Under Utah law, the governor and A/G are not directly responsible for issuing marriage licenses (that rests with county clerks) or for doing things that require recognition or non-recognition of out-of-state marriages (not giving spousal benefits, not allowing joint tax returns, not giving marital deductions, etc.). But they are responsible for advising, supervising, and compellling the clerks and other state officials who refuse in recognizing same-sex marriages, which made them responsible defendants subject to suit. In essence, the court accepted "supervisory" Ex Parte Young liability (which makes sense, since executives delegate all the time).

But we regularly deal with supervisory liability in § 1983 damages actions, without ever invoking standing. For example, imagine Officer Y uses excessive force against A; A sues Supervisor X for failing to supervise Y, but it turns out that X is not Y's supervisor under state law. Without question, A loses. But the court would not say that A lacks standing; instead, that claim fails on the merits. Or compare this Eighth Circuit decision holding that an officer violated a person's rights by enforcing a flag-burning ordinance. The plaintiff also brought a Monell claim against the city for failing to properly train the officer, which the court rejected because, under Missouri law, cities are not responsible for training police officers. So the city could not be liable and the Monell claim failed on the merits. Again, no mention of standing.

So why if "you got the wrong guy" is a merits matter in these actions for retroactive relief, it makes no sense whatsoever for it to become a standing matter in Ex Parte Young actions for prospective relief.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 25, 2014 at 07:13 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (5)

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

The end of umpires?

That is the proposal from John McEnroe to make tennis more interesting--have the players call their own lines, as a way to introduce greater intensity into the game. Players would be given challenges and McEnroe argues that the threat of fan anger would keep players in line. It has been said that back in the day, if the umpire clearly missed a call, the player who benefitted from the blown call would tank the next point as an equalizer (I am not sure if that is true). On surfaces where the ball leaves a mark (notably clay), a player will often point to the spot of the ball to show the opponent before an argument begins.

Continuing my previous suggestion that sports rule as enforced by umpires are analogous to rules of procedure--the framework rules regulating the process in which the players control the outcome through performance of skills: This is the sports equivalent of arbitration; the parties have privatized the dispute-resolution process into something they create and control themselves, perhaps less formally, rather than using formalized "outside" processes and arbiters that they work with but exert less control over. Maybe that means McEnroe's proposal will work about as well as arbitration.

On a different note on McEnroe's suggestion: This video is pretty funny. Latvian Ernests Gulbis is asked about McEnroe's proposal to get rid of umpires; Gulbis misunderstands and thinks the reporter asked about getting rid of vampires and begins to discuss the benefit of getting ride of vampires (in the metaphorical sense of hangers-on).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 24, 2014 at 10:37 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 23, 2014

Goldstein on journalism and SCOTUSBlog's press credential

This morning, the Standing Committee on Correspondents denied SCOTUSBlog's request for a congressional press credential. Tom Goldstein's response is here.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 23, 2014 at 01:15 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

JOTWELL: Thornburg on Hadfield and Ryan and information disclosure

The new Courts Law essay comes from Elizabeth Thornburg (SMU), reviewing Gillian K. Hadfield & Dan Ryan, Democracy, Courts, and the Information Order, 54 J. European Sociology 67 (2013), exploring the demoratizing role of civil litigation, particularly discovery and the public value of information disclosure.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 23, 2014 at 10:21 AM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 21, 2014

Lance Armstrong: Another Civ Pro exam

Judge Wilkins on the District of the District of Columbia  addressed a host of motions to dismiss in the False Claims Act and common law fraud lawsuit against Lance Armstrong and others over false statements and claims relating to the Postal Service sponsorship of Armstrong and his team; the case began as a qui tam action by rider Floyd Landis and the United States intervened. For some reason, when sports disputes hit the courts, they carry procedure and jurisdiction problems with them.

If you are looking for a single source for a lot of possible exam issues, this 81-page decision has a little bit of everything: 1) Presentation of outside documents and facts on a motion to dismiss and the possibility of converting a 12(b)(6) to summary judgment; 2) when an action commences under Rule 3 and the validity of Rule 3 in the face of different state law; 3) handling lawsuits against no-longer existing corporate entities; 4) Relation back of a new party's complaint (the U.S., when it intervened) where the relevant statute of limitations provides for relation back; 5) propriety of the manner of service of process; 6) propriety of using 12(b)(6) to assert a statute of limitations defense; and 7) how to plead fraud under FRCP 9(b).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 21, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 20, 2014

When dissent rhetoric comes true

In covering summary judgment in civ pro, I teach an Eighth Circuit case called Sitzes v. City of West Memphis. A police officer drove, perhaps without lights or sirens, 80-90 mph through a residential neighborhood towards what may or may not have been a genuine emergency and hit a car, killing the driver and injuring the passenger. A divided court held that intent-to-harm was the applicable standard and granted summary judgment in favor of the officer. It is a great teaching case because both the majority and dissent parse the evidence in the record in identifying what may or may not be genuine disputes of material fact and join issue with what facts are material in light of the applicable legal standard. It is also one of the few cases in Civ Pro that genuinely seem to get students riled up.

At one point, the dissenter (a district judge sitting by designation) went into parade-of-horribles mode. The majority held that there was no intent to injure since the officer genuinely subjectively believed he was rushing towards an emergency. That being so, the dissent argued, "an officer could avoid Section 1983 liability for driving 100 miles per hour through a children’s playground during recess time, by stating that he subjectively believed there was an emergency and the path through the playground was the most direct to get to the claimed emergency." The majority's only responses were: 1) that's not this case and 2) "we think it very likely that an officer who intentionally drove through a playground . . . could be held liable even under the intent-to-harm standard, regardless of the officer’s avowed belief, at least absent some compelling exigency not described in the hypotheticals."

Well:

 

True, it is a golf course not a playground and the video seems to suggest it was not crowded. And it was a pursuit, apparently begun when officers attempted to serve outstanding drug warrants, perhaps the "compelling exigency" the majority demanded; it was not the officers using the golf course as a short-cut to reach some other location. And, fortunately, the officers did not hit anyone, so we need not address the § 1983 or due process questions.

On the other hand, why chase him onto the course, with all the attendant risks? There was a police helicopter in the chase, so the guy was not going anywhere.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 20, 2014 at 11:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, June 19, 2014

Standing is easier when you're Younger

An open issue in the standing discussion in SBA List is the extent to which the threat of an administrative proceeding, a la a complaint about false electoral speech before the Ohio Elections Commission, constitutes sufficient harm to allow standing for a preenforcement challenge to the underlying statute. The Court emphasized that adminstrative proceedings impose burdens on time, cost, and distraction to possible speakers and that a Commission finding that some speech was false may be viewed by the public as a state-imposed sanction--all genuine injuries-in-fact. The Court cited Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools for the proposition that "If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not." But the Court ultimately punted on the question because Commission proceedings might be followed by criminal prosecution, presenting an additional element of harm in this case.

But the Court's hesitancy or ambiguity on this point is unwarranted and potentially troubling. There should be no question that genuinely threatened administrative enforcement proceedings should be sufficient for preenforcement standing.

Dayton was a Younger case, which held that federal courts must abstain in deference to ongoing coercive enforcement proceedings before a state civil rights commission. The portion of Dayton quoted  in SBA List was from Footnote 1, in which the Court quickly disposed of any ripeness concerns, citing two other Younger decisions, both of which involved threatened criminal prosecutions, Steffel v. Thompson and Doran v. Salem Inn.

The key is recognizing that connection between standing and Younger. Younger requires abstention in deference to three types of pending state proceedings, including civil enforcement proceedings, especially those in which the state is party to the proceeding and in which the state initiates the formal process following some other preliminary investigation. The Sprint Court expressly recognized the administrative proceedings in Dayton as of the type to which a federal court must abstain. And the Court has never suggested that administrative proceedings must be supported by criminal prosecution to trigger abstention; a purely civil administrative proceeding is enough. Younger does not require abstention where those civil-enforcement proceedings are threatened but not pending. The issue then is one of standing or ripeness (or both)--whether there is a sufficiently credible threat (how sufficient is the point of Marty's post) that any such proceeding will be initiated. This creates a window for individuals to get into federal court--in the time between when the threat of initiation becomes real and when proceedings actually have been initiated.

So now we can frame the standing question for preenforcement challenges in those terms. If there is a credible threat of initiation of any proceeding and it is a proceeding from which Younger would require federal abstention once that proceeding is initiated, then the plaintiff has standing (or the action is ripe, whatever) for a preenforcement challenge. This now preserves that window for getting to federal court. Otherwise, if a genuine threat of a purely administrative proceeding is not sufficient to trigger standing, then a plaintiff is forever blocked from that federal forum--he cannot bring a preenforcement challenge and Younger kicks-in once the government initiates the administrative proceeding. In SBA List, it seems obvious that a federal court would abstain once Commission proceedings were pending against a speaker--that is what the district court initially held in the case (before other things happened procedurally). Therefore, the real threat of those Commission proceedings alone--whether or not supported by criminal prosecution--should be enough to establish standing.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 19, 2014 at 07:07 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, June 18, 2014

More on SBA List and standing

Marty Lederman offers some thoughts at SCOTUSBlog on the future of standing after SBA List. He focuses on something I glossed over a bit: The seeming inconsistency between Clapper, which required that an injury be "certainly impending," and prior case law (referred to in passing in a footnote in Clapper) which only required a "substantial risk" of harm. In SBA List, Justice Thomas presents them as alternative standards. Marty parses the decision, suggesting the Court applied a uniquely forgiving standard there, given that there was little chance (not even substantial and certainly not "certainly impending") of the state bringing a criminal prosecution on top of the administrative proceedings that were more likely. He also argues that the Court has the flexibility to make the requirements looser or stricter, depending on future contexts (considering, e,g., whether free speech is involved or whether election issues are involved or something else).

That "something else" might be the difference between challenges to regulations of the public's primary conduct as opposed to regulations of law-enforcement techniques and practices.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 18, 2014 at 12:53 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (7)

Monday, June 16, 2014

Standing, ripeness, and SBA List

Not surprisingly, SCOTUS in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that the First Amendment challenge to Ohio's prohibition on knowingly or recklessly false campaign speech was justiciable; Justice Thomas wrote for a unanimous Court in a challenge brought by a group that wanted to run ads suggesting that supporting the Affordable Care Act means supporting taxpayer funded abortions. A few things of note (in addition to Richard's comments).

Injury-in-fact is established for purposes of a preenforcement challenge when the plaintiff alleges an intention to engage in some conduct "arguably affected with a constitutional interest" that is prohibited by the challenged statute where there is a credible threat of prosecution. That threat be shown by past prosecutions against similar conduct by the plaintiff or others similarly situated and by the absence of any disavowal of intent to prosecute. Threat may also include bringing administrative proceedings (such as those at issue here), at least when combined with a threat or risk of criminal enforcement (the Court left open whether administrative proceedings alone is enough of an injury to create standing).

Although this is a free speech case and the Court relied on many free speech cases (especially Steffel v. Thompson and Babbitt v. United Farm Workers), the Court spoke about all preenforcement challenges generally. It did not suggest, as some lower courts have said, that there is a lesser standard or reduced burden for free speech cases, but that more is required as to other constitutional rights. This arguably could change lower-court analysis of challenges to, for example, some abortion regulations.

At the same time, the Court did not demand the certainty of injury (i.e., state enforcement of the law) that the Court appeared to require just last year in Clapper v. Amnesty International. The Court did cite Clapper's statement that "allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is 'certainly impending,' or there is a 'substantial risk’ that the harm will occur," but it focused more on substantial risk and did not demand a similar level of certainty. Although the Court does not discuss it, I think the difference lends support to my idea that the Court silently treats standing differently when the challenged law regulates primary conduct of individuals (i.e., whether they can engage in some political expression) as opposed to laws regulating what law enforcement officers can do in investigating oro pursuing criminal activity (i.e., whether they can surveil calls or use chokeholds).

Note that the Sixth Circuit had also analyzed the imminence of the threat of prosecution, concluding it was not sufficiently imminent. But it held that the lack of imminence meant the case was not ripe, while SCOTUS addressed the same question in standing terms. Justice Thomas noted Medimmune's footnote 8 that both standing and ripeness "boil down to the same question," and insisted on speaking in standing terms because that is what prior cases have done.

But the Court did not explain what is the proper realm for these doctrines and how litigants and courts are to know. To the extent standing and ripeness remain distinct aspects of justiciability, how are we to know which to argue? Lea Brilmayer long ago argued that standing arose when the plaintiff wanted to challenge a no-lawn-sign ordinance because his neighbor wants to post the sign, while ripeness arose when the plaintiff did not want to post the sign until next year. But standing cases (certainly since Lujan and including SBA) have focused on plaintiff's present intent and immediate plans to engage in some conduct (such as going to see the Nile crocodile), which sounds like ripeness as Brilmayer has defined it. Or we might say that the plainiff's immediate intent to engage in some conduct goes to standing, while the likelihood that the government will act to enforce goes to ripeness. But SBA discussed both of those as distinct elements that together went to standing.

The Sixth Circuit did consider two additional "prudential" elements for ripeness beyond imminent threat of prosecution--whether the factual record is sufficiently developed and the hardship to the plaintiffs if judicial relief is denied at this stage. SCOTUS cited its decision in Lexmark to suggest that such prudential factors no longer are part of any justiciability analysis, including ripeness (the focus of Richard's post). And even if they were, the Court disposed of both in a short paragraph, hinting that, at least where there is a legitimate threat of prosecution (creating standing), a preenforcement challenge to the constitutionality of a law always will be ripe.

So what role, independent of standing, if any, does ripeness continue to play in constitutional litigation?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 16, 2014 at 04:29 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, June 14, 2014

CFP Deadline: Seventh Junior Faculty Fed Courts Workshop

The full CFP is here. The submission deadline is Friday, June 20. Send abstracts to federalcourtsworkshop@gmail.com. Contact Matt Hall or Kent Barnett (both at Georgia) with questions.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 14, 2014 at 04:02 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Economics of the Offside Rule

The recently begun World Cup allows us to think about soccer (or football, for those of you reading outside the United States) as a source of laws and rules, as opposed to our usual focus on baseball. Well, for all the complaints about the technicality and incomprehensibility of the Infield Fly Rule, it has absolutely nothing on Offside (Law 11 of Football's 17 Laws). I could not explain the rule in the space of this post, although I think I now sort-of  understand it thanks to the videos embedded after the jump.

Offside (note the singular: people get persnickety if you add an 's' at the end) is soccer's counterpart to the infield fly rule as being what marks you as someone who really knows and understands the game--you know baseball if you can explain the infield fly, you know soccer if you can explain Offside. But is Offside a limiting rule as I have defined that term--is it soccer's logical and policy counterpart to the infield fly? I am not sure.

Offside is an anti-"cherry-picking" rule, preventing teams from having one or more players hang around the goal and doing nothing but kicking long balls up the field pitch. It also prevents the defense from having to keep multiple defenders back by the goal to guard the cherry-picker. The result is to push the action up the field and keep more players involved on both ends. The underlying logic is aesthetics and the look of the game. The rulemakers did not want what one soccer web site called a "ping-pong match" of long kicks back and forth, as opposed to short passes and runs up and through the middle of the pitch. It also avoids what many would regard as "cheap" goals.

But Offside does not seem to be about extreme cost-benefit disparties, as is the IFR. I suppose it would give the offense an advantage--the cherry-picker could  get the ball in position to go one-on-one with the goalkeeper, a big advantage to the offense. Importantly, however, the opponent is not helpless. Absent Law 11, the defense simply counters the cherry-picker by moving a defender back to his area. The opponent also might be able to prevent the long pass to the cherry-picker or otherwise prevent the team from taking advantage of the loitering player. More importantly, the cherry-picker is not intentionally failing to perform the expected athletic skills. The infield fly rule aims at a play in which the infielder might otherwise intentionally not catch the ball (the thing he is expected to do). In being in offside position, a soccer player is trying to succeed as expected--he is trying to score a goal by getting into the best position for himself. (Note: I know little about soccer, so please correct me if I miss anything here).

Lastly, the complexity of the rule likely reflects an attempt to calibrate it and the game. As written, the rule allows for long balls, so long as the player was onside when the pass is made. And it only penalizes if the offside player is involved in the play (itself subject to a detailed definition). Again, check out the videos below if you want to learn.

In Esquire's Father's Day edition, there is an article about fathers and sports, with a sidebar giving the approximate ages that kids typically can do certain sports-related things (e.g., sustain a game of catch--8). The last entry: "Understand the Infield Fly Rule--34." I'm 46--what does that say about Offside?

Now for the videos:

 

Watch this one if you like PowerPoint:

 

 

Watch this one if you like British accents, bad graphics, and cheesy music.

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 14, 2014 at 10:46 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, June 10, 2014

Falling in line on the FTAIA

The Second Circuit last week became the latest circuit (joining the Third and Seventh) to overrule circuit precedent and hold that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), which limits the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, is a nonjurisdictional merits limitation. This court focused more on Arbaugh and the absence of "jurisdictional language," rather than Morrison's absolute "extraterritoriality-is-always-merits" approach. But, citing the Seventh Circuit, the court recognizes the merits nature of the FTAIA. The court makes one nice move with the FTAIA's legislative history and its repeated references to jurisdiction. References to the "subject matter jurisdiction of United States antitrust law" are not unambiguously about the adjudicative authority of the federal courts, but instead are better understood as inartfully referring to the prescriptive scope of federal law, which goes to the merits of any claim under that law.

The Second Circuit also recognized that Congress was as confused as the courts about jurisdictionality and as likely as the courts to use terms loosely and inaccurately, at least prior to Arbaugh in 2006. This suggests that even if Congress did include "jurisdictional language" in a pre-2006 statute, courts still must look carefully at whether it really meant adjudicative jurisdiction or whether it meant jurisdiction in some other sense (notably in referring to its own legislative authority). Morrison's absolute approach helps in this reading of statutory text and history.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 10, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 09, 2014

Chief Justice Goldberg? A SCOTUS counterfactual

I am reading Lee Levine's and Stephen Wermiel's The Progeny, which traces the history of New York Times v. Sullivan and subsequent cases and Justice Brennan's efforts to control development of that area of First Amendment law. Arthur Goldberg makes a brief cameo in Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana as a third voice on the Court (along with Justices Black and Douglas) pushing for absolute First Amendment protection for all criticism of government and public officials, before resigning (at LBJ's urging) in summer 1965 to become UN Ambassador and to allow LBJ to appoint Abe Fortas to the Court.

So a counterfactual (and maybe this has been written about): What if Arthur Goldberg had not resigned from the Court?

Short term, The Progeny shows that the early path of post-Sullivan defamation cases might have been different. Goldberg aligned t with Black and Douglas for the broadest First Amendment protection (beyond Brennan's actual malice), while Fortas went in the other direction, on one occasion all by himself. Certainly football coach Wally Butts does not keep his defamation judgment if Goldberg rather than Fortas is occupying what at the time was called "the Jewish seat."

What about longer term? Chief Justice Warren supposedly wanted Goldberg to succeed him as Chief. We probably do not get the insanity of the failed nomination of Fortas to be Chief. We definitely do not get Fortas' subsequent pressured resignation from the Court. Do we get a Democratic Chief in 1968 (Goldberg? Brennan? Someone else, and if so, who?), instead of Warren Burger two years later? Would Goldberg have been filibustered the way Fortas was? And if Goldberg becomes Chief, we get someone other than Harry Blackmun in that associate justice seat, another LBJ nomine in 1968 (likedly Homer Thornberry of the Fifth Circuit, who was nominated to Fortas's seat when Fortas was nominated as Chief). In either event, Goldberg lived until 1990; does he become a 20+-year Justice? (or was too otherwise-ambitious and distracted, believing he could be Governor of New York or President).

If nothinge else, does Flood v. Kuhn come out differently? Goldberg likely would have been a third for Flood on the Court, which might have moved other people. More importantly, Goldberg no longer can represent Flood, so he no longer can deliver one of the worst arguments in the Court's history.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 9, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, June 06, 2014

Pregnancy and information overload

A non-law (although sort of policy) post: Yesterday's Times published "The T.M.I. Pregnancy", on the drawbacks of the wealth of available pre-natal information. The author's daughter-in-law went through a tense pregnancy in which various tests suggested possible problems (including small size, low birthweight, and a short longbone). While obviously beneficial, the extra information that is now available makes the whole experience nerve-racking.

Nine years later, I can sympathize.

Like the author's children, we did the series of genetic tests targeted for Ashkenazi Jews (our O.B. called it the "Jewish Panel") and waited anxiously for the results. The first ultrasound detected an ecogenic focus, a calcium deposit on the developing heart and a soft possible indicator of Down Syndrome; more anxiety and a long weekend waiting for the results of other tests for Down (all were negative--and the focus ultimately disappeared, although not for awhile, so my wife still was slightly worried). Then the doctors were concerned about fetal size (my mother-in-law and sister-in-law both carried very small), which meant weekly ultrasounds for the final six weeks of the pregnancy. At the last ultrasound, 2 1/2 weeks before the due date, they became concerned about size and amniotic fluid and recommended immediate delivery (I made the mistake of reading the report as we drove back to the O.B.). While in the hospital and hooked to the fetal heart-rate monitor (the machine that goes ping), the fetal heart rate tumbled, prompting the doctor to recommend--and us quickly to accept (my precise words were "Get her out of there")--an immediate C-Section (the doctor insisted it was not emergent, but a non-emergency C-Section is like minor surgery--it is what happens to somone else). Our daughter was small but within range and just fine.

It's a bad combination, really--lots of scientific and medical information, but nothing you can know in the moment and nothing you can do if the information is negative, other than wait, hope, and pray.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 6, 2014 at 12:46 PM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 04, 2014

Setting traps in a deposition

A while ago, I linked to a New York Times Verbatim video, in which actors recreate depositions, based on the transcripts. In this one, a lawyer gets increasingly agitated as he goes round and round with the deponent about the meaning of "photocopier." At the time, I missed this feature on the lawyer taking the deposition, David Marrburger, a partner at Cleveland's Baker-Hostetler. Marburger states that in reality he was not angry or agitated during the deposition; he actually enjoyed stringing along the deponent (the exchange goes on for 10 pages), who clearly had been prepped by his lawyer to obfuscate, in a way that was going to make him and the defendant look bad. Watching the reenactment, it was pretty obvious what the deponent was doing and pretty easy to guess why. While the video is funny, the background story provides a nice lesson both for lawyers defending depositions against doing this and for lawyers taking depositions about how to handle it.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 4, 2014 at 08:14 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 03, 2014

Wow, there is a right that is clearly established

According to the Eighth Circuit, it is the right to destroy an American flag for expressive purposes. And an officer who does not know that is the plainly incompetent officer who does not warrant qualified immunity and should be liable for damages.

A police officer in Gape Girardeau, MO arrested Snider--pursuant to a warrant obtained from a county judge on an application from the county prosecutor--for violating the state's flag desecration law. According to the case, neither the officer nor the prosecutor (nor, we must assume, the judge) knew about Texas v. Johnson; the charges were dismissed and Snider was released when a reporter called the prosecutor and told him about the case. Snider then filed a § 1983 action, claiming the arrest violated the First and Fourteent Amendments.

The Eight Circuit agreed that the officer (who conceded that Snider's rights were violated) lacked qualified immunity. Johnson and United States v. Eichman established in 1989-1990 that someone could not be punished for using the American flag to express an opinion and a reasonably competent officer in 2009 (the time of Snider's arrest) would have known that. The officer was not saved by the judge issuing a warrant; while a warrant typically indicates the officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner in effecting an arrest, this case fell within the exception where no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that the warrant was valid, given the clearly established state of the law.

There is some other good § 1983 stuff in this case, including the unexplained intervention of the State of Missouri, attorney's fees (imposed in part on the State, even though it could not have been liable in the case), and the rejection of a failure-to-train claim against the city (one could argue that an officer who does not know something as basic as Johnson has not been constitutionally trained) because the State, not the local government, is responsible for training local police officers.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 3, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, June 02, 2014

Please stop, Chief

From Bond v. United States:

"[T]he global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard." (in fairness, the kitchen cupboard language was in the Third Circuit's opinion). Earlier, Roberts posed a hypothetical about "[a]ny parent . . . when, exasperated by the children’s repeated failure to clean the goldfish tank, he considers poisoning the fish with a few drops of vinegar." (Seriously? Seems like extreme parenting).

I have wondered before whether Robert's penchant for these flourishes makes for good writing or whether it is incredibly distracting. I am still wondering.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 2, 2014 at 02:23 PM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Bad day for the Federal Circuit

Today was a pretty bad day for the Federal Circuit, as it was unanimously reversed twice in decisions from the April sitting (meaning it took less than two months for the Court to do the reversing). While we should not expect SCOTUS to simply rubber stamp the Federal Circuit because of that court's patent expertise, the Court has now unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit three times this term alone. Anyway, this seems a good excuse to highlight the work of Paul Gugliuzza of Boston University, who combines expertise in IP and Fed Courts and has written extensively on the Federal Circuit and its expansion (for good and ill) of its power.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on June 2, 2014 at 11:23 AM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, May 31, 2014

Donald Sterling v. NBA: Your new Civ Pro exam

Donald Sterling sued the NBA to stop his league-imposed punishment and the forced sale of his team. A $ 2 billion offer from Steve Ballmar was accepted by Sterling's wife, Shelly on behalf of the trust that owns the team, having had Donald declared mentally incompetent; the NBA has approved that deal and canceled a planned hearing of the Board of Governors (the other 29 owners) to strip Donald of ownership. The lawsuit, with Sterling and the trust as plaintiffs against the NBA, asserts claims for a violation of the state constitution, federal antitrust, and various breach of contract claims; it seeks damages and an injunction halting the NBA-imposed punishments (a $ 2.5 million fine and lifetime suspension from the NBA) and the hearing to terminate his ownership.

Oddly, these claims are either not ripe or about to become moot, depending on what happens with the sale. The NBA has not yet held the hearing to terminate his ownership, so he has not yet suffered any damages from it. And since the league will cancel the hearing if the sale goes through, that claim becomes moot. If the sale goes through, expect the league to rescind the fine, mooting that element of relief. It might even lift the lifetime suspension--what involvement will Sterling have with the league if he is no longer an owner?--mooting that claim. And assuming the sale goes through, what damage will Sterling have suffered? Two billion dollars will be more than double the sale price of any NBA franchise and likely more money than he would have earned from continued ownership of the team. So, at best, maybe he can get the non-economic value of being an NBA owner--except he is such a pariah now among NBA owners that it would be hard to put any real value on this.

What Sterling really wants is an injunction halting the sale of the team, at least pending outcome of the litigation. But to get that, Shelly Sterling needs to be involved in the case, since she claims an interest in controlling the trust and pushing through the sale. So either she has to be joined under FRCP 19 or she will try to intervene under FRCP 24. (Note: I don't do much more than lecture on these two rules, just to show other ways of bringing parties into cases But Rule 19 confuses students, who think it applies more broadly to cover simple joint-tortfeasor situations; having a nice clear example, purely involving injunctive relief, is helpful).

Jurisidction here hinges on the antitrust claim and § 1331; there is supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims (although Sterling's lawyer--who in an ongoing media blitz has come across as the worst kind of slickster lawyer who does not actually care about things like law and procedure--did not mention that or any other basis for jurisdiction over the non-federal claims). But, here is where it gets fun. Antitrust experts generally agree that the antitrust claim is nonsense--Sterling signed a series of agreements and contracts to become owner of an NBA franchise and cannot claim harm if those contracts harm the public or competitors. Sterling really is arguing that, by violating its own Constitution and By-Laws in punishing him (arguments that are not entirely frivolous), the NBA has breached those agreements; in other words, this is really a state-law case. So perhaps the court declines supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) because the state claims predominate. Moreeover, the court is going to have to figure out who controls the trust (Donald or Shelly) and, perhaps, whether Donald is competent. Those sound like potentially complex issues of state law, warranting the court to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(1). Finally, and most obviously, if the antitrust claim is that weak and the court dismisses it relatively early, it could decline jurisdiction simply for that reasons under § 1367(c)(3).

Update: An alert reader emails with another way Shelly Sterling could be brought into this case: She agreed to indemnify the NBA for any judgments arising from the sale of the team, including for lawsuits by her husband. So, having been sued, the NBA could now implead Shelly and the trust to enforce the indemnification agreement in the same action. Sterling then could assert claims against Shelly relating to any injunction of the sale.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 31, 2014 at 11:02 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Sports | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, May 29, 2014

On class supplements

I have written a supplement (available at your local supermarket checkout line). I assign supplements in every course I teach, including selecting one casebook that combines the best elements of a treaty treatise and a casebook. But the overuse of supplements and study aides, especially in 1L courses, feels as if it is getting out of control. Two related problems: 1) Students are using supplements and study guides in lieu of the class reading and 2) Students are using too many study guides and it is all getting confusing.

Some examples: 1) On Civ Pro, I gave question (from a recent 5th Circuit case) that basically lined up with Nicastro, yet a significant number of students never mentioned Nicastro, but discussed the competing opinions in Asahi (which is what a supplement written before 2011 would have discussed). 2) Several students meeting with me after grades came out told me how hard they worked in the class, always indicated by how many different supplements and study guides and audio recordings they used, never by how much they focused on the actual assigned cases, rules, and statutes.

Do others notice this problem? And is there a way to get it under control, to make students focus primarily on the primary sources and let the supplements be just that?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 29, 2014 at 12:01 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (13)

More statutory interpretation from Donald Sterling

Donald Sterling filed his Answer in the NBA's proceedings to force him to sell the LA Clippers. And as before, it involves a wealth of statutory interpretation questions.

Sterling leads off by challenging the NBA's reliance on the secretly recorded conversations as evidence, which gets interesting. He points to California Penal Code § 632(a), which prohibits recording confidential communications without consent, and § 632(d), which excludes "evidence obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording a confidential communication . . .  in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding." From this, Sterling insists he has a constitutional right not to have his private conversations recorded or having the evidence of his conversations used against him. That seems overstated--that the state offers a statutory protection against being recorded in furtherance of the constitutional right of privacy does not convert the right against being recorded into a constitutional right.

The interesting statutory question is whether internal dispute-resolution proceedings of a private organization constitute an "other proceeding" under § 632(d). On one hand, the language seems to contemplate public proceedings, since the three enumerated types of proceedings are all public in nature. So under ejusdem generis, that catch-all should be read to cover only similarly public proceedings. It also makes sense that the criminal code would regulate evidence in public but not private proceedings. On the other hand, are there any public proceedings that are not judicial, administrative, or legislative? If not, then "other proceedings" must mean something not public. Perhaps it refers to something like arbitration or mediation, which can be considered quasi-public--they are privately controlled processes to which parties agree to send otherwise-public disputes. But this proceeding still seems different. This is not a situation in which the NBA established an outside-but-private process (such as arbitration of appeals under the CBA with the players' union). This is the collection of 30 owners establishing their own internal processes controlled by the 30 owners, for regulating who stays within their own ranks. Even if § 632(d) goes beyond public proceedings, the NBA process still seems fundamentally different.

Finally, the answer may be affected by the 2001 decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper. Bartnicki held that Congress could not punish publication of an illegally intercepted and recorded phone call, where the publishers were uninvolved in the unlawful interception or recording. The First Amendment protects publication (and, implicitly, other uses) of truthful lawfully obtained information on matters of public concern, except where the government is serving a need of the highest order. So perhaps the NBA could argue that it is entitled under Bartnicki to use the laefully obtained (and thus constitutionally protected) recording in its private internal proceedings, meaning California law is limited only to public, California-established proceedings, but not to whatever private proceedings private persons and entities may adopt.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 29, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Current Affairs, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics, Sports | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, May 28, 2014

Is Wood v. Moss generalizable?

Wood v. Moss turned entirely on the reasonable security rationale of keeping protesters out of "weapons range" of the President, even if that meant moving only certain speakers out of visual and audio range of their target. But does this rationale apply to all public officials who have security details? Is the President sui generis  for security purposes? Or can the state troopers who protect, say, Gov. Chris Christie also claim a security interest in moving protesters out of weapons range? Certainly the President has a larger security apparatus and is more of an obvious target. But the security logic of Wood is not so obviously limited, especially since there was no evidence that anyone intended to harm the President here (other than the protesters' disagreement with him).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 28, 2014 at 07:52 AM in Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, May 27, 2014

The awfulness of Wood v. Moss

OK, if Town of Greece did not get me too worked up, Tuesday's decision in Wood v. Moss (summary here), while not surprising, is so bad as to have me going the other way. And this was a Ginsburg opinion for a unanimous Court, so I am all alone on the island on this one. The Court held that two Secret Service agents enjoyed qualified immunity because no case law had held that agents engaged in crowd control were obligated to ensure that competing groups are at comparable locations or given equal access at all times when reasonable security concerns are in play. Sounds simple enough, but inside the opinion is a lot of really bad stuff.

First, the Court makes explicit (it previously was implicit) that the absence of qualified immunity is an element of the claim, rather than qualified immunity being an affirmative defense. The Court stated that the plaintiff must plead facts, under the Twiqbal standard, showing that the defendants violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established. So this means qualified immunity is the default starting point--a plaintiff must carry the burden of persuasion both as to the facts on the ground and the state of the law.

Second, for the third time, the Court assumed without deciding  that a Bivens could be used for First Amendment claims (the issue was not preserved below). Eventually some defendant will be smart enough to preserve this issue (the hints are there) and the Court will resolve it--and likely not in a good way.

Third, while the Court purported to resolve the case on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis (no clearly established right ) rather than the first (no right violated), the analysis kept conflating the prongs and moving back and forth between them--there was a lot of discussion about why there was no violation here because the agents were motivated not by viewpoint discrimination but by security concerns. This is partly a consequence of the Court's insistence that the second prong must consider the right in the particular factual context and not at too high a level of generality, which invites entwinement of the two prongs. But the analysis (particularly at pp. 14-end) is all about why the agents were justified in moving the anti-Bush protesters (but not the pro-Bush protesters) in this case, not about anything having to do with prior case law. That sounds like the Court saying the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead a violation.

Fourth, the decision does not leave any obvious room for protesters to ever challenge Secret Service decisions regarding crowd control (which is what Justice Scalia urged during argument). The Court pays lip service to the principle that "government officials may not exclude from public places persons engaged in peaceful expressive activity solely because the government actor fears, dislikes, or disagrees with the views those persons express." And it insists (as the defendants conceded) that the First Amendment might be violated if the agents moved some protesters with "no objectively reasonable security rationale." But that principle will virtually always be trumped by the overriding concerns for protecting the President and it is impossible to imagine a case in which a court would find that the Secret Service lacked an objectively reasonable security rationale while protecting the President. Indeed, the only purported security rationale in this case was keeping the protesters out of "weapons range" of the President (Ginsburg repeats that phrase four times), even though there is no indication on the facts pled that anyone had or planned to use a weapon. Someone being in range raises, per se, a valid security rationale.

But the Court then summarily dismissed any significance of allegations regarding the diners permitted to remain inside the restaurant--obviously in "weapons range" of the President--as undermining the security rationale. The justices simply accept the defendants' argument that the diners “'could not have had any expectation that they would see the President that evening or any opportunity to premeditate a plan to cause him harm,'" and thus were not a security risk, even if within weapons range. Of course,the anti-Bush demonstrators also did not expect to see the President in the open courtyard; they originally only expected to be able to stand along the path of the President's motorcade as it drove by (with pro-Bush protesters on the opposite sidewalk). So they, too, could not have had any opportunity to premeditate a plan. If the diners were not security threats because they were not expecting to be near the President, then neither should the protesters be security threats. Except for one difference--the protesters held anti-Bush views and were there to express those views. So is the Court saying that everyone who disagrees with the President is a security threat if in weapons range and thus can constitutionally be kept from getting "too close" to the President (at least when he is outside his secure car)?

Fifth, the Court does a lot of factfinding (without acknowledging as much, of course) on a case that remains at the pleading stage. The Court finds and accepts the defendants' security rationale, even though the defendants still have not answered the complaint or offered their own factual allegations or evidence. The Court makes determinations about what maps of the area, included as part of the Complaint, show (perhaps another example of plaintiffs pleading themselves out of court by providing the additional information needed to comply with Iqbal). And the Court rejects inferences about differential treatment of the protesters as compared with the diners. It appears to be apply Iqbal's "obvious alternative explanation," although without saying so. Otherwise, these at least should be matters for discovery and summary judgment, if not the factfinder.

Finally, the plaintiffs alleged past instances of viewpoint discrimination by other Secret Service agents; they were trying for an inference from these past instances to an informal agency policy of viewpoint discrimination to the individual defendants acting pursuant to that policy. The Court rejected this out of hand, insisting that Bivens liability can attach only to the officer's own misconduct and declining to accept the plaintiffs' inferences. Putting aside that reasonable inferences should be drawn in the plaintiffs' favor on a 12(b)(6) motion, this seriously cramps the ability to ever plead viewpoint discrimination in the absence of an agent dumb enough to announce that he is moving speakers because of their viewpoint. Moreover, the Court points to the agency's official policy--which expressly prohibits viewpoint discrimination--as evidence that the agents did not act improperly. But repeated past instances of ignoring official policy at least raise an inference that officers regularly ignore official policy, suggesting that these officers also ignored the policy. At the very least, that should be enough at the pleading stage.

As I pointed out previously, at oral argument Justice Kennedy mused that "it seems to me that if this complaint doesn't survive, nothing will." And given what the Court finally said in this case, nothing will.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 27, 2014 at 08:25 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, May 26, 2014

Legal movie recommendation: "Shenandoah"

My wife's late father grew up in Shenandoah, PA (apparently, pronounced Shen'-en-doe-uh), a coal-mining town in east-central Pennsylvania populated (like many of these towns) by people of eastern European descent  (Poland, Lithuania, etc.). Back in the day, there was a small Jewish population in town that was received about as you would expect for the '40s and '50s; my father-in-law told of suffering anti-Semitic bullying (and worse) growing up and of rocks being thrown at the houses that were not decorated at Christmastime. My wife has not visited since she was a teen-ager (her family is gone from the area).

So she was struck to learn, belatedly, about a documentary called Shenandoah: The story of a working class town and the American dream on trial, released in 2012. It tells the story of the 2008 beating death of Luis Ramirez, an undocumented immigrant from Mexico living in town, by six white members of the high school football team (who shouted ethnic slurs during the attack) and the ethnic, xenophobic, divisions it created in the community. Two players were tried on third-degree murder and related charges in state court, but acquitted on all but simple assault; they then were convicted of federal hate crimes (here is the Third Circuit opinion affirming those convictions). One player pled guilty to federal hate crimes and testified against the other two. And a fourth attacker was a juvenile and not tried as an adult; he cooperated and received probation. (Several police officers also were charged with various federal crimes for helping the players cover-up the crime, with mixed results).

The movie simultaneously tells the story of the murder and the subsequent state court proceedings, of the football's team's unsuccessful season following the attack (playing without several key players), and of a struggling industrial town and how it is dealing with changing demographics. It is definitely a film worth seeing. A couple of thoughts on the film and the story.

One is the role of narrative choice. A main participant in the film was Brian Scully, the juvenile who received probation for his role in the attack. Scully is portrayed very sympathetically in the film--he is remorseful and thoughtful about what they did and how wrong it was, and he is seen achieving some redemption in joining the school musical (the football coach would not allow him to play while charges were pending) and graduating. But the facts in the Third Circuit opinion describe Scully as being more centrally involved in the assault, including in shouting ethnic slurs. The movie shows that the state-court defendants tried to shift blame to Scully, but it portrays this as an unfair lawyer move (that was unfortunately successful).

Second the film portrays the ethnic tension as something new, a product of the town's relatively new economic struggles and the new wave of Mexican immigration. But my father-in-law's experiences suggest that this tension is nothing new; there always have been insiders and outsiders in this community and outsiders have not been treated well. And the smallness of the town (there was much "celebration" of the small town in the film) exacerbates those problems, because outsiders simply stand out more. One of the more disturbing events was a rally in support of the defendants, with attendees wearing shirts and carrying  signs with messages like "I'm American and I speak English" and singing "patriotic" songs. It degenerated into people shouting epithets and sexually offensive comments at the victim's (Anglo) fiancee, who was there as part of a counter-protest. The tenor of the rally was captured by a speaker who said something to the effect of "he didn't deserve to die, but if he had stayed in his own country, he'd be alive today." There concededly is no good way to protest on something like this without looking like a bigot. But you can help yourself by not saying and doing bigoted things.

Third, I did not know that the Fair Housing Act has a hate-crimes provision, which was the basis for the federal convictions of the two assailants. The provision criminalizes violence, threats, or intimidation because of the victim's race and because he is occupying a dwelling or with the intent to prevent him from occupying a dwelling. The goal would appear to be stopping cross burnings and other acts directed at keeping people from integrating neighborhoods. But in affirming the conviction, the Third Circuit made clear the statute reached all conduct motivated by dislike of particular people seeking to live in an area. Statements made during the attack about this being "our town" and telling the victim to go home to Mexico and that he did not belong in Shenandoah, along with evidence the defendants generally did not like the influex of Mexicans into town, all suggested an intent to intimidate him and other Mexicans from dwelling in Shenandoah.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 26, 2014 at 09:23 AM in Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, May 21, 2014

JOTWELL: Malveaux on Marcus on Trans-Substantivity

The new Courts Law essay comes from Suzette Malveaux (Catholic), reviewing David Marcus Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law (BYU Law Review).

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 21, 2014 at 09:41 AM in Article Spotlight, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 20, 2014

Injury and standing, rights and merits

In this post, I suggested that the difference between an injury and a right (or claims of right) marks the difference between standing and merits. Richard's post explaining unspoken standing issues in Town of Greece offered as one possibility that while coercion is necessary to state an Establishment Clause claim, something less (say, mere offense at being subjected to sectarian prayer) is enough of an injury for standing. So are we saying the same thing?

My initial inclination was no. Richard notes that mere offense has not been sufficient injury in other contexts; for example, the stigma of race discrimination is insufficient to establish standing, as is knowledge of general wrongdoing by government. But I saw the offense in Greece as something different and more direct. The plaintiffs were offended by sectarian prayer with which they were directly confronted and made to sit through. A pure stigmatic or generalized injury would be a citizen who did not attend council meetings, but alleged that she was harmed simply because sectarian prayers were going on. It was not that there was something unique about the Establishment Clause that the Court was afraid to address; the nature of the conduct and thus the injury genuinely were different.

But as I think on it further, I am less sure we are not saying the same thing. The difference between Warth or Schlesinger and Town of Greece is the different nature of an injury caused by the Establishment Clause compared with the Equal Protection Clause, given the unique purposes of each provision. But if so, that is problematic for my attempted explanation for the standing/merits divide. It necessarily means that whether someone has suffered an injury-in-fact turns on the potential right at issue--in other words, something may be injury for one source of right (Establishment) but not for another (Equal Protection). This more closely links injury to right (or claim of right). And the closer those two things come together, the less standing doctrine makes sense as a concept distinct from merits and the more it appears as nothing more than a cheat to preempt ordinary merits analysis on some constitutional claims.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 20, 2014 at 01:59 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (5)

Two procedural cases of note

Two procedural cases having nothing to do with one another, other than being interesting (to me).

1) Monday's SCOTUS Orders List included Thomas v. Nugent, in which the Court GVR'd to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of last week's per curiam reversal without full briefing (also of the Fifth Circuit) in Tolan v. Cotton (which I wrote about here and here). I will simply quote what an alert reader wrote in an email: "So if the holding of Tolan is 'remember the basic concept of summary judgment, dummy,' then Thomas v Nugent seems to stand for the proposition 'you probably did it again, dummy, but your work was so sloppy that we're not even going to check it until you rewrite it.'" That about covers it.

2) Scott Dodson (Hastings) points me to this Ninth Circuit decision, written by Fed Courts guru Judge William Fletcher. A lot of Civ Pro/Fed Courts/Civil Rights stuff in here. Of particular note is the discussion at pp. 25-27. Part of the case involved the failure by the county to take sufficient steps to immediately find the family of an unidentified man shot and killed by a police officer (thus denying the family the opportunity to bury him in accordance with their Muslim faith). Among the many claims were I/I/E/D and negligence claims by the victim's siblings; the district court found they lacked standing because they had no legal interest in the disposition of the victim's remains and thus had not suffered an injury-in-fact. The court of appeals rejected that conclusion. The plaintiffs suffered emotional harm allegedly caused by the county's actions, which was sufficient to establish standing. Instead, the siblings' claims failed on the merits, because the county owed no duty to the siblings (defeating the negligence claims) and the county did not intend to cause the siblings emotional distress (defeating the I/I/E/D claims). But the absence of a valid claim of right reflects a failure of the claims on the merits, not an absence of standing/jurisdiction.

This standing analysis--resting on the distinction between injury-in-fact and right (in the Hohfeldian sense)--provides a different explanation for Richard's post on standing in Town of Greece (I tried to put this as a comment to that post, but Typepad is having some problems). There is a difference between whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury and whether his rights have been violated; the former goes to standing while the latter goes to the merits. In other words, a person can be injured, and thus have standing, even if the conduct at issue did not violate their rights, thus losing on the merits.

Here, for example, the siblings' emotional distress constitutes an injury-in-fact for standing, even if their rights were not actually violated (because there was no duty and no intent). In Town of Greece, the plaintiffs suffered an injury in that they were offended or felt excluded, even if their rights were not violated because only actual coercion runs afoul of the First Amendment; again, the plaintiffs have standing, but the claim fails on the merits. Or take one more example: The victim here suffered an injury-in-fact in being shot, providing standing (for his survivors), even if turns out the use of force was reasonable and thus the claim fails on the merits.

Now perhaps this distinction between injury and right is artificial or impossible to implement. But it may be the only way that standing does not swallow merits.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 20, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (1)

State panel denies InfiLaw license

The South Carolina Committee on Academic Affairs and Licensing voted 3-1 to recommended rejection of the sale of Charleston Law School to InfiLaw. Members cited two lawsuits against the company by other law schools. Faculty, students, and alumni all oppose the sale. It now goes to the full Commission on Higher Education for a vote on June 6.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 20, 2014 at 07:50 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, May 19, 2014

More on taxis and the First Amendment

I draw out my thoughts on the swastika-wearing cab driver in a column at law.com.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 19, 2014 at 09:41 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, May 17, 2014

Trimesters?

Jennifer raises a good point: There is too much law to know now. I can think of several subjects I would add to Texas Tech's upper-level requirments. So perhaps the solution is breadth over depth--expose students to a bit less of more areas and subjects. And if that is what we are after, what about a trimester/quarter system? Stanford and Chicago are the most prominent law schools to follow that calendar (Stanford switched about five years ago). And Northeastern uses a year-round quarter system, with students alternating quarters in the classroom and in field co-ops over the course of three calendar years. I did undergrad on a quarter system and really enjoyed the academic experience.

The trade-off in law school is obvious. Students can take 12 courses in an academic year rather than 8-10, so they can be exposed to more subjects and areas. But instead of 13 weeks/52 class hours of a four-hour course, they get 10 weeks/40 class hours; instead of  13 weeks/39 hours of a three-hour course, they get 10 weeks/30 class hours. In Civ Pro, for example, this means so long Erie and discovery.

Thoughts? For those teaching at/attending/attended Stanford or Chicago, how did you like the trimester system? Does the trade-off work and is it worth it? Do we need to trade depth to get additional breadth?

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 17, 2014 at 07:23 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, May 16, 2014

First Amendment problem?

A New York City cab driver who was seen driving around wearing an armband with a Nazi swastika has had his license suspended for 30 days by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission. How does this not raise significant First Amendment problems?

The TLC is an agency of the New York City government. The driver, Gabriel Diaz, appears to be an independent contractor operating under a government license and not an employee of the city or the TLC. According to this report, the suspension was for violating § 54-12(e) of the regulations for medallion cab drivers, which prohibits commission of  "any act that is against the best interests of the public." But the act at issue--wearing the arm band--is unquestionably expressive. There is no indication he ever refused to transport anyone. Is the issue that the armband effectively dissuades people from getting in his cab? But is that enough to overcome his First Amendment interests? Isn't it on him if he chooses to forego income by presenting an unwelcoming vehicle? Or is there an analogy to a licensed attorney who has a Nazi flag in his office--"I'm willing to represent anyone who comes through the door, sorry if you don't want to retain me because of this flag"? How is this different than if he were listening to neo-Nazi radio programs in his cab?

There is a Travis Bickle joke to be made here. But in the meantime, please tell me what I am missing here.

Update: The ADL's public statement praising the suspension made the "message of exclusion" argument, stating that Diaz "sent a frightening and offensive message to New Yorkers about who might be welcome – and unwelcome – in the taxicab he was driving." And this story summarizes Diaz's political beliefs, sarcastically describing him as a "[c]harming fellow all around." But that does not change the role of the First Amendment in prohibiting government from stripping even a "charming fellow" of a business license solely because he holds and wishes to express those reprehensible views.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 16, 2014 at 11:00 PM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (5)

Justice Scalia and the upper-level curriculum

Following on my post on Justice Scalia's William & Mary commencement address.

Scalia also criticizes the absence of required upper-level classes, noting the curriculum from his Harvard days. I probably would be all for required upper-level classes, but do not see how it would happen. The problem is that the first-mover would be at too-great a disadvantage. Schools are now actively and competitively recruiting good students and students are playing schools against one another; one thing schools may try to offer is "flexibility" in the final two years and the chance to "create" an upper-level course package. School A thus can sell that flexibility as against School X and its mandatory post-1L classes (however limited they may be). School X is not going to win the battle for that student (all else being equal), even if its approach may produce better Scaliaesque lawyers-as-professionals.

On the other hand, is that move necessary? At least outside the super-elite schools, the pressure of bar passage causes schools to push students hard towards "bar-tested" courses, which likely are the same courses that schools would make mandatory in any event.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 16, 2014 at 01:53 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (10)

Justice Scalia on legal education

Justice Scalia delivered the law school commencement address at William & Mary earlier this week week and had a lot to say about two-year law schools, "carefully-structured skills-based experience," and the difference between law-as-trade and law-as-profession. Will Baude offers his thoughts. Apropos of my post last month about what every lawyer should know, Scalia specifically points to the First Amendment:

Can someone really call himself an American lawyer who has that gap in his compendious knowledge of the law? And can a society that depends so much upon lawyers for shaping public perceptions and preserving American traditions regarding the freedom of speech and religion, afford so ignorant a bar?

This all reflects a very Tocquevillian view of the law and lawyers as a learned intellectual aristoracy. And much of the resistance to proposals such as two-year law schools and all-experiential education rests on a similar view.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 16, 2014 at 11:22 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, May 14, 2014

Faculty protest at Charleston Law

In the run-up to hearings and a vote (scheduled for next Monday) by the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education regarding the sale of Charleston Law School to InfiLaw, the tenured faculty and untenured faculty (speaking through counsel and anonymously, for fear of retribution) have sent letters to the Commission urging denial of InfiLaw's request for a license to operate the school. The tenured-faculty letter notes the "culture of intimidation and fear--fear of reprisal for speaking out against the transaction or even voicing concerns" about the proposed sale and a desire not to "see the Charleston School of Law mirror the admissions practices, attrition rates, transfer rates, or educational programs of the InfiLaw consortium schools." (For an alleged picture of alleged life at an InfliLaw school, see this lawsuit by two tenured professors fired by InfiLaw-owned Phoenix School of Law).

The Commission has hearings scheduled for this Friday and next Monday morning, with a vote scheduled for Monday afternoon.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 14, 2014 at 08:00 PM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 13, 2014

Web Series: "Approach the Bench"

The final installment of the web series Approach the Bench.

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 13, 2014 at 08:16 AM in Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, May 10, 2014

Workshop Advice

Hear, hear. (From Feminist Law Professors) (H/T: Kerri Stone):

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Posted by Howard Wasserman on May 10, 2014 at 09:31 AM in Howard Wasserman, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (3)