Tuesday, May 21, 2013
Sperm Donation, Anonymity, and Compensation: An Empirical Legal Study
In the United States, most sperm donations* are anonymous. By contrast, many developed nations require sperm donors to be identified, typically requiring new sperm (and egg) donors to put identifying information into a registry that is made available to a donor-conceived child once they reach the age of 18. Recently, advocates have pressed U.S. states to adopt these registries as well, and state legislatures have indicated openness to the idea.
In a series of prior papers I have explained why I believe the arguments offered by advocates of these registries fail. Nevertheless, I like to think of myself as somewhat open-minded, so in another set of projects I have undertaken to empirically test what might happen if the U.S. adopted such a system. In particular, I wanted to look at the intersection of anonymity and compensation, something that cannot be done in many of these other countries where compensation for sperm and egg donors is prohibited.
Today I posted online (downloadable here) the first published paper from this project,Can You Buy Sperm Donor Identification? An Experiment, co-authored with Travis Coan, and forthcoming in December 2013 in Vol. 10, Issue 4, of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies.
This study relies on a self-selected convenience sample to experimentally examine the economic implications of adopting a mandatory sperm donor identification regime in the U.S. Our results support the hypothesis that subjects in the treatment (non-anonymity) condition need to be paid significantly more, on average, to donate their sperm. When restricting our attention to only those subjects that would ever actually consider donating sperm, we find that individuals in the control condition are willing-to-accept an average of $$43 to donate, while individuals in the treatment group are willing-to-accept an aver-age of $74. These estimates suggest that it would cost roughly $31 per sperm donation, at least in our sample, to require donors to be identified. This price differential roughly corresponds to that of a major U.S. sperm bank that operates both an anonymous and identify release programs in terms of what they pay donors.
We are currently running a companion study on actual U.S. sperm donors and hope soon to expand our research to egg donors, so comments and ideas are very welcome online or offline.
* I will follow the common parlance of using the term "donation" here, while recognizing that the fact that compensation is offered in most cases gives a good reason to think the term is a misnomer.
- I. Glenn Cohen
Entry Level Hiring: The 2013 Report - Final Call for Information (For Real)
This is (honestly) the last call for information for the Entry Level Hiring Report. The data collection will close on Friday, May 24. I am aware that I will miss some hires because of this closing date. C'est la report. (And yes, I am also aware that I do not know French.)
At any rate, if you have information about entry-level hires for this year, please either email me directly (slawsky *at* law *dot* uci *dot* edu), or add a comment to the original information-gathering post.
Please encourage anyone you know who has accepted a job but isn't reflected on the spreadsheet to contact me.
As a reminder, I am looking to collect the following information for tenure-track, clinical, or legal writing full-time entry-level hires:
Basic Information: Name, Hiring School, JD Institution, JD Year of Graduation
Other Degrees: Type of Degree, Degree Granting Institution, Degree Subject
Fellowship, VAP, or Visiting Professorship: Institution and Type (e.g., VAP, name of fellowship, etc.)
Clerkship: Court (e.g., 9th Circuit, Texas Supreme Court, etc.)
Areas of Speciality (up to four) (if you are a clinical or LRW hire, please list this as your first Area of Specialty)
Type of Position: Tenure Track or Non-Tenure Track (if you are clinical or LRW and also tenure-track, please indicate this)
Helping OklahomaJust a quick PSA-type post from this Tuscaloosan: Here are a few sites with suggestions about how to direct your aid for the victims of yesterday's tornado in Oklahoma.
Monday, May 20, 2013
FSU Law Is Hiring, 2013 editionFlorida State University's appointments committee for the College of Law will be gearing up over the summer and we are looking (principally) for laterals in the following areas: Environmental Law, Torts/Products, Trusts and Estates, Tax, Health Law and ADR. If you or someone you know is a possibly good fit for FSU’s virtues (ie., extraordinary scholarly culture, good weather, great cookies, among other things), please feel free to (have them) send Wayne Logan (and/or me) a CV and statement of interest. The Fall 2013 committee includes Wayne (Chair), Hannah Wiseman, Manuel Utset, Courtney Cahill, and myself. (If you are outside our targeted area of interest, but still keen on FSU, please don't hesitate to send us your materials as needs and interests evolve.) As always, FSU seeks a diverse pool of applicants from a wide range of backgrounds and interests.
More on the Town of Greece
Following up on Paul's post, just a few quick thoughts (for now): First, I agree entirely with Paul that his book, and Chris Lund's excellent article, are must-reads on this subject. Since Chris is visiting at Notre Dame next year, I look forward to learning a lot from him about this case.
Next -- and proving true, I guess, Paul's predictions about disagreements-among-friends -- I think it would be a good thing if the possibility Eugene Volokh raises - i.e., that the Court might re-examine the so-called "endorsement test" -- came to pass. I think the criticisms directed at that test in Steven Smith's 1987 article had and have force.
Finally, even if the justices leave the "endorsement test" in place, I hope they do not follow the Second Circuit in importing that test into the legislative-prayer context. Yes, this context is an anomalous one and, yes, Marsh was and is something of an outlier, given that it prioritized history, tradition, and practice over the "wall of separation" idea. For reasons I mention in this very short piece, I don't think the courts are very good at deploying all-things-considered balancing tests that purport to somehow measure the effects of religious displays and the like on the feelings of hypothetical "reasonable observers" and so they probably shouldn't try. Better, it seems to me, to either (a) rule out legislative prayers as per se unconstitutional "establishments" or (b) police the practice for discrimination in selection and leave the issue of particular prayers' content to politics and (dare we hope?) a spirit of charity.
Beware of "Town of Greece" Bearing Gifts
The Supreme Court has granted cert. in Town of Greece v. Galloway, a case out of the Second Circuit involving prayers given by guest chaplains before monthly town board meetings. Here is the SCOTUSBlog page, and here's the Second Circuit opinion by Judge Calabresi.
There has been a good deal of circuit court action involving legislative prayer, but the Supreme Court has basically not touched it since Marsh v. Chambers. Prediction is pointless, so I'll just say the following.
1) I talk about legislative prayers and similar cases in my book The Agnostic Age. I characterize the rulings in this area as "constitutional easements" over the Establishment Clause and argue that they are constitutionally problematic, at least, although I suggest that we might be better off letting sleeping dogs lie. (Andy Koppelman criticizes Marsh in similar terms in his excellent recent book, Defending American Religious Neutrality and says clearly that it should be overruled.) It would appear that the dogs are awake and hungry.
2) There is a good deal of consensus and friendship among law and religion scholars these days, at least in my view. The friendships will remain, I'm sure. But this is one case that will reveal the differences among us more starkly than many recent cases. I look forward to friendly disagreements with colleagues like Rick Garnett and Marc DeGirolami.
3) The best scholarly work in this area that I am aware of is by Christopher C. Lund. If you're interested in this case and these issues, you ought to read Chris's work. I hope we can get him over here for a timely guest stint at Prawfsblawg.
Sex, People with Disabilities, Prostitution, and Universal Health Care: Reflections on "The Sessions"
One of my favorite initiatives at Harvard Law School, where I teach, is that faculty members get to offer an optional 10-12 student not-for-credit "First-Year Reading Groups" on a topic of interest to them that is related to law in some way but not too law-class like. I've taught a reading group on bioethics and law through film that pairs films with papers/topics in bioethics (e.g., A.I. with readings on personhood, Minority Report and neuroscience and law and predicting criminality, Dirty Pretty Things and organ sale and exploitation, The Constant Gardener with clinical trials in the developing world, Eternal Sunshine for the Spotless Mind and therapeutic forgetting and "cosmetic neurology" and many others...)
Next year I will add The Sessions, a film I found very enjoyable starring John Hawkes, Helen Hunt, and William H. Macy from last year that I also found very bioethically interesting. The film is based on a true story and follows Mark O'Brien, a poet who lives in an Iron Lung due to complications from Polio. After unsuccessfully proposing to his caretaker, and believing the end of his life may be nearing, he decides he wants to lose his virginity. He hires Cheryl Cohen-Greene, a professional sex surrogate, who will offer him a maximum of six sessions but makes clear to him this is therapy not romance. I will stop there to avoid ruining the film, but on to the bioethics...
There are fairly clear issues raised about commodification, exploitation, the difference between sex therapy and prostitution, that I have written about in various forms in various places. These are certainly interesting issues but familiar enough. What the film newly prompted me to think about, though, is actually universal health care. In particular, as I have written about indirectly in a couple of papers, what would some of the most prominent theories explaining why we need universal health care say about whether the state should pay for sex therapy (or perhaps even prostitution) for people with disabilities like Mark who find themselves otherwise unable to have sex?
For example, in his wonderful book Just Health, my colleague Norman Daniels, coming from a more Rawlsian tradition (i.e., a liberal tradition focused on promoting liberty and distributive justice through giving priority to the worst-off), grounds the state’s role in promoting health in the obligation, as a matter of political justice, to ensure access to the “normal opportunity range” to pursue the “array of life plans reasonable persons are likely to develop for themselves.” Although Daniels' focus is on health care, it seems to me that sexual satisfaction is also part of that normal opportunity range and part of a life plan most of us would like to pursue.
Similarly, Martha Nussbaum in her great book Frontiers of Justice, writing from a more aretaic (i.e., Aristotelian, focusing on character and virtue) perspective, has argued that the state’s role is to enable human flourishing by raising people above the threshold level on a number of “capabilities.” Among these she mentions “bodily integrity,” as including “having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction." I have previously discussed how this kind of approach may justify funding reproductive technologies, but it seems to me as though it also fairly directly establishes an argument for funding Mark's attempts to lose his virginity.
Now this is meant to be provocative, of course. And for some this is no doubt a reductio ad absurdum against universal health care. Fair enough. But for those who believe there is a moral case for funding universal health care, does the argument also lead to funding these kinds of sex therapies? Health is important, of course, but let's be frank (and my parents can stop reading at this point) so is sexual satisfaction, and both seem to me essential parts of the normal opportunity range and/or human flourishing.
Friday, May 17, 2013
Non-State Law and Enforcement
As I mentioned in my last post, I've been doing some thinking about what it means to be non-state law and looking to different types of non-state law - such as international law or religious law - to consider some common dynamics that consistently arise.
One theme that regularly emerges - and is often discussed - in the context of non-state law is the problem of enforcement. Put simply, without the enforcement power of a nation-state, non-state law must typically find alternative mechanisms in order to ensure compliance with its rules and norms. This hurdle has long figured into debates over whether one can properly conceptualize international law as law.
But the focus on enforcement is problematic for a couple of reasons. First of all, the challenge of enforcement for non-state law is in many ways overstated. For example, in a 2011 article titled Outcasting: in Domestic and International Law, Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro explored this issue, emphasizing - especially in the context of international - how certain forms of nonviolent sanctions, such as denying the disobedient the benefits of social cooperation and membership, can be deployed as a form of non-state law enforcement. Indeed, the use of outcasting has long been prominent in other areas of non-state law, such as a method to enforce religious law within religious communities.
There's, of course, much more to be said on the relationship between non-state law and enforcement (something I may explore in a subsequent post). But too heavy an emphasis on this piece of the non-state law puzzle is problematic for a second reason - it too often obscures other important ways in which non-state law functions as law. In my next couple of posts what I'd like to do is consider other ways in which various forms of non-state law function as law by focusing more directly on the internal practice of law within the relevant communities.
The Modified Workshop Queuing Experiment
In the interest of sharing ideas, I wanted to say a word about workshops. Over the last several years I have co-run with Einer Elhauge a workshop in health policy, biotechnology, and bioethics, where leading scholars present works in progress.
We usually have a significant number of faculty and fellows, as well as several students who enroll for credit. The session is about two hours, with 30 minutes ear marked for the presenter and the rest for Q & A. After observing our faculty workshops and other Harvard Law workshops over the years, I became dissatisfied with standard queue system, in part because tangents or ideas get lost and don’t build on one another as much as I would like. Instead I have used what I call the “modified queue,” am quite happy with it, and want to share it with you (and also get other ideas you have used that work).
Here is how it works (it sounds much harder than it is, it is pretty easy in operation):
- Raise one hand and get listed on the “regular” queue just like in most workshops.
- Raise TWO hands if you have a follow-up question to one that has been asked (or to the answer to it). I always remind people here that they will be policed by the social opprobrium of others if their “follow-up” question does not look sufficiently follow-up-esque. I then go through all the follow-ups and put them on a follow-up queue [But note that if you ask a follow-up to a follow-up you are given no additional priority on the follow-up queue, just put to the end of it]
- If you are on the “regular queue” and you ask a follow-up I “demote” you and put you to the end of the “regular queue” as it now stands, thereby making asking a follow-up question slightly costly in that it means your own question is delayed.
- Occasionally when there are too many follow-ups (say more than four or five) and/or when we are getting towards the end of our time and someone who has been patiently waiting on the regular queue has not yet got to ask their question, I will “cheat” and start putting people asking follow-up questions to the end of the regular queue. This way I ensure that follow-ups don’t swallow the whole regular queue.
I (and I think others who have attended the workshop from what I hear) have been very happy with this system. I have now started exporting it to conference sessions I chair where the format is workshop-y too. Try it out, if you care to, and let me know what you think!
Thursday, May 16, 2013
Missing Minorities in a New Publication About Law School Diversity
The publication Lawyers of Color just published a special issue on diversity in the legal academy, apparently aimed at students. It identifies "50 Under 50", the most influential minority law professors under 50 years old, a very distinguished group. It also purports to list the most diverse law faculties and to identify every minority law professor teaching at every law school.
Unfortunately, the reliability of these lists is impaired by the fact that many people were left off the list of minority law faculty. For example, at UC Davis, 10 colleagues were listed, but I was omitted. I might suspect that this was my dean's way of trying to tell me something, but he was another one of the ten faculty in total who were left off. The missing faculty may explain why UC Davis made the National Jurist Diversity Honor Roll but not this list. Seattle University, which has around 18 minority law faculty, was not mentioned at all.
Because this is a digital publication, I hope it can be corrected and updated before students making decisions are misled.
Learning from exams
I want to own and expand on a comment from Jessie's post about the teaching value of taking and grading exams.
Like Jessie's commenter, grading exams puts in stark relief what I did well and not so well during the semester. My exams showed that the two big problems this semester involved amendments to pleadings under FRCP 15(a) and the primary federal venue statute, § 1391. The answers I saw on the exam showed that the overwhelming majority of students did not understand what the language of either provision means or how the pieces fit together. This is a bit ironic, actually, because both provisions recently were revised (§ 1391 in the Juridiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 and FRCP 15 substantively and as part of the Restyling Project) specifically to make them clearer. So much for that. Like Jessie's commenter, I wish I had known this at the time so I could have spent a bit more time going over it.
At some level, the misunderstanding as to both provisions reflects a general weakness in reading and understanding statutes, triggering the ongoing question of how to get students to properly read statutes when they otherwise are focused only on case law.
Spreading out grading
I am happy to say I have finished grading for the semester and it was as thrilling an experience as ever. I experimented for the first time with a mixed short-answer/multiple choice format for the final in Civ Pro and liked it a lot as a testing mechanism; it gave me a good sense of what students did and didn't know (I will have more to say about that in a later post). I also did not find grading it overly burdensome.
The real struggle for me was grading the take-home essay portion--that is the part that feels overwhelming. And it struck me this cycle that the source of the struggle is several-fold: 1) the sheer number of essays to read all at one time, 2) that they all say basically the same thing (things actually, since students wrote on one of 3 questions), and 3) the fairly short time window (about a week) to get them all read, which even if sufficient time, feels crunched. So while it is perhaps too soon (my grades have not yet posted and I have not yet met the deluge of questioning 1Ls), I am thinking about alternative approaches for next spring.
Blog Symposium on Radin's BoilerplateThere is a blog symposium at ContractsProf on Peggy Radin's new book, Boilerplate. My micro-review on the fetishization of consent is available here.
First Amendment Institutions in the Law and Politics Book ReviewMy most recent book, First Amendment Institutions (it makes a good Victoria Day gift!), is reviewed in the latest issue of the Law and Politics Book Review by law professor Ruthann Robson. It's a tough but fair review. I welcome the criticism, and hope I may be forgiven for cherry-picking a couple of generous lines: the book "provides the most sustained, nuanced, and well-reasoned argument for an 'institutional turn' in First Amendment jurisprudence," and "admirably achieves" the goal of "open[ing] a conversation about First Amendment institutionalism, . . . providing a book that is worth reading, considering, and debating." Obviously, I hope people will read and even buy the book, and take part in that conversation. But it's very much meant to be a conversation, and Robson's criticisms are a valuable part of that. Read the whole review (and the book, of course!).
Wednesday, May 15, 2013
Rationing Legal Services
In the last few years at both the federal and state level there have been deep cuts to providing legal assistance to the poor. This only only makes more pressing and manifest a sad reality: there is and always will be persistent scarcity in the availability of both criminal and civil legal assistance. Given this persistent scarcity, my new article, Rationing Legal Services just published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Legal Analysis, examines how existing Legal Service Providers (LSPs), both civil and criminal, should ration their services when they cannot help everyone.
To illustrate the difficulty these issues involve, consider two types of LSPs, the Public Defender Service and Connecticut Legal Services (CLS), that I discuss in greater depth in the paper. Should the Public Defender Service favor offenders under the age of twenty-five years instead of those older than fifty-five years? Should other public defenders offices with death eligible offenses favor those facing the death penalty over those facing life sentences? Should providers favor clients they think can make actual innocence claims over those who cannot? How should CLS prioritize its civil cases and clients? Should it favor clients with cases better suited for impact litigation over those that fall in the direct service category? Should either institution prioritize those with the most need? Or, should they allocate by lottery?
I begin by looking at how three real-world LSPs currently rationi(PDS, CLS, and the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau). Then, in trying to answer these questions I draw on a developing literature in bioethics on the rationing of medical goods (organ, ICU beds, vaccine doses, etc) and show how the analogy can help us develop better rationing systems. I discuss six possible families of ‘simple’ rationing principles: first-come-first-serve, lottery, priority to the worst-off, age-weighting, best outcomes, and instrumental forms of allocation and the ethical complexities with several variants of each. While I ultimately tip my hand on my views of each of these sub-principles, my primary aim is to enrich the discourse on rationing legal services by showing LSPs and legal scholars that they must make a decision as to each of these issues, even if it is not the decision I would reach.
I also examine places where the analogy potentially breaks down. First, I examine how bringing in dignitary or participatory values complicates the allocation decision, drawing in particular on Jerry Mashaw’s work on Due Process values. Second, I ask whether it makes a difference that, in some cases, individuals who receive legal assistance will end up succeeding in cases where they do not “deserve” to win. I also examine whether the nature of legal services as “adversarial goods”, the allocation of which increases costs for those on the other side of the “v.”, should make a difference. Third, I relax the assumption that funding streams and lawyer satisfaction are independent of the rationing principles selected, and examine how that changes the picture. Finally, I respond to a potential objection that I have not left sufficient room for LSP institutional self-definition.
Posted by Ivan Cohen on May 15, 2013 at 02:57 PM in Article Spotlight, Civil Procedure, Law and Politics, Legal Theory, Life of Law Schools, Peer-Reviewed Journals | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)
Buy "The Business of Baby!"I almost missed it, but you might enjoy, from this weekend's New York Times Book Review, this review by Annie Murphy Paul of "The Business of Baby," a book by the capitalist journalist Jennifer Margulis.
JOTWELL: Coleman on Hoffman on federal rulemakingThe latest essay for JOTWELL's Courts Law is by Brooke Coleman (Seattle), reviewing Lonny Hoffman's Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal (forthcoming, U.C. Davis Law Review).
A Jot on "Balkan Ghosts"The latest con law "jot" from Jotwell: Pat Gudridge on Reva Siegel, balkanization, and equal protection. Enjoy!
The Getting (Criminal Law) Scholarship into Courts Project: Litigate This
I'm involved in a new project designed to connect practicing criminal lawyers with useful legal scholarship. I am very excited about it, because, contrary to some, I think law review articles are frequently relevant to legal issues decided by courts. Every month, a committee of practicing and academic lawyers will identify a set of articles about issues practitioners might want to raise in their cases, and the NACDL will circulate them. Here's the first batch, featured in the NACDL magazine, The Champion, which includes papers by Deborah Denno, Glenn Reynolds & John Steakley, and Deborah Tuerkheimer.
The premise is that practitioners do not have time to read law review articles systematically because, many articles, even in the criminal area, will be distant from the kinds of claims and arguments cognizable in court. The result is that lawyers may never see law review articles that could be sources of ideas, cases, and authority. We hope and believe there will be an appetite for innovative, ready-to-litigate articles. We invite all Prawfs readers to nominate recent articles written by themselves or others which might be of interest to lawyers litigating cases (contact Andrew Ferguson at aferguson -at- udc.edu).
My view is that the generally low visibility of articles is unfortunate for both professors and practitioners.
Freedom of the Church Without Romance
I'm happy to share my latest draft paper, Freedom of the Church Without Romance. It was written for a symposium at the University of San Diego's law school called "Freedom of the Church in the Modern Era," and I must say that the articles coming out of that symposium, mine excepted, are very strong and will constitute excellent resources for those interested in the increasingly popular subjects of "freedom of the church," religious institutional autonomy, the ministerial exception, and related themes. Some of them are available for download here, and see also these pieces.
Every scholar has articles they're more or less proud of for one reason or another, and I'm quite proud of this one, for two reasons: (1) it takes an idea I have championed and associated myself with and subjects it to critical analysis, rather than simply defending it one more time; and (2) it makes the important (I think) point that church-state legal scholars ought to do much more with the substantial literature on the economics of religion. I hope others enjoy it, and I welcome comments. Here's the abstract:
This Article is part of a symposium issue titled "Freedom of the Church in the Modern Era." Freedom of the church, roughly, connotes the independent nature or sovereignty of the church. The most dramatic moment in its development was the eleventh century Investiture Controversy, with its confrontation between Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV at Canossa, but it has a long prior and subsequent history. Recently, with the renewed scholarly interest in the institutional rights of churches and religious organizations and the Supreme Court's decision affirming the "ministerial exception" doctrine in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,the idea of "freedom of the church" has taken on new champions--and critics.
This Article, from an author who has written supportively about freedom of the church and/or religious institutionalism in prior work, takes a deliberately unromantic look at freedom of the church. It evaluates it through two useful disciplinary lenses: history, and the economics of religion.
Both historical and economic analysis of the concept of"freedom of the church" suggest the following conclusions: (1) The concept should be treated carefully and with a full awareness of its mixed history, without undue romanticism on the part of its champions--or a confident conclusion on the part of its critics that it is no longer necessary. (2) Whatever the concept of "freedom of the church" means today, the present version is decidedly diminished and chastened, a shadow of the medieval version. Supporters of freedom of the church should welcome that fact. Freedom of the church persists, and may have continuing value, precisely because it has become so domesticated. (3) There are solid historical and economic grounds for some form of freedom of the church or religious institutional autonomy. In particular, religion's status as a credence good, whose value and reliability is certified by religious agents such as ministers, strongly suggests that state interference with religious employment relations can be dangerous to a church's well-being and long-term survival. (4) The history and economics of religion also teach us something about the optimal conditions for freedom of the church--the conditions under which it is likely to do the most good and the least harm. In particular, they suggest that champions of freedom of the church ought to welcome religious pluralism and a strong non-establishment regime.
The Article closes with some speculation about why there has been a recent revival of interest in freedom of the church, including the possibility that its resurgence, even if it is fully justified, also involves an element of rent-seeking by religious institutions.
There are two broader underlying suggestions as well. First, there are good reasons to support some version of freedom of the church, but it deserves a more critical and nuanced examination by friends and adversaries alike. Second, legal scholars writing on church-state issues have paid far too little attention to the literature on the economics of religion.
Two Moving TestimoniesHere are links to two recent powerful pieces of personal testimony, both dimly but only dimly law-related. The first is this moving letter-cum-tribute between law professor Charles Barzun and his illustrious grandfather, Jacques Barzun. The second, even more powerfully personal, is this piece by lawyer Tony Nitti, about suffering and recovering from a brain aneurysm, in which he observes and explains why, "when recovering from a life-threatening ailment, the real challenge often doesn’t begin until the healing is complete." Both are well worth reading.
Tuesday, May 14, 2013
Dean Wu and Judge Chin Reenact Vincent Chin Trial
May is Asian Pacific American Heritage Month, so it is appropriate to share this reenactment of the trial of the men who killed Vincent Chin in 1982. The killing was a transformative event in the history of APAs, and UC Hastings Chancelor & Dean Frank Wu and Second Circuit Judge Denny Chin have presented this trial reenactment in a number of venues. It is quite amazing, in my opinion.