Thursday, March 06, 2014
More on United States v. Abu Ghayth
In its opening statement to the jury in the conspiracy and material support trial against Sulaiman Abu Ghayth, about which I posted a blog entry yesterday, the government did not allege that Abu Ghayth helped plan 9/11 or any other terrorist attack. Instead, the government alleged that Abu Ghayth was part of a "global conspiracy" and used his words to recruit fighters to the Al Qaeda cause.
Rachel VanLandingham, a prominent national security scholar and excellent person, has provided a thoughtful counterargument to my first blog post. Given that as well as the prosecution's opening statements, a few additional thoughts are in order, after the jump...
The 2013 Full Hiring Report
Alexander Tsesis, of Loyola-Chicago Law School, has individually contacted all 180 law schools that are members of the AALS and collected all of the hiring data for entry-level law school hires who began in 2013 (i.e., last year's report: this year will be the 2014 hiring report).
I run some analysis of this information below, but let's be absolutely clear: all of the work on this project was done by Tsesis, to whom, if you are interested in this sort of thing, you owe a big thanks. (I'll start: Thank you!)
Following is a data summary that compares the Spring Self-Reported Entry Level Hiring Report for 2013 (i.e., last year's report) to the full data set for 2013 (last year).
To remain consistent with previous analyses, while the Tsesis data spreadsheet contains all hiring information he received, the data analysis includes only tenure-track hires at U.S. law schools.
In the self-reported version, there were reports of 106 tenure-track hires, at 74 different law schools. The complete data set has 128 tenure-track hires, at 83 law schools. So the self-reported version got about 82% of the new hires.
We had only two schools have been reported as doing no entry level hiring in 2013. In contrast, the complete data set has 87 schools reported as doing no entry level hiring.
(87 schools did no entry level hiring; 83 schools hired entry-level tenure-track professors, perhaps in addition to non-tenure-track clinical entry-level hires; and 10 schools did not hire entry-level tenure-track professors, but did hire non-tenure-track clinical entry-level hires. This is a total of 180 schools.)
The two sets are quite similar. The biggest difference is in the percentage of fellowships: in the self-reported set, 78% of the hires had fellowships, and in the complete data set, 72% have fellowships.
Here are the schools from which people got their JDs in the complete data set, with the increase in number of reports in parentheses. The biggest bumps come to Yale and Harvard, and include (but are not limited to) people who were hired after the data collection closed.
Q: How many tenure-track hires in 2013 got their JD from School X?
Schools in the "other" category with two JD/LLBs who reported hires: Stanford; Texas; UCLA.
Schools in the "other" category with one JD/LLB who reported hires: American; Boston U; Brooklyn; College of Mgmt Acad Stud; Diego Portales; Duquesne ; Florida; Fordham; George Mason; Hastings; Kansas; Louisana State; Melbourne; Mexico; Miami; Montana; New Mexico; North Carolina; Oklahoma; Penn; Phillipines (U of); Puerto Rico (+1); Russian University; Rutgers-Camden; SMU; Tulane; UC Davis; Washington (St. Louis); West Virginia.
Here is the full spreadsheet. This includes sheets with (1) All tenure-track and long-term clinical hires; (2) tenure track hires only (this is the data on which I ran the comparison, to be consistent with previous reports); (3) a list of schools that did not do entry-level hiring in 2013; and (4) a comparison of the self-reported data and the full data set. Hires that were not on the self-reported sheet are indicated by a yellow highlight.
Three cheers for Alexander Tsesis!
[Originally posted 3/6/14; edited 3/6/14 to remove one hire erroneously included.]
The Unfulfilled Potential of "Above the Law"
"Above the Law" has been disappointing. Like a lot of other law professors, I would guess, I'm uncomfortable with some of the anti-law-school rhetoric that Elie Mystal and others have been trading in there. But that's not the disappointing part -- in fact, I think Elie has been largely responsible in his vitriol. (And there have sadly been many deserving targets.) Instead, I'm disappointed that ATL has not fulfilled its promise of being the go-to site for news about lawyers and law schools. Instead, it's been a useful site for *links* to news about lawyers and law schools.
What's the difference? ATL has almost no original content, at least in terms of news. There's a lot of opinion, yes, and that opinion can be entertaining and informative. But most of the time, the opinion is: "Hey, did you see this? Wow! LOL!" I cannot remember any time--any time--where ATL broke a news story. Maybe they have, and I'm forgetting. All the stories I remember start with a brief overview, a link, opinion, a block quote from the original source, and then further opinion. It's like I'm reading Yahoo.
So here's my plea -- do some original journalism! Yes, journalism is expensive. But how many people are working over there? Can't you assign three folks out of j-school or law school each to a "beat" -- law schools, Big Law, and other lawyers and judges -- and set them loose with a modest expense account and time to dig? There's news out there -- do some actual reporting! I suppose it's not the Gawker way, perhaps, but seriously -- how much better would ATL be if it actually broke some of its own stories? It would depend on the quality of the stories, of course. But ATL could make itself into a "farm team" for folks looking to work at the New Yorker, NY Mag, VF, the Atlantic, the Awl, or Grantland. I'd prefer some long-form pieces -- send somebody to X law firm or Y law school to actually do some digging and provide a deeper perspective. But short "Page Six" items would be entertaining as well!
I give ATL credit for its rankings, which were a thoughtful attempt to reconstruct the formula with more emphasis on jobs and alumni rankings. (Full disclosure: SLU placed 47th.) But it's not the investigative journalism that ATL seemed poised to provide when it started. With the proliferation of blogs, there is so much opinion out there. ATL is now a group blog, with some smart folks and smart opinions but just links, not news. I had thought it had the chance to be something a little different.
More on the Civil Rights Division
Dahlia Lithwick basically gets it right: The "notion that the head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division should have ever fought for civil rights has now become disqualifying."
But this is not anything new--Senate Republicans have been doing this to Democratic nominees to the Civil Rights Division for 20 years. As Bill Clinton's first nominee for the position, Lani Guinier famously faced strong Republican opposition based largely on her academic writings; Clinton withdrew the nomination when it became clear she could not be confirmed. And Bill Lan Lee served Clinton's entire second term without Senate confirmation--2+ years as acting head and one year as a recess appointee. Senate Republicans explicitly opposed Lee because he was and would be "activist" on civil rights. (And I would add that using that word to describe a lawyer and an executive-branch official reveals just how utterly meaningless it is).
Wednesday, March 05, 2014
More Honest Bob Casey
[But any attorney who seeks to help guarantee that right, in a case in which I believe the crime is sufficiently heinous, becomes per se unqualified for high public office. So, hey attorneys, feel free to help guarantee that right to citizens.]
Down with OCC?
Most banking experts would agree that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is the most captured of the banking agencies. In fact, given its funding structure (it is paid fees by the banks it regulates), how could it not be? If you don’t believe me, go and read Saule Omarova’s excellent article that carefully describes the OCC’s use of interpretive letters to allow banks to engage in derivatives trading, which is clearly outside the parameters of “the business of banking.” The OCC allowed a historical expansion of traditional banking activities and introduced unprecedented risk into the banking sector without seeking public comment through rulemaking. In addition to allowing banks to engage in risky activities, the OCC also did its best to protect national banks from state consumer protection laws. In other words, the OCC repeatedly asserted that federal consumer protection law preempted state consumer protection law. That would be just fine if there were similar federal consumer protection laws that the OCC or other regulators meaningfully enforced. What it actually did, as Art Wilmarth explains, was to free national banks from any consumer protection law that had any bite. But why wouldn’t you do that if you are funded by fees from the very banks that get to choose you as their regulator?
After the financial crisis, some suspected that the OCC would be disbanded like the OTS. But that didn’t happen. It would appear that actually nothing happened to punish the OCC except some verbal slapping around by Congress. Indeed, Congress—for mysterious reasons—elevated the OCC’s status by making it an independent agency. However, Kent Barnett’s article, Codifying Chevmore (forthcoming in the NYU Law Review), points out that Congress does actually punish the OCC in a way that has huge repercussions for the administrative state.
The article says that Dodd-Frank slaps the OCC with a “Skidmore penalty” for preemption decisions. Meaning: while all the well-behaved agencies get stronger Chevron deference, the OCC now has weaker Skidmore deference. This does a few important new things: (1) alerts the courts that they need to keep an eye on the OCC, (2) sends a strong message of disapproval to the captured agency, (3) codifies Chevron and Skidmore deference (which he calls Chevmore) for the first time, suggesting that Congress knows of and generally acquiesces to the Chevmore doctrines, and (4) establishes that Congress has found another legislative tool for agency oversight—what Congress giveth in agency interpretive discretion, it can taketh away.
The Skidmore penalty is a great message Congress sends to the OCC as to agency preemption. But it does not apply to other OCC decisions. Congress went out of its way in Dodd–Frank to say just that (§25b(b)(5)(B)).So nothing stops the OCC from acting through guidance documents as it did with derivatives. Should Congress use the Skidmore Penalty for other OCC decisions? Other agencies? Which ones? And will it ultimately make any difference to agency decision-making?
Swansea University College of Law Chair In Empirical Legal Studies Available
Swansea University College of Law wishes to further augment its interdisciplinary research through the appointment of a Chair in Empirical Legal Studies. We seek a research leader with training in criminology, social sciences and law whose work is focused in quantitative methods as they are applied to law, institutions of criminal justice, and human behaviour. The successful appointee will also serve as Head of the Department of Criminology within the College of Law.
Applications are invited for the post of Chair in Empirical Legal Studies, reference AC00757. This is a permanent post on the Research and Leadership pathway.
This is an exciting opportunity for the successful candidate to establish themselves as a recognised campus leader on quantitative analysis in the social sciences, responsive to external research income initiatives of UK research councils and European funding bodies. Swansea University is one of the leading natural and physical sciences and engineering universities in the United Kingdom. This post offers an opportunity to bring expertise in the empirical social sciences to complement the cutting edge research being undertaken at Swansea University not only in the natural and physical sciences and engineering but also in the social sciences, the humanities and the professional disciplines.
Applicants should have an outstanding record of international excellence in research achievement and publication over the last five years in their subject area. They will be excellent and enthusiastic communicators of their subject and will demonstrate the ability to provide academic vision for their subject, with supporting evidence of strong academic leadership in research and teaching. In addition to demonstrating a first-rate research publication record (3* and 4* in REF terms), applicants should look to establish their credentials for academic leadership.
The College will be delighted to speak with potential candidates who wish to explore this appointment further on an informal and confidential basis. Please contact the Head of College, Professor John Linarelli J.Linarelli@swansea.ac.uk, +44 (0) 1792 295831.
Sulaiman Abu Ghayth, Membership Crime, and the First Amendment
The criminal trial of Sulaiman Abu Ghayth is beginning in the Southern District of New York. Abu Ghayth is charged with conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, conspiracy to provide material support and resources to terrorists, and providing said material support. See United States v. Sulaiman Abu Ghayth, No. S14-98-cr-1023-LAK. The initial (not superseding) indictment is here. The indictment alleges that Abu Ghayth “urged others to swear allegiance to Bin Laden, spoke on behalf of and in support of al Qaeda’s mission, and warned that attacks similar to those of September 11, 2001 would continue.” In addition to these allegations, the government has alleged the following overt acts: Abu Ghayth agreed to assist Bin Laden by “giving speeches and appearing in al Qaeda propaganda” for the purpose of recruitment to al Qaeda; praised the September 11 attacks; praised other terrorist attacks; and participated in other al Qaeda propaganda. It is also alleged that Abu Ghayth was “engaged in planning and perpetrating federal crimes of terrorism against the United States.” More after the jump...
SEALS Prospective Scholars Workshop
I had the good fortune last summer to participate in the program for prospective law profs (prawfs?) at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) conference. I participated in two mock interviews with folks that I'm sure will be terrific faculty members, and we also got a chance to chat more informally and review their CVs. Luke Milligan and Leah Chan Grinvald are again hosting the workshop this year on August 2 and 3. If you are a potential candidate and are interested in the SEALS workshop, you should contact Luke at email@example.com.
Monday, March 03, 2014
Partial Speech-Tort Remedies?
Thanks to everyone at Prawfsblawg for inviting me to guest blog this month.
One of the projects that I'm working on focuses on the ways in which courts resolve speech-tort cases, and on that note, I'd like to pose a question to the room. Most people are I think familiar with the Snyder v. Phelps case, where the family of a marine who had died while serving in Iraq sued the Westboro Baptist Church for IIED after it had picketed the marine's funeral. Although the jury deemed the church liable under Maryland tort law and awarded the Snyder family substantial damages, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment completely barred any such liability against the church.
But let's say that the Snyder Court instead decided to adopt a more Solomonic approach--let's say that it found Westboro liable for IIED, but it held that the First Amendment applied solely to limit the damages to which the Snyders were entitled. Perhaps they were entitled only to compensatory damages for purely economic losses; perhaps they were entitled to nothing but nominal damages. The Court's rationale would be that while Westboro's speech has some value and thus should have some degree of First Amendment protection, the Snyders should have at least something to show for the social harm committed against them, even if it's only the purely dignitary benefits associated with getting a public pronouncement of IIED liability against Westboro.
Does this sort of partial-remedy approach appeal to you as a potential means for courts to resolve speech-tort cases, or would it bother you? Why? I'm posing this question in the abstract, not in terms of whether such an approach would make sense under the particular facts of the Snyder case. Otherwise, I'll leave the question vague; my sense is that people's gut reactions tend to differ widely on this, so I'm interested to hear everyone's thoughts.
In Why We Need More Judicial Activism (the subject of a great Green Bag micro-symposium), Suzanna Sherry identified the eight universally condemned Supreme Court decisions (Spoiler Alert: Bradwell v. Illinois, Minor v. Happersett, Plessy, Abrams, Buck v. Bell, Gobitis, and Hirabayashi and Korematsu). The unifying theme is that all have been, if not overruled, certainly discredited, such that none remains good law.
But are there cases that remain genuinely good law that are similarly disliked by both sides of political and constitutional debates and that both sides would like to see overruled? Two come to mind.
One is DeShaney. Liberals would like to see the Fourteenth Amendment impose affirmative obligations on government to protect the public; conservatives see affirmative government obligations to protect the public as a possible route to prohibiting abortion (my thoughts here were triggered by Steve's post about North Dakota's personhood amendment, which, as I said in the comments there, arguably overrules DeShaney at the state level and imposes some sort of affirmative obligations on government). A second, I think, is Slaughterhouse. Both sides would like a textually sounder basis for incorporation through Privileges of Immunities (although Due Process incorporation is so well-established at this point that the issue is more formalist). And since that was an economic liberty case, conservatives would like to see it come out differently.
What other cases might fit the bill? And am I wrong about these?
Entry Level Hiring: The 2014 Report - Call for Information
Time once again for the entry level hiring report.
I will gather the following information for tenure-track, clinical, or legal writing full-time entry-level hires:
Basic Information: Name, Hiring School, JD Institution, JD Year of Graduation
Other Degrees: Type of Degree, Degree Granting Institution, Degree Subject
Fellowship, VAP, or Visiting Professorship: Institution and Type (e.g., VAP, name of fellowship, etc.)
Clerkship: Court (e.g., 9th Circuit, Texas Supreme Court, etc.)
Areas of Speciality (up to four) (if you are a clinical or LRW hire, please list this as your first Area of Specialty)
Type of Position: Tenure Track or Non-Tenure Track (if you are clinical or LRW and also tenure-track, please indicate this)
The information will be aggregated on this spreadsheet (which is reproduced below and which you can view and download by clicking on this link); scroll across to see all of the information we will be aggregating.
Please leave the information in the comments, and, to protect those on the job market, please sign the comment with your real name. (Ideally, the reporting person would be either the hired individual or someone from the hiring committee at the hiring school.) If you would like to email information instead of posting it, please send it to Sarah Lawsky at slawsky *at* law *dot* uci *dot* edu. Remember: you can't edit the spreadsheet yourself. To get your information into the spreadsheet, you must either post in the comments or email me.
We will also gather the names of schools that are doing no entry-level hiring this year (that's the second tab on the spreadsheet), so if you know for sure that your school is not doing entry-level hiring, please post that in the comments or email me.
If you see any errors, or if I have incorporated your information into the spreadsheet but you are not yet ready to make it public, please don't hesitate to email me, and I will take care of the problem as soon as I can.
This report follows in the tradition of Larry Solum's excellent work over many years.
All PrawfsBlawg entry level hiring report tagged posts.
[Originally posted 3/3/14]
An Empirical Analysis of the Infield Fly Rule
The third piece in my "Infield Fly Rule Trilogy," titled An Empirical Analysis of the Infield Fly Rule, is up on SSRN. As the title suggests, I (with the help of seven FIU students, who all seemed to enjoy themselves) conducted an empirical study of the past four MLB seasons to find out the frequency of Infield Fly calls and the effectiveness of the rule in avoiding dramatically inequitable cost-benefit exchanges.
Haters Gonna Hate
One of the most satisfying accomplishments of my career happened just a few weeks ago when I received my first slew of hate emails. They came all at once in response to my New York Times Op-Ed about post office banking and each one brought a smile to my face. (That’s not fully accurate—the three page hand-written letter I got from a prisoner in Georgia who informed me how difficult it is for him to even get stamps from the post office, let alone a loan, made me really sad). But I was cheered up when the Breitbart blog disparaged me and Elizabeth Warren in the same sentence—that just had me downright blushing. I was also flattered by the article that said that I was hiding my past as a high-powered bank lobbyist at Davis Polk—if only! Let me be clear, I’m not talking about nasty personal attacks that some of my friends have dealt with. I was just incredibly impressed by people who read the Op-Ed, disagreed with it, and took the time to write me a long substantive email. Although I did write each one back individually to thank them for their emails (except for the creepy ones), I would like to answer just a few general criticisms to post office banking here:
I have written about Post office banking in an article two years ago and more recently, in an essay on the HLR Forum so if you really want to disagree with me, those other sources will give you more to work with.
Sunday, March 02, 2014
Legrand and Werro on the Doctrine Wars
The following guest post is a contribution to the conversation continued by Rob Howse here earlier.
Professor Pierre Legrand teaches at the Sorbonne and has been visiting at the University of San Diego Law School and at Northwestern University Law School. Professor Franz Werro teaches at the Université de Fribourg and at the Georgetown University Law Center.
When It Would Have Been Better Not To Talk About a Better Model
So, the German Wissenschaftsrat — a government body concerned with the promotion of academic research (broadly understood) — suggests that legal scholarship should become more interdisciplinary and international. And the American Bar Association — a non-government body devoted to the service of the legal profession — opines that legal education should become more practical and experiential. These pro domo pleas featuring their own interesting history and having generated much debate already, we want specifically to address Professor Ralf Michaels’s reaction.
Saturday, March 01, 2014
Should the government be required to recognize and protect life?
I'm writing to you from beautiful Bismarck, North Dakota, where I spent the day speaking with folks about SCR 4009, commonly known as the Personhood Amendment. It will appear on the ballot this November, and if it passes will become part of the North Dakota Constitution. Here's the language, which is similar to failed amendments in Mississippi and Colorado:
"The inalienable right to life of every human being at any stage of development must be recognized and protected."
This is, of course, an anti-abortion measure that, because of the Supremacy Clause, will have no direct legal effect on abortion, but that could prohibit IVF treatments, DNR orders, living wills, the right of pregnant women to refuse certain prenatal prescriptions and make decisions regarding childbirth, and the right of all of us to make many medical decisions. It also suggests that North Dakota would now have a positive duty to "protect" life, as opposed to the more typical negative requirement that it generally not interfere with people's lives.
Having become somewhat of an expert on this amendment, I'm struck by a few things. First, this amendment turns constitutional law on its head, imposing on North Dakota a German-style positive duty to undertake a panoply of measures (state-provided housing and food, anyone?). Second, it was approved by our legislative assembly without regard to these potentially wide-ranging consequences. Third, and maybe most interestingly, it raises a more theoretical question: what role should state or federal governments play in "recognizing" and "protecting" life? Should states have a positive duty to recognize and protect life, or would that turn them into unworkable and bankrupt socialist utopias? What, indeed, is "life" for purposes of protecting it? At this level, the Personhood Amendment ceases to be a political issue and becomes one of fundamentally restructuring social and governmental systems.
Waldron v. Seidman, and the obligations of officials and the rest of us
"Never Mind the Constitution." That's the awesome title of this characteristically sharp and learned essay by Jeremy Waldron, reviewing in the HLR Mike Seidman's new book, On Constitutional Disobedience. Seidman's got a cheeky and funny short reply to Waldron, entitled, appropriately enough, "Why Jeremy Waldron Really Agrees With Me." I wonder if Seidman's Response will continue the apparent trend of the personal title for scholarship, e.g., Why Jack Balkin is Disgusting. If Susan Crawford's Response in the Harv. L. Rev. Forum to the review of her book by Chris Yoo is any indication, I suspect at most we can use these few data points only to identify a trend in favor of the "meta" title and not make broader generalizations just yet.
Moving past the title to something like the merits, I'll confess I'm pretty skeptical toward the general thrust of Seidman's argument (as characterized by Waldron and as evidenced in his NYT oped from last year). He is, as Waldron notes, basically a philosophical anarchist and that's a position I find largely untenable under particular conditions of a reasonable well-working liberal democracy. (Importantly, some of Waldron's work on political obligation was what led me down that path but little of Waldron's work on that subject figures into his review of Seidman.) One last mildly interesting thing to note is that Seidman's embrace of philosophical anarchism and his export of it to constitutional theory basically coincides with the thrust of Abner Greene's recent book, Against Obligation. There are differences between them, some of which are discussed here (review of Seidman by Greene) and here (review of Greene by Seidman). For those interested in these overlapping and important projects, the BU Law Review published a symposium on these two books last year, and you can find the contributions here, which I'm looking forward to exploring further, since, full disclosure, I am writing dreaming up something inspired by these various works on the moral and political obligations of prison or other corrections officials as a distinct class of officials).
Thanks to Dan and the rest of the Prawfs folks for having me as a guest blogger during March. I'm an assistant professor at the University of North Dakota School of Law and am currently doing a semester-long visitorship at New England Law | Boston. I teach criminal procedure, sentencing, constitutional law II, and First Amendment, and write at the intersection of First Amendment and criminal law, specifically "group" or "membership" crime, with an occassional dash of national security. You can find some of my representative work here, here, and, currently making its way through the spring submissions season, here.
Some of the issues that particularly interest me, and that I hope to explore during this guest blogging stint include: the role of the law professor in the "new" law school milieu of practice readiness, etc.; the role of the law professor as public intellectual, as Nicholas Kristof has recently discussed; and the abiding importance of scholarship for teaching and society, and how it can be understood and contextualized. Maybe I'll get to these, and maybe other events will unfold.
Friday, February 28, 2014
As March approaches, I just wanted to take a moment to thank our February guests, some of whom will linger as they get some remaining thoughts off their desk, and also to welcome our band of visitors for March: Erik Gerding from Colorado (with a new book to promote!), Steven Morrison from U North Dakota, Mehrsa Baradaran from Georgia, and David Han from Pepperdine. Thank you all for being part of the conversation and community here!
New York Times v. Sullivan at 50
As the faculty advisor to the Alabama Law Review, I'm delighted to note that the Law Review today is hosting a symposium on the 50th anniversary of New York Times v. Sullivan. The editors did a wonderful job putting together a great list of speakers. We are welcoming Judge U.W. Clemon (ret.), who not incidentally was the first African-American federal district court judge in the state; Judge Robert Sack of the Second Circuit; and Professors Sonja West (Georgia), Mark Tushnet (Harvard), RonNell Andersen Jones (BYU), David Anderson (Texas), and Christopher Schmidt (Chicago-Kent). I'm especially happy that the Law Review, in selecting these speakers, has recognized that the Sullivan decision is more than one thing: it's a speech case, to be sure, and an important press case, and an important case in comparative constitutional law (sometimes accepted, sometimes rejected), but it is also fundamentally a civil rights case, an aspect of the decision that is sometimes omitted. I'm glad in particular that students in and from Alabama, where the case began, have made an effort both to commemmorate this important decision and to spotlight its crucial civil rights aspects. I'm looking forward to a great day and want to praise the students who put this together. If you happen to be down the road enjoying a late breakfast at Rama Jama's or an early lunch at Dreamland, y'all come.
This being a blog, I will also link to a recent piece of mine on institutional actors in New York Times v. Sullivan, which doubtless is flawed but attempts to (1) think about the press, the civil rights movement, and the courts as institutional actors in the case; (2) ask questions about the long-term status of Sullivan as a canonical constitutional case; and (3) offer a puckish point in a footnote about Professor McConnell's excellent recent discussion of Citizens United as a Press Clause case. That point links my interest in law and religion to my interest in freedom of the press, and I believe Prof. West's paper today will take up a similar topic. Given similar concerns about identifying "religion," "churches," and "the press," it may be that church-state scholars can and will have something to add to thinking and writing about the Press Clause.