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Saturday, November 26, 2005

Judge Randolph, Judge Friendly, and Abortion

A few weeks ago, in Washington, D.C., Judge Ray Randolph delivered the Federalist Society's annual Barbara Olson lecture.  (Thanks to Orin Kerr for the link).  He opened with this:

It is well-known that Henry J. Friendly was one of the greatest judges in our nation’s history. Along with Holmes and Brandeis and Learned Hand, he was certainly one of the most brilliant. What is not known is that in 1970, three years before Roe v. Wade, Judge Friendly wrote an opinion in the first abortion-rights case ever filed in a federal court. No one knows this because his opinion was never published. I have a copy of the opinion and his papers are now at the Harvard Law School, awaiting indexing.

The lecture is not long, though it is too long to excerpt helpfully here.  This passage, though -- taken from Judge Friendly's draft -- caught my eye:

"An undertone of plaintiffs’ argument is that legislative reform is hopeless, because of the determined opposition of one of the country’s great religious faiths. Experience elsewhere, notably Hawaii’s recent repeal of its abortion law, would argue otherwise. But even if plaintiffs’ premise were correct, the conclusion would not follow. The contest on this, as on other issues where there is determined opposition, must be fought out through the democratic process, not by utilizing the courts as a way of overcoming the opposition . . . clearing the decks, [and] thereby enabling legislators to evade their proper responsibilities. Judicial assumption of any such role, however popular at the moment with many high-minded people, would ultimately bring the courts into the deserved disfavor to which they came dangerously near in the 1920's and 1930's. However we might feel as legislators, we simply cannot find in the vague contours of the Fourteenth Amendment anything to prohibit New York from doing what it has done here.

Posted by Rick Garnett on November 26, 2005 at 02:13 PM | Permalink

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» The intellectual origins of Roe . . . in a law review from Concurring Opinions
Here's a nice piece of trivia: what law review article laid the blueprint for Roe v. Wade? Thanks to Orin Kerr's link to Judge Raymond Randolph's thought-provoking speech to the Federalist Society on Judge Friendly's unpublished 1970 draft opinion... [Read More]

Tracked on Nov 26, 2005 8:49:09 PM

» "Decisional autonomy" and the Constitution from New World Man - he's got a roadmap of Jupiter
Update: The post originally assumed knowledge of Judge Randolph's speech and Judge Friendly's unpublished opinion. I've added some background below. 11/29 You will not be surprised to learn that I am in almost complete, almost giddy, agreement with Jud... [Read More]

Tracked on Nov 29, 2005 8:24:51 AM

» "Decisional autonomy" and the Constitution from New World Man - he's got a roadmap of Jupiter
Update: The post originally assumed knowledge of Judge Randolph's speech and Judge Friendly's unpublished opinion. I've added some background below. [11/29] George Will on Judge Friendly and The Speech here. [12/1] You will not be surprised to learn th... [Read More]

Tracked on Dec 1, 2005 7:50:28 AM

Comments

Rick: Thanks for highlighting that passage. There are several things going on there, and I think it would help to distinguish them, and, perhaps, for you to clarify which of them caught your fancy. (Nothing I'm about to say is at all original -- this is, of course, well-trod ground.)

First, there is the notion that "issues where there is determined opposition, must be fought out through the democratic process, not by utilizing the courts as a way of overcoming the opposition . . . clearing the decks, [and] thereby enabling legislators to evade their proper responsibilities."

I don't believe this, and I don't think you do, either. I'll make the easy, and all-too-common move here: There was determined opposition -- *very* determined opposition -- to Brown, and to the school prayer cases, and to the womens' rights cases, and . . . [fill in the blank with the SCOTUS decisions dearest to your heart in which the Court struck down what you view as pernicious and unconstitutional laws or courses of government conduct]. The fact that something is the subject of intense, and principled, democratic debate does *not* mean that the Court should necessarily stay its hand, even where the constitutional answer is not clear on the face of the document. Perhaps the Court should have permitted the abortion issue to be resolved in the legislatures -- as you know, there are those on *both* sides of the issue who now think that would have been the wiser, more effective, course -- but, if so, it's for reasons other than that "where there is determined opposition, [issues] must be fought out through the democratic process."

Second, there's the notion that the Court should be careful not to bring itself into "disfavor" ("deserved" or otherwise -- if the decision is a "correct" one, then the disfavor *isn't* deserved). This is true up to a point, of course -- if the Court loses the people's respect in a dramatic way, then it won't be able to have much influence going forward, in which case the short-term "principled" decision will have had severe long-term costs that aren't worth the candle. I don't think Roe is such a case -- the Court's role (for better or worse) has never been more respected than it is now: Even when the Court issues a decision such as Bush v. Gore, that at least half the nation views as completely illegitimate and political in the worst sense of the word, the Court's decree stands and there's no rioting in the street. But in any event, I don't think *that* (loss of respect for the Court) has much, if anything, to do with why *you* think the Court erred in Roe, right?

OK, finally, there's Friendly's view that "we simply cannot find in the vague contours of the Fourteenth Amendment anything to prohibit New York from doing what it has done here." I assume you agree with this -- but it, too, doesn't have much to do with why you think the Court was so wrong in deciding Roe, if I'm not mistaken. After all, justification for the vast majority of the Court's decisions striking down government action -- at an increasing rate since 1992 -- can't be "found" in the words or the vague contours of the document itself. And yet you (and I) do not feel passionately that the Court got *all* those decisions wrong -- or at the very least, we wouldn't be compelled to write about each of them repeatedly, or to blog about Henry Friendly's early take on them. (OK, so I am a bit obsessed about Boerne, and Printz, and Seminole, etc.; but my point is that it's not simply because the Court "misread," or creatively construed, the document, something it does virtually every day. I care about the decisions in those cases because the outcomes *matter* to me.)

I'm not sure where that leaves us (assuming, of course, that you agree with this -- and you may not). My sense -- although I may be wrong -- is that the reason you and I care about Roe so much is simply that we both care about the outcome a *great* deal (if from very different perspectives). It's not so much that the Court "properly" read the Due Process Clause that causes me to celebrate Roe; and by the same token it's not so much that the Court overturned a legislatively enacted statute that causes you to bemoan the decision. Instead, it is that Roe reflects and supports certain moral commitments, and certain constitutional visions, and undermines others -- visions and commitments that we (and many others) care about a great deal.

Friendly, on the other hand, was (as far as I know) a Frankfurterish (or Sunsteinian? Tushnetian?) judicial minimalist -- he probably was a bit uneasy with Brown, and Griswold, too. But that's not where you are, is it? (*Not* a rhetorical question -- I'm genuinely curious.)

Posted by: Marty Lederman | Nov 26, 2005 4:24:53 PM

Marty Lederman: I disagree with your interpretation of Judge Friendly's comment on the need to resolve the abortion issue in state legislatures. Look at the first sentence in the excerpt. I think that the plaintiffs in the case were arguing that the court was justified in setting abortion policy because, as a result of a very vocal minority, the democratic process was defective.

You seem to be suggesting that Judge Friendly thought that the intensity of the political fight over abortion was an argument in favor of upholding abortion laws. I think Judge Friendly merely meant that the structure of the political fight (where a determined minority prevailed over a less motivated majority) was not an argument in favor of overturning them.

Posted by: FXKLM | Nov 26, 2005 4:48:00 PM

Marty asks me to clarify what in the Judge Friendly excerpt "caught my fancy." Not to be pedantic, but . . . in my post, I said "caught my eye." In any event, what I was focusing on was this: "An undertone of plaintiffs’ argument is that legislative reform is hopeless, because of the determined opposition of one of the country’s great religious faiths." The line reminded me of the question I've been thinking about a lot lately, namely, whether judicial predictions or observations of "political divisiveness along religious lines" should play in role in identifying or determining the content of constitutional provisions.

Marty also writes: "My sense -- although I may be wrong -- is that the reason you and I care about Roe so much is simply that we both care about the outcome a *great* deal (if from very different perspectives). It's not so much that the Court 'properly' read the Due Process Clause that causes me to celebrate Roe; and by the same token it's not so much that the Court overturned a legislatively enacted statute that causes you to bemoan the decision. Instead, it is that Roe reflects and supports certain moral commitments, and certain constitutional visions, and undermines others -- visions and commitments that we (and many others) care about a great deal."

Marty is right that I regret Roe not *merely* because the Court "overturned a legislatively enacted decision." But, I would emphasize that my regret over Roe reflects more than my considered judgment that abortion (insofar as it constitutes the direct killing of innocent human persons) is immoral (I like to think I would regret Roe even were I pro-choice on abortion); it also reflects my view that the Court's "overturn[ing] [of] a legislatively enacted decision" was, in this particular case, unjustifiable and has had a pernicious effect on our law and politics.

Posted by: Rick Garnett | Nov 27, 2005 12:40:56 PM

Thanks, Rick -- apologies (to you and to Nicole!) for confusing your eye and your fancy.

Both you and FXKLM emphasize the line in the Friendly memo about Catholic opposition. I agree, of course, that whether and to what extent the opposition to legislative reform is from particular religious denominations or not should have absolutely no bearing on the Court's willingness to overturn statutory rules.

You emphasize that your opposition to Roe is based not only on your moral judgment, but also on your view that "*in this particular case,*" the Court's overturning of a statute was "unjustifiable and has had a pernicious effect on our law and politics." Fair enough -- I agree that both factors are necessary in order to trigger outrage and concerted opposition. But I assume you would concede that your moral judgment (and mine) has a great deal to do with whether one concludes that the judicial review *is* "unjustifiable" and has a "pernicious effect" in a particular case.

Counterfactual hypo: Assume that next Term, after Alito is confirmed, the Court not only overrules Roe and Casey, but also holds that states are constitutionally *obliged* to prohibit abortion (or certain forms of abortion), e.g., because of a holding that fetuses have due process rights. Presumably, even if you thought such a holding was wrong as a matter of constitutional law, you would be relieved that the Court had pretermitted the legislative process (a process that would, almost certainly, eventually lead to less severe abortion constraints); and you presumably wouldn't expend much energy publicly attacking the Court's anti-"democratic" decision. Right? (I'm not saying this in order to be critical, in the least -- my point is that this is what we all do.)

Posted by: Marty Lederman | Nov 27, 2005 2:12:07 PM

Dear Marty -- You ask, "I assume you would concede that your moral judgment (and mine) has a great deal to do with whether one concludes that the judicial review *is* 'unjustifiable' and has a 'pernicious effect' in a particular case." You also ask whether I'd spend much energy criticizing an "anti-democratic" decision by the Court requiring the States to closely regulate abortions."

I suppose you are right. That is, I probably *wouldn't* allocate emotional and intellectual resources to complaining about such a decision, even if I thought it was wrong. (An analogy, maybe: I think the Adkins case was wrongly decided, but -- to my discredit, perhaps -- I don't spend much time worrying about it, because I oppose capital punishment.)

Still, I like to think that my view that Roe's holding is "unjustifiable", and its analysis unconvincing, *really does* owe nothing to (even if it does, I admit, coincide with) my moral judgment regarding abortion. Your point, though, might be that I'm kidding myself? Best, R

Posted by: Rick Garnett | Nov 27, 2005 4:03:47 PM

Thanks again, Rick: No, not that you're kidding yourself. I'd never suggest any such thing. My point was simply that the excerpts of Friendly's speech that Randolph quoted aren't themselves adequate to explain why Roe might have been wrongly decided: The characteristics he identifies are present, as well, in many decisions that we -- you and I, and almost everyone else -- think were rightly decided, and others that we think were wrong but that we don't feel the need to publicly criticize. That is to say: I think you do have very powerful reasons to oppose and inveigh against Roe; but I doubt very much that the fact of public opposition to abortion liberalization in 1973 is (or ought to be) high on that list of reasons. Perhaps I'm mistaken, however . . .

Best,

Marty

Posted by: Marty Lederman | Nov 27, 2005 4:16:29 PM

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