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Monday, September 11, 2017

Who Cares Whether Cake-Baking Is "Expressive"? The Doctrinal Costs of Focusing on Private Burdens Rather Than Governmental Purpose

In their focus on the creative artistry of wedding cakes, the briefs that are now piling up in Masterpiece Cakeshop read more like an episode of Cake Boss rather than a typical SCOTUS argument. Many focus on a question that, I shall suggest after the jump, ought to be legally irrelevant -- whether baking a wedding cake is sufficiently "expressive" to qualify as "speech" the compulsion of which violates Wooley v. Maynard's "forced speech" doctrine. Baker & Botts has submitted an amicus brief on behalf of "cake artists" that dives the deepest down this particular rabbit hole of edible art by supplying the justices with numerous photos of (admittedly gorgeous) cakes the sole point of which is to prove that cake-makers are artists entitled to the same protection from regulatory burdens that any other artist enjoys.

The problem with this focus on the burdens experienced by artists is that, as Elena Kagan and Jed Rubenfeld both argued roughly two decades ago, it should be, legally irrelevant. First Amendment doctrine generally focuses on governmental purpose, not private burdens. If the local health department, for instance, forced Jack Phillips to post a sign ordering employees to wash their hands after using the bathroom, the content-neutrality of the requirement's purpose (at least prior to the stringent formalism of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, which may have caused the law of warning signs to fly off the rails) and its commercial purpose would sustain the rule, regardless of how artistically Phillips wielded his spatula. By contrast, even if Phillips were a mere confectioner drudge devoid of creativity, it would raise a serious constitutional question for the Colorado Human Rights Commission to require him to post a sign declaring that same-sex marriage is morally equal to heterosexual marriage. The difference between the two rules is not the private burden imposed but the public purpose expressed: The first sign is patently aimed at prevention of spread of disease, whereas the second seems to aim at barring the spread of ideas.

And yet the Masterpiece Cakeshop briefs, in kind of odd doctrinal atavism, focus on some old burden-based tests derived from mostly outmoded precedents like O'Brien and Spence. First Amendment Speech and Press doctrine of "expressive association," combined with "forced speech" precedents like Wooley, invite briefing on the incidental burdens on bakers' expression by even content-neutral anti-discrimination law. Despite the urging of Kagan and Rubenfeld, there is still no Speech & Press clause precedent analogous to Washington v. Davis or Employment Division v. Smith presumptively making the presence or absence of a content-neutral purpose the test of constitutional liability.

After the jump, some thoughts about (1) why this focus on private burdens rather than governmental purpose comes at a high doctrinal cost and (2) why courts and litigators are tempted nevertheless to pay the price anyway.

1. The Costs of Burden-Based Approaches to Private Rights

Measuring constitutional liability by assessing private burdens invites one of two judicial responses. First, courts can define the forbidden type of burden by some categorical rule that does not require comparison of private burdens against the challenged regulation's public benefits. Second, courts can treat the right to be free from excessive burdens on their expression as a defeasible rule that can be outweighed by a sufficiently compelling governmental interest. Either approach tends to be practically costly: The categorical rules tend to be badly matched to any plausibly constitutional purpose, while the mushy balancing looks illegitimately legislative.

The Becket Fund's excellent amicus brief provides a good example of a question-begging categorical rule. Becket Fund's brief valiantly defends an apparently crisp doctrine: No one can be forced to "participate in wedding ceremonies," period. On the Becket Fund's theory, it does not matter whether or not Jack Phillips has poured his artistic heart and soul into his cake batter (brief at page 14 n.7), because "regardless of whether wedding cakes are expressive (they are), there can be no doubt that weddings themselves are highly expressive" (id. at page 13), and First Amendment free speech doctrine bars Colorado from forcing Phillips to "participate in" someone else's expressive event. "The government simply has no power to force anyone to celebrate, clap, salute, praise or otherwise support another’s religious event," the Becket Fund asserts. On this view, the First Amendment bars Colorado from forcing anyone, even "unartistic" businesspersons like hotel owners, limo drivers, furniture renters, and the like from being dragooned into "supporting" or "participating in" a ceremony.

Alas, the crisp character of the Becket Fund's rule breaks down as soon as one digs a bit deeper into what it means to "participate in" a ceremony. After all, Jack Phillips is not being asked to show up at the ceremony, let alone "celebrate, clap, salute, [or] praise" it: He is being asked to deliver a product to the site of the reception, presumably before the ceremony even occurs. So why is the sale and delivery of a product a form of coerced "participation"? PruneYard Shopping Center was not forced to "participate in" pro-Israel activism merely by being forced to let the activists occupy its real estate. Why is Phillips being forced to "participate in" a wedding ceremony merely he is forced to let a same-sex couple occupy his cake?

To make the leap from cake-baking to "participation," the Becket Fund has to re-introduce the "Cake Boss" argument: According to the Becket Fund, cakes are "communicative," because a "large fancy cake" will "send and celebrate messages about the couple" (Page 24). Jack Phillips' cakes are indeed fancy, and they might indeed promote a celebratory mood among the guests. If that message is entirely incidental to the public accommodation law's purpose, however, then why should such a communicative effect matter? Suppose that the local health department requires Phillips to use pasteurized milk even though Phillips vehemently believes in the health benefits of raw milk: If his use of pasteurized milk dilutes Phillips' capacity to send a message of contempt towards pasteurization, then must the law be subject to heightened scrutiny? To ask the question (I hope) is to answer it: The government's genuine desire to protect public health cannot be stymied merely because it conflicts with someone's expressive project, if the government has no interest in suppressing that project.

The United States' amicus brief illustrates the other lemma of burden-based arguments -- not the metaphysical silliness of trying to distinguish between "expression" and plain old "conduct" but rather the political illegitimacy of judges' engaging in cost-benefit balancing for which they have no institutional advantage over the legislatures they are reviewing.

According to the United States, Colorado's law banning discrimination based on sexual orientation unconstitutionally compels expression without an adequately "compelling" justification. By contrast, the United States urges that a similar prohibition on racial discrimination would be justified even under "heightened scrutiny," because the states' racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause. This dragooning of "suspect classification" doctrine into the role of resolving a conflict between rival values of private expressive autonomy and public enforcement of equality shows how badly lawyers are likely to perform in striking such balances. The doctrine of suspect classifications governs state actors' use of racial classifications, not private actors' expressive rights: Private parties are constitutionally entitled to draw suspect classifications in their racist speech. The First Amendment's Speech clause, after all, protects Nazis' marching in Skokie and similar racist speech. Presumably, the First Amendment would also immunize those parading Nazis from being required to carry signs praising racial and religious equality. If a public accommodations law really forces a racist to display a message with which the racist disagrees, therefore, it does not seem plausible to say that the state's compelling interest in suppressing racism justifies that law, anymore than the state's interest in suppressing racism justifies Skokie's shutting down the Nazis' parade or requiring them to recite MLK's "I have a dream" speech.

Behind the argument for purpose-based doctrine lies John Hart Ely's institutional insight that courts have no institutional advantage over legislatures and bureaucrats when the latter act for constitutionally acceptable reasons. If non-judicial lawmakers do not seek to undermine expression, then they are trustworthy enough to balance the value of expression against other benefits without aggressive judicial oversight. Of course, even a pure-minded legislator or bureaucrat might negligently slight speech by carelessly imposing a rule with costs for expression exceeding the rule's non-expressive benefits. Except for Judge Posner (who has Herculean confidence in judges' or at least his own balancing abilities), we ordinarily believe that the democratic and bureaucratic process suffices to cure these mistakes just so long as the non-judicial decision-makers are not actually hostile to the messages that they accidentally curtail.

2. So why do we not have a wholly purpose-based speech doctrine?

The doctrine of "expressive association" in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale revived the idea that private expressive rights should be determined by a judicial assessment of how much a law burdens the right-holders' capacity to communicate a message. Rumsfeld v. FAIR peremptorily trimmed back on Dale's burden-based analysis by peremptorily limiting Dale to laws affecting an organization's membership, but, because FAIR gave no real reasons for its limit, any good lawyer can distinguish FAIR and set Dale's burden-based zombie back on its feet when the facts differ from FAIR's. That is why the United States' amicus brief cites Dale twelve times: Dale provides a little island of burden-based doctrine in a sea of doctrinal hostility towards challenges attacking content-neutral laws.

Why do lawyers and judges persist in pressing and accepting burden-based arguments in the special enclave of "expressive association" doctrine when they have mostly been abandoned in other areas? One reason might be suspicion about the real purpose of anti-discrimination laws. Although such laws do not facially target speech, they might seem to have a hidden agenda of stigmatizing business owners' beliefs under the guise of protecting access to goods and services. When applied to non-profit associations that do not sell anything (e.g., the Boy Scouts) or to small retail businesses for which there are many competiting suppliers of whatever is being sold (e.g., Masterpiece Bakeshop), the minimal material benefits of the law suggests that it is less a content-neutral effort to insure equal market access and more a content-based effort to stigmatize the message conveyed by the business owners' refusal to serve. Dale seems to offer such a purpose-based argument for striking down New Jersey's enforcement of its anti-discrimination law against the Boy Scouts in its penultimate sentence's quotation of Hurley: Anti-discrimination law, according to Dale, is not free to interfere with speech "'for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.'" In emphasizing New Jersey's bad reasons for burdening the Boy Scout's speech, in other words, Dale justified a burden-based rule with a purpose-based rationale. (I argued that Dale had such a purpose-based rationale ‘way back in 2003).

Put to one side, for a moment, the question of whether Masterpiece Bakeshop ought to prevail under such a theory. (My own view FWIW is that proper deference in a federal system to a state's characterization of its own legislative purpose should lead the SCOTUS to uphold Colorado's law). Would it not be better if this sort of purpose-based rationale played a more prominent role in the Masterpiece Bakeshop argument? I could imagine Colorado's defending its law on the ground that allowing retailers to refer customers to competing businesses would impose unequal regulatory burdens on businesses located in small towns with thin markets. I could imagine Masterpiece Bakeshop responding that such a system of facilitated referral would so easily accommodate the state's legitimate ends that forcing Jack Phillips to bake the cake rather than refer the customer to another bakery could serve only the purpose of gratuitously stigmatizing Phillips' beliefs. All of these inquiries make sense to me as a judicial investigation of the state's reliability as a fair regulator of the marketplace for confections that does not seek to take sides in the marketplace of ideas.

But what I cannot really understand is why any court would want to adjudicate the question, constitutionally meaningless to me, of whether Jack Phillips is an artistic craftsman or instead just a businessman. He is obviously both, and I cannot see why constitutional law should care.

Posted by Rick Hills on September 11, 2017 at 08:23 AM | Permalink

Comments

Side point for sure, but I think it's a little disingenuous to claim a case is evidence that Reed v. Town of Gilbert has "caused" an area of First Amendment law to go "off the rails" when that case doesn't cite Reed once.

Posted by: Enrique Armijo | Sep 11, 2017 11:36:34 AM

It's not that forcing someone to put up a sign reminding people to wash their hands isn't speech, it's that its a necessary health regulation. Copyright laws punish speech, but it doesn't mean that copyright is illegal. Copyright takes precedence over completely free speech to ensure that free speech doesn't prevent markets.

Baking a cake for a wedding is not a necessary health regulation (or a copyright violation, or libel, or CP, or treason, or forced school prayer), anymore than forcing Michael Brown's mother's bakery to bake a cake for a police retirement party is a health regulation.

Posted by: Forced Art is not the same as a health regulation | Sep 11, 2017 1:26:16 PM

The cake is expressive for the same reason a "painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schönberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll" are expressive.

Would you see the case differently if instead of a baker it was a painter who was commissioned to paint a painting of the wedding? Or if it was a musician commissioned to compose a wedding march for the wedding?

Surely forcing someone to wash their hands or obey traffic laws is not the same as forcing someone to create art that will neither prevent or cure disease, right?

Posted by: Hurley Burley | Sep 11, 2017 1:35:15 PM

"whether Jack Phillips is an artistic craftsman or instead just a businessman. He is obviously both, and I cannot see why constitutional law should care."

Because freedom of speech is protected under the constitution while freedom of contract is not. Lochner (like Roe and Lawrence) can be overruled because it's not an enumerated right; freedom of speech is.

Posted by: Lawrence Roes the Boat | Sep 11, 2017 1:40:40 PM

There's a big difference between forcing a student to take a test (or wash their hands) and forcing them to say a school-organized prayer. The test is part of school, the prayer is not.

Not discriminating is an intrinsic part of being a business open to the public (i.e., the whole public), catering weddings or police retirement parties or KKK rallies (and therefore being associated with them) is not.

Posted by: Catering a KKK rally | Sep 11, 2017 1:45:14 PM

People have a right to drink raw milk because it doesn't lead to AIDS like gay sex does. That is, if AIDS doesn't mean gay sex creates an imminent danger, than neither does drinking raw milk. People who drink raw milk live longer than AIDS patients.

Posted by: raw milk is safer than anal sex | Sep 11, 2017 1:51:16 PM

If marijuana is safe, than so is raw milk. If medicinal marijuana is safe, then so is medicinal raw milk.

Posted by: raw milk is safer than marijuana | Sep 11, 2017 1:53:15 PM

I think being "artistic" matters somewhat but as Breyer noted in a recent case involving regulating credit transactions, a myriad of things has some sort of expressive content. The 1A is specifically concerned with expression, but that alone doesn't trump in many cases. Things have to be looked at as a whole.

It is not a matter of "merely." It is a matter of there some reason to be at least somewhat more careful in certain cases. But, here you have someone who said 'no' merely when a cake was asked for. The "expressive" content there was slight and as suggested any number of things might allegedly do that. A wedding cake has a certain symbolic character but so does the wedding itself and various other events. Supplying any of them might somehow be "expressive."

So, that alone can't seal the deal. Plus, you have a compelling state interest to address discrimination. OTOH, if it was some relatively trivial interest, which many laws might promote, I might be more wary. Since, yes, expression is important even when balancing other things.

Posted by: Joe | Sep 11, 2017 1:57:30 PM

"The Black Man is being asked to deliver a product to the site of the KKK Rally, presumably before the rally even begins. So why is the sale and delivery of a product a form of coerced "participation"?"

The Black Man has a right to stay as far away from KKK rallies as he desires. Just because The Black Man wants to get off of welfare by starting a business does not mean he has to go to KKK rallies.

Posted by: Been Carson | Sep 11, 2017 2:01:05 PM

Would you rather your kids drink vodka or raw milk? Would you rather your kids take up smoking or drinking raw milk? So if drinking and smoking are safe, then so is raw milk.

Posted by: Marlboro Camel | Sep 11, 2017 2:09:06 PM

I second the comment previously regarding interesting comments.

These discussions are interesting. Hope some of these comments don't turn off people from leaving comments open.

Posted by: Joe | Sep 11, 2017 2:23:05 PM

I really want to agree with Rick here, but I can't. As long as we refrain from silly mystifications about who or what constitutes "art" or whatever, it seems reasonable and quite workable to have an objective burden-based doctrine, i.e., a doctrine based on the idea that there are some social contexts in which compelling someone to carry a government message might also lead people to come to the unjustified conclusion that the someone endorses that message. After all, I take it that the point of constitutionalizing a prohibition against censorship is precisely that we do not (pace Ely) trust legislatures to balance expression against other stuff.

(That being said, it also seems bloody silly to me to think that requiring someone to serve a wedding cake in any way undermines their capacity to express their disapproval of same-sex marriage. AND at the same time, it also seems bloody silly to try to regulate away this kind of low-level baker bigotry as opposed to just letting the market and the disapproval of neighbors handle it. Bakers aren't common carriers, we're not talking about employment or access to basic human needs, it's different from, e.g., the only pharmacist in town refusing to sell contraception, where there's a serious injury. Why would you even want to buy a cake from a bigot baker? So I really disagree with everyone about everything here.)

Posted by: Paul Gowder | Sep 11, 2017 5:17:57 PM

(Note that the last comment changes if there's a pervasive and stigmatizing refusal to sell cakes to same-sex weddings.)

Posted by: Paul Gowder | Sep 11, 2017 5:19:38 PM

I did not think anti-discrimination law where customers are not discriminated against for basic characteristics like race, sex or sexual orientation was only not "bloody silly" when "basic human needs" are involved. Or, if there was only one store in town that sells an item.

I personally don't care about the beliefs of store owners when I buy stuff at my local bakery, perhaps because by law they cannot deny service for basic things like my race, sex or sexual orientation. And, I might want to buy stuff at a certain store for various reasons -- including because the cake is well made, the price is right, it's close by etc. -- even if the person who sells it is a bigot.

Posted by: Joe | Sep 11, 2017 5:51:07 PM

I appreciate - well, thanks to you I do now - that burden tests have problems asnd that it would be nice to get away from them with an up-or-down rule about purpose. But I don't think they can be gotten away from so simply. If Colorado's law had the purpose of stigmatizing the message conveyed by sexual-orientation discrimination, I don't see how that could make it invalid in all applications. Even supposing that all open discrimination in the provision of any service is expressive inasmuch as it conveys a discriminatory message, not all discrimination is open; often it's pretextual. Someone who aims to keep their discrimination against gays in the provision of, say, plumbing isn't expressing a thing, so unless you go pretty far down the road of valid-rule theory, I don't see how he can have a First Amendment claim, whatever the statute's purpose, and hence, can't see how we can get away from deciding if the plaintiff's conduct is expressive or not. Maybe purpose could be the sole criterion of constitutionality once we decided if we had a plaintiff engaged in protected speech or not, but I think we at least must decide that much. You say that even if Philips were a drudge it would raise a serious First Amendment problem to make him post a sign about gay marriage; yes, but that's at least in part because he'd be speaking when he posted the sign and not solely because of the purpose of the law.

Posted by: Asher Steinberg | Sep 11, 2017 6:04:40 PM

I mean, "in the provision of. say, plumbing a secret . . ."

Posted by: Asher Steinberg | Sep 11, 2017 6:07:10 PM

Joe, "bloody silly" was an overstatement---I think I just believe more in shaming and shunning for this kind of isolated & small-scale bigotry. Mostly because it seems like it would be a more effective strategy, given that large majorities of Americans support same-sex marriage.

I also don't know what it's like in really red areas though. Do the bigoted bakers actually get shamed once people recognize their bigotry? (They definitely would in somewhere like Iowa City---a baker who refused to serve same-sex couples would lose the business of most of the community. But this is a college town... and maybe my perception of the scale of the harm is biased by that being here.)

Posted by: Paul Gowder | Sep 11, 2017 8:24:42 PM

How about we make raw milk prescription, like opioids. Adults seem to be able to take opioids without problems (otherwise we'd ban them), so they should be equally responsible enough to take raw milk.

Posted by: prescription raw milk | Sep 12, 2017 1:36:03 AM

Would you rather your pregnant wife drink a bottle of vodka or raw milk every day while pregnant?

Posted by: raw milk doesn't mutate pregnancies | Sep 12, 2017 6:32:12 AM

HERE'S AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS

The Washington State Supreme Court unanimously ruled just a few months ago that a florist who had repeatedly served a gay couple nevertheless illegally discriminated against them when she refused to provide flowers for a wedding of two homosexual men.

But would she be equally guilty if she refused to provide flowers for white supremacists celebrating the murder of a black person, or heterosexuals glorifying the rape of young girls?

This is similar to instances where bakeries in Indiana, Colorado, and Oregon were sued for refusing to provide wedding cakes with two grooms on the top. In each of these cases, the refusals were based upon strongly held religious beliefs which reject same-sex marriages, and their participation in them.

While these cases seemingly create an irreconcilable conflict between religious freedom and freedom from discrimination, there’s a simple way to safeguard both very important interests.

This novel answer is to simply follow the clear language of the anti-discrimination statutes, and punish denials of services where they are based upon the status of the PERSON requesting service (e.g., gay, female, black), but not when the denial is based solely the ACTIVITY to which the merchant strongly objects, and feels would violate his religious or other deeply held beliefs.

Note that religious Christians who do not wish to sell he-and-he wedding cakes for gay weddings - like religious Jews who do not want to bake swastika-shaped cakes for the KKK, or Muslims who do not wish to cater weddings at which alcohol will be served - might be able to do so legally by having a uniform business policy which applies equally to all prospective purchasers, regardless of the customers’ individual sexual orientation, religious beliefs, etc.

In states which have laws prohibiting discrimination against people based upon their sexual orientation, it would be illegal for a baker to refuse to sell any kind of cake to a person simply because of his sexual orientation. But refusing to sell a wedding cake with a same-sex statue or a male-male floral arrangement to anyone at all, regardless of sexual orientation, would not violate the words of the statute since nobody is being discriminated against because of their own sexual orientation.

So, if a baker would refuse to prepare and sell such a cake to a gay person, but would do the same (i.e. deny it) if the request for exactly the same cake came from a best man who is straight, or from the heterosexual mother of one of the celebrants, the letter of the law wouldn't be broken because the refusal is not based upon a protected characteristic of the customer such as sexual orientation, but rather upon the activity the devout merchant is being forced to support - same-sex weddings.

Similarly, a Jewish bakery might have a policy against baking a cake in the shape of a swastika, whether it is ordered by a German Nazi sympathizer, a racist fraternity, a Jewish student seeking to "take back" the hated symbol (similar to a recent situation at GWU), a crude friend who wants it as a joke, etc.

In each case, there is no discrimination based upon a protected factor because the baker is treating all prospective purchasers the same, regardless of sexual orientation, gender, religion, etc.

One advantage of limiting anti-discrimination statutes to protection against refusals to serve customers based upon the customers’ own sexual orientation, but permitting businesses and others not to utter messages (including cake decoration, flower arrangements, etc.) of which they disapprove, means the government (bureaucrat or judge) doesn’t have to engage in a subjective balancing act regarding how compelling is the government’s interest, are there other feasible approaches, how expressive are flower arrangements, wedding cakes, etc.

It also does not unfairly elevate religious freedom above similar desires not to participate based upon ethical/moral grounds rather than religious ones.

For example, there are many bakers - including those who are agnostics or even atheists - who have very strong objections to what the Nazi swastika stands for, and would refuse as a matter of conscience not to bake such a cake, regardless of who ordered it and for what purpose.

The problem with trying to use religious freedom arguments to protect people such as these bakers put into such situations is that it would protect bakers who refuse to make such cakes based upon their own religious beliefs, but not those who do it for simple moral or ethical considerations, he says.

Doing this - permitting merchants to refuse to provide services based upon the activity they are being forced to support, but not permitting them to deny services solely based upon the characteristics of those requesting the service - would eliminate this unnecessary disparity.

Most people would probably agree that no baker should be required to prepare a cake with a symbol to which he is strongly opposed, for religious or for other ethical or moral reasons. No baker should be forced to bake a cake encouraging (or opposing) abortion (depending on his point of view), supporting or opposing gun control, depicting sexual activity or witchcraft, etc. against their wishes.

This simple distinction is illustrated by two recent decisions involving bakeries. Recently, the Colorado Civil Rights Division ruled that a cake shop could not refuse to make a wedding cake for a gay couple, calling it discriminatory, because its refusal was based upon the sexual orientation of the customers.

However, when a man ordered cakes with writing a Denver bakery considered derogatory towards gays, its refusal to provide the cakes was upheld because the bakery would refuse to provide a cake with that language to any potential customer - gay or straight, Christian or atheist, etc., and for any purpose.

Although the customer claimed that the refusal to provide a cake with this message was "demeaning to his beliefs," the agency said the owner was within his rights to refuse to put a message on cakes which included "derogatory language and imagery," provided it would do so for all customers.

These two decisions illustrate how such an approach can work in practice. No bakery can refuse to provide services to customers, just because they happen to be Christian, gay, black, female, etc.

However, every merchant would be free not to support by participating in an activity to which he is strongly morally opposed - whether because of religion, or for reasons of ethics, morals, or good taste.

No civil rights official or judge has to make any decision about whether the religious motive is sincere, whether the state’s interest is sufficiently compelling, whether an owner’s religious views should give a business more leeway than other businesses to refuse service, or how much First Amendment protected speech is involved in providing the service.

To the question of how can the government tell whether the refusal to provide a particular service is based upon the sexual orientation of the customer, or simply the activity which the service would support, the government can use the same technique utilized in traditional civil rights cases.

If a real estate broker refuses to show or sell a house to a black couple, but does the same when confronted with a similarly situated white test couple, the refusal to provide service was not based upon race.

Similarly, if a baker refuses to sell a same-sex wedding cake not only to a gay couple, but also to straight (even test) customers, there is no discrimination based upon sexual orientation.

There is no inherent conflict between religious freedom and a freedom from discrimination, if anti-discrimination statutes are simply interpreted this way.

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW PROFESSOR JOHN BANZHAF


Posted by: LawProf John Banzhaf | Sep 16, 2017 6:12:53 PM

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