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Friday, February 23, 2007
Highlights of "The Charter@25," and a Scalia Contest
Thank you so much to one of my commenters for referring me to this Globe & Mail story discussing the dialogue between Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie and U.S. Justice Antonin Scalia at the conference marking the 25th anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms. Neither Justice disappointed, with what would seem like interesting and newsworthy comments by both. The usual caution that this is a newspaper story and not gospel applies.
Binnie, says the story, "extolled the virtues of measured judicial activism over an archaic notion of 'frozen rights' that do not evolve with the times." He added: "'The ability of the courts to move with the times has served this country very well. . . . I say that if you erect a silo over our court system based on a theory of originalism, it is a very good reason to throw it out.'" Finally, he said, "'[J]udges are as much a part of society as anyone else, and they can recognize a dead letter when they see one.'"
Scalia, for his part, derided the notion of living constitutionalism, saying, "'It is blindingly clear that judges have no greater moral capacity than the rest of us to decide what is right.'" Scalia suggested that living constitutionalism, in the story's words, "simply encourages judges to make anti-democratic decisions that extend rights to questionable groups such as bigamists and pederasts." Scalia ridiculed Roe v. Wade for failing to decide when a fetus becomes human life. Finally, responding to a discussion of a Canadian Supreme Court decision involving criminal justice, he said, "'I have been on the court for 20 years and I have not seen a case where I thought there was the slightest doubt about the person's innocence.'"
My own thoughts about the Justices' remarks are after the jump. First, though, a question and challenge for Prawfsblawg readers about Scalia's quote in bold above. I can't judge his subjective views, and I don't have the criminal law chops to evaluate this statement. Many of you do, however, so I ask: On a reasonably objective view, do you think he's right? Can any Prawfsblawg readers supply the names of cases either argued before the Court or in which cert. was sought in the past 20 years in which, in your view, any reasonable person would harbor more than "the slightest doubt about the person's innocence?" I look forward to your responses. Again, click through for more.
Some of my views on the story:
First, whatever the virtues of "mov[ing] with the times," Justice Binnie is surely too simple in suggesting that the vehicle for doing so must be the courts. The Charter itself provides an amendment procedure, and of course its scope might be read narrowly to allow for legislative developments that the courts would then enforce, so there are lots of ways to move with the times that don't involve aggressive Charter interpretation. His "dead letter" remark raises the disturbing specter of judges not only aggressively interpreting the Charter, but also selectively underenforcing a binding legal document on grounds of social progress. And Binnie offers no metric to assess his claim that the Canadian courts have served the country well in the post-Charter era; at the least, he would have to weigh not only the direct effects of rulings, but also any damage to full and vigorous citizen participation in the political process caused by the judicialization of central issues of Canadian life. I might add one point in mitigation of Binnie's remarks, however: Canada's Charter also provides an override mechanism, so we might see courts there as having greater warrant to interpret the Charter in a more aggressive manner than they would in the U.S., since the Canadian system provides a mechanism for political intervention in court rulings that falls short of the demanding requirements for constitutional amendment.
Given those failings in Binnie's remarks, you might say Scalia takes the debate on points. And that would be true if "Good Scalia" -- the Justice who preaches a narrow judicial role for methodological and democratic reasons -- had shown up. But it looks as if "Bad Scalia" attended the Montreal conference. I don't mean that as a comment on his political views. Rather, I mean it in the sense of a Scalia who undermines his own view of the ideal judge as one who simply interprets the original understanding of the Constitution without injecting his own political views, by making arguments that appeal directly to those political views. Under Scalia's ideal vision of constitutional interpretation as I understand it, we ought not give a damn what the Justice thinks of "questionable groups such as bigamists and pederasts." (And, I'm sure Scalia would add sotto voce, "homosexuals.") The Constitution protects their rights or does not; and if it does not, the political process can decide whether to protect them or not. But he has little or no business selling his vision of the Constitution based on his own substantive views about who the "questionable groups" in our society are or what the Constitution ought to say about them. Every time he opens his mouth to make such statements, he lends ammunition to those who argue that his supposedly loyal interpretation of the Constitution happens to favor views he doubtless holds personally. I'm not saying his interpretive method is therefore a ruse, nor am I critiquing his personal political views. But his arguments about the narrow judicial role would be much stronger if he could resist the temptation to share his own presumably irrelevant political views and use them as support for his substantive views on the Constitution, as he seems regularly to do at such conferences.
Posted by Paul Horwitz on February 23, 2007 at 08:55 AM in Constitutional thoughts | Permalink
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Comments
This is an excellent post.
Posted by: Steve H | Feb 23, 2007 11:54:14 AM
Not to be too "lawerly," but there's a problem with your challenge. Scalia said that there hasn't been a case in which HE "thought there was the slightest doubt about the person's innocence." You're asking us readers to "supply the names of cases either argued before the Court or in which cert. was sought in the past 20 years in which, in [our] view, any reasonable person would harbor more than 'the slightest doubt about the person's innocence there.'"
The reason this is a problem is because it likely eliminates the most recent candidate: House v. Bell, decided just last term. A majority of the Court in that case believed that it was more likely than not that no reasonable jury would have found Paul House guilty beyond a reasonable doubt had all of the relevant information been before the jury. Scalia, of course, joined the Chief Justice's dissent.
So, if a majority of the Supreme Court constitutes "a reasonably objective view," then yes, there has been such a case in the last twenty years. But that still does not account for Scalia's subjective view that no case raising a legitimate innocence claim has been presented during his tenure on the Court.
Posted by: a | Feb 23, 2007 12:31:38 PM
I agree that the Scalia quote suggests he is offering a personal and subjective view. The goal of my question -- which is offered in an open-ended way and not for loaded purposes -- isn't to look for evidence that Scalia is lying when he says what he says. I just found his claim so surprisingly broad that I wondered whether others who know the criminal law field better might believe that there have been cases before the Court in the past 20 years, either in the cert. process or actual decided cases, that so starkly present serious doubt about the defendant's innocence that Scalia cannot *reasonably* believe that not one case he has seen has raised more than the slightest doubt about actua linnocence.
Posted by: Paul Horwitz | Feb 23, 2007 12:45:43 PM
Scalia is a human being, and unfortunately more prone to prejudice than he should be. The question shouldn't be whether he undermines his own positions through that prejudice--he obviously does--but rather (1) the merits of the argument for textualism or originalism (they're conceptually very different, I think) and (2) whether his judicial philosophy is successful in restraining his prejudice. Someone--Chesterton?--wrote that one of the reasons he was a Christian was that he was such an ornery person. Similarly, stubborn and opinionated person who strives for intellectual honestly might be particularly inclined to adopt a textualist or originalist philosophy, as well as project a (possibly justified) suspicion of judicial motives on his peers.
In other words, it's not Good Scalia vs. Bad Scalia: it's a fallible human versus an abstract and objective judicial philosophy. The two are separable and the second is debatable on its merits.
Posted by: Alex | Feb 23, 2007 10:24:11 PM
To clarify: by "undermines his own positions through that prejudice" I mean practically, not theoretically. My whole point is that the theoretical question of judicial philosophy is totally separable. Chesterton (again) quipped that the only good argumnent against Christianity was other Christians -- it's often an effective argument something to cite the foibles of its adherents, but it's not theoretically persuasive.
Posted by: Alex | Feb 23, 2007 10:27:07 PM
It is society that finds pederasts and bigamists "questionable," as evidenced by the panopoly of legislation. Scalia's merely pointing that out, rather than "selling" the idea that they should be treated as such.
Posted by: Joel Smith | Feb 27, 2007 5:08:28 PM
For a leading consideration of dialogue between the Supreme Court and the Legislatures in Canada, see P.W. Hogg & A.A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75.
Posted by: Owen | Mar 8, 2007 4:55:33 PM
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